[EM] Gerrymandering and competitive districts

2008-11-18 Thread Raph Frank
Was doing a google search on "redistricting competitive districts" and
hit this book

http://www.routledgepolitics.com/books/Redistricting-and-Representation-isbn9780415964524

They argue that competitive districts are actually a bad thing.

>From reading the summary their theory seems to be that in non
competitive districts, a greater proportion of the voters will have
voted for their Representative, so happiness is improved.

This seems the poltical equivalent of Keynes' economic theory, it
gives politicians a plausible reason to do what they want to do
anyway.  The question is, are homogeneous or heterogeneous districts
better.

With plurality, the answer is almost certainly No.

However, I wonder if all districts were arranged so that 80% of the
voters in each district supported one or other party, would that party
run more than 1 candidate, or would you still have a situation where
the party only runs 1 candidate?

With plurality, if a district has more than 2/3 of the population from
the same party, then a party can run 2 candidates in complete safety,
as if each party supporter votes for one or other of them, their
preferred candidate will get more than 1/3.  The non-party members
still get to influence which of the 2 party members wins.  It is kinda
like top-2 runoff without the first round.

Likewise, under Range/Scorevoting, the party could run lots of
candidates and the voters would be pretty sure that no matter how they
voted, someone from their party would win.  The reduces the Burr
dilemma (if it is a problem at all).

The main point being that with a competitive election method which has
no spoiler effect, voters can remove incumbents no matter how the
districts are gerrymandered.  This may dull the incentive for
politicians to gerrymander.  At the moment, there is both a personal
benefit and a party benefit.

If heterogeneous districts were acceptable, the method could assign
the number of districts to each party based on a party popularilty
vote.  For example,

- break State into small election areas
- each voter ranks the parties
- least popular party is excluded until all parties have won a
majority in each areas to make up at least 1 seat
-- votes are gives to highest ranked party
- assign seats/districts to remaing parties using d'Hondt
- create election areas so as to maximise support of the party in its
districts according to party votes
-- Other rules would also apply

This splits the districts between the parties using PR and results in
heterogeneous districts.  Tiny parties which don't have concentrated
support wouldn't be assigned any districts though.  This is true for
districting methods based on geography.

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Re: [EM] Gerrymandering and competitive districts

2008-11-18 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax

At 09:51 AM 11/18/2008, Raph Frank wrote:

However, I wonder if all districts were arranged so that 80% of the
voters in each district supported one or other party, would that party
run more than 1 candidate, or would you still have a situation where
the party only runs 1 candidate?


You can do it perfectly with Asset Voting, and without even 
necessarily thinking about political parties.


It happens by discarding fixed districts entirely. Rather, virtual 
districts can be created by the electors; a "district" would consist 
of voting precincts from which votes appeared that created the seat. 
In the case of a popular party, this district might be relatively 
small. The districts would overlap.


Thus you might have, with districts that include the precinct you 
voted in, a Republican member of the assembly, a Democrat, a 
Libertarian, a Green, etc. The Republican and the Democrat, if these 
are two major parties, might have small districts. The Green or 
Libertarian might have a district that includes the whole state.


However, what you would have, for sure (with proper details) is a 
member of the assembly that you voted for, directly or indirectly. 
You will know who this is.


100% satisfaction, or the best possible compromise, with who represents you.

I.e., for the first time, true representation of every voter in the 
assembly, but still a peer assembly, with equal voting power for each member.


(Or something similar.)



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Re: [EM] language/framing quibble

2008-11-18 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm

Fred Gohlke wrote:

Good Morning, Kristofer


I'm finding steadily less to comment on; we seem to be reaching a 
convergence of sorts, where we either agree, or we disagree but have 
found that the only real way to find out which of us is right is to run 
this thing in practice. Thus, I've been a bit slow at replying, because 
I've simply been using the time to find out what to say.



re: "... would be good for the petition to include information
 about the level of the person who originated it."

My initial reaction to this suggestion was unfavorable, oddly, for the 
very reason you thought it worthwhile; fear that petitions coming from 
the lower levels of the 'pyramid' would be considered less important. On 
further thought, though, I agree with you.  As you point out, it is 
likely the distribution of petitions will be simplified by including the 
petitioner's level.  In addition, those who rose to higher levels were 
deemed more representative of the views of their peers than those at 
lower levels.  It is reasonable to give their opinions greater weight. 
One additional factor is that it may aid discourse among those who met 
to make selections.


It also acknowledges that the structure is recursive; a pyramid is made 
up of many small pyramids, which are made up of many small pyramids. 
Instead of having to go all the way to the top, you may find some who 
are higher up yet willing to listen to you, but if those have been 
corrupted, you still have the option of going straight to the top (only 
that you have to informally organize many others for your message to 
hold the same weight).



re: "The assumption here is that if someone high up in the
 pyramid petitions the official, he has the support of many
 below him."

I agree this is a reasonable assumption in terms of how an elected 
official initially evaluates a petition.  However, the ease with which 
constituents may support or oppose petitions provides a means of 
confirming the assumption.  Since it is easy for constituents to support 
or oppose a petition, official performance will be better judged by 
actual support than by implied support.


Beyond performance evaluation, though, is the impact of petitions on an 
official's biases.  Petitions represent ideas and convictions.  They may 
counter ideas and convictions held by the elected official or reinforce 
them.  They may achieve merit on the breadth of their support or on the 
force of their reason.  Thus, the bidirectionality of the system not 
only provides a means of sanctioning, it also serves to influence 
elected officials' attitudes.  As you've pointed out, when participants 
move to higher levels they can not represent all the views of all the 
people who elevated them.  Petitions provide a means of energizing views 
which are commonly held but which are 'lost in transit', so to speak.


Yes, that is true, and it's what I meant by that the bidirectionality 
would not only correct, but also provide information to guide. 
Hopefully, the councilmembers higher up (including those that have been 
selected for the public body) will choose to heed those words instead of 
thinking their own ways trump them. In some sense, they have been 
selected not to jump on the latest complaint and wildly swing back and 
forth on the opinion scale, but they've also been selected not to ignore 
the people. In any case, if worst comes to worst, there's the ultimate 
counter of initiative and referendum. But that, also, can be a guide, 
not just a sanction; if a selected official just forgets about a certain 
issue, not out of malice, but of simply being limited (as we all are), 
and the messages don't nudge him in the right direction, the option of 
referendum will work as a crude steering mechanism.


I use the term "selected", since elected doesn't really fit. There's no 
public election, there's simply a whole lot of mini-elections that come 
together.



re: "... the pyramids exist ... and their composition is known to
 (at least) the public officials ..."

In my view, the composition of the pyramids and all petitions should be 
public information.  It is true this will make those who achieve the 
higher levels targets for influence peddlers but I don't believe such 
corruption will be as easy to achieve as it is at present.  Here's why:


Our political landscape is dominated by political parties and political 
parties are conduits for corruption.  Corruption occurs in static 
conditions and party professionals are like apples in barrels, 
susceptible to rot.  The Practical Democracy electoral method is 
dynamic; is has no organization or fund raiser to provide a corrupting 
influence.  Those who would corrupt our elected representatives can not 
do so en bloc, as they do with parties, they have to corrupt each 
elected official, individually.


There is an enormous difference between telling a party fund-raiser what 
laws you want in return for your 'contribution' and trying to