Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
At 06:14 PM 12/21/2008, James Gilmour wrote: Abd ul-Rahman LomaxSent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 1:44 AM LNH as an absolute principle, which, as an election criterion, it is, is harmful. That is a value judgement - which of course you are perfectly entitled to make. Sure. The desirability of any criterion is generally a value judgement. However, there are fundamental values and less fundamental ones, consensus values and idiosyncratic ones, ignorant values and informed ones. What I've heard from you, James, is that LNH is desirable because, without it, some voters (how many? under what conditions?) will be inclined to not add additional preferences, fearing harm to their favorite. Apparently, hang the outcome! I said as an absolute principle. There is a political issue. If a voting system doesn't satisfy LNH, but the situations where that's possible, where that would actually impact the voter's interests, it's politically inconvenient. One can't say Never. I've seen, however, that LNH has been asserted for a method where, in context, it simply wasn't true, it was possible for a later preference, with IRV, to harm the favorite's election prospect, because it was IRV where a true majority requirement was maintained. *LNH is incompatible with a majority requirement, unless the further process considers all eliminated candidates permanently eliminated, no matter what. It's incompatible with direct democratic process.* When I wrote absolute, I meant that some forms of LNH protection were quite possibly useful. How, indeed, do we judge voting system criteria? Is there any approach that isn't subjective? How much harm is done by those alleged truncations because of the theoretical possibility of LNH failure. I've never seen any evidence that truncation is less common with IRV than it was with Bucklin, and there is some evidence to the contrary. Bucklin. Should I say, the American Preferential Voting System, as it was called? It was an Englishman, though, who noted the probable reason for most truncation, and it ain't LNH fears. It is a combination of ignorance regarding remaining candidates and, on the other hand, strong preference for the favorite and relative disinterest in who wins if the favorite doesn't win. Preference strength. Don't leave home without it. It makes all kinds of voter behavior far more understandable. It prevents the system acting as a negotiator seeking compromise, because it prevents compromise until and unless the favorite is eliminated. Frankly, I doubt that anyone who fully understands the implications would prefer an LNH system to one which more appropriately negotiates on behalf of the voter, seeking the best compromise. LNH means *no compromise unless you eliminate my candidate totally!* That kind of position will readily be seen as fanatic, intransigent, and selfish, in normal negotiation situations. LNH in a system *enforces* this, requiring all voters to be just this intransigent. I would hesitate to describe the electors I have experienced as fanatic, intransigent and selfish. Of course not, but they are voting in a system that makes it unnecessary, if they are voting in an STV system. The system does it for them, and what I see from Mr. Gilmour is that this is what they want. I don't think they would really want it, if they understood the implications, and I suspect that he has not explained them to them. I said that, in direct personal negotiations, this kind of behavior would generally be seen that way, not that voters were this way. What interests me particularly is that their insistence on LNH (or at least, their reaction to the effects of its presumed absence) is an intuitive response. Sure. Like lots of intuitive responses, it's less than optimal. There is nothing wrong with the response, per se. Bullet voting as an initial stage in negotiation is perfectly normal and functional. This is what I want, people will say. They don't say, if they have a significant preference, This is what I want, but if you don't like that, this other option is fine with me. That's giving away the farm for a small price. So I expect some kind of reluctance to disclose lower preferences. The strongest effect would be with Approval, which only allows equal ranking top or bottom. Bucklin fixes that, though, without *enforcing* LNH under all circumstances. Voters will know how to use it. Optional Preferential Voting, in Australia, sees massive truncation. Truncation is normal, when voters are free to do it. *Most voters* in *most public elections* will truncate, they won't use up all the ranks even in a 3-rank system. Other comments made by ordinary electors over the years lead me to suspect that this intuitive response reflects the importance ordinary electors attach to their first preference. Yes. It's functional, as I wrote above. The problem arises when the system *can't* move beyond that,
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
At 06:39 PM 12/21/2008, James Gilmour wrote: It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35% and 33% for the other two candidates. But I find it completely unimaginable, ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first preferences could be elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the other two candidates had 48% and 47% of the first preferences. Condorcet winner - no doubt. But effective President - never! Depends on the process. What if the process required majority approval. I.e., say it was a Range ballot, and first preference is expressed with a 100% vote. (Voters *may* express multiple first preferences, perhaps but there is little strategic incentive to do so, a 99% rating would have almost the same impact. Or a first preference marker is required, there could be some reasons for doing that.) But 50% rating is defined as Approval. I.e., consent to elect. If the winner had a majority of ballots showing consent to elect, why would you think that this President couldn't be effective? We don't require that now! And some very effective Presidents didn't get a majority. They got a majority in the electoral college, that's different. What if the electoral college were actually representative? What if it used real deliberative process, instead of voting as obligated? So, perhaps, electors, say, represented first preference votes. A candidate gets 5% first preference. But this is really the compromise candidate, and because of this, eventually gets the votes of a majority of electors? Why would this be a bad result? Low first preference can mean different things. It means, for starters, that the candidate isn't the candidate of a major party. That could mean ineffective, or not. It would depend on the context. I'd assume that the electors representing the major party candidates wouldn't compromise on this one unless they though he or she would be effective! But *effective* isn't everything. Sometimes it's enough to Do No Harm. In a badly polarized environment, on the verge of a civil war, electing the candidate with the most core support can be a total disaster, think the Hutus in Ruanda. James No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.9.19/1860 - Release Date: 21/12/2008 15:08 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
--- On Mon, 22/12/08, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote: The two situations I had in mind were: Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R; centrist candidate M Election 1 35% DM; 33% RM; 32% M Election 2 48% DM; 47% RM; 5% M M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political consequences of the two results would be very different. My own view is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the result of the second election would be unacceptable to the electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored completely!). If such an outcome is possible with a particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system will not be adopted for public elections. Example 1. In this country there are 10 small parties. Each party has one candidate. In addition there is one neutral candidate that has worked to make the fighting parties agree with each others. All voters vote MyPartyCandidate TheNeutralCandidate ... The neutral candidate gets 0% first preferences but he might be the best president anyway. Example 2. Voters of the large parties think that one should not elect a president from a 5% party. The votes are 48% DR; 47% RD; 5% M. Candidate D will win. If the voters think that it is better to elect a candidate from a 5% party than to elect the candidate of the large competing party then they could vote as in your example. Maybe they gave M a mandate although he is from a small 5% party. Example 3. IRV philosophy is to emphasize the importance of first place preferences (among the remaining candidates during the elimination process). First place preferences could be considered to be a sincere target in elections where the elected person will need support of his first place supporters when in office (well, the voters could also simply vote for candidates that have sufficient first place support among the citizens). One could do a similar trick also in Condorcet. Let's say that a pairwise preference has strength 1.5 if it includes the most preferred candidate of the ballot. In that case with preferences 43% DM; 42% RM; 15% M the pairwise comparison results would be D-R 64.5-63; D-M 64.5-64.5; R-M 63-65.5. That is a tie between D and M. Would this be a good balance between the 35% M and 5% M examples? Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be objectionable. In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M. Who has any business objecting? 52 of 100 prefer M over D 53 of 100 prefer M over R Neither R nor D got a majority of the votes. As to my no first preferences example, surest way to cause such is to be unable to respond to them. DWK On Mon, 22 Dec 2008 10:18:34 - James Gilmour wrote: James Gilmour had written: It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35% and 33% for the other two candidates. But I find it completely unimaginable, ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first preferences could be elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the other two candidates had 48% and 47% of the first preferences. Condorcet winner - no doubt. But effective President - never! Dave Ketchum Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 4:24 AM Such a weak Condorcet winner would also be unlikely. Second preferences? That 5% would have to avoid the two strong candidates. The other two have to avoid voting for each other - likely, for they are likely enemies of each other. The other two could elect the 5%er - getting the 5% makes this seem possible. Could elect a candidate who got no first preference votes? Seems unlikely. I see the three each as possibles via first and second preferences - and acceptable even with only 5% first - likely a compromise candidate. Any other unlikely to be a winner. What were you thinking of as weak winner? I'm afraid I don't understand your examples at all. The no first preferences example is so extreme I would not consider it realistic. But, of course, if it were possible to elect a no first preferences candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would be disastrous. The two situations I had in mind were: Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R; centrist candidate M Election 1 35% DM; 33% RM; 32% M Election 2 48% DM; 47% RM; 5% M M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political consequences of the two results would be very different. My own view is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the result of the second election would be unacceptable to the electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored completely!). If such an outcome is possible with a particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system will not be adopted for public elections. James -- da...@clarityconnect.compeople.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Dave, I think you make a common semantic manipulation about the nature of a Condorcet winner (particularly in a weak CW example) by using the term wins by a majority. In fact, each of the separate and distinct pairwise majorities may consist largely of different voters, rather than any solid majority. This is why I think the Mutual-Majority Criterion is a more useful criterion. In a crowded field, a weak CW may be a little-considered candidate that every voter ranks next to last. The phrase wins by a majority creates the image in the reader's mind of a happy satisfied group of voters (that is more than half of the electors), who would feel gratified by this election outcome. In fact, in a weak CW situation, every single voter could feel the outcome was horrible if the CW is declared elected. Using a phrase like wins by a majority creates the false impression that a majority of voters favor this candidate OVER THE FIELD of other candidates AS A WHOLE, whereas NO SUCH MAJORITY necessarily exist for there to be a Condorcet winner. The concept of Condorcet constructs many distinct majorities, who may be at odds, and none of which actually need to like this Condorcet winner. I am not arguing that the concept of Condorcet winner is not a legitimate criterion, just that its normative value is artificially heightened by saying the candidate wins by a majority when no such actual solid majority needs to exist. Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com To: jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 7:23 PM Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2 Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be objectionable. In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M. Who has any business objecting? 52 of 100 prefer M over D 53 of 100 prefer M over R Neither R nor D got a majority of the votes. As to my no first preferences example, surest way to cause such is to be unable to respond to them. DWK On Mon, 22 Dec 2008 10:18:34 - James Gilmour wrote: James Gilmour had written: It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35% and 33% for the other two candidates. But I find it completely unimaginable, ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first preferences could be elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the other two candidates had 48% and 47% of the first preferences. Condorcet winner - no doubt. But effective President - never! Dave Ketchum Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 4:24 AM Such a weak Condorcet winner would also be unlikely. Second preferences? That 5% would have to avoid the two strong candidates. The other two have to avoid voting for each other - likely, for they are likely enemies of each other. The other two could elect the 5%er - getting the 5% makes this seem possible. Could elect a candidate who got no first preference votes? Seems unlikely. I see the three each as possibles via first and second preferences - and acceptable even with only 5% first - likely a compromise candidate. Any other unlikely to be a winner. What were you thinking of as weak winner? I'm afraid I don't understand your examples at all. The no first preferences example is so extreme I would not consider it realistic. But, of course, if it were possible to elect a no first preferences candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would be disastrous. The two situations I had in mind were: Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R; centrist candidate M Election 1 35% DM; 33% RM; 32% M Election 2 48% DM; 47% RM; 5% M M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political consequences of the two results would be very different. My own view is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the result of the second election would be unacceptable to the electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored completely!). If such an outcome is possible with a particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system will not be adopted for public elections. James -- da...@clarityconnect.compeople.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Hallo, Terry Bouricius wrote (22 Dec 2008): In a crowded field, a weak CW may be a little-considered candidate that every voter ranks next to last. As the Borda score of a CW is always above the average Borda score, it is not possible that the CW is a little-considered candidate that every voter ranks next to last. Terry Bouricius wrote (22 Dec 2008): The phrase wins by a majority creates the image in the reader's mind of a happy satisfied group of voters (that is more than half of the electors), who would feel gratified by this election outcome. In fact, in a weak CW situation, every single voter could feel the outcome was horrible if the CW is declared elected. Using a phrase like wins by a majority creates the false impression that a majority of voters favor this candidate OVER THE FIELD of other candidates AS A WHOLE, whereas NO SUCH MAJORITY necessarily exist for there to be a Condorcet winner. On the other side, IRV supporters usually use the term majority winner in such a manner that it could refer to every candidate, except for a Condorcet loser. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
