Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
On Dec 21, 2007, at 7:41 AM, Jan Kok wrote: I personally have voted on bylaws or platform issues at political conventions, where I wanted to cast a weak vote rather than a strong yes or no vote. The reason was that I had only a weak opinion, and would have preferred to let those with strong opinions have their way - but if nearly everyone had only weak opinions, then I might as well register my opinion and participate in the decision. Then there's Yeats's counter-argument. The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Simple two candidate election
Hello, --- Jan Kok [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : To restate the questions my own way: What do we _mean_ by best, fairest, most democratic, etc. Is there some standard (criterion, figure of merit) that we can all agree upon for evaluating and comparing voting methods? It appears that, so far, there is no widely agreed-upon definition for best, fairest, most democratic, etc. that can be used for comparing voting methods. Nor is there some gold standard that we can all agree upon for comparing methods. I had thought there were only a couple commonly held standards, but I see from this thread that there are perhaps four or more: The Majority Criterion: roughly speaking, the majority of voters get their way. I think it creates confusion to use the term majority criterion to refer to the principle that suggests the majority criterion rather than the criterion itself... Social Utility: pick the winner that maximally benefits society, or gives maximal overall voter satisfaction, etc. Equal voting power: all voters have equal influence over the election. Minimize or eliminate the need or temptation for voters to vote strategically. Some people (anarchists) reject the idea of voting entirely! Many thousands of words have been written to try to define those standards or criteria more precisely. I won't add to that verbiage here. I think it's not very productive to haggle over detailed definitions when we don't agree about which of those broad criteria is best. Instead, I'll say a few words to promote my view that Social Utility / Overall Voter Satisfaction / Maximum Net Tangible Utility (I like it :-) is the best standard. I would say that when Range supporters and others argue about the outcome of a two-candidate election, this has little to do with what is the best standard. It's usually a technical discussion about voter incentives. The notion that you can simply add up ratings to estimate social utility isn't a standard at all, it's just one approach to achieving the standard of maximizing social utility. Those who favor majoritarianism don't necessarily have a different best standard. They could disagree with the Range supporter on the two-candidate scenario because they feel the Range approach will degenerate into something worse, according to the Range advocates' own standard, than would be provided by a majoritarian approach. Other standards can as easily be seen as measures to try to maximize social utility. A majoritarian election method invites less strategy. Less strategy means better information. I'm not sure what you mean by equal influence, but even random ballot could be seen to aim to maximize utility or at least distribute it more evenly, over time. Kevin Venzke _ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail http://mail.yahoo.fr Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
Markus, Thank you for your insight. I certainly agree with you that only the best method should be used, but I would pose to you the question: Why is it that the best method isn't used? You and I (though not some others) would agree that the condorcet criterion is the correct one when determining the outcome of single winner elections, and yet they are not used in any public election anywhere in the world. Though the current best methods (Yours, and Ranked Pairs), are relatively new, Condorcet methods have been around for quite a long time. So the newness of the methodology can't be the reason. The difficulty in changing an electoral system once it has been started certainly plays a part, but IRV seems to be making significant inroads in this area whereas Condorcet methods are not. I think the answer lies in looking at the organizations that have adopted the Schulze method. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method 44 organizations, and almost all of them are technically oriented. The answer seems to me to be clear, complexity. Though beat-path is the best methodology, and the one that I would use in any professional organization that I was a part of, it violates a principle of democracy. For an election method to be of the people the people must be able to understand its implementation. They must be able to understand why one leader was picked, and not another, and further, how their ballot played a part in that decision. This begs that question of whether there is a Condorcet method simple enough for everyone to understand, and yet having the greatest number of desirable properties. Perhaps one answer might be in Borda-elimination methods. They are the only ones to have ever been used in public elections, and have very little added complexity when compared to IRV. IRV has had a great deal of success in being adopted, so we know that voters can handle something as complex as IRV. Borda-elimination also stacks up favorably when compared to anything but ranked pairs and Schulze. The only criteria that it doesn't pass are local IIa, monotonicity and independence of clones. non-monotonicity, while weird, doesn't imply that the candidate chosen is in any way inferior to a candidate chosen under a monotonic rule. I would have thought that the main reason why you would want a monotonic rule is so that people would accept it as valid. This does not appear to be an issue as IRV is non-monotonic, and is well liked. There are some possible issues regarding additional sussepability to strategy, but I'm not sure how serious those would be. Also, like all condorcet methods, Borda-elimination is monotonic if there is a Condorcet winner. local IIa and independence of clones are not passes, and this is an inferiority. but at least it passes them when there is a Condorcet winner. I seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where vote-splitting is rampant. So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up for by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty understanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method has been adopted by any government? Ian http://thefell.googlepages.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Markus Schulze Sent: Friday, December 21, 2007 1:47 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections? Dear Ian Fellows, the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate monotonicity and independence of clones. They also violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the result of the elections. When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted somewhere, you will not only be attacked by the FPP supporters and the IRV supporters. You will also be attacked by the supporters of all kinds of election methods. Therefore, it will not be sufficient that you argue that the proposed method is better than FPP and IRV; you will rather have to argue that the proposed method is the best of all methods. Therefore, it is useful to propose a Condorcet method that satisfies a large number of criteria. Furthermore, I don't think that it makes much sense to try to find a Condorcet method that looks as much as possible like IRV or as much as possible like Borda. The best method according to IRV's underlying heuristic will always be IRV; the best method according to the underlying heuristic of the Borda method will always be the Borda method. It makes more sense to propose a Condorcet method that stands on its own legs. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
Ian, I think a big part of the reason that Condorcet methods aren't adopted is that from the perspective of a party in power, it's clear how such methods could undermine their ability to stay in power. IRV has some ability to disregard weak candidates, that's all; if a party in power is sometimes stung by third party candidates then IRV could be appealing here. But IRV will still basically stick to electing one of the FPP contenders. If people want to use a Condorcet method but they don't want to use a method so complicated as RP, Schulze, or Jobst's River method, then I suggest one of these: 1. Elect the Smith set member whose greatest loss is the weakest (according to winning votes) 2. If there is no Condorcet winner, elect the candidate with the most rankings (Condorcet//Approval with implicit approval) 3. Elect the Smith set member with the most rankings I also feel it is ok to fudge Condorcet slightly to gain other criteria. In particular my Improved Condorcet//Approval method technically fails Condorcet but picks up compliance with the favorite betrayal criterion. I point this out partly because while I like method #2, my simulations suggested rather frequent occurrence of favorite betrayal incentive under it... I could not support a Borda-based method because Borda's mechanism strikes me as unreasonable. It doesn't make sense for scoring to be dependent upon the number of candidates representing some policy. Kevin Venzke _ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail http://mail.yahoo.fr Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
Ian, I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality would be a easy alternative: If no beats-all candidate exists, eliminate the plurality loser. Like Nanson and Baldwin, this method meets Smith but violates monotonicity and cloneproofness, but opposite to Borda elimination, it meets summability and dominant mutual third. 2007/12/21, Ian Fellows [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Markus, Thank you for your insight. I certainly agree with you that only the best method should be used, but I would pose to you the question: Why is it that the best method isn't used? You and I (though not some others) would agree that the condorcet criterion is the correct one when determining the outcome of single winner elections, and yet they are not used in any public election anywhere in the world. Though the current best methods (Yours, and Ranked Pairs), are relatively new, Condorcet methods have been around for quite a long time. So the newness of the methodology can't be the reason. The difficulty in changing an electoral system once it has been started certainly plays a part, but IRV seems to be making significant inroads in this area whereas Condorcet methods are not. I think the answer lies in looking at the organizations that have adopted the Schulze method. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method 44 organizations, and almost all of them are technically oriented. The answer seems to me to be clear, complexity. Though beat-path is the best methodology, and the one that I would use in any professional organization that I was a part of, it violates a principle of democracy. For an election method to be of the people the people must be able to understand its implementation. They must be able to understand why one leader was picked, and not another, and further, how their ballot played a part in that decision. This begs that question of whether there is a Condorcet method simple enough for everyone to understand, and yet having the greatest number of desirable properties. Perhaps one answer might be in Borda-elimination methods. They are the only ones to have ever been used in public elections, and have very little added complexity when compared to IRV. IRV has had a great deal of success in being adopted, so we know that voters can handle something as complex as IRV. Borda-elimination also stacks up favorably when compared to anything but ranked pairs and Schulze. The only criteria that it doesn't pass are local IIa, monotonicity and independence of clones. non-monotonicity, while weird, doesn't imply that the candidate chosen is in any way inferior to a candidate chosen under a monotonic rule. I would have thought that the main reason why you would want a monotonic rule is so that people would accept it as valid. This does not appear to be an issue as IRV is non-monotonic, and is well liked. There are some possible issues regarding additional sussepability to strategy, but I'm not sure how serious those would be. Also, like all condorcet methods, Borda-elimination is monotonic if there is a Condorcet winner. local IIa and independence of clones are not passes, and this is an inferiority. but at least it passes them when there is a Condorcet winner. I seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where vote-splitting is rampant. So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up for by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty understanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method has been adopted by any government? Ian http://thefell.googlepages.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Markus Schulze Sent: Friday, December 21, 2007 1:47 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections? Dear Ian Fellows, the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate monotonicity and independence of clones. They also violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the result of the elections. When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted somewhere, you will not only be attacked by the FPP supporters and the IRV supporters. You will also be attacked by the supporters of all kinds of election methods. Therefore, it will not be sufficient that you argue that the proposed method is better than FPP and IRV; you will rather have to argue that the proposed method is the best of all methods. Therefore, it is useful to propose a Condorcet method that satisfies a large number of criteria. Furthermore, I don't think that it makes much sense to try to find a Condorcet method that looks as much as possible like IRV or as much as possible like Borda. The
Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
A correction: 2007/12/22, Diego Santos [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Ian, I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality would be a easy alternative: If no beats-all candidate exists, eliminate the plurality loser. Like Nanson and Baldwin, this method meets Smith but violates monotonicity and cloneproofness, but opposite to Borda elimination, it meets summability and dominant mutual third. Where I said dominant mutual third I really would wanted to say third burial resistance. This criterion is not met by Schulze neither MAM. 2007/12/21, Ian Fellows [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Markus, Thank you for your insight. I certainly agree with you that only the best method should be used, but I would pose to you the question: Why is it that the best method isn't used? You and I (though not some others) would agree that the condorcet criterion is the correct one when determining the outcome of single winner elections, and yet they are not used in any public election anywhere in the world. Though the current best methods (Yours, and Ranked Pairs), are relatively new, Condorcet methods have been around for quite a long time. So the newness of the methodology can't be the reason. The difficulty in changing an electoral system once it has been started certainly plays a part, but IRV seems to be making significant inroads in this area whereas Condorcet methods are not. I think the answer lies in looking at the organizations that have adopted the Schulze method. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method 44 organizations, and almost all of them are technically oriented. The answer seems to me to be clear, complexity. Though beat-path is the best methodology, and the one that I would use in any professional organization that I was a part of, it violates a principle of democracy. For an election method to be of the people the people must be able to understand its implementation. They must be able to understand why one leader was picked, and not another, and further, how their ballot played a part in that decision. This begs that question of whether there is a Condorcet method simple enough for everyone to understand, and yet having the greatest number of desirable properties. Perhaps one answer might be in Borda-elimination methods. They are the only ones to have ever been used in public elections, and have very little added complexity when compared to IRV. IRV has had a great deal of success in being adopted, so we know that voters can handle something as complex as IRV. Borda-elimination also stacks up favorably when compared to anything but ranked pairs and Schulze. The only criteria that it doesn't pass are local IIa, monotonicity and independence of clones. non-monotonicity, while weird, doesn't imply that the candidate chosen is in any way inferior to a candidate chosen under a monotonic rule. I would have thought that the main reason why you would want a monotonic rule is so that people would accept it as valid. This does not appear to be an issue as IRV is non-monotonic, and is well liked. There are some possible issues regarding additional sussepability to strategy, but I'm not sure how serious those would be. Also, like all condorcet methods, Borda-elimination is monotonic if there is a Condorcet winner. local IIa and independence of clones are not passes, and this is an inferiority. but at least it passes them when there is a Condorcet winner. I seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where vote-splitting is rampant. So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up for by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty understanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method has been adopted by any government? Ian http://thefell.googlepages.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ]On Behalf Of Markus Schulze Sent: Friday, December 21, 2007 1:47 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections? Dear Ian Fellows, the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate monotonicity and independence of clones. They also violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the result of the elections. When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted somewhere, you will not only be attacked by the FPP supporters and the IRV supporters. You will also be attacked by the supporters of all kinds of election methods. Therefore, it will not be sufficient that you argue that the proposed method is better than FPP and IRV; you will
