[Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two candidate election

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 09:47 AM 12/25/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > > [...] Range, voted with full strategic
> > > effect, reduces to Approval Voting, which may reduce to bullet
> > > voting. It *still* is not Plurality, because it only takes a few
> > > percent of voters adding multiple votes to eliminate the spoiler
> effect.
> >
> >So you say that if Range is not quite as bad as Plurality, then that's
> "as
> >well as hoped" for Range? I think most Range advocates have higher
> hopes.
> 
> No. But I can understand why Mr. Venzke would think that's my 
> position.

Well, you appeared to disagree with my "summary in 25 words or less." I'm
only trying to figure out why you disagreed with it.

> When a writer writes something that, without careful 
> reading, can be interpreted to confirm some stereotype, it's very 
> easy to overlook contradictory details. Further, an extension of the 
> Wikipedia principle of Assume Good Faith, which is to assume that a 
> writer is actually saying something of interest, would require not 
> being satisfied with a shallow and meaningless interpretation.

If you can understand why I don't understand what you were saying, why are
you bringing up "Assume Good Faith"?

> Read what I wrote. I described what happens under certain conditions, 
> the *worst* case. And then I noted that a few voters voting other 
> than Plurality style are enough to solve the number one problem with 
> Plurality. That's not shabby, particularly for Approval, which 
> accomplishes this at no cost, merely starting to do what should have 
> been a no-brainer from the beginning. It's the elephant in the living 
> room, we never noticed, thought he was part of the furniture.

Alright then, so "as good as hoped" is Approval? It seems to me "as good as
hoped" involves many voters not exaggerating their preferences. You don't
agree with that? Do you say that Range advocates generally set their sights
lower for Range?

> I did a study of strategic voting in Range 3, using some simple 
> assumptions: three candidates, many voters, utilities for the voter 
> of 1.0, 0.5, 0, and zero knowledge. Turns out that the sincere vote 
> utility is equal to the "strategic vote" utility in that case, which 
> is the same whether the voter votes (1,0,0), or (1,1,0). The claim 
> that bullet voting is higher utility is not correct, it depends. 
> *Accurate* sincere voting is on a par, at least, with "strategic 
> voting," but there were different implications. The exaggerated vote 
> resulted, as one might predict, in more wins for the favorite. But it 
> also resulted in more wins for the least-favored. The sincere vote 
> was less variable in result.

This is (virtually?) always true when a candidate's value equals the
expectation from the election.

> There was another interesting result from that study: if we take the 
> Range election, with equal expected outcome for both the sincere vote 
> and the strategic vote, and make it an Approval election, i.e., 
> restrict the set of legal votes to the Approval style votes, the 
> expected outcome *declines.* The existence of even one voter who 
> votes intermediate causes the entire vote distribution to dither, 
> increasing accuracy, at least that's my theory of why this occurred.
> 
> (More study is needed to confirm this; Warren Smith did co-author a 
> page on it at rangevoting.org, so I think the math is sound; but the 
> implications of converting to pure Approval have not been confirmed.)
> 
> However, first things first. While Range may be theoretically 
> superior, Approval does improve results quite a bit in the 
> simulations, and it is blatantly obvious why. Approval is free, just 
> Count All the Votes. In the ranked form, Bucklin, it was used fairly 
> widely in the U.S. at one time, though before the living memory of 
> nearly everyone.
> 
> Consider this an election, and electability is important. The 
> candidates are Plurality, IRV, Approval, Range, Condorcet. How would 
> we vote in this election, held right now, assuming some level of 
> public education in the campaign? How should the election be held? 
> What method should be used?

So, I have no information about other voters' preferences? I would prefer
Condorcet. Although my best Range vote involves a strict ranking, that
doesn't mean other voters find themselves in the same situation. I could
certainly hope for a better (or worse) outcome under a different method.

> >Your claim that strategic Range voters are actually sincere is not
> >different from choosing to believe that the Plurality winner is always
> the
> >favorite candidate of the most voters.
> 
> I'm disappointed. Mr. Venzke, I've seen much better analysis from 
> you. Look again.
> 
> In Range, there is no strategic advantage, ever, to reverse expressed 
> preference from real preference. 

I don't think it matters. Why can't I argue that the Nader supporter (who
should understand how "sincere

[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to Lawsuit Against IRV

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- Kathy Dopp <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Thanks for your comments Abd ul-Rahman Lomax (what name should I call
> you?)
> 
>  I do find that ballots (2nd choices) of some, but not all
> voters is considered with IRV, and hence my opinion is that it does
> not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
> under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
> equally.
> 
> I find there to be many scenarios where IRV voting makes a candidate a
> winner who is not supported by the most number of voters and I do not
> support it and in fact I oppose IRV.
> 
> There must be better methods.

I do not like IRV either, and I do think there are better methods, but I
could not agree that it does not treat all ballots equally.

The fact that IRV sometimes regards second preferences and sometimes
doesn't is due to the logic of the algorithm and is not random or
prejudicial. One of the advantages of IRV is that IRV only looks at the
lower preferences when it can only be of use to that voter, so that there
is no incentive to provide a limited ranking.

Virtually all "superior" election methods contain "if this then do that"
logic. I guess Approval would be the main exception. Maybe Bucklin.

But I don't think any pairwise-oriented method would stand a chance of
meeting your criteria if IRV doesn't.

Kevin Venzke


  
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[Election-Methods] a story for christmas

[rob brown]

I decided to write a little story to share with the voting geeks on
Christmas.  Enjoy and Merry Christmas!

-rob

A large housing complex was under construction, and a locksmith was hired to
install the locks on all the apartments.  He suggested that they key all the
locks to use the same key.  There are many advantages, the most obvious
being cost, he suggests.  The landlord doesn't need to keep hundreds of
keys, and if anyone loses their key, they can just borrow a key from a
neighbor to get into their apartment.

The owner of the complex doesn't understand.  "But any resident can simply
walk into any other apartment and take what they want! That seems like a
supremely bad idea."

"Not to worry," says Warren, the locksmith.  "Look, it should be obvious
that what we are after here is maximum net utility, right?  That is, the
most happiness for all"

"Umm, well sure" says the owner.  "Happiness is a good thing.  I'm
having trouble seeing where you are going with this, though"

"I can prove that everyone having the same key results in greater net
utility.  More happiness all around.  I've done polls as to whether people
will take items from each other, and based on those results, I've simulated
the situation on my computer.  The net utilities are always greater if
everyone's lock has the same key."

He goes on to show how, if everyone was to honestly rate the utilities
afforded by each thing they own or might want to own, that taking others'
property, on average, causes an net increase in utility.  Typically those
taking other people's things are less wealthy than those they are taking
them from, so they usually will value the item they take more than the
original owner did...meaning an increase in net utility!

Furthermore, he has polled people, and the great majority of them have said
they wouldn't take stuff from their neighbors even if they could.  But even
if everyone *were* to take others' things, that situation is *still* better
than having locks, from a net utilities perspective -- since those taking
stuff probably want the item more.  If it turns out the original owner wants
the item more, well, he can take such an item from another neighbor.

The owner thinks about it.  "Well, that may increase happiness, but it
doesn't seem fair to those who don't take property".

"Nope," says the locksmith.  "The system is perfectly fair.  Everyone has
equal opportunity to take other people's property, so no one is at a
disadvantage.  Anywayfairness schmairness. If people are happy who cares
about fairness?"

Finally Warren shows, as support for this working, that honeybees have been
shown to freely share property with colony-mates this way for one hundred
million years, and they are no worse off for it.  If it didn't work for
them, natural selection would have eliminated it long ago.

He shows the polling data.  He shows the math.  He shows the computer
simulations.  He talks about bees. It all makes sense.  And the owner just
can't find a good argument otherwise.

They do it, and it works great.  Well, for a while.

At first, only a few people take other people's stuff, and when they do, it
is just little stuff, like grabbing a beer out of their neighbor's fridge.
One resident gets fired from his job because he calls in sick too much, and
he realizes he can just take a low paying part time job, since he can just
tap into his neighbors groceries and such.  Eventually those that previously
didn't want to take their neighbor's stuff start to resent that they are
doing more than their share of purchasing, and they decide to start taking
things from their neighbors.

After a few years, some people have lost their desire to work hard and work
overtime and get raises, since they can live with an equal lifestyle to
those who earn more than them.  This means the total amount of property
within the housing complex is less, so the utility has gone down -- way down
-- even though Warren the locksmith's calculations had shown otherwise.

The owner calls the locksmith in.  "Look, your system didn't work.  It might
have worked in the short term, but you didn't take into account the long
term.  The people you said wouldn't steal from each othereven if they
wouldn't have back when you asked themseem to have no problem whatsoever
with taking each others' stuff now.  Actually they have no choice, since
most of them don't bother going to work anymore.  This place is miserable.
The residents are demanding a solution."

Warren the locksmith thinks about it a bit.  "Well, sorry that didn't work
out,  I have no clue why it didn'tthe math was all in place.  Well,
here, I have an idea.  We could find out what the residents want to do.
Let's put it to a vote!"

The owner says "now there's a good idea, I think I'll do that!"

"And by the way, I have a perfect system of voting for you," says the
locksmith.  "It's guaranteed to maximize the residents' happiness with the
result."

The owner thinks for a moment.  "Umm

Re: [Election-Methods] IRV ballot is at least as fair as FPTP ballot

[Stéphane Rouillon]

Yes some voters have second-choice considered but they are all still 
treated equally.
I agree when you say IRV voters whose first-choice loses in the first 
round have their second choices considered.


I do not understand why you conclude that then obviously IRV does
not consider the ballots choices of all voters equally. Who is 
advantaged during next round according to you?


The people whose have their second choices considered or the people who 
still have a first choice still running?


S. Rouillon

Kathy Dopp a écrit :

On Dec 25, 2007 2:35 PM, Stéphane Rouillon
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  

 Miss Dopp,

 I definitively cannot accept this analysis.
 What you just wrote SEEMS OBVIOUSLY TRUE WITH IRV to me.

 in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, every voter has
their first place choice tabulated and no one has any second-choice
considered and all voters' ballots are treated equally.




So you are now claiming that No Voter has any second-choices
considered in IRV voting?

Well I must have totally misunderstood IRV then.  Pray tell me why are
voters supposed to provide their second choices if "no one has any
second-choice considered" then?

I am mystified.

My understanding was that with IRV voters whose first-choice loses in
the first round have their second choices considered.

If that were true (you claim now it is not) then obviously IRV does
not consider the ballots choices of all voters equally and countably
infinite situations result when candidates whom a majority of voters
do NOT support can win the election.

Kathy

  

This is obviously not true with IRV.

Kathy
 In IRV, every voter has a current preference tabulated and all voters'
ballots are treated equally.
 The fact that it is a first, second or fifth preference is definitively
unrelevant when having to consider
 the voting method fair or not. The treatment is the same for every voter,
and you cannot say in advance
 which voter will be unfairly treated, or less than with FPTP.
 And this previous statement is simply unbelievable!!!

my opinion is that it does
not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
equally.

(...)

Kathy

 Obviously to me, IRV ballots are at least as fair than FPTP ballots,
 and definitively more precise.

 Stéphane Rouillon, ing., M.Sc.A., Ph.D.

 Kathy Dopp a écrit :
 -
Allen,

Your statement is flatly false.

in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, every voter has
their first place choice tabulated and no one has any second-choice
considered and all voters' ballots are treated equally.

This is obviously not true with IRV.

Kathy


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Re: [Election-Methods] IRV ballot is at least as fair as FPTP ballot

[Kathy Dopp]

On Dec 25, 2007 2:35 PM, Stéphane Rouillon
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Miss Dopp,
>
>  I definitively cannot accept this analysis.
>  What you just wrote SEEMS OBVIOUSLY TRUE WITH IRV to me.
>
>  in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, every voter has
> their first place choice tabulated and no one has any second-choice
> considered and all voters' ballots are treated equally.


So you are now claiming that No Voter has any second-choices
considered in IRV voting?

Well I must have totally misunderstood IRV then.  Pray tell me why are
voters supposed to provide their second choices if "no one has any
second-choice considered" then?

I am mystified.

My understanding was that with IRV voters whose first-choice loses in
the first round have their second choices considered.

If that were true (you claim now it is not) then obviously IRV does
not consider the ballots choices of all voters equally and countably
infinite situations result when candidates whom a majority of voters
do NOT support can win the election.

Kathy

>
> This is obviously not true with IRV.
>
> Kathy
>  In IRV, every voter has a current preference tabulated and all voters'
> ballots are treated equally.
>  The fact that it is a first, second or fifth preference is definitively
> unrelevant when having to consider
>  the voting method fair or not. The treatment is the same for every voter,
> and you cannot say in advance
>  which voter will be unfairly treated, or less than with FPTP.
>  And this previous statement is simply unbelievable!!!
>
> my opinion is that it does
> not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
> under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
> equally.
>
> (...)
>
> Kathy
>
>  Obviously to me, IRV ballots are at least as fair than FPTP ballots,
>  and definitively more precise.
>
>  Stéphane Rouillon, ing., M.Sc.A., Ph.D.
>
>  Kathy Dopp a écrit :
>  -
> Allen,
>
> Your statement is flatly false.
>
> in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, every voter has
> their first place choice tabulated and no one has any second-choice
> considered and all voters' ballots are treated equally.
>
> This is obviously not true with IRV.
>
> Kathy
>
>
> Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 12:51:10 -0500
> From: Allen Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to
>  Lawsuit Against IRV
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Umm... in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, anyone voting
> for a candidate who doesn't win has their votes not considered,
> essentially. While IRV has its definite problems, I'd not say this is one of
> them (indeed, given that it counts the choices (for the two top candidates)
> of voters who vote for a third/whatever candidate when FPTP doesn't, this is
> an argument for _FPTP_ being illegal under such a law...). However, it's
> perfectly possible that courts may disagree; as can be seen with such things
> as rulings that Congress is competent to determine medical necessary (as
> with marijuana), courts frequently make mistakes when dealing with matters
> outside of their rather limited area of expertise (said area being the law,
> as opposed to reality...).
>
>  -Allen
>
> On Dec 25, 2007 11:15 AM,
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>  Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>  election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>  http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>  1. Re: Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to Lawsuit Against IRV
>  (Kathy Dopp)
>  2. Re: Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to Lawsuit Against IRV
>  (Allen Smith)
>  3. Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two candidate election
>  (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)
>
>
> --
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 10:11:47 -0700
> From: "Kathy Dopp" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to
>  Lawsuit Against IRV
> To: "Abd ul-Rahman Lomax" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Message-ID:
>  <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=WINDOWS-1252
>
> -
> Thanks for your comments Abd ul-Rahman Lomax (what name should I call you?)
>
>  I do find that ballots (2nd choices) of some, but not all
> voters is considered with IRV, and hence my opinion is that it does
> not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
> under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
> equally.
>
>
> I find there to be many scenarios where IRV voting makes a candidate a
> winner who is not supported by the 

[Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to

[Kathy Dopp]

-
Allen,

Your statement is flatly false.

in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, every voter has
their first place choice tabulated and no one has any second-choice
considered and all voters' ballots are treated equally.

This is obviously not true with IRV.

Kathy


Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 12:51:10 -0500
From: Allen Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to
   Lawsuit Against IRV
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Umm... in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, anyone voting
for a candidate who doesn't win has their votes not considered,
essentially. While IRV has its definite problems, I'd not say this is one of
them (indeed, given that it counts the choices (for the two top candidates)
of voters who vote for a third/whatever candidate when FPTP doesn't, this is
an argument for _FPTP_ being illegal under such a law...). However, it's
perfectly possible that courts may disagree; as can be seen with such things
as rulings that Congress is competent to determine medical necessary (as
with marijuana), courts frequently make mistakes when dealing with matters
outside of their rather limited area of expertise (said area being the law,
as opposed to reality...).

   -Allen

On Dec 25, 2007 11:15 AM,
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
> election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> 
> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>1. Re: Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to LawsuitAgainst IRV
>   (Kathy Dopp)
>2. Re: Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds toLawsuit Against IRV
>   (Allen Smith)
>3. Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two candidate election
>   (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)
>
>
> --
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 10:11:47 -0700
> From: "Kathy Dopp" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to
> Lawsuit Against IRV
> To: "Abd ul-Rahman Lomax" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Message-ID:
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=WINDOWS-1252
>
> -
> Thanks for your comments Abd ul-Rahman Lomax (what name should I call you?)
>
>  I do find that ballots (2nd choices) of some, but not all
> voters is considered with IRV, and hence my opinion is that it does
> not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
> under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
> equally.
>
>
> I find there to be many scenarios where IRV voting makes a candidate a
> winner who is not supported by the most number of voters and I do not
> support it and in fact I oppose IRV.
>
> There must be better methods.
>
> Kathy
>
> On Dec 24, 2007 11:25 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > At 12:12 AM 12/23/2007, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> > >-
> > >What do you think of this lawsuit?
> > >Kathy
> >
> > I've done a fair amount of study on Brown v.
> > Smallwood, and it's worth reading. Google it;
> > there is a copy of the decision on rangevoting.org.
> >
> > >FairVote Minnesota Responds to Lawsuit Against Instant Runoff Voting
> > >
> > >Minneapolis, MN (December 20, 2007)?FairVote Minnesota, a nonprofit,
> > >nonpartisan organization leading the effort to institute instant runoff
> > >voting in Minnesota, is issuing a response to news of a lawsuit brought
> > >against the City of Minneapolis and various elected officials by an Eden
> > >Prairie-based organization that is opposed to the pending use of instant
> > >runoff voting (a.k.a. single transferable vote or ranked choice voting) in
> > >the City of Minneapolis.
> >
> > The lawsuit was inevitable. It might be premature, however.
> >
> > >The lawsuit alleges that instant runoff voting (IRV) is unconstitutional
> > >and violates the principle of ???one person, one vote.??  Additionally, the
> > >plaintiffs contend that voters won???t understand how to vote using instant
> > >runoff voting.
> >
> > They probably also allege that it will cause
> > dandruff. That's all fluff. There is a real legal
> > question in Minnesota, and all the hand-waving by
> > FairVote is not going to make it go away.
> >
> > FairVote wrote a legal opinion before, similar to
> > what's in this release. It may have been what was
> > used to convince Minneapolis authorities to go
> > ahead in spite of legal opinions given to the contrary.
> >
> > >FairVote Minnesota presents the following facts as guidance in the
> > >discussion of this lawsuit.
> >
> > Ah

Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two candidate election

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 09:47 AM 12/25/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> > [...] Range, voted with full strategic
> > effect, reduces to Approval Voting, which may reduce to bullet
> > voting. It *still* is not Plurality, because it only takes a few
> > percent of voters adding multiple votes to eliminate the spoiler effect.
>
>So you say that if Range is not quite as bad as Plurality, then that's "as
>well as hoped" for Range? I think most Range advocates have higher hopes.

No. But I can understand why Mr. Venzke would think that's my 
position. When a writer writes something that, without careful 
reading, can be interpreted to confirm some stereotype, it's very 
easy to overlook contradictory details. Further, an extension of the 
Wikipedia principle of Assume Good Faith, which is to assume that a 
writer is actually saying something of interest, would require not 
being satisfied with a shallow and meaningless interpretation.

Read what I wrote. I described what happens under certain conditions, 
the *worst* case. And then I noted that a few voters voting other 
than Plurality style are enough to solve the number one problem with 
Plurality. That's not shabby, particularly for Approval, which 
accomplishes this at no cost, merely starting to do what should have 
been a no-brainer from the beginning. It's the elephant in the living 
room, we never noticed, thought he was part of the furniture.

I did a study of strategic voting in Range 3, using some simple 
assumptions: three candidates, many voters, utilities for the voter 
of 1.0, 0.5, 0, and zero knowledge. Turns out that the sincere vote 
utility is equal to the "strategic vote" utility in that case, which 
is the same whether the voter votes (1,0,0), or (1,1,0). The claim 
that bullet voting is higher utility is not correct, it depends. 
*Accurate* sincere voting is on a par, at least, with "strategic 
voting," but there were different implications. The exaggerated vote 
resulted, as one might predict, in more wins for the favorite. But it 
also resulted in more wins for the least-favored. The sincere vote 
was less variable in result.

There was another interesting result from that study: if we take the 
Range election, with equal expected outcome for both the sincere vote 
and the strategic vote, and make it an Approval election, i.e., 
restrict the set of legal votes to the Approval style votes, the 
expected outcome *declines.* The existence of even one voter who 
votes intermediate causes the entire vote distribution to dither, 
increasing accuracy, at least that's my theory of why this occurred.

(More study is needed to confirm this; Warren Smith did co-author a 
page on it at rangevoting.org, so I think the math is sound; but the 
implications of converting to pure Approval have not been confirmed.)

However, first things first. While Range may be theoretically 
superior, Approval does improve results quite a bit in the 
simulations, and it is blatantly obvious why. Approval is free, just 
Count All the Votes. In the ranked form, Bucklin, it was used fairly 
widely in the U.S. at one time, though before the living memory of 
nearly everyone.

Consider this an election, and electability is important. The 
candidates are Plurality, IRV, Approval, Range, Condorcet. How would 
we vote in this election, held right now, assuming some level of 
public education in the campaign? How should the election be held? 
What method should be used?

The Range Voting people are *all*, to my knowledge, supporting 
Approval at this time. While CRV is doing a level of educational 
effort regarding Range, it's Approval which is seeing real advocacy. 
It has a solid history of academic study. It's significant enough 
that FairVote is putting some considerable effort into finding ways 
to attack it. Simple, cheap, easy to understand, strategy very 
simple, no surprises, solves the spoiler problem, but has no center 
squeeze effect. Center squeeze is not important in a two-party 
system, but what if election reform lives up to the sometimes-implied 
promise that it helps third parties gain a toehold?

>Your claim that strategic Range voters are actually sincere is not
>different from choosing to believe that the Plurality winner is always the
>favorite candidate of the most voters.

I'm disappointed. Mr. Venzke, I've seen much better analysis from 
you. Look again.

In Range, there is no strategic advantage, ever, to reverse expressed 
preference from real preference. The so-called "insincere" vote in 
Range is simply a non-linear squeeze of the internal utilities, or 
another way to put it, the internal absolute utilities are 
normalized, first -- nearly everyone will do that, since an election 
is a choice, and choices are almost automatically normalized -- then 
the scale is expanded depending on two factors: expectations of how 
the electorate as a whole is likely to vote, and the effort the voter 
is willing to put into determining how to vote. Approval-style voting 
is relatively ea

Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to Lawsuit Against IRV

[Allen Smith]

In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (on
25 December 2007 10:11:47 -0700), [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kathy Dopp) wrote:
> I do find that ballots (2nd choices) of some, but not all
>voters is considered with IRV, and hence my opinion is that it does
>not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
>under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
>equally.

Umm... in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, anyone voting
for a candidate who doesn't win has their votes not considered,
essentially. While IRV has its definite problems, I'd not say this is one of
them (indeed, given that it counts the choices (for the two top candidates)
of voters who vote for a third/whatever candidate when FPTP doesn't, this is
an argument for _FPTP_ being illegal under such a law...). However, it's
perfectly possible that courts may disagree; as can be seen with such things
as rulings that Congress is competent to determine medical necessary (as
with marijuana), courts frequently make mistakes when dealing with matters
outside of their rather limited area of expertise (said area being the law,
as opposed to reality...).

-Allen

-- 
Allen Smith  http://cesario.rutgers.edu/easmith/
There is only one sound argument for democracy, and that is the argument
that it is a crime for any man to hold himself out as better than other men,
and, above all, a most heinous offense for him to prove it. - H. L. Mencken

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Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to Lawsuit Against IRV

[Kathy Dopp]

-
Thanks for your comments Abd ul-Rahman Lomax (what name should I call you?)

 I do find that ballots (2nd choices) of some, but not all
voters is considered with IRV, and hence my opinion is that it does
not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
equally.


I find there to be many scenarios where IRV voting makes a candidate a
winner who is not supported by the most number of voters and I do not
support it and in fact I oppose IRV.

There must be better methods.

Kathy

On Dec 24, 2007 11:25 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> At 12:12 AM 12/23/2007, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> >-
> >What do you think of this lawsuit?
> >Kathy
>
> I've done a fair amount of study on Brown v.
> Smallwood, and it's worth reading. Google it;
> there is a copy of the decision on rangevoting.org.
>
> >FairVote Minnesota Responds to Lawsuit Against Instant Runoff Voting
> >
> >Minneapolis, MN (December 20, 2007)—FairVote Minnesota, a nonprofit,
> >nonpartisan organization leading the effort to institute instant runoff
> >voting in Minnesota, is issuing a response to news of a lawsuit brought
> >against the City of Minneapolis and various elected officials by an Eden
> >Prairie-based organization that is opposed to the pending use of instant
> >runoff voting (a.k.a. single transferable vote or ranked choice voting) in
> >the City of Minneapolis.
>
> The lawsuit was inevitable. It might be premature, however.
>
> >The lawsuit alleges that instant runoff voting (IRV) is unconstitutional
> >and violates the principle of “one person, one vote.† Additionally, the
> >plaintiffs contend that voters won’t understand how to vote using instant
> >runoff voting.
>
> They probably also allege that it will cause
> dandruff. That's all fluff. There is a real legal
> question in Minnesota, and all the hand-waving by
> FairVote is not going to make it go away.
>
> FairVote wrote a legal opinion before, similar to
> what's in this release. It may have been what was
> used to convince Minneapolis authorities to go
> ahead in spite of legal opinions given to the contrary.
>
> >FairVote Minnesota presents the following facts as guidance in the
> >discussion of this lawsuit.
>
> Ah, I must say that I'm tempted to use the term
> "lies," when opinions, perhaps even weak
> opinions, are presented as fact. Some of what is
> said will be arguments, and some facts will be stated as well.
>
> >1. IRV has been upheld on the principle of "one person, one vote" in legal
> >challenges following its adoption in Cambridge, Mass. (Moore v. Election
> >Commissioners of Cambridge (1941) and in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Stephenson v.
> >Ann Arbor Board of Canvassers (1975).
>
> Yes. Different states. Further, the court in
> Brown v. Smallwood was aware that it was
> contradicting precedent in other states.
>
> >Sources:
> >http://www.rwinters.com/docs/moore.htm;
> >http://www.fairvote.org/library/statutes/legal/irv.htm
>
> Lesson One: don't rely on legal advice from people with a conflict of 
> interest.
>
> >2. No legal challenges are threatening instant runoff voting anywhere it's
> >in use—San Francisco, Calif.; Cambridge, Mass.; Burlington, Vermont; Takoma
> >Park, Maryland and Cary and Hendersonville, North Carolina.
>
> I'll be a little surprised if a challenge doesn't
> arise in San Francisco, though a lot depends on
> details. IRV is sold as a replacement for top-two
> runoffs, and top-two runoffs are only employed
> where it is considered desirable to have a
> majority result. In San Francisco, there are
> elections being won with, I think, less than 40%
> of the vote. As any parliamentarian would know,
> you can't create a majority by discarding ballots
> with legal votes on them, merely because they did
> not vote for the top two. This *might* be the
> basis of a challenge to IRV, though, more likely,
> the IRV implementation superceded the majority
> requirement, which may not have been absolute.
>
> When IRV has been proposed for the election of
> governor in Vermont, it has been quite clear that
> exhausted ballots still counted, and that the
> election would still go to the legislature if the
> winner did not get a majority, as required by the
> Vermont constitution: the legislature is to
> choose from among the top three candidates.
>
> Now, this makes a lie out of the ballot
> instruction that has been proposed in that
> Vermont legislation: that adding a lower ranked
> preference cannot hurt your first preference. It
> can. Odd, don't you think, that such a thing would escape notice?
>
> >3. Election exit polls in cities using IRV all show voters in overwhelming
> >numbers not only understand IRV, but prefer it to the old way of voting.
> >The share of voters indicating they understood IRV well or very well the
> >first time using IRV: San Francisco ­ 87%, Burlington ­ 89%; Takoma Park ­
> >88%; 8%; Cary ­ 

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Juho!

You wrote:

> I could imagine a voting system that might address this issue for larger 
> groups, but it isn't Range. 
> 
> One could have elections that take into account e.g. proportionality in time 
> (that could be called one kind of reciprocity) (favour a republican after a 
> democrat, favour other pizzas after pepperoni).

Try D2MAC! It does precisely that in the long run :-)

Yours, Jobst
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[Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two candidate election

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 11:18 PM 12/23/2007, rob brown wrote:
> >On Dec 23, 2007 7:28 PM, Kevin Venzke 
> ><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >For Range to work as well as hoped, it is important that voters do *not*
> >realize how to vote effectively. Or, that they choose not to.
> >
> >
> >You've summed up, in 25 words or less, everything that is wrong about
> Range.
> >
> >Very nice job. :)
> 
> Would have been, if it were correct. Range, voted with full strategic 
> effect, reduces to Approval Voting, which may reduce to bullet 
> voting. It *still* is not Plurality, because it only takes a few 
> percent of voters adding multiple votes to eliminate the spoiler effect.

So you say that if Range is not quite as bad as Plurality, then that's "as
well as hoped" for Range? I think most Range advocates have higher hopes.

Your claim that strategic Range voters are actually sincere is not
different from choosing to believe that the Plurality winner is always the
favorite candidate of the most voters. Essentially Range comes with a
suggestion on how to rate candidates, that isn't motivated by the method's
incentives. And then no matter how people vote, you choose to interpret
that they followed the suggestion.

Kevin Venzke


  
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