[EM] Preferential Party List Method Proposal
All current forms of party list proportional representation have each voter cast a vote for a single party. I say this is inadequate since a small party can be eliminated and hence denied any representation (this is particularly relevant if the legislature has a threshold). However, votes for a party that doesn't have sufficient support to win any seats in the legislature are simply wasted. Thus I propose an alternative method. Each voter votes for as many parties as they wish in a defined order. My vote might be democratgreenlibertarianrepublican or something like that. Anyway, first we calculate each party's weight. Weight is calculated simply by counting the number of times the party appears on a voter's ballot in any position (this should be reminiscent of approval voting). Each party also has a status hopeful, elected, or disqualified. Next, pick your favorite allocation method. D'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Largest Remainder, anything else you can think of, with or without a threshold. We then use this allocation method to determine each party's mandate if everyone voted for their first preference. If every hopeful party has at least one seat, then all the hopeful parties are declared elected. If at least one hopeful party has no seats at all, the party with the lowest weight is disqualified, its votes are redistributed, and the allocation is done again with the new list of hopeful parties. This method has some advantages over traditional systems. People would not be motivated to betray their favorite party for fear that it will lack enough support to win any seats in the legislature and hence their vote would be wasted. This method can also be slightly modified into a cardinal method, with a voter's first choice being defined as the highest rated party on their ballot remaining and weight being calculated by the arithmetic mean of a party's rating à la Range Voting. This class of voting method is probably compatible with MMP, but I haven't yet worked out the details of how that would work. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Preferential Party List Method Proposal
Greg Nisbet Sent: Saturday, August 13, 2011 10:25 PM All current forms of party list proportional representation have each voter cast a vote for a single party. I say this is inadequate since a small party can be eliminated and hence denied any representation (this is particularly relevant if the legislature has a threshold). However, votes for a party that doesn't have sufficient support to win any seats in the legislature are simply wasted. Not necessarily so. See apparentement. Parties can chain their votes so that fewer votes are wasted in the seat allocation calculations. James Gilmour Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Preferential Party List Method Proposal
On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 6:21 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.comwrote: Glad to see thinking, though we part company on some details. On Aug 13, 2011, at 5:25 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote: All current forms of party list proportional representation have each voter cast a vote for a single party. I say this is inadequate since a small party can be eliminated and hence denied any representation (this is particularly relevant if the legislature has a threshold). However, votes for a party that doesn't have sufficient support to win any seats in the legislature are simply wasted. Thus I propose an alternative method. That some party may get zero seats, that does NOT make their attempt a pure waste: .If they are growing, they are on the way - and a warning to other parties that their apparent goals deserve more attention - perhaps to be honored by those who do get seats. Under this system, we would in fact see greater support for small parties since it is less of a gamble. Even IF my first choice (probably a niche party) does not get a seat, my vote will be eventually transferred to a party that *does* have a seat. This means that I'm more likely to support my first choice to begin with. (This isn't fool proof though in the original formulation ... ranking other parties at all increases their weight which helps them compete against my preferred niche party, I don't think this is a huge vulnerability though and it can be solved by allowing greater flexibility in rankings). I would base the voting and counting on the ranking we do in Condorcet for single seats - same N*N matrix and whoever would be CW be first elected, with next the one who would be CW if the first CW was excluded. . If the above could elect too many from any one party, exclude remaining candidates from that party on reaching the limit. . Note that the N*N matrix has value that does not often get mentioned - it is worth studying as to pairs of candidates, besides its base value of deciding the election. I'm sure I don't have to remind you a Condorcet Winner does not always exist. I don't completely understand your description of your method. How does it work with parties? Each voter votes for as many parties as they wish in a defined order. My vote might be democratgreenlibertarian**republican or something like that. Anyway, first we calculate each party's weight. Weight is calculated simply by counting the number of times the party appears on a voter's ballot in any position (this should be reminiscent of approval voting). Each party also has a status hopeful, elected, or disqualified. Next, pick your favorite allocation method. D'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Largest Remainder, anything else you can think of, with or without a threshold. We then use this allocation method to determine each party's mandate if everyone voted for their first preference. If every hopeful party has at least one seat, then all the hopeful parties are declared elected. If at least one hopeful party has no seats at all, the party with the lowest weight is disqualified, its votes are redistributed, and the allocation is done again with the new list of hopeful parties. I see first preference and think of avoiding IRV's problems - which the above ranking attends to. I am assuming candidates identified with their parties, and parties getting seats via their candidates getting seats. Thus, once all the seats get filled, remaining parties - due to their lack of strong candidates - get no seats. My system does not have voters voting for candidates at all. In fact, candidates needn't even exist (theoretically of course) for my method to be well-defined. Instead people simply vote for parties, with parties that can't get any seats dropped from the lowest weight first. Making the system more candidate-centric could be done, but my algorithm (or class of algorithms) is supposed to be a minimal, easily analyzable change from non-preferential party list methods. This method has some advantages over traditional systems. People would not be motivated to betray their favorite party for fear that it will lack enough support to win any seats in the legislature and hence their vote would be wasted. This method can also be slightly modified into a cardinal method, with a voter's first choice being defined as the highest rated party on their ballot remaining and weight being calculated by the arithmetic mean of a party's rating à la Range Voting. This class of voting method is probably compatible with MMP, but I haven't yet worked out the details of how that would work. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] School of Election Science on Wikiversity
Thanks for the welcome Abd, and thanks for answering my question. Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: Well, take a look around Wikiversity. If you are interested, participate. Or just watch, or just wait. As your proxy, I'll contact you if I think your participation might be needed in something. If you like, you can chat up delegable proxy. Or ask questions about the Assembly, etc. I'm especially interested in the actual practice of the Assembly. I'll wait to see how it unfolds. I see that you do have some MediaWiki and WikiMedia Foundation experience. That's great. Really only the former. We develop electoral/legislative software that incorporates MediaWiki. See pollwiki and streetwiki: http://zelea.com/project/outcast/_overview.xht I've formally welcomed you, so that put your Talk page on my Watchlist. You might consider putting my User Talk page on your Watchlist. Done, thank you. This is public, on the EM list, and that's fine, there is no secret here. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Preferential Party List Method Proposal
Message: 2 Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 00:32:14 +0100 From: James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: Re: [EM] Preferential Party List Method Proposal Message-ID: 1E8F1DC34EB34C50A49239C7C1BA6CCB@u2amd Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Greg Nisbet Sent: Saturday, August 13, 2011 10:25 PM All current forms of party list proportional representation have each voter cast a vote for a single party. I say this is inadequate since a small party can be eliminated and hence denied any representation (this is particularly relevant if the legislature has a threshold). However, votes for a party that doesn't have sufficient support to win any seats in the legislature are simply wasted. Not necessarily so. See apparentement. Parties can chain their votes so that fewer votes are wasted in the seat allocation calculations. James Gilmour Apparentement as it were (or even panachage, as the Swiss allow), still are not the same type of method as the type I propose. Apparentement, as I am now aware exists, is solely at the discretion of the parties, and thus doesn't reflect the wishes of the voters directly, and as such cannot truthfully be called a preferential allocation method since it does not allow the expression of arbitrary preferences and panachage is too candidate-centric and not flexible enough to be a method of the same ilk as the one I propose. I thank you for educating me on this matter, but believe I am nevertheless technically correct (at least by a reasonable definition of preferential method). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
