Re: [EM] Executive Summary for Declaration
I do like the executive summary. Maybe it's a little too long? I think we could do without the sentence "Some good Condorcet methods are:..." I do think the PR section could be significantly shortened. I made a few changes. Feel free to review, roll back, and discuss if you think I have erred. ~ Andy Jennings On Wed, Sep 7, 2011 at 9:25 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: > On 9/7/2011 2:09 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: > > I still think the 12 page declaration (incl table of contents) needs an > > executive summary. The table of contents does not in my honest opinion > > give good enough information. > > > I agree that the declaration needs an executive summary. Here is what I've > come up with as a first draft: > > - Executive Summary - > > This declaration, which has been signed by election-method experts from > around the world, publicly denounces the use of plurality voting in > governmental elections. Plurality voting mistakenly assumes that the > candidate who receives the most ballot marks – on single-mark ballots – is > the most popular. Plurality voting also suffers from vote splitting, which > is what forces political parties to offer only a single choice in each > election. > > As replacements for plurality voting, this declaration recommends four > significantly fairer election methods, namely, in alphabetical order: > Approval voting, any Condorcet method, Majority Judgment voting, and Range > voting. These methods use better ballots – namely the Approval ballot, > Ranked ballot, and Score ballot – to collect much more preference > information compared to plurality's primitive single-mark ballot. > > The lack of awareness about plurality voting's unfairness arises from its > use of single-mark ballots, which not only fail to collect enough > information to correctly identify the most popular candidate, but also fail > to collect enough information to produce proof or evidence of the unfair > results. > > Computer technology now makes it easy to count better ballots and correctly > identify who deserves to win. All the supported methods are based on the > fact that a majority of voters, not just a plurality of voters, must approve > or prefer the winning candidate in order to produce fairer results. > > In spite of the academically recognized, well-known unfairness of plurality > voting, it is used throughout Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, > and to some extent nearly every democracy around the world. As a > consequence of adopting fairer election methods, this declaration's signers > expect the benefits to include a dramatically reduced gap between voters and > government, more easily -- and fairly -- resolved political conflicts, and > significantly increased economic prosperity for any region that adopts > fairer election methods. > > Significantly the election-method experts do not support the use of > instant-runoff voting, which is also known as the alternative vote. This > method is based on the mistaken belief that the candidate with the fewest > plurality votes is the least popular candidate. > > The four supported methods also can be adopted for use in non-governmental > situations, such as electing an organization's officers, making democratic > decisions, and electing corporate board members. > > The signers of this declaration do not share any common political beliefs, > and are confident that the recommended election reforms will not favor any > particular political parties or political orientations. Their clearly stated > goal is to improve election fairness by replacing primitive plurality voting > with any of the fairer supported methods. Their expectation is that a higher > level of democracy will lead to higher standards of living, reduced > conflicts, and widespread greater economic prosperity, just as replacing > monarchies and dictatorships with plurality voting has produced dramatic and > widespread benefits. > > The signers urge everyone to learn more about how voting should be done – > using Approval voting, Condorcet methods, Majority Judgment voting, or Range > voting – and begin adopting the supported voting methods in whatever > situations currently, yet inappropriately, use plurality voting. > > - end - > > It mentions some concepts that currently aren't in the declaration itself, > so if this executive summary is liked, adjustments will need to be made in > either this summary or in the declaration. > > Also note that this summary does not mention PR. We still need to decide > what to do about that section. It is long yet just says we like PR but > oppose closed-list PR. > > Richard Fobes > > > On 9/7/2011 2:09 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: > >> Dear Jameson, >> >> I still think the 12 page declaration (incl table of contents) needs an >> executive summary. The table of contents does not in my honest oppinion >> give good enough information. >> >> An executive summary is standard when writing policy recommendations >> like this, and you
[EM] Executive Summary for Declaration
On 9/7/2011 2:09 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: > I still think the 12 page declaration (incl table of contents) needs an > executive summary. The table of contents does not in my honest opinion > give good enough information. I agree that the declaration needs an executive summary. Here is what I've come up with as a first draft: - Executive Summary - This declaration, which has been signed by election-method experts from around the world, publicly denounces the use of plurality voting in governmental elections. Plurality voting mistakenly assumes that the candidate who receives the most ballot marks – on single-mark ballots – is the most popular. Plurality voting also suffers from vote splitting, which is what forces political parties to offer only a single choice in each election. As replacements for plurality voting, this declaration recommends four significantly fairer election methods, namely, in alphabetical order: Approval voting, any Condorcet method, Majority Judgment voting, and Range voting. These methods use better ballots – namely the Approval ballot, Ranked ballot, and Score ballot – to collect much more preference information compared to plurality's primitive single-mark ballot. The lack of awareness about plurality voting's unfairness arises from its use of single-mark ballots, which not only fail to collect enough information to correctly identify the most popular candidate, but also fail to collect enough information to produce proof or evidence of the unfair results. Computer technology now makes it easy to count better ballots and correctly identify who deserves to win. All the supported methods are based on the fact that a majority of voters, not just a plurality of voters, must approve or prefer the winning candidate in order to produce fairer results. In spite of the academically recognized, well-known unfairness of plurality voting, it is used throughout Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and to some extent nearly every democracy around the world. As a consequence of adopting fairer election methods, this declaration's signers expect the benefits to include a dramatically reduced gap between voters and government, more easily -- and fairly -- resolved political conflicts, and significantly increased economic prosperity for any region that adopts fairer election methods. Significantly the election-method experts do not support the use of instant-runoff voting, which is also known as the alternative vote. This method is based on the mistaken belief that the candidate with the fewest plurality votes is the least popular candidate. The four supported methods also can be adopted for use in non-governmental situations, such as electing an organization's officers, making democratic decisions, and electing corporate board members. The signers of this declaration do not share any common political beliefs, and are confident that the recommended election reforms will not favor any particular political parties or political orientations. Their clearly stated goal is to improve election fairness by replacing primitive plurality voting with any of the fairer supported methods. Their expectation is that a higher level of democracy will lead to higher standards of living, reduced conflicts, and widespread greater economic prosperity, just as replacing monarchies and dictatorships with plurality voting has produced dramatic and widespread benefits. The signers urge everyone to learn more about how voting should be done – using Approval voting, Condorcet methods, Majority Judgment voting, or Range voting – and begin adopting the supported voting methods in whatever situations currently, yet inappropriately, use plurality voting. - end - It mentions some concepts that currently aren't in the declaration itself, so if this executive summary is liked, adjustments will need to be made in either this summary or in the declaration. Also note that this summary does not mention PR. We still need to decide what to do about that section. It is long yet just says we like PR but oppose closed-list PR. Richard Fobes On 9/7/2011 2:09 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: Dear Jameson, I still think the 12 page declaration (incl table of contents) needs an executive summary. The table of contents does not in my honest oppinion give good enough information. An executive summary is standard when writing policy recommendations like this, and you cannot write a scientific paper without an abstract. On the other hand I understand, that writing summaries and abstracts is sometimes a pain (it is at least to me), and that it is easier to point out things that could be improved and more difficult to do something about it, like writing the summary myself. I dont write this just to nag. If you want your recommendations to be read by decision makers, you had better catch the interest within the one or two minutes this person will
Re: [EM] Declaration ... - political-party & direct-participation side issues
On 9/7/2011 3:30 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Richard, re: "Nothing in this statement should be interpreted to imply that we believe that election-method reform is the only area of existing political systems that currently needs reform. In fact, most of us also support other reforms such as broader campaign-finance-reporting rules, increased use of other decision-making aids such as deliberative polling, and clearer ethics rules for officeholders. We believe that the election-method reforms we advocate here would be synergistic with such other reforms, both in terms of easing their adoption and multiplying their beneficial effects." Patronizing me would be more effective if you did so from a position of strength. I'm not sure why you thought it necessary to ridicule my position with this ludicrous tripe, but so be it. Whoa! I did not write this paragraph! In fact, this particular paragraph is one of the few that I have not touched (that I can recall). This declaration is a collaboration. Therefore, please direct your comments about the document to the forum in general, without assuming that any specific content was written by any particular contributor. Thank you! Now that you have expressed disapproval of this paragraph, that makes it easier for me to feel comfortable making revisions to this portion of the document. Thanks. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] "Meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
>Lundell: > How does it keep me honest in that scenario? Presumably I'd vote 1-0-0; > what's my motivation to do otherwise? > >Quinn: > Because there's a small chance that your (first "honest" range) vote actually > will decide between a lottery of some chance of A or C and a certainty of B. > If you haven't voted honestly, then that could make the wrong decision. And > such decisions are all your "honest" ballot is ever used for, so there is no > motivation to strategize with it. >Lundell: That's always the case with strategic voting when we don't have perfect knowledge of the other votes. There's a larger chance (in this example) that a sincere vote will cause B to defeat A. The more I know about the state of other voters, the more motivation I have to vote insincerely. This is true, of course, of any manipulable voting rule. --wrong. There is NOT a "larger chance" that a sincere (double range voting) vote will cause B to defeat A. There is in this example ZERO chance of that, Also double range voting is NOT a "manipulable voting rule" (or more precisely, it cannot be advantageously manipulated by altering the "please be honest" range-style sub-ballot, and indeed any such manipulation whatsoever will be strictly disadvantageous) As far as I can tell, Lundell has either never read, or has not comprehended, what "double range voting" is. That's a pity because it is a major theoretical advance with considerable philosophical implications, which was sort of the whole point of this whole thread. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration ... - political-party & direct-participation side issues
Richard, re: "Nothing in this statement should be interpreted to imply that we believe that election-method reform is the only area of existing political systems that currently needs reform. In fact, most of us also support other reforms such as broader campaign-finance-reporting rules, increased use of other decision-making aids such as deliberative polling, and clearer ethics rules for officeholders. We believe that the election-method reforms we advocate here would be synergistic with such other reforms, both in terms of easing their adoption and multiplying their beneficial effects." Patronizing me would be more effective if you did so from a position of strength. I'm not sure why you thought it necessary to ridicule my position with this ludicrous tripe, but so be it. The idea that all we need is "clearer ethics rules for officeholders" is preposterous and dangerously misleading. No competent 'expert' in political science can be unaware of the repeated attempts to reform the ethics of politicians (in the United States). Such attempts have marked my 82 years as an American citizen. They failed for two fundamental reasons: 1) You cannot legislate morality, and 2) The political parties control the executive and legislative branches of the state and federal governments. They are masters of misdirection and obfuscation. They can not be reformed as long as they control the selection and financing of candidates for public office. More than 100 years ago, Theodore Roosevelt warned the American people about the 'unholy alliance' between corrupt business and corrupt politics[1]. He described the invisible government behind the ostensible government, "owing no allegiance and acknowledging no responsibility to the people". Yet, a century later, the 'expert' continues to ignore this warning, fails to recognize the need for institutions that harness human nature, and refuses to consider ways to destroy this 'invisible government'. Instead, as Durant wrote, he "... put on blinders in order to shut out from his vision all the world but one little spot, to which he glued his nose.", in this case, counting mechanisms. * The reforms you describe will do nothing to stop the forces that paid for and got the gutting and repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the repeal of which led directly to the excesses that brought the entire world to the brink of economic collapse. * They do not acknowledge, much less attack, the corruption that fostered the outrageous expansion of 'intellectual property rights', so-called 'rights' that allow corporations (which have no intellect) to levy a perpetual tax on the people. * No amount of "broader campaign-finance-reporting" will prevent such tragedies as America's unwarranted invasion of a sovereign nation, an invasion which resulted in the death of more than 4,000 U. S. armed servicemen and more than 100,000 Iraqis. * Nothing in the proposed 'reforms' will stop parties from selling legislation like The Broadband Conduit Deployment Act[2], introduced by two Democratic senators, that saddles the American taxpayer with the cost of laying broadband conduit for the communications industry. That's the real world. It will take the best efforts of our best minds to improve the lot of the humans among us. We should get started. Fred Gohlke (1) http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/118.html (2) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.2428: Broadband Conduit Deployment Act Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Fix Philly Districts (Warren Smith)
Here's a compactness measure I haven't seen proposed before: Compose a district boundary out of line segments. The "thickness" of a line segment is the closest distance of any voter to any point on that line segment. Minimize the total of the length of segments divided by their thickness. It is, of course, not an easy measure to maximize. In particular, small perturbations of boundaries could give big changes, and the measure would go infinite if any boundary crossed over a voter. However, I suspect that "simulated annealing" would do a decent job. But it is easier than travel time to calculate, and more sensitive to population distribution than splitline or purely perimeter-based districting. At any rate, you'd probably have to do it with a contest to find the best answer. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Fix Philly Districts (Warren Smith)
Warren, I am fairly certain that you made a logic error by conflating the Roeck and Schwartzberg methods, which I believe are not equivalent. http://rangevoting.org/TheorDistrict.html In fact, the Schwartzberg method seems to me to be equivalent to the class of compactness measures which use the ratios of perimeter to area (or better yet, the ratios of perimeter squared to area or alternatively, perimeter to square root of area). All such methods, including Schwartzberg's method, validly measure area compactness in a way that is not susceptible to gerrymandering (wiggly boundaries does decrease measured compactness values) and does not have the tendency you claim when you say: "these three ideas – and many others – are stupid, is that you can take a multi-district map "optimal" by this measure, then add a ton of essentially arbitrary wiggles to large portions of the district boundaries, while leaving the "quality" of that map exactly the same" I believe you are correct in making that claim for the other measures you discuss on your web page, but not for the Schwartzberg method. I have done a mathematical proof that this class (using ratios of powers of perimeter to area of the districts) of compactness measures are equivalent in the sense that they rank any two redistricting plans in exactly the same order. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1857944 I cannot recall currently why I abandoned the idea of minimizing the sum of perimeters of the districts. If I recall I will let you know. That is not to say that your split-line algorithm is not a useful approach to finding the most compact set of districts, although there are other concerns with drawing districts in addition to population, including political and geographic boundaries, including election jurisdiction boundaries in order to make the districts convenient to serve, comprehensible to voters, and convenient to administer. I wonder if you could adjust your splitline algorithm to take those other factors into account, and then use the isoperimetric quotient (the most logical measure to adopt of the class of equivalent compactness measures) to evaluate any two of the redistricting plans your splitline algorithm finds are adjusting to minimize the number of independently administered jurisdictions within each district and take account of impassible mountain ranges and rivers that divide communities. Many people claim keeping communities together is very important in redistricting. > Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2011 12:36:18 -0400 > From: Warren Smith > > https://www.fixphillydistricts.com > > They held another district-drawing contest. $500 prize. > While the winning plan(s) seem to improve over the old ones, they > don't strike me as > ultra-wonderful. It seems plausible splitline or Olson would have done > comparably or better. > > I noticed they mentioned only the Roeck and Schwartzberg compactness > measures for districts, > which both were flagged in my review as stupid and > incredibly-ultra-stupid measures, respectively: > http://rangevoting.org/TheorDistrict.html > > > -- > Warren D. Smith > http://RangeVoting.org? <-- add your endorsement (by clicking > "endorse" as 1st step) > and > math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html > -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." "Renewable energy is homeland security." Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SODA false claim
Claim: SODA is simpler for voters than any system I know of, and specifically simpler for voters than approval. Justification: Simplest algorithm for voting Approval that is reasonably close to strategically optimal: Find the two frontrunners. Vote for one of them plus any candidate that's better. Simplist algorithm for voting SODA that's reasonably close to strategically optimal: Vote for your favorite. I understand that there is room for debate on this claim, and I'm not asking you to accept it at face value. But certainly I have a basis for making it. JQ 2011/9/7 Andrew Myers > On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Warren Smith wrote: > >> It is simply false to say SODA's simplicity (for either the voter, or >> the counters) >> "beats any other system I know of." >> >> It is less simple than plain approval voting. Full stop. >> >> If you persist in making ludicrous statements, then you will hurt your >> credibility. >> >> I have to agree. SODA to me seems quite complex. It appears to pose > difficult strategic decisions for candidates and even for voters. > > -- Andrew > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Lp-ball range
On Wed, Sep 7, 2011 at 4:56 PM, Andy Jennings wrote: >> > The unit ball for method two has no corners or bulges (which all other >> > values of p involve), so the strategy is not so obvious. But if Samuel >> > Merrill is right, then in the zero information case, the optimum strategy >> > for method two is to vote appropriately normalized sincere utilities. >> >> --wrong. >> Your best strategy for any of these methods is, you identify the two >> "frontrunners", you vote max for one and min for the other, and then >> if you have any freedom left, you start considering the other N-2 >> candidates. > > He said "in the zero information case". I think this means you can't know > who the frontrunners are. --Aha! OK, so I guess Zero Info means that all the other votes are assumed to be random uniformly selected (independently) from the allowed-vote ball. Your best strategy is to maximize expected utility of the winner in that case. Assume your probability of you swinging it from winner A to winner B is roughly proportional to the score-difference your vote gives to B minus your score for A. Also assume that it is much less (neglectibly less) likely that you can accomplish more than one swing. (Those assumptions are correct in regimes where the central limit theorem holds...) You then should cast the vote (within the allowed-vote ball) maximizing sum_j S_j * (U_j - meanU) where S_j is your score for candidate j and U_j is your utility for candidate j. This sum is proportional to your expected utility gain from casting a vote versus doing nothing. Assume wlog for simplicity that meanU=0. Geometrically speaking, you want to push the hyperplane that is orthogonal to the direction (U_1, U_2, U_3..., U_N) as far as you can in that direction, subject to the constraint that it still have nonempty intersection with the allowed-votes ball. Any point within that intersection is an optimal-vote (to first order, anyhow). The solution to that problem is obviously a unique optimal vote for any allowed-votes-ball which is strictly convex, e.g. for an Lp-ball for any fixed p within 1http://RangeVoting.org Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SODA false claim
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Warren Smith wrote: It is simply false to say SODA's simplicity (for either the voter, or the counters) "beats any other system I know of." It is less simple than plain approval voting. Full stop. If you persist in making ludicrous statements, then you will hurt your credibility. I have to agree. SODA to me seems quite complex. It appears to pose difficult strategic decisions for candidates and even for voters. -- Andrew <> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Lp-ball range
> > > The unit ball for method two has no corners or bulges (which all other > values of p involve), so the strategy is not so obvious. But if Samuel > Merrill is right, then in the zero information case, the optimum strategy > for method two is to vote appropriately normalized sincere utilities. > > --wrong. > Your best strategy for any of these methods is, you identify the two > "frontrunners", you vote max for one and min for the other, and then > if you have any freedom left, you start considering the other N-2 > candidates. He said "in the zero information case". I think this means you can't know who the frontrunners are. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Lp-ball range
>FW Simmons: Range voting is cardinal ratings with certain constraints on the possible ratings, namely that they have to fall within a certain interval or "range" of values, and usually limited to whole number values. Ignoring the whole number requirement, we could specify a constraint for an equivalent method by simply limiting the maximum of the absolute values of the ballot scores. Call this "method infinity." We could get another (non-equivalent) system by limiting the sum of the absolute values of the scores. Call this "method one." Yet another system is obtained by limiting the sum of the squared values of the scores. Call this method two. Other methods are obtained by limiting the sum of the p powers of the absolute values of the scores. In this scheme method two corresponds to p=2, and methods infinity and one, respectively, are the limits of method p as p approaches infinity or one. Suppose that there are three candidates. Then graphically the constraints for the three respective methods corresponding to p equal to infinity, one, and two, turn out to be a cube, an octahedron, and a ball with a perfectly spherical boundary, respectively. The optimal strategies for methods infinity and one generically involve ballots represented by corners of the cube and octahedron, respectively. In the case of method infinity, this means that all scores on a strategically voted ballot will be at the extremes of the allowed range, i.e. method infinity is strategically equivalent to Approval. In the case of method one, the corners represent the ballots that concentrate the entire max sum value in one candidate, and since negative scores are allowed, this method is strategically equivalent to the method that allows you to vote for one candidate or against one candidate but not both. I don't think anybody has studied this method --it was proposed about 30-40 years ago and served as an inspiration for approval voting (mentioned in Brams book I think, I think the name "negative voting" perhaps was used?) > but in the case of only three candidates it is the same as Approval. --it is equivalent to it... votes: A gets +1, B and C get 0; or A gets -1, B and C get 0 > The unit ball for method two has no corners or bulges (which all other values > of p involve), so the strategy is not so obvious. But if Samuel Merrill is > right, then in the zero information case, the optimum strategy for method two > is to vote appropriately normalized sincere utilities. --wrong. Your best strategy for any of these methods is, you identify the two "frontrunners", you vote max for one and min for the other, and then if you have any freedom left, you start considering the other N-2 candidates. With L-infinity voting you get approval. With L1 or L2 voting you get either plurality or antiplurality as the two kinds of strategic vote. ONLY with p=infinity (among all p>=1) is there any freedom of choice left after you max/min the two frontrunners. This is the ONLY method in this class whee strategic voters can express order N bits of information. This begins to explain why range voting has a unique status among all "COAF" voting methods (based on convex "balls" defining the allowed votes)... I pointed all this out some 11 years back... -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] SODA false claim
It is simply false to say SODA's simplicity (for either the voter, or the counters) "beats any other system I know of." It is less simple than plain approval voting. Full stop. If you persist in making ludicrous statements, then you will hurt your credibility. -- Warren D. Smith Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] [CES #3566] Re: Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch
Dear all, the statement would probably benefit from executive summary of length 1/2 to 1 page. Best regards Peter Zbornik On Wed, Sep 7, 2011 at 7:01 PM, Toby Pereira wrote: > I agree that it's too long. I've had another go at culling come parts of > it, but if anyone objects, feel free to revert some or all. > > *From:* Warren Smith > *To:* electionscie...@googlegroups.com; election-methods < > election-meth...@electorama.com> > *Sent:* Wednesday, 7 September 2011, 16:17 > *Subject:* Re: [EM] [CES #3566] Re: Declaration of Election-Method Experts > and Enthusiasts: final stretch > > this "declaration" is suffering from exactly what everybody > most-complains about re the rangevoting.org website. > > I.e. it tried to cover everything and got large. In fact, enormous. > > That for a website is a flaw that is not necessarily an > insurmountable obstacle > since one can put short "summary" pages (or try...) and use of lots > of hyperlinks, so it isn't just a flat document, it's > easier to get to information. > > But for a "consensus statement" it is a major problem since (a) nobody > is going to sign it and (b) nobody is going to read it. > > Well, "nobody" is an exaggeration. But not by much. > > This statement (4328 words) is now over 3 times the length of the > USA's "Declaration of Independence" (1315 words) and also longer than > the entire USA constitution (as un-amended) at 4318 words. > > Have you seen my attempt to study what election experts and/or Joe > Public actually agree on? The total amount of true consensus out > there, is extremely small. So you could have an extremely short > statement, if you wished to summarize what is the current consensus. > If you have the more ambitious goal of creating consensus by actually > changing minds... well, I doubt you can do it with one single > document. > > It's very hard to get people to sign statements, and the difficulty > increases with the length. > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] [CES #3566] Re: Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch
I agree that it's too long. I've had another go at culling come parts of it, but if anyone objects, feel free to revert some or all. From: Warren Smith To: electionscie...@googlegroups.com; election-methods Sent: Wednesday, 7 September 2011, 16:17 Subject: Re: [EM] [CES #3566] Re: Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch this "declaration" is suffering from exactly what everybody most-complains about re the rangevoting.org website. I.e. it tried to cover everything and got large. In fact, enormous. That for a website is a flaw that is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle since one can put short "summary" pages (or try...) and use of lots of hyperlinks, so it isn't just a flat document, it's easier to get to information. But for a "consensus statement" it is a major problem since (a) nobody is going to sign it and (b) nobody is going to read it. Well, "nobody" is an exaggeration. But not by much. This statement (4328 words) is now over 3 times the length of the USA's "Declaration of Independence" (1315 words) and also longer than the entire USA constitution (as un-amended) at 4318 words. Have you seen my attempt to study what election experts and/or Joe Public actually agree on? The total amount of true consensus out there, is extremely small. So you could have an extremely short statement, if you wished to summarize what is the current consensus. If you have the more ambitious goal of creating consensus by actually changing minds... well, I doubt you can do it with one single document. It's very hard to get people to sign statements, and the difficulty increases with the length. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Fix Philly Districts
https://www.fixphillydistricts.com They held another district-drawing contest. $500 prize. While the winning plan(s) seem to improve over the old ones, they don't strike me as ultra-wonderful. It seems plausible splitline or Olson would have done comparably or better. I noticed they mentioned only the Roeck and Schwartzberg compactness measures for districts, which both were flagged in my review as stupid and incredibly-ultra-stupid measures, respectively: http://rangevoting.org/TheorDistrict.html -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] [CES #3566] Re: Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch
this "declaration" is suffering from exactly what everybody most-complains about re the rangevoting.org website. I.e. it tried to cover everything and got large. In fact, enormous. That for a website is a flaw that is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle since one can put short "summary" pages (or try...) and use of lots of hyperlinks, so it isn't just a flat document, it's easier to get to information. But for a "consensus statement" it is a major problem since (a) nobody is going to sign it and (b) nobody is going to read it. Well, "nobody" is an exaggeration. But not by much. This statement (4328 words) is now over 3 times the length of the USA's "Declaration of Independence" (1315 words) and also longer than the entire USA constitution (as un-amended) at 4318 words. Have you seen my attempt to study what election experts and/or Joe Public actually agree on? The total amount of true consensus out there, is extremely small. So you could have an extremely short statement, if you wished to summarize what is the current consensus. If you have the more ambitious goal of creating consensus by actually changing minds... well, I doubt you can do it with one single document. It's very hard to get people to sign statements, and the difficulty increases with the length. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch
Noise, but possibly worth a response. In writing about a Condorcet race the standard format seems to be A>X>Y. For voting the ballot format seems to be to be able to assign rank numbers to as many of the candidates as the voter chooses. In reporting election results the n*n matrix has findable values for each pair of candidates. Robert calls the format he has seen for the matrix "silly", and suggests another format. The reporting is a human readable copy of what is being computed - with the computing almost certainly done by computer if many candidates. Therefore a reporting format such as Robert's would be usable if humans could agree - or even have selectable choices of formats if enough desire. Dave Ketchum On Sep 7, 2011, at 1:12 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: still not sure of the efficacy of trying to persuade voters (or their elected representatives) to try out different ballot formats than ranked choice but... "... The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates. ..." why, oh why, are all of you election method experts stuck on that silly n x n matrix geometry (where the main diagonal has no information you have to associate one number on the lower left with another number on the upper right, and it isn't obvious which number goes with which candidate) instead of grouping the pairwise totals *in* *pairs*??? like A 56 B 44 A 88 B 65 C 12 C 35 A 90 B 82 C 55 D 10 D 18 D 45 THAT format is where you have useful information about the relationships between candidates at a glance. if we're gonna tell people about Condorcet, why are we putting it in a stupid rectangular array where it is difficult to tell who beat who? it only makes it harder to sell this to skeptics. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
