[EM] The meaning of this discussion (or lack thereof)

[Michael Allan]

matt welland wrote:
> I did not say that a "vote has little meaning", I said that it is
> meaningless to discuss the individual vote! Those are two vastly
> different things.

Well, I think what you said is wrong.  Here is the original version:

> > > The meaning of an individual vote is mostly irrelevant and
> > > pointless to discuss. ...

This implies that the individual vote itself is irrelevant.  I wish to
clarify your intention on that point: are you saying that the
individual vote is irrelevant?

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/


matt welland wrote:
> On Sun, 2011-08-28 at 23:24 -0400, Michael Allan wrote:
> > Matt, Dave and Fred,
> > 
> > > > > The meaning of an individual vote is mostly irrelevant ...
> > > >
> > > > The individual vote itself is irrelevant?  We know that the vote
> > > > is the formal expression of what a person thinks in regard to an
> > > > electoral issue.  Do you mean:
> > > >   (a) What the person thinks is irrelevant in reality?  Or,
> > > >   (b) What the person thinks is irrelevant to the election method?
> > 
> > Matt Welland wrote:
> > > (c) Discussing the meaning of an individual vote is mostly
> > > pointless
> > 
> > I can understand why you might want to dodge the question.  You've
> > taken a position that is difficult to defend.
> 
> Huh? Nothing to defend, if you continue to think that the "meaning of an
> individual vote" is worthy of analysis then more power to you. The (a)
> and (b) answers completely missed the point of my original statement so
> I added (c).
> 
> > > > The election method cannot tell you, "there are ten thousand
> > > > people who share your values and will vote as you vote" ...
> > > 
> > > Here in the US we have these things called "polls" which happen
> > > periodically prior to the real election. ...
> > 
> > I know.  Stuff happens outside of the election and beyond the reach of
> > the formal method, even (sometimes) unexpected stuff that the original
> > designers had no experience or understanding of.  Maybe later we can
> > say something about these.  For now, if you agree, let's return to the
> > topic and look at the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof).
> > 
> > You claim that the vote has little meaning, and I claim it has none at
> > all.  In either case, I think we can show that the election method is
> > consequently flawed.  Once we recognize the flaw and understand its
> > nature, then we can attempt to trace its consequences, including the
> > work of the polsters.
> 
> I did not say that a "vote has little meaning", I said that it is
> meaningless to discuss the individual vote! Those are two vastly
> different things.
> 
> In my original response I voiced the opinion that analyzing a vote in
> isolation is meaningless. Well, mostly meaningless. I then had some fun
> contradicting myself and went ahead and gave some simple mathematical
> meaning to a single vote and illustrated how approval gives the voter N
> times more voting power than plurality where N is the number of
> candidates.
> 
> In my opinion your claim that an individual vote has no meaning is wrong
> and all one has to do is look at the real world to see that. What is
> interesting is that I think it may be possible to show the relative
> value of a vote for each system. 
> 
> Value of a vote per system:
> V=number of voters, N=number of candidates
> 
> Plurality: 1/(N*V)
> Approval:  1/V
> Condorcet: 1/(2*V)
> Range: 1/V
> 
> etc.

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

[Jameson Quinn]

Please do your work on the google
doc.
If
you understand how, please post the changes here when you're done (to help
involve others in the discussion).

JQ

2011/8/28 Richard Fobes 

> I'll try to find a balance.  I too recognize the importance of starting by
> educating voters through non-governmental elections -- so that later it will
> be much easier to get fairer election methods adopted in governmental
> elections.  Yet I was wondering if maybe this explanation about Roberts
> Rules of Order was too long, and based on the feedback I'll try to shorten
> it.  Also I think I can merge it with another request to cover multiple
> rounds of voting, which is not yet covered -- and which also is important.
>
> The other two paragraphs I expect to keep in the next draft -- at the end
> as a part of the summary -- but they can be removed if they prove to be
> disliked.
>
> I'll start working on the next draft. It will be longer than the first
> because of all the additions that were requested, but fortunately I expect
> to be able to shorten it in a few places.
>
> Richard Fobes
>
>
>
> On 8/28/2011 2:13 PM, Ralph Suter wrote:
>
>> Even if improving public elections is the statement's primary aim, that
>> needn't be its only aim -- nor, I'm convinced, should it be.
>>
>> One point I've tried to make is that one of the best practical means for
>> improving the prospects for reforming difficult-to-change public
>> elections would be to promote the use of alternative voting and
>> representation methods for use in non-public elections and other kinds
>> of decisionmaking processes (both public and non-public), including not
>> only formal ones such as organizational and formal meeting elections and
>> decisions but also informal ones that involve small and temporary groups
>> -- and for not only critically important decisions such as presidential
>> elections and constitutional referendums but also much less important
>> decisions such as groups of friends and co-workers deciding where to eat
>> lunch together. (For the latter, I believe approval voting and other
>> quick and simple methods are, in virtually all cases, indisputably
>> better than more complicated and time-consuming though maybe technically
>> superior ones.)
>>
>> The important things to keep in mind regarding this point are, first,
>> that it is much easier to experiment with alternative voting and
>> representation methods in other than public elections and, second, that
>> doing so has the great added advantage of helping educate people about
>> alternative methods and (hopefully) helping persuade much larger numbers
>> of people that some alternative methods would be great improvements over
>> plurality voting and single-representative legislative districts for use
>> in public elections.
>>
>> -RS
>>
>> On 8/28/2011 12:45 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>
>>> I question adding this collection of paragraphs to the major
>>> declaration, which seems more aimed at improving public elections.
>>>
>> 
>>
>
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>

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Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
> > NOT true, for the vote, without the voter's vote, could be a tie - and
> > the voter's vote mattering.
>
> That notion of effect has several drawbacks:
>

...all of which merely serve to minimize its practical importance, not to
assail its mathematical validity.


> ...  But if we (this is my
> hope) can cogently demonstrate this failing to the experts in this
> list, especially in terms of the voting mechanisms they understand so
> well, then they will be more open to drawing the larger conclusions
> that seem so obvious to you and me, and I daresay others in this list.


I've been trying to avoid entering this sub-thread, as I think it's mostly
angels-on-pinheads stuff, but if you actually have a point, I suggest you
make it, rather than portentiously musing on how it depends on a
supposedly-proven, but still-debated claim.

Jameson Quinn

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Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Aug 29, 2011, at 6:25 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> Dave Ketchum wrote:
> > NOT true, for the vote, without the voter's vote, could be a tie - and
> > the voter's vote mattering.
> 
> That notion of effect has several drawbacks:
> 
> ...all of which merely serve to minimize its practical importance, not to 
> assail its mathematical validity.
>  
> ...  But if we (this is my
> hope) can cogently demonstrate this failing to the experts in this
> list, especially in terms of the voting mechanisms they understand so
> well, then they will be more open to drawing the larger conclusions
> that seem so obvious to you and me, and I daresay others in this list.
> 
> I've been trying to avoid entering this sub-thread, as I think it's mostly 
> angels-on-pinheads stuff, but if you actually have a point, I suggest you 
> make it, rather than portentiously musing on how it depends on a 
> supposedly-proven, but still-debated claim.
> 

The usual argument that I've seen is that the expected utility of casting a 
vote (the utility of the result you favor, however you might measure that, 
times the probability that your vote will be decisive) is so small (because the 
probability is small) that the cost of casting the vote outweighs its utility. 

The validity of the argument depends on the election, of course. In a small 
enough voting body, it's not true. OTOH, it's obviously true for a US 
presidential voter in California, who we can safely assert will never be 
decisive in a presidential election. (And yet voters cast presidential votes in 
California.)
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Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)

[Kathy Dopp]

> From: matt welland 
> To: EM Methods 
> Subject: Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof) and a
>        (new?) metric for voting systems

>
> Here in the US we have these things called "polls" which happen
> periodically prior to the real election. Other information sources might
> include attending political rallies and noticing the number of people
> attending, talking with friends and so forth.
>

FYI, Virtually all U.S. opinion polls, including the ANES Michigan U
academic polls adjust their samples (remove people from the sample) to
adjust the samples to match US election results based on the
unaudited, unchecked officially reported vote tallies.  Thus, if US
election results are being manipulated by any of the insiders who
secretly "secure" and process US ballots or who secretly count US
votes without any independent scrutiny or public oversight, then the
opinion polls are biased and do not give any more of a true picture of
US opinion than do the secretly processed and tallied US ballots, some
of which are even secretly cast (DRE votes).  We have very little, if
any, reason to believe in the integrity and accuracy of any close
election outcomes in the U.S. in the vast majority of US states, and
for the same reasons, we should be skeptical of virtually all US
opinion polls and the research based on them.

There are many many ways to tamper undetectably with election outcomes
in the US today, because there are  no routine procedures in place to
detect such tampering.

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174

View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

[Fred Gohlke]

Good Afternoon, Mr. Suter

You made excellent points with brevity and clarity.

Thank you,

Fred Gohlke


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Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)

[Fred Gohlke]

Good Afternoon, Michael

re: "... every voter has that right (to influence the choice of
 candidates and the issues on which they vote), but is
 forever cheated of it precisely because the election method
 grants no electoral power whatsoever to the voter, but
 instead renders his or her vote entirely meaningless in any
 practical sense.  As you say, it is not "worth a tinker's
 dam."  But if we (this is my hope) can cogently demonstrate
 this failing to the experts in this list, especially in
 terms of the voting mechanisms they understand so well, then
 they will be more open to drawing the larger conclusions
 that seem so obvious to you and me, and I daresay others in
 this list."

And my hope, as well.

Your reference to the experts made me think of Will Durant's 
observations in the preface to the second edition of The Story of 
Philosophy[1]:


  "... philosophy itself, which had once summoned all sciences
   to its aid in making a coherent image of the world and an
   alluring picture of the good, found its task of coordination
   too stupendous for its courage, ran away from all these
   battlefronts of truth, and hid itself in recondite and narrow
   lanes, timidly secure from the issues and responsibilities of
   life."

and

  "... The specialist put on blinders in order to shut out from
   his vision all the world but one little spot, to which he
   glued his nose.  Perspective was lost.  "Facts" replaced
   understanding; and knowledge, split into a thousand isolated
   fragments, no longer generated wisdom.  Every science, and
   every branch of philosophy, developed a technical terminology
   intelligible only to its exclusive devotees; ..."

Let us hope we can find a tiny chink in this formidable armor so we can 
consider the purpose of Electoral Methods as well as the mechanics.


Fred Gohlke

1. pp v, vi, The Story of Philosophy, Will Durant

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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

[Jameson Quinn]

The latest changes to the voting reform consensus
statement(copied
from file:revision history. Changes show as green, apologies to
those with text-only mail clients which won't show the difference between
unchanged, new, and removed text.)

-

We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in which
there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer several
ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably
produce much fairer results. The systems we suggest offer different
advantages, but we agree to suggest the simplest of them, Approval voting,
as a good first step to reform. We also endorse any of many possible
proportional representation (PR) systems to solve the problems of
gerrymandered single-seat elections for legislatures.

.

 * Bucklin voting, which uses ranked ballots, and which initially counts
only the most-preferred candidate on each ballot, and identifies a winner
only if that candidate receives a majority of votes, and which successively
adds consideration for lower-ranked candidates until a majority outcome is
reached.

* Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots and pairwise counting to
compare each candidate with each of the other candidates, with the winner
being the candidate who is pairwise preferred over each and every other
candidate. In some elections none of the candidates will win all of their
pairwise comparisons, so there are variations that resolve these cases. In
practical use, such situations will be rare, so while we may debate about
which “cycle resolution” method is best, we unanimously endorse any of the
various computable Condorcet methods which have serious advocates.

* Majority Choice Approval, which uses score ballots, and elects a candidate
with the highest median score. {footnote: Other similar median-based methods
exist, and are sometimes called “Bucklin” methods. If the term “median” is
too technical, they can be described equivalently as methods which attempt
to pick the highest possible ratings threshold such that the winner is
ranked above that threshold by a majority of voters. We would endorse such
methods if there were a serious proposal to implement a specific one of
them.}




(The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is needed.)

These methods have different advantages, and we disagree about which of them
are the overall best systems for public elections. However, despite these
disagreements, we can agree that Approval Voting represents a step towards
whatever system we feel is ideal. It also has the advantage that it is a
simple, well-defined system, with no room for distracting disagreements
about trivial details. And of course, to reiterate, it would be a
substantial improvement over plurality. Therefore, while few of us feel that
Approval is the absolutely ideal system, we find that it is the best
consensus endorsement, and we agree to work together to promote its
adoption, without abandoning the right to individually promote others of the
systems above.

The Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed descriptions and
characteristics of these methods.




Most of us agree that an even better choice would be to adopt an election
method in which the choice of who wins one seat interacts with who wins
another equivalent seat in ways that ensure that the overall composition of
the legislature at least roughly matches the preferences of the voters,
especially in terms of political-party preferences. However, we disagree
about which election method best serves this purposeThere are many systems
for accomplishing this “proportional representation” (PR). While the
signatories to this statement reserve our right to disagree with specific PR
systems, we believe that the broad majority of such systems would be clear
improvements over even the most impartially-drawn single-member districts,
and would get our unanimous endorsement..

Most European nations (but not the United Kingdom) use "party list”
proportional
representation" to match legislative representatives with the
political-party preferences of the voters. Specifically, when electing
members of parliament (MPs) by this method, voters not only vote for a
candidate, but they also indicate their favorite political party.
Proportional representation then makes adjustments to ensure that the
percentage of legislative seats filled by members of each party roughly
matches the percentage of voters who support each party. In other words, if
15% of the voters mark the Green Party as their favorite, then approximately
15% of the parliamentary seats are filled by Green Party politicians.

Proportional representation methods typically use either "open lists",
"closed lists", or “candidate-centric” methods to determine which
politicians are se

[EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

[Toby Pereira]

I've just been looking at the statement - 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US&pli=1#


I think overall it's pretty good, but there are a couple of things I thought 
I'd 
mention. It seems to repeat itself:
 
"Four of the counting methods that we agree would produce significantly better 
results compared to plurality voting are, in alphabetical order:"
 
And then:
 
"Yet most of us also agree that we will support the adoption of any of the 
supported methods, namely, in alphabetical order:"
 
followed by the same list. I think that it can therefore be shortened a bit. I 
think it can probably also be shortened elsewhere, but it depends on how long 
you think is reasonable for it to be.
 
Also in the second list it individually lists the Condorcet methods. It also 
says "the Condorcet methods" implying that it is an exhaustive list. But 
anyway, 
I don't think it is probably necessary to list them at all.
 
Also, and I think this has been mentioned, it refers to election-method 
experts, 
and that may put some of us off signing.
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[EM] Simpler URL for Election Methods forum?

[Richard Fobes]

Currently the URL for the Election-Methods forum is:

http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com

Question: Can the site's admin person add a "redirect" to allow a 
simpler, alias URL such as:


www.electorama.com/election-methods ?

(If it's easier to do, another option is to create a new HTML page at a 
simpler URL, and it can point to the longer URL.)


(An answer of "no" is perfectly acceptable.)

If it can easily be done, that would be useful in the declaration we are 
creating.


Richard Fobes


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Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

[Jameson Quinn]

I have made some further changes to the
statement,
mostly to clarify the advantages and to speak of how this issue spans the
political spectrum; you may see them by looking at the doc.

Currently, I think that the weakest point of the statement is the
exhortation to look things up on Wikipedia. I suggest giving a bibliography,
and saying that "we do not endorse everything in every paper or book cited
in our bibliography, and in particular we do not believe that any negative
statement about the systems we have mentioned should be construed to imply
that the system criticized is worse than plurality overall." The
bibliography can include some Wikipedia articles, including "voting system",
but it should also include important scholarly articles, whether published
in peer-reviewed journals or not.

JQ

2011/8/29 Jameson Quinn 

> The latest changes to the voting reform consensus 
> statement(copied
>  from file:revision history. Changes show as green, apologies to
> those with text-only mail clients which won't show the difference between
> unchanged, new, and removed text.)
>
> -
>
> We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
> unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in which
> there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer several
> ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably
> produce much fairer results. The systems we suggest offer different
> advantages, but we agree to suggest the simplest of them, Approval voting,
> as a good first step to reform. We also endorse any of many possible
> proportional representation (PR) systems to solve the problems of
> gerrymandered single-seat elections for legislatures.
>
> .
>
>  * Bucklin voting, which uses ranked ballots, and which initially counts
> only the most-preferred candidate on each ballot, and identifies a winner
> only if that candidate receives a majority of votes, and which successively
> adds consideration for lower-ranked candidates until a majority outcome is
> reached.
>
> * Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots and pairwise counting to
> compare each candidate with each of the other candidates, with the winner
> being the candidate who is pairwise preferred over each and every other
> candidate. In some elections none of the candidates will win all of their
> pairwise comparisons, so there are variations that resolve these cases. In
> practical use, such situations will be rare, so while we may debate about
> which “cycle resolution” method is best, we unanimously endorse any of the
> various computable Condorcet methods which have serious advocates.
>
> * Majority Choice Approval, which uses score ballots, and elects a
> candidate with the highest median score. {footnote: Other similar
> median-based methods exist, and are sometimes called “Bucklin” methods. If
> the term “median” is too technical, they can be described equivalently as
> methods which attempt to pick the highest possible ratings threshold such
> that the winner is ranked above that threshold by a majority of voters. We
> would endorse such methods if there were a serious proposal to implement a
> specific one of them.}
>
> 
>
>
> (The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is needed.)
>
> These methods have different advantages, and we disagree about which of
> them are the overall best systems for public elections. However, despite
> these disagreements, we can agree that Approval Voting represents a step
> towards whatever system we feel is ideal. It also has the advantage that it
> is a simple, well-defined system, with no room for distracting disagreements
> about trivial details. And of course, to reiterate, it would be a
> substantial improvement over plurality. Therefore, while few of us feel that
> Approval is the absolutely ideal system, we find that it is the best
> consensus endorsement, and we agree to work together to promote its
> adoption, without abandoning the right to individually promote others of the
> systems above.
>
>
> The Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed descriptions
> and characteristics of these methods.
>
> 
>
>
> Most of us agree that an even better choice would be to adopt an election
> method in which the choice of who wins one seat interacts with who wins
> another equivalent seat in ways that ensure that the overall composition of
> the legislature at least roughly matches the preferences of the voters,
> especially in terms of political-party preferences. However, we disagree
> about which election method best serves this purposeThere are many systems
> for accomplishing this “proportional representation” (PR). While the
> signatories to this statement reserve our right to disagree with specif

Re: [EM] The meaning of this discussion (or lack thereof)

[matt welland]

On Mon, 2011-08-29 at 04:28 -0400, Michael Allan wrote:
> matt welland wrote:
> > I did not say that a "vote has little meaning", I said that it is
> > meaningless to discuss the individual vote! Those are two vastly
> > different things.
> 
> Well, I think what you said is wrong.  Here is the original version:
> 
> > > > The meaning of an individual vote is mostly irrelevant and
> > > > pointless to discuss. ...
> 
> This implies that the individual vote itself is irrelevant.  I wish to
> clarify your intention on that point: are you saying that the
> individual vote is irrelevant

Ah, yes I can see the error. Some poor and ambiguous English on my part.
I intended to group the "irrelevant and pointless" and apply it to the
word "discuss". Sorry about that.



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[EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts

[Richard Fobes]

On 8/29/2011 6:39 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I have made some further changes to the statement
> 


> ...

And I've made yet more changes -- to implement the requests made earlier.



I have not yet written the section about rounds of voting, which is an 
addition that was requested.


Richard Fobes



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