Re: [EM] A design flaw in the electoral system
James, Juho and Fred, Thanks very much for looking at the argument. > > An individual vote has no effect on the formal outcome of the > > election; whether the vote is cast or not, the outcome is the same > > regardless. James Gilmour wrote: > These statements worry me - surely they contain a logical flaw? If > these statements were true and every elector responded rationally, > no-one would ever vote. Then the outcome would not be the same. It's an interesting distinction, and it might help in answering a question I have about how people respond to this information (more on that below). But here I think you're looking at the effect of knowing (if indeed it is true) that a vote has no effect, whereas I'm looking at the effect of that vote itself. Maybe the easiest way to understand it is in retrospect, by looking at past votes that you cast. I make a statement concerning each of those votes and its actual effect in the objective world. Juho Laatu wrote: > I think it is incorrect or at least misleading to say that > individual votes do not have any influence. They do, as a group. If it had no bearing on the argument, then I might agree it's misleading to say it. But it's actually the premise of the argument. Yesterday I wrote to another correspondent: A more direct answer [how is it possible?] is in the rounding procedure that translates a fine-grained sum into a coarse-grained outcome (who gets into office). In that rounding, the effect of the fine grain is lost. ... Or, we might stand on empirical grounds and state: the measureable effect of an individual vote on the outcome is zero. Which raises another question, "Why are people surprised to learn this?" James's observation that "no-one would ever vote" if they accepted the truth of it might figure into the answer. But I think the fact itself is indisputable, a matter of empirical science. A simple thought experiment will demonstrate this: 1. Take the last election in which you voted, and look at its outcome (P). 2. Subtract your vote from that election. 3. Recalculate the outcome without your vote (Q). 4. Look at the difference between P and Q. 5. Repeat for all the elections you ever participated in. Your vote never made a difference. Most people feel uncomfortable or perplexed in this knowledge, and I think the feeling indicates that something's wrong. Fred Gohlke wrote: > I am not entirely clear on the flow of logic in your abstract, but I > get the sense that you're saying voters should be able to cast their > vote and have it, too ... > > Voters are not pieces of cake. The act of voting does not > remove their needs and desires from the political system. > They should be able to continue to influence the political > process after they've voted. I say that electors are physically separated from their ballots, and I explain why this procedure is necessarily a design flaw. I trace other flaws, faults and failures back to this (including the meaningless vote). But I say nothing about how to deal with the situation. I think we lack an understanding of the overall problem, so I'm just trying to figure it out. > If I am offered options that affect my life, options that I've had > no voice in defining, the ability to choose one of them is neither > free nor democratic. On the contrary, it expresses my status as a > subject of those who defined the options. The right to vote in such > circumstances is a farce. Yet, I believe this too can be traced to the design flaw in the electoral system. It's surprising a single flaw could propagate so many failures, in such different forms, but it appears to be the case. This draft section (design flaw) dealt only with the flaw itself, and how it renders the results of the election technically invalid. Other sections (not yet drafted) will attempt to uncover the paths by which the design flaw propagates through society at large. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ James Gilmour wrote: > Michael Allan > Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 9:31 AM > > ABSTRACT > > > > An individual vote has no effect on the formal outcome of the > > election; whether the vote is cast or not, the outcome is the > > same regardless. > > These statements worry me - surely they contain a logical flaw? If these > statements were true and every elector responded > rationally, no-one would ever vote. Then the outcome would not be the same. > > I am not "into logic", but I suspect the flaw is in some disconnection > between the individual and the aggregate. When A with 100 > votes wins over B with 99 votes, we cannot say which of the 100 individual > votes for A was "the winning vote", but it is clear that > is any one of those 100 votes had not been for A, then A would not have won. > At best, if one A-voter had stayed at home, there > would have been a tie. If one of the A-voters had voted for B instead,
Re: [EM] Enhanced DMC
After some private email exchanges with Forest and Chris, I'm
proposing a simple way of implementing Enhanced DMC, plus a new name,
Strong Approval Round Robin Voting (SARR Voting).
Ballot:
Ranked Voting, all explicitly ranked candidates considered approved.
Equal ranking allowed. I'm basing this on recommendation from Chris
Benham. I'm open to alternatives, but it seems to be the easiest way
to do it for now, and the most resistant to burying strategies.
Tallying:
Form the pairwise matrix, using the standard Condorcet procedure. In
the diagonal entries, save total Approval votes.
For N candidates, the list of candidates in order from highest to
lowest approval is
X_0, X_1, ..., X_k, X_{k+1}, ..., X_{N-1}
Initialize the Strong set to the empty set
Initialize the Weak set to the empty set.
For k = 0 to N-1,
If X_k is already in the Weak set, continue iterating. (X_k is
defeated by a higher approved candidate. This is called being
"strongly defeated".)
If X_k loses to a member of the Weak set, continue iterating. (X_k
may defeat all higher approved candidates, but is "weakly defeated"
by at least one of them.)
If we're still here in the loop, X_k defeats all candidates in the
Strong Set and all candidates in the Weak set. (X_k "covers" all
previously added members of the Strong set.)
Add X_k to the Strong set and add all of X_k's defeats to the Weak
set.
Set the provisional winner to X_k.
The last provisional winner (the last candidate added to the Strong
set) is the winner of the election.
Note:
The first member of the Strong Set will be X_0.
It is easiest to do this by hand if you first permute the pairwise
array so that it follows the same X_0, ..., X_{N-1} ordering.
As an example election, consider the one on this page:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Marginal_Ranked_Approval_Voting
Iterating through E, A, C, B, D, we find
E: Strong and Weak Sets are empty, so E has no losses to either.
Strong set = {E}; Weak set = {C, D}
Provisional winner set to E.
A: A defeats Strong set {E} and Weak set {C, D}.
=> Strong set = {E, A}; Weak set = {C, D}
Provisional winner set to A.
C: in Weak set, not added to Strong set.
B: Defeats A, but is defeated by D from Weak set (and is therefore
"weakly defeated" by A).
D: in Weak set, not added to Strong set.
A is the last candidate added to the Strong set, so A wins.
Ted
--
araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com
On 26 Sep 2011 11:44:13 -0700, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> Forest,
>
> "I think in general that if the approval scores are at all valid I
> would go for the enhanced DMC winner over any of the chain building
> methods we have considered. I think other considerations over-ride
> the importance of being uncovered."
> I agree.
>
> I think the chain
> building method in comparison seems a bit arbitrary and less
> philosophically justified.
>
> Also the method has a fairly
> straight-forward description that doesn't need to mention "Smith
> set" or "the Condorcet winner". So of these similar methods
> (that include Smith//Approval and all elect the same winner if the
> Smith set contains 3 members or 1 member), I think this is my
> favourite. Maybe it could use a new name :)
>
> Chris
>
>
>
>
> From: "fsimm...@pcc.edu"
> To: C.Benham
> Cc: election-methods-electorama@electorama.com
> Sent: Monday, 12 September 2011 8:50 AM
> Subject: Re: Enhanced DMC
>
> Very good Chris.
>
> I tried to build a believable profile of ballots that would yield the
> approval order and defeats of this
> example without success, but I am sure that it is not impossible.
>
> I think in general that if the approval scores are at all valid I would go
> for the enhanced DMC winner over
> any of the chain building methods we have considered. I think other
> considerations over-ride the
> importance of being uncovered.
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "C.Benham"
> Date: Sunday, September 11, 2011 10:08 am
> Subject: Enhanced DMC
> To: election-methods-electorama@electorama.com
> Cc: Forest W Simmons
>
>> Forest Simmons wrote (15 Aug 2011):
>>
>> >Here's a possible scenario:
>> >
>> >Suppose that approval order is alphabetical from most approval
>> to least A, B, C, D.
>> >
>> >Suppose further that pairwise defeats are as follows:
>> >
>> >C>A>D>B>A together with B>C>D .
>> >
>> >Then the set P = {A, B} is the set of candidates neither of
>> which is pairwise
>> >beaten by anybody with greater approval.
>> >
>> >Since the approval winner A is not covered by B, it is not
>> covered by any
>> >member of P, so the enhanced version of DMC elects A.
>> >
>> >But A is covered by C so it cannot be elected by any of the
>> chain building
>> >methods that elect only from the uncovered set.
>> >
>>
>> Forest,
>>
>> Is the "Approval Chain-Building" method the same as simply
>> electing the
>> most approved u
Re: [EM] advocacy: Approval is premature compromise
Of course Approval voting will never be used for electing U.S. Congressmen or state governors. Yet at the opposite end of the "size" spectrum, Approval voting is clearly useful in small groups. At what point in the continuum between high-stakes elections and small-group decisions does Approval voting become inappropriate? We don't know, and we wouldn't agree, so let's let others make that choice. The "elephant in the room" is that advocates of Range voting need to also endorse Approval voting both because one criticism of Range voting is that it can (might?) produce Approval-like results if every voter votes strategically, and because Score ballots have greater appeal if we also promote Approval ballots. I think our role is to educate citizens about alternatives to single-mark ballots, and then let those newly educated citizens choose which method best fits each specific situation. Although I wouldn't want a U.S. President chosen by Approval voting, I would be happy to use Approval voting in a _primary_ election for U.S. President. I agree we should aim high. I think we are already doing that by aiming for a large number of signatures. Richard Fobes On 10/3/2011 1:54 PM, Brian Olson wrote: I know that Approval is technically better than a lot of things, and I think it's better than IRV, but I want to argue that it's not good enough and we shouldn't aim low or advocate it too strongly. I've always been personally unsatisfied with the prospect of filling out an Approval ballot. Sure I can say that either Al Gore or Ralph Nader would be fine choices for President, but I don't get to say which one I like better. I think this psychological aspect is important. In my mind it might drive me to misjudge my proper approval threshold, and I think I'd be likely to approve too few candidates and tend toward pick-one. I also today see Approval as fitting the pattern of premature compromise in politics. Afraid that we might not be able to get the awesome thing, we start off only trying for the mediocre thing. We could have real universal healthcare or Obama-Romney-care. We could try for a budget that makes sense, or we could have a budget half full of cruft and with tax tweaks that make no sense because someone whined for it. If we're going to do this, we should do it right. Go all the way. Go for the best thing possible. Isn't that one thing that frustrates us so much with the IRV advocates? They recognize that election method reform is important, but then they go all-in on a mediocre reform. Anyway, that's my random afternoon strategy opinion, I could be wrong. Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] PR approval voting
My system isn't quota based and doesn't involve any reweighting or redistribution. It looks at every possible result (potentially problematic in itself) and works out a score for each one. Because there is no redistribution, a voter can lose out more than some other systems by voting too high for a candidate that is going to get elected anyway. But I would argue that it gives the best proportional results for honest voting, and could still potentially deliver good overall results unless some candidates' supporters are much better at adopting strategy than others. A bit like with single-winner range where you wouldn't expect one particular faction of voters to vote approval style and "ruin" the whole thing. (Not that it would necessarily ruin it) From: Ted Stern To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Cc: Ted Stern Sent: Monday, 3 October 2011, 20:49 Subject: Re: [EM] PR approval voting On 03 Oct 2011 12:23:10 -0700, Toby Pereira wrote: > > I noticed on your page that you suspect that all multi-winner > methods fail participation. I don't think that's the case. I would > suggest that Forest Simmons's Proportional Approval Voting passes > it. Also I think my versions of Proportional Approval Voting and > Proportional Range Voting pass. Since I wrote that, I have come to believe (but still haven't proved) that Approval-based methods will generally pass participation and IIAC. A range based method will pass participation, at least in single-winner, if it doesn't adjust ratings. In many cases my version of Range Transferable Vote will elect winners without having to raise ratings to meet quota. It only fails participation in those cases where the quota is not met, which most often happens on the last or penultimate seat. Is your PRV method quota-based? If so, does it pass Droop proportionality? If so, how do you deal with elevating preferences if no candidate achieves a quota? Ted Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] advocacy: Approval is premature compromise
I certainly sympathize with the desire to avoid premature compromise. Brian gave the example of universal healthcare versus the Obama plan. As someone who phonebanked for Obama in 2008 (from Guatemala) but now thinks he's a decidedly worse-than-average president, I agree with your example. But I don't think that the voting reform situation is comparable. With healthcare, it is clear that Obamacare is a compromise; that the more radical option is single payer; and that going further still would take you to single provider. With voting reform, the next step after approval is not so clear. Is it Condorcet, Majority Judgment, SODA, or Range? Any one of us could answer that question; but we cannot agree on a common answer. Also, approval is clearly a step towards any of those other systems. Obamacare is an unholy Frankenstein of ad-hoc adjustments. I am not suggesting that we all redirect all our energies to passing approval. Obviously we are all free to make our own evaluations of where our reform energy is best-spent. I am simply arguing that ... well, if we were voting on voting systems, correct strategy would be to all put our "approval threshold" just below approval. Jameson 2011/10/3 robert bristow-johnson > On 10/3/11 4:54 PM, Brian Olson wrote: > >> I know that Approval is technically better than a lot of things, and I >> think it's better than IRV, but I want to argue that it's not good enough >> and we shouldn't aim low or advocate it too strongly. >> >> I've always been personally unsatisfied with the prospect of filling out >> an Approval ballot. Sure I can say that either Al Gore or Ralph Nader would >> be fine choices for President, but I don't get to say which one I like >> better. I think this psychological aspect is important. In my mind it might >> drive me to misjudge my proper approval threshold, and I think I'd be likely >> to approve too few candidates and tend toward pick-one. >> >> I also today see Approval as fitting the pattern of premature compromise >> in politics. Afraid that we might not be able to get the awesome thing, we >> start off only trying for the mediocre thing. We could have real universal >> healthcare or Obama-Romney-care. We could try for a budget that makes sense, >> or we could have a budget half full of cruft and with tax tweaks that make >> no sense because someone whined for it. >> >> If we're going to do this, we should do it right. Go all the way. Go for >> the best thing possible. Isn't that one thing that frustrates us so much >> with the IRV advocates? They recognize that election method reform is >> important, but then they go all-in on a mediocre reform. >> >> Anyway, that's my random afternoon strategy opinion, I could be wrong. >> >> Brian Olson >> http://bolson.org/ >> > > Brian, i have posted much the same sentiments on August 22 and August 4. i > really don't see why so much energy goes into promoting the approval ballot > over the ranked-choice ballot as a reform of FPTP. > > -- > > r b-j r...@audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A design flaw in the electoral system
Good Morning, James I, too, am not completely clear on Michael's meaning. When a choice is made by counting votes, your notion that each vote has an effect seems intuitively obvious. However, the effectiveness of each vote is less clear. One expression of the problem was written by Daniel R. Ortiz in The Paradox of Mass Democracy: "Democracy's three necessary conditions increasingly and embarrassingly conflict. For perfectly understandable reasons, the more we broaden and equalize political participation, the more difficult we make individual political choice. In other words, there is some tradeoff between the quantity and quality of individual political engagement." p. 211, Rethinking The Vote, Oxford University Press, 2004 Thus, voting in the real world becomes - as Michael says - meaningless. We must look deeper. The most fundamental element of politics is that issues arise in the body politic. Although individuals and groups can instigate issues, they cannot prevent their inception. That is to say, issues are independent of any individual or group; they are a matter of the people. Current political practice allows groups to 'interpret' public issues and offer options for their resolution. Such a process is inherently flawed because the groups that 'interpret' the issues offer options that favor their interest. The result is perpetual confrontation between groups seeking advantages. We can do better than that. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A design flaw in the electoral system
Good Morning, Michael I am not entirely clear on the flow of logic in your abstract, but I get the sense that you're saying voters should be able to cast their vote and have it, too ... Voters are not pieces of cake. The act of voting does not remove their needs and desires from the political system. They should be able to continue to influence the political process after they've voted. If that understanding of your paper is incorrect, I must improve my understanding before I can comment more intelligently. At the risk of digressing, I'd like to suggest that the 'Design Flaw in the Electoral System' is a step further back. The flaw is in the assumption that the right to vote, by itself, makes a system free and democratic. That assumption is the root of the failure of our political system. If I am offered options that affect my life, options that I've had no voice in defining, the ability to choose one of them is neither free nor democratic. On the contrary, it expresses my status as a subject of those who defined the options. The right to vote in such circumstances is a farce. This is not to say voting is unimportant, it is to say that formation of the options on which we vote is more important. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
