Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Kathy Dopp wrote: It seems to me that most of the persons on this list would rather have votes fraudulently counted using some alternative voting scheme that requires an unverifiable unauditable electronic voting system, than accurately counted using the plurality election method. Some have that attitude. I'm not one of them. I think that plurality is a lousy voting method *and* that our current voting system is wide-open to fraud. In my view both can and should be addressed. For the most part the means of addressing them are orthogonal. That said, voting methods that are not countable in precincts (eg. IRV) pose a very large challenge to providing for election integrity. This, in addition to other significant faults of IRV, causes me to oppose IRV.. I notice that some supporters of Condorcet voting (Dave Ketchum in particular) directly argue that improving the plurality system should be done even if it sacrifices election integrity. So I will ask a pair of constructive questions: 1. Can Condorcet voting be compatible with precinct level optical scan systems? (which many election integrity advocates consider to be pretty good) 2. Can Condorcet voting be compatible with end-to-end verifiable election integrity systems such as punchscan, 3-ballot, etc...? I suspect that the answers to both questions is 'yes' which would make Ketchum's dangerous arguments that software can be blindly trusted irrelevant. -Greg Wolfe -- I now run an election reform website. Read my rantings here: http://AllAboutVoting.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
On Oct 6, 2008, at 5:42 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote: Jonathan Lundell wrote: BTW, it seems to me that there's a relatively straightforward solution in principle to the problem of computerized vote counting, based on the use of separate data-entry and counting processes. Let voters vote on paper, either by hand or with an electronic marking machine, enter the ballot data, perhaps by scanning, in such a way that the resulting ballot data can be verified by hand against the paper ballots, and permit counting by multiple independent counting programs. That is exactly what Burlington (VT) and San Francisco (CA) do. Optical scan ballots are used, and the voter rankings are tallied by an official open-source program, but can also be tallied (and has been tallied) by other programs, because all of the ballot images are posted on the Internet. A key element, however is a hand-audit of a random sample of machines to assure (to a reasonable degree of confidence) that the computer record for the ballots matches the paper record. This redundant record is what makes these ranked-ballot elections significantly MORE secure than traditional hand-count elections (were some ballots stolen, added, re-marked to spoil, etc.?) and more secure than all electronic elections (was there a bribed programmer who inserted a virus?) California has a pretty good statewide requirement for a random (by precinct IIRC) recount. However, I'm mildly skeptical on the above, both that SF uses open- source counting software and that the ballots are available online. Can you provide URLs for both? I'd love to do some counting myself. Putting hand-marked ballot images online raises vote-buying issues. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
On Oct 6, 2008, at 11:19 AM, Raph Frank wrote: Condorcet is precinct countable. You just need an N*N grid of numbers from each precinct. OTOH, that degree of compression is hardly necessary. IRV/STV ballots could be captured at the precinct level, cryptographically signed, and transmitted to a central counting facility (or exchanged, to count in multiple locations). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
On Oct 6, 2008, at 11:30 AM, AllAbout Voting wrote: So I will ask a pair of constructive questions: 1. Can Condorcet voting be compatible with precinct level optical scan systems? (which many election integrity advocates consider to be pretty good) Yes. 2. Can Condorcet voting be compatible with end-to-end verifiable election integrity systems such as punchscan, 3-ballot, etc...? Aside from the NxNx3 adaption of 3-ballot to condorcet information, I think it was suggested on this list a while ago that 3-ballot can be adapted to 0-100 range voting by scaling up its three ballots of 0-1 voting and requiring sums of 100-200 for a valid vote instead of sums of 1 or 2. If that sort of system was used, rankings for condorcet counting could be extracted from the ratings votes, or a more advanced ratings-aware system could be used. Actually, that sounds pretty messy. NxNx3 is probably better. Most of these methods require automatic ballot construction or specially clueful voters. I'd expect 99% of voters to never bother verifying that the election was actually done right if they had the certificates with which to check it. I think probably the best defense against electoral malfeasance is probably through the political and legal processes, and through the vigilance of the citizenry. We'll never make a system so mathematically perfect that we don't still need those other things. Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
