Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?

[Russ Paielli]

On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 10:34 PM, Juho Laatu  wrote:

> On 5.7.2011, at 3.09, Russ Paielli wrote:
>
> Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized
> that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar
> to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I
> consider a major defect.
>
>
> I agree that if IRV is interesting then also this method is. Some IRV
> related problems remain but you will get summability, clear declarations of
> candidate preferences, very simple voting and ability to handle easily large
> number of candidates. You could say that this method is also an improvement
> of TTR (similar voting, but has ability to pick the winner in one round
> only, maybe smaller spoiler problem).
>
>
After thinking about it a bit more, it seems to me that the method I
proposed at the top of this thread greatly improves on the practicality of
IRV. Not that I'm a big fan of IRV, but it *is* getting a lot of political
support these days, so improving it should be of interest.

First of all, my method is summable, which I consider a huge practical
benefit. Secondly, my method does not require the voter to rank candidates.
That's another huge practical benefit, greatly simplifying equipment
requirements and voter education.

The only "benefit" missing in my proposal compared to IRV is that the voter
cannot specify his own ranking of the candidates but rather must depend on
the candidates own rankings of the other candidates. I hardly consider that
a benefit anyway. I'll bet most voters would rather just leave the ranking
to their preferred candidate anyway. The candidate is likely to have more
time to research the issue, and if you trust the candidate to govern, you
must trust his judgment to some extent to some extent anyway.



> If people don't like the preference list given by their favourite
> candidate, one could nominate additional fake candidates to offer additional
> preference lists. If the preference list of candidate A is A>B>C, then thee
> could be an additional (weaker) candidate A1 whose preference order would be
> A1>A>C>B.
>
> One possible extension would be to allow candidates that are afraid that
> they would be spoilers (that reduce the votes of a stronger favourite
> candidate too much so that he will be eliminated too early) to transfer
> their votes right away. The preference list could have a cutoff. Preference
> list A>B>C>>D>E (of candidate A) would be interpreted so that votes to A
> would be added right away also to the score of B and C (but not D and E). If
> A gets transferred votes from some other candidates, they will be
> transferred further (to candidates not mentioned above cutoff in the
> original transfer list) only after A has been eliminated. (One could use
> this trick also in regular IRV.)
>
> If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end
> up using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that
> approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order.
> Votes would be counted right away for each branch, and the candidate of the
> largest brach of the largest branch of the ... would win.
>

That sounds interesting, but I'm not sure I understand what you mean. Can
you give an example?


>
>
> OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this
> thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in
> Approval Voting. How does that stack up?
>
>
> You should define that method a bit more in detail. I started wondering if
> it would allow candidate X to win if he asked also 100 of his friends to
> take part in the election and transfer their votes to him.
>
>
Yeah, it could get a bit weird. Maybe it's not a great combination.

--Russ P.



> Juho
>
>
>
>
> By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't
> consider it a "practical reform proposal." It's way too complicated to ever
> be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already
> pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA.
>
> Regards,
> Russ P.
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until
>> a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe
>> that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd
>> disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects
>> of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, 
>> SODA,
>> is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real
>> hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here.
>>
>> With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off.
>> First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV,
>> because there is a fairly broad range of situations 

Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?

[Juho Laatu]

On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:

> If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end up 
> using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that 
> approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order. 
> Votes would be counted right away for each branch, and the candidate of the 
> largest brach of the largest branch of the ... would win.
> 
> That sounds interesting, but I'm not sure I understand what you mean. Can you 
> give an example?

Here's one example.

Tree of candidates + number of personal votes + sum of votes of candidates of 
each branch:

Branch1 (13)
Branch1.1 (7)
A (4)
B (3)
Branch1.2 (6)
C (6)
Branch2 (18)
Branch2.1 (12)
D (5)
E (7)
Branch2.2 (5)
F (3)
G (2)
Branch2.3 (1)
H (1)

- Branch2 has more votes than Branch1 => Branch2 wins
- Branch2.1 has more votes than Branch2.2 and Branch2.3 => Branch2.1 wins
- candidate E has more votes than candidate D => candidate E wins

The tree approach thus forces the order of transfer to be non-cyclic. The 
transfer order of candidate E is E > D > {F, G, H}.

The tree format can be printed on paper and it is easy to grasp. The ballot 
sheet may also follow the same tree format. Branches may have names (e.g. party 
names) or be unnamed. Left wing parties could join forces under one branch. 
Candidates of one party could be divided in smaller groups. Or maybe the 
branches have no party names and party affiliations, maybe just descriptive 
names, maybe no branch names at all.

Juho






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Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/7/4 Russ Paielli 

> Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized
> that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar
> to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I
> consider a major defect.
>
> OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this
> thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in
> Approval Voting. How does that stack up?
>
> By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't
> consider it a "practical reform proposal." It's way too complicated to ever
> be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already
> pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA.
>

The method you just proposed *is* SODA. That is, you've given the
one-sentence summary, and SODA works out the details. Voters are used to the
fact that laws typically have both a pithy name/goal and an actual content
which is paragraphs of legalese. Even approval voting or plurality take
paragraphs to define rigorously.

JQ

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Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
> Political parties can be a good thing because people normally take
> shortcuts when deciding whom to vote for - by selecting the political
> party that agrees with their own ideology. Especially under the party
> list system, parties can be beneficial because smaller political
> parties that challenge the major parties have a far greater chance of
> winning seats in a large legislature, so that voters can vote for
> minor parties without wasting their votes or causing a spoiler effect,
> unlike with IRV/STV methods.
>

Under non-list systems, parties would still exist to guide the voters. But
the distinctions between coalitions, parties, and intraparty factions would
be more fluid, without the system artificially privileging one of those
levels.

Oh, and the spoiler problem in STV is many times less than under IRV; and
there are a broad array of STV-like systems which avoid it entirely.


>  So you think the open list method is worse than the nonproportional US
> system then of two-major political parties and single member districts
> or entire states?
>

You weren't asking me, but my answer is an obvious no. Still, I hope we can
do better than just "better".


>
> I definitely believe strongly that the IRV/STV methods are far far
> worse than the current US plurality system.
>

Please don't lump IRV and STV. Yes, they use the same underlying mechanisms,
but the effects are totally different. STV can, in practice, completely
eliminate the partisan spoiler problem; IRV cannot. And, as I've said above,
the core STV insight - the part that's shared by other STV systems like
Schulze-STV - is not the bottom-up elimination, but the transfer and
assignment of votes.

JQ

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Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?

[Kathy Dopp]

On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Jameson Quinn  wrote:

>
> Please don't lump IRV and STV. Yes, they use the same underlying mechanisms,
> but the effects are totally different. STV can, in practice, completely
> eliminate the partisan spoiler problem; IRV cannot. And, as I've said above,
> the core STV insight - the part that's shared by other STV systems like
> Schulze-STV - is not the bottom-up elimination, but the transfer and
> assignment of votes.
> JQ

STV reduces to IRV in the last round and shares many of the same flaws
as IRV including, but not limited to - unequal treatment of voters'
votes, hiding the 2nd and later choices of some voters not others,
nonmonotonicity, requires centralized counting or a huge number of
separate totals for each precinct (more than the number of precinct
voters in any case with large numbers of candidates), and thus
eviscerates election transparency and verifiability, and has potential
to create all sorts of anomalous outcomes.  In other words, is one of
the few voting methods that fails more of Arrow's fairness criteria
than plurality method and introduces extreme difficulties in
administering elections and verifying the integrity of outcomes.  Both
IRV and STV pose a serious threat the fairness and integrity of
elections IMO and I oppose these methods strongly.



-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174

View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] What's wrong with the party list system?

[James Gilmour]

Kathy Dopp  > Sent: Tuesday, July 05, 2011 2:30 AM
> 
> > On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 7:19 PM, James Gilmour 
> >
> > Kathy, your comments illustrate the fundamental problems with all 
> > party list voting systems: 1. you must have registered political 
> > parties;
> 
> As someone else noted in this thread already, registered 
> political parties are unnecessary to use the party list 
> system.  Candidates can simply put together their own lists.

But someone has to control, or take responsibility for, each list, even if it 
is only to submit it to the Returning Officer on
nomination day so that an agreed list will be printed on the ballot paper.  I 
am aware that in some jurisdictions otherwise
"independent" candidates can form "groups" for this purpose, but these groups 
are registered for the purpose of the election.


> > 2. each party must produce a list of candidates ordered in some way;
> 
> Each *list* is normally ordered - Yes.  But the list method 
> does not have to be done that way if it is an open list 
> system where voters can vote for candidates, and thus voters 
> determine the list order.  

In open-list systems the names of the candidates are printed on the ballot 
paper, under the respective party headings.  So the names
must be ordered in some way, even if it is alphabetical or random.  So the 
voters do NOT determine the order of the candidates in
each party's list.  The voters may vote in ways that determine which of the 
listed candidates is elected to one of that party's
seats, and determine the order in which the candidates in a list are elected, 
but that is all post-election.  The voters in the
public election do not in any way determine the order of the candidates in the 
parties' lists as those names appear on the printed
ballot papers.


> Most voters would disagree with 
> you and think it is a benefit to have the political party or 
> leading candidate put together the list order for them so as 
> to save the voters the time and effort it would take to 
> research all the candidates.

It is clearly "most voters" in some countries (because those voters appear 
happy with their present closed-lists), but others would
disagree and prefer to have some or a lot of choice in determining which of 
their favoured party's candidates should actually fill
the seats allocated to that party.  The voters could have a great deal of 
effect without having to research every candidate or
indicate a ranking for every candidate on their favoured party's list.


>  However, a less popular system, 
> would simply require voters to pick a candidate from the 
> list. 

I don't know what you mean by "less popular", but this (pick one candidate) is 
in fact a common version of open-list party-list.


> I suppose it's possible, as some have also commented 
> here, to allow voters to rank order a list, but that would be 
> administratively burdensome and probably not practical for 
> large national elections, as has been mentioned.

The practicality depends on the size of the electoral districts, and on how the 
candidates are presented.  In some countries there
is one national list for each party; in others, the votes are totally 
nationally, but the parties' list are presented on a regional
basis.


> > 3. voters are restricted (to a greater or lesser
> > degree) in how they can respond to the choices of representative 
> > offered to them.
> 
> Relative to some electoral methods that are less desirable in 
> other ways, perhaps.  However, the list system has many 
> benefits those other systems don't have, which is why it is 
> so popular in many countries - for nationwide legislative 
> bodies where other systems may not be practical or desirable.

Yes, even closed-list party-list delivers party PR in a way that some other 
systems do not, notably plurality in single-member
districts (UK, USA and Canada).  If there were no alternative, that would be an 
advance.  But we already know how to do better than
that.


> > All of these impose unnecessary limitations on
> > the PR of the voters that could be obtained by a less constrained 
> > voting system.
> 
> You might want to read up on the many studies of voting 
> behaviour - say American Voter Revisited or Controversies in 
> Voting Behavior. Most voters do not want to have to 
> investigate and individually rank hundreds of candidates, so 
> an open party list system where they are familiar with the 
> top ranked candidates on each list and have the chance to 
> vote for someone they prefer most to move them up the list.

I am certainly not recommending any voting system that would require voters to 
investigate and individually rank hundreds of
candidates.  That is both undesirable and unnecessary.  The number of 
candidates presented to voters in any one electoral district
is a function of electoral district size.

If the voter chooses a list headed by a familiar candidate and then has "the 
chance to vote for someone they prefer most", it MAY
mov

Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Kathy Dopp wrote:

On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:18 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
 wrote:

Kathy Dopp wrote:

Thanks Kristofer.  I ignored the "all* in "all others".

I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times. The Droop
quota seems to go hand in hand with IRV and STV methods.

Then the question you should ask is where you want to balance
proportionality and majoritarianism. When dealing with multiwinner
elections, there are two objectives that work against each other. On the one
hand, you'd want proportionality, so that variation in the electorate is
reflected by variation in the assembly or council. That is, you'd like it to
have members that some people like a lot. On the other, you'd want quality
across the board, i.e. candidates that every voter can like to some extent.


The questions I would ask are:

1.  how to minimize "unhappiness" of the voters.  (perhaps this is
similar or the same as "Bayesian regret"?), and
2. how to ensure all voters' votes are always treated equally.

In your scenario 55% of people hate 50% of the winners and 45% hate
(ranked last) 50% of the winners.  If the Center and Right win, only
45% of the voters hate 50% of the winners and everyone else is happy.
Also, in your scenario, often the voters' votes are treated unequally
and only some of the 2nd choices of some voters are counted - thus
causing undesirable results  -- on the part of a majority of voters --
on occasion.


If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates 
 hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the 
majority  criterion for a single-winner method as you did against the 
Droop proportionality criterion. That is, imagine an election of the sort:


51: Left > Center > Right
45: Right > Center > Left
 4: Center > Right > Left.

The majority criterion forces Left to win in a single-winner election. 
However, Left is hated by 49% of the voters.


Borda, which fails the majority criterion, would elect Center as a 
compromise. Center is not hated by any of the voters, and so by your 
metric, that would be a better outcome.


Yet I suppose that since you like the Condorcet criterion, you also like 
 the majority criterion that it implies. That means that some methods 
(like Borda) can be *too* centrist by your/the Condorcet measure.


It is, of course, possible to disregard majority rule entirely and 
instead focus on satisfaction, electing the alternative that would 
benefit the people the most. That is what Range is supposed to do, and 
does under certain assumptions (linear comparable utility functions, 
honest voting). It's relatively simple to imagine elections where such a 
 method would overrule a majority, e.g.


51 voters value X at 99%, Y at 50%, Z at 0%
49 voters value Y at 99%, Z at 10%, X at 0%,

where the majority choice (X) makes the minority quite unhappy (assuming
these are honest votes, comparable, etc), but where the compromise, Y,
leaves the majority satisfied and the minority happy. By Range's logic, 
electing Y is the *right* thing to do (and it produces the least 
Bayesian regret) - but doing so does fail the majority and Condorcet 
criteria.



I.e. I'm looking at satisfying the most number of voters and fairness,
*and* on proportionality - but a much greater proportion of voters
avoid dissatisfaction by avoiding the Droop quota requirement and
looking at all voters' 2nd choices.


How much proportionality for how much satisfication? Majority rule is 
itself a sort of proportionality (single-seat proportionality, that is), 
in that a majority can control the outcome. Droop seems to be another 
sort of proportionality: per-seat majorities, if you will.



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Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation

[Kathy Dopp]

On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:20 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
 wrote:

> If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates
>  hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the majority
>  criterion for a single-winner method as you did against the Droop
> proportionality criterion. That is, imagine an election of the sort:
>
> 51: Left > Center > Right
> 45: Right > Center > Left
>  4: Center > Right > Left.
>
> The majority criterion forces Left to win in a single-winner election.
> However, Left is hated by 49% of the voters.

Yes. Of course I totally agree that with a rank choice ballot, the
Droop quota also is not a good idea.  (Droop quota is the same as
majority in a single winner election.)

>
> Borda, which fails the majority criterion, would elect Center as a
> compromise. Center is not hated by any of the voters, and so by your metric,
> that would be a better outcome.

Yes. I agree completely with that.

>
> Yet I suppose that since you like the Condorcet criterion, you also like
>  the majority criterion that it implies. That means that some methods (like
> Borda) can be *too* centrist by your/the Condorcet measure.

Huh!?  One obviously is not equivalent to the other, so "No".

Sorry. Too busy today to go through the rest of your statements currently.


-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174

View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
> 51: Left > Center > Right
> 45: Right > Center > Left
>  4: Center > Right > Left.
>
> The majority criterion forces Left to win in a single-winner election.
> However, Left is hated by 49% of the voters.
>

Just to point out the obvious here: Center would lose even with up to 49% of
the vote in this situation.

JQ

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Re: [EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/7/5 Kathy Dopp 

> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:20 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
>  wrote:
>
> > If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates
> >  hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the
> majority
> >  criterion for a single-winner method as you did against the Droop
> > proportionality criterion. That is, imagine an election of the sort:
> >
> > 51: Left > Center > Right
> > 45: Right > Center > Left
> >  4: Center > Right > Left.
> >
> > The majority criterion forces Left to win in a single-winner election.
> > However, Left is hated by 49% of the voters.
>
> Yes. Of course I totally agree that with a rank choice ballot, the
> Droop quota also is not a good idea.  (Droop quota is the same as
> majority in a single winner election.)
>
> >
> > Borda, which fails the majority criterion, would elect Center as a
> > compromise. Center is not hated by any of the voters, and so by your
> metric,
> > that would be a better outcome.
>
> Yes. I agree completely with that.
>
> >
> > Yet I suppose that since you like the Condorcet criterion, you also like
> >  the majority criterion that it implies. That means that some methods
> (like
> > Borda) can be *too* centrist by your/the Condorcet measure.
>
> Huh!?  One obviously is not equivalent to the other, so "No".
>
> Sorry. Too busy today to go through the rest of your statements currently.
>
>
The problem is, that any election system which doesn't obey the majority
criterion (or, for multiple seats, the Droop criterion) is essentially
asking for strategy. As Charles Dodgson wrote, it makes elections into a
game which the most skillful player wins, the rule of which is, whenever the
choice is between two alternatives you don't like, you must support the less
popular one. At best, you get a system you didn't ask for (ie, Approval
instead of Range); at worst, you elect a useless nobody or a scheming
bastard. And  whether it's true or not, sore losers will whine that they
only lost because of strategy.

So yes, majority democracy is the worst system, except for all the others.
And the same goes for the Droop criterion in a proportional context.

JQ

ps. OK, to be fair, at best you get mostly-approval instead of range, and
mostly-approval is better than approval. But that doesn't compensate for the
worst case where you elect a scheming bastard, or for all the ready-made
argument you're handing to sore losers.

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Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?

[Jameson Quinn]

Russ, you said that SODA was too complicated. In my prior message, I
responded by saying that it was actually pretty simple. But thanks for your
feedback; I realize that the SODA page was not conveying that simplicity
well. I've changed the procedure there from 8 individual steps to 4 steps -
simple one-sentence overviews - with the details in sub-steps. Of these 4
steps, only step 1 is not in your proposal. And the whole of step 4 is just
three words.

The procedure is exactly the same, but I hope that this
versiondoes
a better job of communicating the purpose and underlying simplicity of
the system.

Thanks,
Jameson

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[EM] SODA

[fsimmons]

Jameson suggested that the SODA candidates make their approval decisions 
sequentially instead of 
simultaneously.

The problem with this is that if a winning candidate moves to first place in 
the sequence by an increase 
in support, she may become a losing candidate:

Assume sincere preferences are

35 A>B>C
34 B>C>A
31 C>A>B

If approval decisions are made in descending order of faction size A, B, C, 
then B wins.

If B gains more support so that the totals become

34 A>B>C
35 B>C>A
31 C>A>B,

the sequential order becomes B, A, C, and the winner will be C.

Going from smallest to largest has its problems, too.  I don't think it fixes 
the monotonicity problem, and 
it introduces other problems like changing what would be the game of chicken in 
the simultaneous case 
into a clear cut win for the smaller faction:

49 C
27 A>B
24 B>A

In the simultaneous case there is a game of chicken between A and B.

In the sequential case whichever member of the set {A,B} goes first wins.

How can we fix this?

How about allowing the largest faction (in this example 49 C) to go second, and 
making the second 
largest faction (in this example 27 A>B) go first?

That would also work in the example above.  How bad would it be in a worst case 
example?

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Re: [EM] SODA

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/7/5 

> Jameson suggested that the SODA candidates make their approval decisions
> sequentially instead of
> simultaneously.
>
> The problem with this is that if a winning candidate moves to first place
> in the sequence by an increase
> in support, she may become a losing candidate:
>
> Assume sincere preferences are
>
> 35 A>B>C
> 34 B>C>A
> 31 C>A>B
>
> If approval decisions are made in descending order of faction size A, B, C,
> then B wins.
>
> If B gains more support so that the totals become
>
> 34 A>B>C
> 35 B>C>A
> 31 C>A>B,
>
> the sequential order becomes B, A, C, and the winner will be C.
>

No. B still wins. If A feels that C is winning, then A can delegate to B,
and then B cannot lose. So C cannot be the winner. And therefore B will
delegate to C, to force A's hand. Whether or not C delegates then is
irrelevant.

Of course, if A actually prefers C to B, and has managed to keep B ignorant
of this fact, then C will win. But then, in such a case, A could have gotten
the same result by being honest from the start.

>
>
> How can we fix this?
>
>
I don't think there's anything that needs fixing, though you may find
another example to show I'm wrong.


> How about allowing the largest faction (in this example 49 C) to go second,
> and making the second
> largest faction (in this example 27 A>B) go first?
>
> That would also work in the example above.  How bad would it be in a worst
> case example?
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>

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Re: [EM] SODA

[fsimmons]

I thought that A was required to make her approvals consistent with her 
ordering, i.e. to approve 
everybody ranked above her cutoff.  Doesn't that mean she is required to 
approve herself?

Maybe I'm thinking of an older version of SODA.

I hope you are right that there is nothing to fix.


- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn 
Date: Tuesday, July 5, 2011 1:07 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] SODA
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com

> 2011/7/5 
> 
> > Jameson suggested that the SODA candidates make their approval 
> decisions> sequentially instead of
> > simultaneously.
> >
> > The problem with this is that if a winning candidate moves to 
> first place
> > in the sequence by an increase
> > in support, she may become a losing candidate:
> >
> > Assume sincere preferences are
> >
> > 35 A>B>C
> > 34 B>C>A
> > 31 C>A>B
> >
> > If approval decisions are made in descending order of faction 
> size A, B, C,
> > then B wins.
> >
> > If B gains more support so that the totals become
> >
> > 34 A>B>C
> > 35 B>C>A
> > 31 C>A>B,
> >
> > the sequential order becomes B, A, C, and the winner will be C.
> >
> 
> No. B still wins. If A feels that C is winning, then A can 
> delegate to B,
> and then B cannot lose. So C cannot be the winner. And therefore 
> B will
> delegate to C, to force A's hand. Whether or not C delegates 
> then is
> irrelevant.
> 
> Of course, if A actually prefers C to B, and has managed to keep 
> B ignorant
> of this fact, then C will win. But then, in such a case, A could 
> have gotten
> the same result by being honest from the start.
> 
> >
> >
> > How can we fix this?
> >
> >
> I don't think there's anything that needs fixing, though you may find
> another example to show I'm wrong.
> 
> 
> > How about allowing the largest faction (in this example 49 C) 
> to go second,
> > and making the second
> > largest faction (in this example 27 A>B) go first?
> >
> > That would also work in the example above. How bad would it 
> be in a worst
> > case example?
> > 
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em 
> for list info
> >
> 

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Re: [EM] SODA

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/7/5, fsimm...@pcc.edu :
>
> I thought that A was required to make her approvals consistent with her
> ordering, i.e. to approve
> everybody ranked above her cutoff.  Doesn't that mean she is required to
> approve herself?
>
> Maybe I'm thinking of an older version of SODA.
>
> I hope you are right that there is nothing to fix.

Let's do this slowly. Here's the scenario:

 34 A>B>C
 35 B>C>A
 31 C>A>B,

B delegates first. B delegates to B,C. Totals are now C 66, B35, A34.
A's turn. If A does not delegate, C will be winning when it comes to
C's turn, and so C will not delegate. So A delegates to A,B. Totals
are now B69, C66, A34. C's turn. C is unhappy with B and so delegates
to C,A - but it's not enough. Final totals are B69, C66, A65.

I believe that the correct strategy for any combination of delegable
and undelegable votes (including minor, non-Smith candidates) in a
3-candidate Smith set is always for everyone to approve two members of
the Smith set if they care between the bottom two. This gives the same
result as minimax and most Condorcet methods. I haven't proven this,
and I don't have a general understanding of strategy for larger Smith
sets.

It is possible, when there are 3 or more near-clones A1, A2, A3...
running against a different candidate B with almost 50% - that is, B
can beat any combination of fewer than all the A's, and B has no
preference among the A's - that the true Condorcet winner among the
A's is subject to center squeeze, and the A's are forced to throw
their support to whichever of them has the most delegable votes, in
order to prevent B from winning. The upshot is that SODA, even
assuming candidates are honest in their pre-vote rankings and
strategic in their delegation, does not pass the Condorcet criterion,
but does pass the majority Condorcet criterion (that is, a pairwise
winner always wins if each of the pairwise wins constitutes a
majority). But I can't find any nonmonotonic scenario pairs, so this
"Plurality within the faction" is the worst result I can find. I think
that it's both unlikely and, really, not so bad.

JQ

>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: Jameson Quinn
> Date: Tuesday, July 5, 2011 1:07 pm
> Subject: Re: [EM] SODA
> To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>
>> 2011/7/5
>>
>> > Jameson suggested that the SODA candidates make their approval
>> decisions> sequentially instead of
>> > simultaneously.
>> >
>> > The problem with this is that if a winning candidate moves to
>> first place
>> > in the sequence by an increase
>> > in support, she may become a losing candidate:
>> >
>> > Assume sincere preferences are
>> >
>> > 35 A>B>C
>> > 34 B>C>A
>> > 31 C>A>B
>> >
>> > If approval decisions are made in descending order of faction
>> size A, B, C,
>> > then B wins.
>> >
>> > If B gains more support so that the totals become
>> >
>> > 34 A>B>C
>> > 35 B>C>A
>> > 31 C>A>B,
>> >
>> > the sequential order becomes B, A, C, and the winner will be C.
>> >
>>
>> No. B still wins. If A feels that C is winning, then A can
>> delegate to B,
>> and then B cannot lose. So C cannot be the winner. And therefore
>> B will
>> delegate to C, to force A's hand. Whether or not C delegates
>> then is
>> irrelevant.
>>
>> Of course, if A actually prefers C to B, and has managed to keep
>> B ignorant
>> of this fact, then C will win. But then, in such a case, A could
>> have gotten
>> the same result by being honest from the start.
>>
>> >
>> >
>> > How can we fix this?
>> >
>> >
>> I don't think there's anything that needs fixing, though you may find
>> another example to show I'm wrong.
>>
>>
>> > How about allowing the largest faction (in this example 49 C)
>> to go second,
>> > and making the second
>> > largest faction (in this example 27 A>B) go first?
>> >
>> > That would also work in the example above. How bad would it
>> be in a worst
>> > case example?
>> > 
>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
>> for list info
>> >
>>
>

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Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?

[Russ Paielli]

On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:14 AM, Juho Laatu  wrote:

> On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:
>
> If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end
>> up using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that
>> approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order.
>> Votes would be counted right away for each branch, and the candidate of the
>> largest brach of the largest branch of the ... would win.
>>
>
> That sounds interesting, but I'm not sure I understand what you mean. Can
> you give an example?
>
>
> Here's one example.
>
> Tree of candidates + number of personal votes + sum of votes of candidates
> of each branch:
>
> Branch1 (13)
> Branch1.1 (7)
> A (4)
> B (3)
> Branch1.2 (6)
> C (6)
> Branch2 (18)
> Branch2.1 (12)
> D (5)
> E (7)
> Branch2.2 (5)
> F (3)
> G (2)
> Branch2.3 (1)
> H (1)
>
> - Branch2 has more votes than Branch1 => Branch2 wins
> - Branch2.1 has more votes than Branch2.2 and Branch2.3 => Branch2.1 wins
> - candidate E has more votes than candidate D => candidate E wins
>
> The tree approach thus forces the order of transfer to be non-cyclic. The
> transfer order of candidate E is E > D > {F, G, H}.
>
> The tree format can be printed on paper and it is easy to grasp. The ballot
> sheet may also follow the same tree format. Branches may have names (e.g.
> party names) or be unnamed. Left wing parties could join forces under one
> branch. Candidates of one party could be divided in smaller groups. Or maybe
> the branches have no party names and party affiliations, maybe just
> descriptive names, maybe no branch names at all.
>
>
Thanks for the example, but I don't understand. Who decides what the
branches are, and based on what? Why is E transferring votes if E has the
most votes? And what are the counts after each transfer? Sorry if those are
dumb questions.

--Russ P.

-- 
http://RussP.us

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Re: [EM] Has this idea been considered?

[Russ Paielli]

On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> Russ, you said that SODA was too complicated. In my prior message, I
> responded by saying that it was actually pretty simple. But thanks for your
> feedback; I realize that the SODA page was not conveying that simplicity
> well. I've changed the procedure there from 8 individual steps to 4 steps -
> simple one-sentence overviews - with the details in sub-steps. Of these 4
> steps, only step 1 is not in your proposal. And the whole of step 4 is just
> three words.
>
> The procedure is exactly the same, but I hope that this 
> versiondoes
>  a better job of communicating the purpose and underlying simplicity of
> the system.
>
>
I still think that's too complicated. The whole "do not delegate" option is
over the top -- way over the top for major public elections. Also, the
week-long delay after the initial count is unacceptable. Why is it necessary
if, as you say, "the correct strategies for all candidates and the resulting
winner will already be obvious"?

Yeah, I know it's frustrating. Back when I was somewhat active on this list,
I got caught up in complicated schemes, but I eventually realized I was
kidding myself to think that those schemes will ever see the light of day in
major public elections. What is the limit of complexity that the general
public will accept on a large scale? I don't know, but I have my doubts that
anything beyond simple Approval will ever pass muster -- and even that will
be a hard sell.

Your SODA rules may be mathematically sublime and beautiful, but it won't
matter. Once you start explaining it to the general public, people will just
roll their eyes ask what you are smoking to make you think that these rules
would ever be used in a major election. I wish it weren't so, but I'm afraid
it is.

If you take out the "do not delegate" option and eliminate the week-long
delay, you might have a better chance, but even that will be a very tough
sell.

Regards,
Russ

-- 
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