[EM] Pirate Party of Sweden adopts the Schulze method
Hallo, in October 2009, the Pirate Party of Sweden adopted the Schulze method. See e.g.: http://forum.piratpartiet.se/FindPost174988.aspx http://forum.piratpartiet.se/FindPost176567.aspx http://forum.piratpartiet.se/FindPost191479.aspx The Schulze method is used in the internal elections (14 December 2009 to 17 January 2010) to fill the 82 list places for the upcoming Riksdag elections. There are 230 candidates and about 50,000 eligible voters: http://www.piratpartiet.se/primarvalskandidater Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] just to let you know ...
plurality leader in the initial tally ended up losing weak Condorcet compromise in third place if Burlington had used Condorcet rules ... there would be even more vociferous calls for repeal These are all semi-valid concerns in a country that is so used to plurality winners and single-party governments (winner without lots of / sufficient amount of of first preference support could be a weak single-party ruler). I note that also the spoiler effect is a quite well known problem in the USA and that the 33% plurality winner would have lost also with the old rules (the probability of electing a Republican might be bigger with the old rules though). All this together shows that the discussion and decision making is probably more abut who makes the best and most convincing claims at correct times than about who makes the correct and rational claims. There is no one making a rational summary of all the arguments. The discussion is more likely to hover around various simple claims (that may well be oversimplified, false, unclear, intentionally unclear and/or in conflict with each others just like the already mentioned claims are, no problem). Many voters may have interest but not sufficient knowledge and time/ interest to draw rational conclusions. Politicians may well drive only the short term interests of their own party and themselves (instead of the society as a whole) (big parties usually have even rational (selfish) reasons). Media may also be mostly interested in short term juicy stories. And experts too may have mixed interests. I however note that there is always some tendency to find solutions that are good in theory and in practice (and tendency to avoid solutions that have clearly been proven wrong). Decision making will go slightly in that (rational, sensible) direction if all the facts are made known and especially if clear descriptions and clear justification of them are available. That means that despite of the demagogic nature of the discussion also rational argumentation does have a place in the process. Better to throw the argumentation in although the discussion and its outcome may not fully follow the intended logic. Juho On Jan 7, 2010, at 1:49 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote: Juho, Actually, the opposition to IRV in Burlington is predominantly focused on the complaint that the plurality leader in the initial tally ended up losing in the runoff tally. This candidate was actually the Condorcet LOSER among the top three candidates (though a fringe candidate with only 35 votes was the technical Condorcet loser). The complaint from those circulating the IRV repeal petition is that there shouldn't be any ranked ballots, and that the plurality winner with 33% of the vote in the first round (and the essential Condorcet-loser) should have been declared elected. There is no momentum toward a Condorcet approach currently. I haven't heard more than a couple of people in Burlington suggest that the actual Condorcet winner should have won, because he was a weak Condorcet compromise in third place in the initial tally. I suspect that if Burlington had used Condorcet rules and the candidate in third place in the initial tally had been declared elected, there would be even more vociferous calls for repeal in favor of plurality or runoffs. Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk To: EM Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com Sent: Wednesday, January 06, 2010 5:05 PM Subject: Re: [EM] just to let you know ... In Burlington at least the arguments for Condorcet should be straight forward. People are already ok with ranked ballot based voting. Many of them may feel that in the last election the Condorcet winner should have won. From this point of view Condorcet is just a small modification that fixes this problem. Many voters may support going back to the old system since that would (at least seem to) fix the problem of failing to elect the (beats all) Condorcet winner. It would make sense to make them aware that there are also other ways to solve the problem (= just fix the tabulation method). Juho On Jan 6, 2010, at 7:47 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: Terry and i agree on many things and I am convinced we have a common goal: fair elections that represent the will of the electorate and do not penalize voters for voting non-strategically. and we agree that the first-past-the-pole (with delayed runoff if no one exceeds 40%) is no good, worse than the IRV that was passed in 2005 and used twice since. Terry, we *do* disagree about some things. factually, it is *not* just Republicans. there are many, many Democrats that have joined that One Person, One Vote group and, Terry, if IRV is repealed this March, it's gonna be because the number of Democrats on that side have been underestimated and not taken seriously. I am against the repeal. I hope it loses, but only
Re: [EM] just to let you know ...
On Jan 6, 2010, at 6:49 PM, Terry Bouricius wrote: Actually, the opposition to IRV in Burlington is predominantly focused on the complaint that the plurality leader in the initial tally ended up losing in the runoff tally. That's stupid enough to get me a bit angry. They see a problem with IRV results. Going back to pick-one voting is sticking their heads in the sand and denying to see the problem. Because we have the full data dump from the rankings ballots we can do analysis and figure out what happened and how IRV was wrong (and how pick-one would have been wrong), but if they take that away then we just won't know again. Problem hidden! I really hope the forces of stupid don't win. Good luck up there guys. If there was going to be a big public meeting, I might even be tempted to drive up from Boston. Even if I didn't get to contribute much I'd be curious to see just how these things play out amongst real Americans who aren election theory wonks. Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A Majoritarian, Clone Free, High Efficiency, Sincere Ratings Lottery
I'm afraid the method is not monotone: If a member of S moves up on the ordinal ballots, it is true this move will increase her chances of winning if L(S) is chosen over A, but it might make it so that L(S) is not chosen over A. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Pirate Party of Sweden adopts the Schulze method
Raph Frank wrote: Is it a pure condorcet ordering, or are they adding any PR elements to the list? Using google translate (which did a pretty good job), on those threads, they say it is decided According to a variant of the Condorcet / Single-Transferable-Vote named Schultz method. Full källkod kommer att publiceras. Full source code will be published. Is this Schulze STV? It's plain old Schulze, as in the Condorcet method. It seems to me that using a proportional ordering (house monotone PR method) would be a better approach for a party list than to just use a Condorcet method directly. In the latter case, the list would be full of centrists, but in the former, there would be some opinion space variation. I seem to remember that Schulze designed a proportional ordering version of Schulze STV as well, but it may be too untested even for the Pirate Party. http://forum.piratpartiet.se/FindPost176567.aspx implies that the source code is based on the Wikipedia implementation. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Pirate Party of Sweden adopts the Schulze method
Hallo, the Schulze ranking will be used as defined in the Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method I agree that it would have been better if a proportional ordering method had been used. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Pirate Party of Sweden adopts the Schulze method
They also said: Condorcet-Schultze med 30% kvotering = Condorcet-Schultze with 30% quotas I just wonder if that adds something to the basic Schulze method. Juho On Jan 7, 2010, at 11:30 PM, Markus Schulze wrote: Hallo, the Schulze ranking will be used as defined in the Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method I agree that it would have been better if a proportional ordering method had been used. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Pirate Party of Sweden adopts the Schulze method
Juho wrote: They also said: Condorcet-Schultze med 30% kvotering = Condorcet-Schultze with 30% quotas I just wonder if that adds something to the basic Schulze method. That means that 30% of the people on the list has to have some property. I'm not sure what that property is, but I guess it refers to matters of gender - at least 30% of each. I don't see any mention of how they're going to achieve this. If I were to make something like that, I would probably divide the result into ordered lists, based on the property (e.g. gender), then go straightforward down along the social ordering until either group decreases below the quota. At that point, pick the highest ranked from the list of the minority in question until that group is no longer below the quota. One could probably devise even more complex solutions involving global optimization, particularly for methods that return a cardinal social ordering (a ratings ballot as output). For such an ordering, one could simply phrase it as an integer programming problem: maximize the total rating, subject to that one may not pick more than the number of seats and that no group may have less than 30% of the seats. I would be surprised if that's how they do it, though, in particular since the Schulze method doesn't return a cardinal social ordering. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Utah Republican Party Scraps IRV Voting Method
Nice to know someone has some common sense to scrap IRV voting. I found out that NYC tried IRV in the 1930s and scrapped it too. Also Burlington VT and Aspen CO have ongoing efforts to scrap it and several other locations recently made the wise decision to scrap possibly the only alternative voting method that has more flaws and fails more of Arrow's fairness criteria than plurality voting. http://utahpolicy.com/featured_article/utah-republican-convention-change-could-change-strategy-candidates Some people are waking up to the fact that IRV/STV is a threat to the fairness and integrity of elections. Cheers, Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Utah Republican Party Scraps IRV Voting Method
On Jan 7, 2010, at 7:41 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: Nice to know someone has some common sense to scrap IRV voting. I found out that NYC tried IRV in the 1930s and scrapped it too. Also Burlington VT and Aspen CO have ongoing efforts to scrap it *some* people in Burlington VT. don't assume (until Town Meeting Day, March 2) that they speak for the electorate of the city. we'll see. Kathy, you *still* haven't responded to my question of 10 weeks ago. ever plan to? On Oct 31, 2009, at 12:18 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Oct 31, 2009, at 10:29 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote: 5. It always amazes me how irrationally the supporters of IRV/STV support a nonmonotonic system that creates more problems than it solves when there are clearly better alternatives available that actually solve more problems than they create. so, Kathy, i am curious as to which of these better alternatives you promote? i'm still interested in your answer. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Utah Republican Party Scraps IRV Voting Method
I've answered that question on this list before and Abd ul also answered it. There are *many* good alternative voting methods that do solve the spoiler problem, are monotonic, and elect majority winners and are precinct summable. I don't know of any alternative voting methods as bad as IRV/STV (although there must be one somewhere), so I would probably support almost any alternative method that lacks the multitude of flaws that IRV/STV have. Abd ul has convinced me that regular top-two runoffs are good too. On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 7:50 PM, robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com wrote: On Jan 7, 2010, at 7:41 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: Nice to know someone has some common sense to scrap IRV voting. I found out that NYC tried IRV in the 1930s and scrapped it too. Also Burlington VT and Aspen CO have ongoing efforts to scrap it *some* people in Burlington VT. don't assume (until Town Meeting Day, March 2) that they speak for the electorate of the city. we'll see. Kathy, you *still* haven't responded to my question of 10 weeks ago. ever plan to? On Oct 31, 2009, at 12:18 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Oct 31, 2009, at 10:29 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote: 5. It always amazes me how irrationally the supporters of IRV/STV support a nonmonotonic system that creates more problems than it solves when there are clearly better alternatives available that actually solve more problems than they create. so, Kathy, i am curious as to which of these better alternatives you promote? i'm still interested in your answer. -- r b-j ...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. -- Kathy Dopp Town of Colonie, NY 12304 phone 518-952-4030 cell 518-505-0220 http://utahcountvotes.org http://electionmathematics.org http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/ Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Utah Republican Party Scraps IRV Voting Method
On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 8:28 PM, robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com wrote: On Jan 7, 2010, at 7:55 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: I've answered that question on this list before and Abd ul also answered it. There are *many* good alternative voting methods that do solve the spoiler problem, are monotonic, and elect majority winners and are precinct summable. would this list include Condorcet? Yes. Condorcet is precinct-summable in an n x n matrix where n is the number of candidates. I don't know of any alternative voting methods as bad as IRV/STV (although there must be one somewhere), so I would probably support almost any alternative method that lacks the multitude of flaws that IRV/STV have. Abdul has convinced me that regular top-two runoffs are good too. i'm sure as hell not convinced. if that were the case in Burlington in 2009, a candidate would be elected on Runoff Day that was less preferred by the electorate than an identified specific candidate who was not included in the runoff. Well, let's just say top-two runoff is precinct-summable, monotonic, virtually always finds majority winners, preserves voters' rights and otherwise lacks most of the major flaws of IRV/STV, but does not solve all the flaws of plurality that IRV/STV was incorrectly envisioned as solving. Kathy On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 7:50 PM, robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com wrote: On Jan 7, 2010, at 7:41 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: Nice to know someone has some common sense to scrap IRV voting. I found out that NYC tried IRV in the 1930s and scrapped it too. Also Burlington VT and Aspen CO have ongoing efforts to scrap it *some* people in Burlington VT. don't assume (until Town Meeting Day, March 2) that they speak for the electorate of the city. we'll see. Kathy, you *still* haven't responded to my question of 10 weeks ago. ever plan to? On Oct 31, 2009, at 12:18 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Oct 31, 2009, at 10:29 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote: 5. It always amazes me how irrationally the supporters of IRV/STV support a nonmonotonic system that creates more problems than it solves when there are clearly better alternatives available that actually solve more problems than they create. so, Kathy, i am curious as to which of these better alternatives you promote? so you're answer is the traditional election with runoff between the top two vote getters if there is no majority? why can't that runoff be Instantized? *must* people be required to return to the polls at a later date to vote in the runoff? -- r b-j ...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. -- Kathy Dopp Town of Colonie, NY 12304 phone 518-952-4030 cell 518-505-0220 http://utahcountvotes.org http://electionmathematics.org http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/ Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Utah Republican Party Scraps IRV Voting Method
At 07:55 PM 1/7/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote: I've answered that question on this list before and Abd ul also answered it. There are *many* good alternative voting methods that do solve the spoiler problem, are monotonic, and elect majority winners and are precinct summable. I don't know of any alternative voting methods as bad as IRV/STV (although there must be one somewhere), so I would probably support almost any alternative method that lacks the multitude of flaws that IRV/STV have. Abd ul has convinced me that regular top-two runoffs are good too. Top two runoff, of course, shares the center-squeeze problem that IRV suffers from, but, interestingly enough, that problem may not be as serious if write-in votes are allowed in the runoff, as they are by default in California and perhaps some other jurisdictions. Not widely known is the fact that the spoiler effect is connected with partisan elections. IRV in nonpartisan elections seems to reproduce Plurality closely. With top-two runoff in nonpartisan elections, the runner up in the primary wins roughly one-third of the time, per a study by FairVote. However, with IRV, these comeback elections hardly ever occur. IRV does fix what I call the first-order spoiler effect, where a minor party candidate draws away votes from a major party candidate, causing the less popular of the major party candidates to win. However, as a recent Burlington election shows, IRV can award victory to a candidate who would, by the votes expressed on the ballots, lose in a direct contest to an eliminated candidate, because of the peculiar significance that IRV gives to the first choice. It is entirely possible that without the promise of IRV as a fair system, the same configuration of candidates would not exist, and the more popular candidate would have won. There is another system that uses the same ranked choice ballot as IRV, but that is probably much better at handling the center squeeze situation, and that was at one time widely used in the U.S. (Far more widely than the recent IRV fad.) That's Bucklin voting. It could be called Instant Runoff Approval. It's much easier to canvass than IRV, the totals for each rank are simply collected from each precinct, and the handling, if there is no majority in first preference, is simple addition; the difference from Approval is that the approvals are ranked, so additional approvals are only considered if nobody gets a majority in first preferences. Why was Bucklin rejected? Partly, it may have been for similar reasons to the prior and present rejections of IRV. IRV has been sold on a false promise: to find majorities without runoff elections. Bucklin was sold in the same way, and it fails to find majorities reliably for the same reason as IRV fails: people don't rank enough candidates. This has been a known problem with STV for more than a century, and whenever a candidate doesn't get a majority in first preferences, it is *normal* for IRV to never find a majority even after vote transfers, the IRV majority is a faux majority, a new invention, a last round majority, based on an entirely new concept of a majority that isn't the traditional one: a majority of ballots case. Bucklin is based on majority of ballots cast, as are standard repeated ballot systems. All ballots are considered. Bucklin, because of the lack of candidate eliminations, which really means ballot eliminations in actual practice, is more efficient at finding majorities, however, because it will find votes concealed under votes for a leading candidate. We tend to think of partisan elections, for some reason, where a voter for one of the top two candidates would one rarely also approve one of the other top two. But in nonpartisan elections, which are the vast majority of recent IRV applications, a supporter of one of the leading candidates might well express support for another leading candidate. Not highly partisan supporters, but general voters. IRV conceals these votes, Bucklin finds and counts them. The error with prior implementations was in the false promise: when it was realized that Bucklin wasn't actually finding majorities in some of the places where it was used, because of enough voters doing the traditional vote-for-one thing, Bucklin was dumped entirely. It, as also happened with IRV in some prior situations, it was replaced with top-two runoff, which usually finds a majority. Instead, Bucklin should have been used as a method of avoiding unnecessary runoffs. I like to think of this as the voter's strategy. With Bucklin, I will unconditionally vote in first preference for my favorite. There is never a reason not to. (With IRV, there can be circumstances where voting for your favorite will turn out to be foolish, it can cause a much worse outcome, it can even cause your favorite to lose. That's what non-monotonicity means.) Then, as to adding other, lower-ranked approvals, the
Re: [EM] Utah Republican Party Scraps IRV Voting Method
On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 10:08 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote: Abd ul, Just a few comments and a correction re. Burlington. (Single Transferable Vote is considerably better when used for multiwinner elections, though there are better methods still, for sure. True multiwinner STV has been rejected after use in the U.S., but not for good reasons. It was rejected because it resulted in fair representation for minority groups. Most people who oppose IRV/STV today support proportional reprentation, but IRV has not achieved that in most places it has been tried and there are other methods, such as the party list system, cumulative voting, etc. that achieve it without being nonmonotonic and without the spoiler effect and without the complex transparency-eviscerating central counting that IRV/STV produce. IRV/STV do not count all voters' 2nd choices, even when voters' first choice candidate loses, and so is a fundamentally unfair method that tends to elect extreme right or left candidates and eliminate the centrist majority-favorite candidates, just like it did in Burlington, VT mayoral contest. I urge election activists opposed to IRV not to jump for the temptation of praising those rejections as wise. They weren't. They were racist and prejudiced in other ways against the fair choices of the voters. In Ann Arbor, MI, IRV was rejected on arguments similar, apparently, to some of those being advanced in Burlington now: it deprived the Republican of his rightful victory over the Democrat, which had been previously happening because of vote splitting in a college town between the Democratic candidates and the Human Rights Party candidates. Correction - In Burlington the Democrat was the centrist majority-favorite (Condorcet) candidate and the Republican acted as a spoiler, causing the Leftist candidate to win. Republicans have not won any mayoral election in Burlington for over a decade and was the spoiler. Almost all the folks who voted their true preference for the Republican, caused their last choice (the most liberal candidate) to win. For a simple short understandable film explaining the vote counts in Burlington that was just finished today, see this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPCS-zWuel8 However, the situation in Burlington is pretty different: the problem there is that there are three major parties there, and IRV does very poorly in that context. It worked in Ann Arbor, and, for that reason, a referendum on it was scheduled for when the students were on break, mostly out of town!) IRV does poorly wherever there are three strong candidates and the spoiler problem pops up. Kathy -- Kathy Dopp Town of Colonie, NY 12304 phone 518-952-4030 cell 518-505-0220 http://utahcountvotes.org http://electionmathematics.org http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/ Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Utah Republican Party Scraps IRV Voting Method
On Jan 7, 2010, at 8:45 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 8:28 PM, robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com wrote: On Jan 7, 2010, at 7:55 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: I've answered that question on this list before and Abd ul also answered it. There are *many* good alternative voting methods that do solve the spoiler problem, are monotonic, and elect majority winners and are precinct summable. would this list include Condorcet? Yes. Condorcet is precinct-summable in an n x n matrix where n is the number of candidates. i knew that. but what i wanted to know is if, from where you stand, it was one of the acceptable alternatives to IRV. or if your ideal solution is to return to the traditional runoff or just first-past- the-pole. I don't know of any alternative voting methods as bad as IRV/STV (although there must be one somewhere), so I would probably support almost any alternative method that lacks the multitude of flaws that IRV/STV have. Abdul has convinced me that regular top-two runoffs are good too. i'm sure as hell not convinced. if that were the case in Burlington in 2009, a candidate would be elected on Runoff Day that was less preferred by the electorate than an identified specific candidate who was not included in the runoff. Well, let's just say top-two runoff is precinct-summable, monotonic, virtually always finds majority winners, preserves voters' rights and otherwise lacks most of the major flaws of IRV/STV, but does not solve all the flaws of plurality that IRV/STV was incorrectly envisioned as solving. with that i agree with you on everything. but, for Burlington, until we get Condorcet, i still think that IRV does a better job than plurality of solving the main problem of rewarding the compromising strategy for supporters of 3rd-party candidates. but i do not understand why anyone would envision the ranked-order ballot, skip over the Condorcet concept (something i thought of 38 years ago in high school, 3 decades before reading the term Condorcet), and come up with the STV method. specifically the arbitrary threshold that the weakest candidate to eliminate is the one with the fewest 1st- pick votes (that 2nd-pick count as well as last pick). whose idea was that? even in high school, i knew that the problem was in the difference on how people who are idealistic would choose their candidate in a multi-party or multi-candidate race compared to if there were only two candidates. the latter is a simple problem for both the voter and for the election system. no strategies to be had; vote for the candidate you like the most or vote for the candidate you like the least. there is no reason why the latter would serve any political interest of the voter, so he/she may as well vote sincerely and hope for the best. but once there is a credible 3rd candidate, that is no longer the case. all Condorcet does (assuming there *is* a Condorcet winner) is extend the concept to the extra candidates. if there is a Condorcet winner and if that person is always elected to office, there is no reason why the multi-candidate election would turn out better for anyone by trying to be tricky. throwing a Condorcet election into a cycle for strategic reasons is pretty risky and i've never been convinced that a cycle is common at all. and if a cycle does happen, Tideman ranked-pairs is fine, as far as i can tell. Shulze is probably better, but hard to explain to Joe 6-pack. but i can explain Condorcet to Joe 6-pack. it's simple enough. thanks for responding, Kathy. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
