[EM] Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?
Mike refers to this scenario:
The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it again here:
Sincere preferences:
49: C
27: A>B
24: B>A
A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C.
Actual votes:
The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the
co-operativeness and
responsibility of the A voters:
49: C
27: A>B
24: B
I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a
just interventionist mind-reading God
should award the election to A.
But a voting method's decisions and philosophical justification should
be based on information that is actually
on the ballots, not on some guess or arbitrary assumption about some
maybe-existing "information" that isn't.
I think a very reasonable tenet is that if, based on the information on
the ballots, candidate X utterly dominates
candidate Y then we should not elect Y.
For several reasons (for those who can pooh-pooh this as "merely
aesthetic"): electing Y gives the supporters
of X a very strong post-election complaint with no common-sense or
philosophically cogent answer, X is highly
likely to be higher Social Utility (SU), Y's victory will have
compromised legitimacy.
The Plurality criterion is one very reasonable criterion that says that
C is so much stronger than A that the election
of A can't be justified. . There are other criteria I find reasonable
that say the same thing:
"Strong Minimal Defense": If the number of ballots on which both X is
voted above bottom and Y isn't is greater than
the total number of ballots on which Y is voted above bottom, then don't
elect Y.
And 2 that only use information from the normal gross pairwise matrix:
"Pairwise Plurality": If X's smallest pairwise score is larger than Y's
largest pairwise score, then don't elect Y".
"Pairwise Strong Minimal Defense" : If X's pairwise score versus Y is
larger than Y's largest pairwise score, then
don't elect Y.
The election of A is unacceptable because C's domination of A is
vastly more impressive than A's pairwise win over
B. The Plurality criterion plus the three other criteria I define above
all loudly say "not A".
Minimal Defense and Strong Minimal Defense and "Pairwise Strong Minimal
Defense" all say "not C" (due to B), and
I find that message very reasonable but nothing like as compelling as
the "not A" message.
The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the
co-operativeness and
responsibility of the A voters:
The plausibility of arbitrary claims about the voters' sincere
preferences and motivations can weighed in the light of the
used election method's incentives. How is it so "co-operative and
responsible" of the A voters to rank B when doing
so (versus truncating) can only help their favourite? And why would the
B voters be insincerely truncating ("defecting")
when doing so can only harm their favourite?
Given the incentives of the MDD,TR method that Mike is advocating, it is
only reasonable to assume that the truncators
are all sincere and that the A>B voters' sincere preferences could be
A>B or A>C or A. It's a bit like Mike is assuming that
the voters were all deceived into thinking that their votes would be
counted using a method like Bucklin or MCA (which have
truncation and defection incentives, failing Later-no-Harm and meeting
Later-no-Help).
(I might comment on IRV in another post).
Chris Benham
Mike Ossipoff wrote (16 Nov 2011):
Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria:
Kevin, you objected to my preference-mentioning criteria on the grounds
that no one knows what the voters'
true preferences really are. But so what?
As I said before, my criteria indirectly stipulate votes. They do that
when they stipulate that people have
a certain preference and vote sincerely; or have a certain preference
and don't vote anyone equal to or over
their favorite. Etc.
Are you saying that methods meeting my preference-mentioning criteria
can act wrongly when the preferences aren't
as stipulated? If so, then say so explicitly, and show how that can happen.
As a matter of fact, that _can_ happen with some votes-only criteria,
such as the Plurality Criterion:
The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it again here:
Sincere preferences:
49: C
27: AB
24: BA
A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C.
Actual votes:
The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the co-operativeness and
responsibility of the A voters:
49: C
27: AB
24: B
Now, in MDDTR and MMPO, A wins. According to the Plurality Criterion,
that's wrong.
But it's only wrong if the B voters aren't voting for A because they
don't prefer A to C
as much as the A voters prefer B to C.
Given the preferences, and the explanation for the actual votes, the
Plurality Criterion is wrong
when it calls the election of A a wrong result.
So yes: A criterion can rule wrongly, based on an incorrect built-in
assump
[EM] MMPO tiebreakers that don't violate FBC.
Mike Ossipoff wrote (15 Nov 2011): By the way, when people object to "random-fill incentive" for MDDTR, maybe they're forgetting that MDDTR is a 3-slot method. And, if MMPO were proposed as a 3-slot method, that would avoid the "random-fill incentive" criticism of it too. Mike, why do you think it will do that? There's no reason why a 3-slot method can't have a random-fill incentive. Chris Benham Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Descending Acquiescing Coalitions versus Nested Acquiescing Coalitions
Forest,
This NAC method suggestion of yours fails my Descending Solid Coalitions
bad example:
49: C
48: A
03: B>A
NAC, like DSC and FPP, elects C while DAC elects the MDT ("Mutual
Dominant Third") winner A.
DAC goes AC96 (disqualify B), AB51 (disqualify C), A wins.
NAC skips AB because that includes an already disqualified candidate and
next goes to C49 and
disqualifies A.
Which of the good properties of DAC are retained by NAC?
I think Majority for Solid Coalitions and probably Clone Independence
and maybe some others.
I'd be surprised if it meets Participation.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (9 Nov 2011):
DAC (descending acquiescing coalitions) disappointed Woodall because of
the following example:
03: D
14: A
34: A>B
36: C>B
13: C
The MDT winner is C, but DAC elects B.
DAC elects B even though the set {B} has a DAC score of zero, because
the "descending" order of
scores includes both the set {C,B} (with a score of 49) and the set
{A,B} (with a score of 48), and the
only candidate common to both sets is B, so B is elected by DAC.
But suppose that we change DAC to NAC (Nested Acquiescing Coalitions) so
that sets in the sequence
of descending scores are not only skipped over when the intersection is
empty, but also skipped over
when the set with the lower score is not a subset of the previously
included sets. Then, in the above
example, C is elected.
I want to point out that this NAC method also solves the "bad approval
problem" by electing C, B, and A
respectively, given the respective ballot sets
49 C
27 A>B
24 B,
and
49 C
27 A=B
24 B,
and
49 C
27 A>B
24 B>A .
Which of the good properties of DAC are retained by NAC?
Thanks,
Forest
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] 3 seat Largest Remainder Hare avoids the pit-falls of most ordered party-list elections.
I blogged about this at my blog a while back in response to the args given by the Electoral Reform Society of the UK against ordered party list forms of PR. http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html I think a better way to do a mixed method parliamentary election than what is done in Germany is to have a large number of 4 seat super-districts, where 3 seats would be elected with a 3 seat LR Hare and the 4th seat would be elected by some [deliberately unspecified] single-winner election rule besides FPTP. It keeps most of the strengths of ordered party list elections and helps third parties to win some seats and more influence if and only if they are able to persuade the center that their cause is just. As such, one could help a nazi party get elected but they wouldn't gain any ground on their distinctive issues. It would counter the criticism that LR Hare does not guarantee a majority rule or is biased in favor of smaller parties. The use of a single-winner election rule would tend to help bigger parties win more seats so that it's easier to have a clear-cut leadership who is accountable for the actions of the ruling government. It wouldn't be proportional, but there be at least one competitive seat per district, since the case when the 3 seats would be non-competitive with LR Hare would lead to a very competitive single-winner seat. And in my view, to guarantee the existence of a balance of non-competitive and competitive seats is very important for getting people interested, without making the election get too cut-throat competitive. It retains the legislator-constituent relationship to a greater degree. This Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Critical part of Re:Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Since my reply is long, I thought I'd share the last bit separately, here. KM:However, even if we wanted to choose that strategy[pushing hard for PR in US/State representative elections and city council elections], those who organize voting might at any point ask "well, what of single-winner elections?". Then we can say "pick Approval, Schulze (e.g.), MJ or Range; authorities X, Y, Z, think they're all pretty good". We just have to get X, Y, and Z to sign. If some local governments try any of them and find out that, say, MJ is good enough, then we can later say "X, Y, Z think they're all pretty good, and [county W] says they've had good experience with MJ". [endquote] dlw: Why not say, "the use of PR in 'more local' elections(like the above) will create a greater ability for third parties to spoil 'less local' single-winner elections, thereby increasing the demand for single-winner election reform. Right now, the plurality of support among electoral reform activists is for the use of a form of IRV to replace FPTP. We think that will change later down the road, since there are other options, but we'd rather just stay united in pushing hard for American forms of PR than cause dissent over an issue that is secondary in importance. dlw Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Critical part of Re:Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Unfortunately, I think it's hard to build a national or even a local
movement for a complicated, multi-step reform plan. You have to be able to
say what you want in about four words, tops.
Plan A:
1. Local elections using PR. ("But I don't care about local elections...")
2. Increases power of third parties ("But I don't care about third
parties...")
3. More spoiled or near-spoiled elections increase pressure for
single-winner reform ("Huh?")
4. Single-winner reform implemented ("But IRV was the wrong reform, we
should have gone for system X")
5. etc.
6. One day, we have a competitive, more-than-two-way race for
representative, senator, president, or mayor
7. Corruption withers.
See how many people you lose before you get to steps 6 and 7?
I think this works better:
Plan B:
1. Empower a commission (like the one in Rhode Island now... which hasn't
been constituted yet although it was supposed to start working in
September) to pick a good single-winner system.
2. Use that system at all levels.
3a. Increases pressure for PR reform
3b. All races more competitive
4. Corruption withers
My point is not that single-winner reform is more important or easier than
PR reform, but that if either one will lead to the other, we should start
with the one that can apply to all races initially, not the one which is
limited in scope. It appeals to people who only care about the top of the
ticket, and it does not lead to the disruptive and
temporarily-counterproductive step 3 of plan A.
Anyway, that's why I prefer something like plan B. Obviously on the whole
what we need are different people starting out with different plans, and
also ready to support any plan that starts working. So I'm not telling
anyone to stop doing what they're doing, just giving my own thoughts.
Jameson
2011/11/17 David L Wetzell
> Since my reply is long, I thought I'd share the last bit separately, here.
>
> KM:However, even if we wanted to choose that strategy[pushing hard for PR
> in US/State representative elections and city council elections], those who
> organize voting might at any point ask "well, what of single-winner
> elections?". Then we can say "pick Approval, Schulze (e.g.), MJ or Range;
> authorities X, Y, Z, think they're all pretty good". We just have to get X,
> Y, and Z to sign. If some local governments try any of them and find out
> that, say, MJ is good enough, then we can later say "X, Y, Z think they're
> all pretty good, and [county W] says they've had good experience with MJ".
> [endquote]
> dlw: Why not say, "the use of PR in 'more local' elections(like the
> above) will create a greater ability for third parties to spoil 'less
> local' single-winner elections, thereby increasing the demand for
> single-winner election reform. Right now, the plurality of support among
> electoral reform activists is for the use of a form of IRV to replace FPTP.
> We think that will change later down the road, since there are other
> options, but we'd rather just stay united in pushing hard for American
> forms of PR than cause dissent over an issue that is secondary in
> importance.
>
> dlw
>
>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?
Hi Mike, De : MIKE OSSIPOFF >>À : election-meth...@electorama.com >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 16 Novembre 2011 11h32 >>Objet : [EM] Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. >>Divulge IRV election specifics? >> I don't object to such criteria. I just prefer not to use them. In practice they usually have to be translated into votes-only criteria in order to figure out how to use or test them. You say it is inelegant to specify assumptions about methods to which criteria apply. But your alternative is criteria that have to discuss not just sincere preferences but also the degree to which voting may be insincere. And you need to define these concepts in a universal way, irrespective of ballot format. I don't feel this is more elegant. Possibly better-defined (if done well), but not more elegant. Kevin Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria: Kevin, you objected to my preference-mentioning criteria on the grounds that no one knows what the voters' true preferences really are. But so what? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?
2011/11/17 Kevin Venzke > > ..In practice [preference-mentioning criteria] usually have to be > translated into votes-only criteria in order to figure out how to use or > test them. > Yes, this is another (better?) way of putting what I said about "Criteria which apply to ballots and mention preferences". Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] JamesonQ, wrt critical part of re: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 12:01 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> JQ:Unfortunately, I think it's hard to build a national or even a local
> movement for a complicated, multi-step reform plan. You have to be able to
> say what you want in about four words, tops.
dlw: It helps if you use alliteration or variations on existing
slogans...God Bless(We Need) American Proportional Representation(PR)!
> Plan A:
> 1. Local elections using PR. ("But I don't care about local elections...")
>
Re: that's cuz they're (almost) never competitive.
The reason why is because we don't use PR.
If we use PR, it will make them competitive, which will make us care about
them and it will help in lots of ways (increased local activism, where
we're more effectiveand so on...)
> 2. Increases power of third parties ("But I don't care about third
> parties...")
>
Alternatives: (start with) Handicap major party rivalry (End Incentive for
Grid-Lock) or Give third parties a role/part-to-play/chance or "Let us
Play Coy (Politically)"
> 3. More spoiled or near-spoiled elections increase pressure for
> single-winner reform ("Huh?")
>
Alternative: Meaningful Multi-seat elections mean More Voices. More voices
means more reforms, including electoral reforms.
> 4. Single-winner reform implemented ("But IRV was the wrong reform, we
> should have gone for system X")
>
Re: With IRV, there'll be room for more than one electoral reform at a time!
[JQ]6. One day, we have a competitive, more-than-two-way race for
> representative, senator, president, or mayor
> 7. Corruption withers.
>
> See how many people you lose before you get to steps 6 and 7?[/JQ]
>
dlw: Not as many as you all tend to lose when you talk about your alphabet
soups of characteristics of single-winner election rules.
>
> JQ:I think this works better:
> Plan B:
> 1. Empower a commission (like the one in Rhode Island now... which hasn't
> been constituted yet although it was supposed to start working in
> September) to pick a good single-winner system.
>
[/endquote]
how is this commission "empowered" and how do they pick the criterion that
is decisive for picking a good single-winner system?
>
>
2. Use that system at all levels.
>
dlw:That's 6 words.
dlw: But one election rule doesn't fit all elections so this undercuts the
deeper need for electoral pluralism! And it's too damn easy to get some
smart person who understands electoral analytics to find something to make
any election rule look bad.
3a. Increases pressure for PR reform
>
dlw:You gotta get folks first to swallow the super-rule. There is
precedent for election reforms getting reversed, and not just with IRV!!!
3b. All races more competitive
>
dlw: Start at the top, after changing every election, and then PR? But the
whole point is that the partial/strategic use of PR gives us more bang than
some mythical single-winner reform that has yet to be tried out much in
political elections.
dlw: I may not my idea packaged [yet] for general consumption, but that
doesn't mean I'm not generally right...
> 4. Corruption withers
>
dlw:Age of Aquarius begins.
>
> JQ:My point is not that single-winner reform is more important or easier
> than PR reform, but that if either one will lead to the other, we should
> start with the one that can apply to all races initially, not the one which
> is limited in scope. It appeals to people who only care about the top of
> the ticket, and it does not lead to the disruptive and
> temporarily-counterproductive step 3 of plan A.
>
dlw:"if" either one will lead to the other.
Experience has not suggested that we're going to agree on one election rule
as inherently superior so that it should be implemented in all elections.
I for one would argue against such, saying that election rules are like
screw-driver, no one works well for all elections. But even if we did
somehow come to agreement, we'd still need to make the change one election
at a time, rather than to all elections at once. That's political science
fiction. There's precedent in the US for getting PR adopted in "more
local" elections, as there's precedent for stalwarts using smoke and
mirrors to subvert electoral reform.
>
> JQ:Anyway, that's why I prefer something like plan B. Obviously on the
> whole what we need are different people starting out with different plans,
> and also ready to support any plan that starts working. So I'm not telling
> anyone to stop doing what they're doing, just giving my own thoughts.
>
dlw: The push for American forms of PR is going to begin soon, it's a good
time to get prepared to make it a success!
>
> Jameson
>
>
> 2011/11/17 David L Wetzell
>
>> Since my reply is long, I thought I'd share the last bit separately, here.
>>
>> KM:However, even if we wanted to choose that strategy[pushing hard for PR
>> in US/State representative elections and city council elections], those who
>> organize voting might at any point ask "well, what of single-winner
>> elections?". Then we can
[EM] Replies to two postings from Jameson Quinn
Jameson-- You said: There are three possible kinds of criteria: 1. Criteria which apply to ballots and do not mention preferences. [endquote] When I say "apply to", in connection with criteria, I'm referring to what methods can be compared with those criteria. I don't know what "apply to" means when you use it in this posting. I'm going to guess that "apply to" means "stipulate about in the criterion's premise". You continue: 2. Criteria which apply to ballots and mention preferences. [endquote] I don't know what sort of "mention" you're referring to. I'm going to guess that, when you say "mention", you're referring to some kind of mention other than stipulation in the criterion's premise. But, in that case, it isn't clear what you mean by "mention". You continued: for instance, as part of the justification for why the criterion is desirable [endquote] Such "mention" of course isn't part of the criterion, and so your #2 criteria are essentially #1 criteria, as regards the criterion-wording itself. You continue: 3. Criteria which apply to preferences. [endquote] I'm going to guess that you're referring to criteria that stipulate preferences and a relation between preferences and votes. And maybe sometimes directly stipulate votes too. Remember that stipulation of preferences and a relation between preferences and votes amounts to an indirect stipulation of votes. You continue: You are saying that type 1 is bad [endquote] No, I'm not. I'm merely saying that often type 1 criteria are ridiculous. ...as when Plurality meets Condorcet's Criterion and Minimal Defense. Probably Majority-for-Solid-Coalitions too, unless it inelegantly stipulates against Plurality. You continue: so we are forced to choose type 3. [endquote] Some criteria that I use are votes-only criteria. Some of them aren't ridiculous. You continue: Everyone else is telling you that type 3 is essentially incoherent. [endquote] The "everyone" who, in current discussion here, have a problem with preference criteria consists of you and one other person :-) Can you be coherent enough to say what you mean, and then justify it? Specifically, what particular sentence in one of my preference criteria don't you understand the meaning of? In what way is one of my preference criteria ambiguous in meaning. What different meanings could it have? Is there a reasonable or proposed method that can't be unambiguously said to pass or fail one of my criteria? What method and what criterion? ...Or are you just incoherently making angry noises? >From your other posting: You wrote: The scenario: > 49: C > 27: A>B > 24: B(>A sincere) Options: 1. Elect B pro: it makes sense given the ballots [endquote] Unsupported assertions won't do. How does it make sense? The B voters are the smallest faction. Remember that, in MMPO and MDDTR, middle ratings are not approvals. You continue: con: the B voters are getting away with their strategy, and next time the A voters will probably follow them. 2. Elect A pro: It is correct for these sincere preferences con: it is badly wrong for other possible sincere preferences that could have given these ballots, especially if the A voters are only strategically voting for B. [endquote] How is it wrong? As I said, the B voters are the smallest faction. The A voters are the largest faction whose candidate doesn't have someone voted over hir by a majority. I assume you mean that maybe the A voters are really indifferent between B and C. For one thing, true indifference is rare. For another thing, the A voters' votes are their own, and they can use them as they wish, for whatever reason. One flaw in the "random-fill" criticism is the rarity of genuine indifference. You continue: 3. Elect C pro: well, that will teach those sneaky B voters a lesson! [endquote] Better yet: If they know that's what defection will do, then they won't defect. You continue: con: What if the B voters were being sincere? [endquote] If they're sincerely indifferent between A and C, then they won't mind of C wins instead of A, will they? Or are you saying that it's unfair to the sincere B voters if B doesn't win? As I said, B voters are the smallest faction. And, in MMPO and MDDTR, middle ratings are not approvals. Why should they expect B to win? You continue: 4. Allow candidate C to choose whether A or B is elected. (The SODA solution) [endquote] So you're saying to let the election be decided by a faction who has a majority defeat. No thanks. And there is no way that the public, in any jurisdiction, will agree to let the method rules automatically give that decision to a candidate. What are you mixing in your soda? You continue: My preference over these options: 4>3>1>2. Apparently, Mike Osipoff's preferences are something close to the reverse of this. [endquote] Almost. My preference-ordering is: 2>3>1>4 There's nothing wrong with electing C in that example. And ma
Re: [EM] JamesonQ, wrt critical part of re: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
2011/11/17 David L Wetzell
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 12:01 PM, Jameson Quinn
> wrote:
>
>> JQ:Unfortunately, I think it's hard to build a national or even a local
>> movement for a complicated, multi-step reform plan. You have to be able to
>> say what you want in about four words, tops.
>
>
> dlw: It helps if you use alliteration or variations on existing
> slogans...God Bless(We Need) American Proportional Representation(PR)!
>
>
>> Plan A:
>> 1. Local elections using PR. ("But I don't care about local elections...")
>>
> Re: that's cuz they're (almost) never competitive.
>
Really? You think the only reason that people spend more time talking about
the president than the city council is that the presidential election is
more competitive?
> The reason why is because we don't use PR.
> If we use PR, it will make them competitive, which will make us care about
> them and it will help in lots of ways (increased local activism, where
> we're more effectiveand so on...)
>
>
>> 2. Increases power of third parties ("But I don't care about third
>> parties...")
>>
> Alternatives: (start with) Handicap major party rivalry (End Incentive for
> Grid-Lock)
>
People are very good at asking "cui bono".
Reformer: "End gridlock incentive" (good slogan, by the way)
Person: "How?"
Reformer: "By giving you a third choice."
Person: "Oh, you're one of those third-party freaks. Greens are dirty
hippies, libertarians are unrealistic Ayn Rand cultists or antisemitic
conspiracy theorists [I know, that's actually Larouche, but people get
confused]. I would never want to elect those people."
I know, this is a hurdle for any election reform path. But the longer the
path, the less you can convince people to keep their eye on the prize and
jump the hurdles.
or Give third parties a role/part-to-play/chance or "Let us Play Coy
> (Politically)"
>
>
>> 3. More spoiled or near-spoiled elections increase pressure for
>> single-winner reform ("Huh?")
>>
> Alternative: Meaningful Multi-seat elections mean More Voices. More
> voices means more reforms, including electoral reforms.
>
This argument goes both ways - from PR to single-winner, or vice versa.
>
>
>> 4. Single-winner reform implemented ("But IRV was the wrong reform, we
>> should have gone for system X")
>>
> Re: With IRV, there'll be room for more than one electoral reform at a
> time!
>
???
>
> [JQ]6. One day, we have a competitive, more-than-two-way race for
>> representative, senator, president, or mayor
>> 7. Corruption withers.
>>
>> See how many people you lose before you get to steps 6 and 7?[/JQ]
>>
>
> dlw: Not as many as you all tend to lose when you talk about your alphabet
> soups of characteristics of single-winner election rules.
>
That's when we're talking to each other.
>
>> JQ:I think this works better:
>> Plan B:
>> 1. Empower a commission (like the one in Rhode Island now... which hasn't
>> been constituted yet although it was supposed to start working in
>> September) to pick a good single-winner system.
>>
> [/endquote]
>
> how is this commission "empowered" and how do they pick the criterion that
> is decisive for picking a good single-winner system?
>
As in Rhode Island, by the state legislature. Or by some legislature at
another level - congress, municipal, whatever. How do they choose? As
reasonable people - like the New Zealand commission did.
>
>>
> 2. Use that system at all levels.
>>
>
> dlw:That's 6 words.
>
OK, "No more plurality elections".
>
> dlw: But one election rule doesn't fit all elections so this undercuts the
> deeper need for electoral pluralism! And it's too damn easy to get some
> smart person who understands electoral analytics to find something to make
> any election rule look bad.
>
> 3a. Increases pressure for PR reform
>>
>
> dlw:You gotta get folks first to swallow the super-rule. There is
> precedent for election reforms getting reversed, and not just with IRV!!!
>
Including PR. In fact, each seat that PR gives to a third party is a seat
with a dispersed constituency, and all the major parties need to do to take
it back is repeal. With single-winner reform, there's a better chance that
the winner has the political strength to defend the system - or to defend
themselves as an incumbent without the system, which makes repeal less
tempting.
> 3b. All races more competitive
>>
>
> dlw: Start at the top, after changing every election, and then PR? But
> the whole point is that the partial/strategic use of PR gives us more bang
> than some mythical single-winner reform that has yet to be tried out much
> in political elections.
>
More bang per election, but fewer elections. I'd take one mayor over three
city councilmembers.
>
> dlw: I may not my idea packaged [yet] for general consumption, but that
> doesn't mean I'm not generally right...
>
>
>> 4. Corruption withers
>>
> dlw:Age of Aquarius begins.
>
Sure, you never really reach the end of the road, but it's still worth
setting your sights
[EM] Reply to Chris regarding the Approval bad-example
Chris said:
Mike refers to this scenario:
> The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it again here:
>
> Sincere preferences:
>
> 49: C
> 27: A>B
> 24: B>A
>
> A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C.
>
>
> Actual votes:
>
> The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the
> co-operativeness and
> responsibility of the A voters:
>
> 49: C
> 27: A>B
> 24: B
>
I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a
just interventionist mind-reading God
should award the election to A.
[endquote]
Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other instances?
Chris continued:
But a voting method's decisions and philosophical justification should
be based on information that is actually
on the ballots, not on some guess or arbitrary assumption about some
maybe-existing "information" that isn't.
[endquote]
Why? Why shouldn't a voting system avoid a worst-case, if, by so doing,
it hasn't been shown to act seriously wrongly in other cases?
And MMPO & MDDTR don't just bring improvement in the Approval bad-example. They,
in general, get rid of any strategy dilemma regarding whether you should
middle-rate
a lesser-evil instead of bottom-rating hir. For instance, consider the
A 100, B 15, C 0 utility example.
In MCA, there's a question about whether you should middle-rate or bottom-rate
B. In
MDDTR and MMPO, that dilemma is completely eliminated.
In those methods, middle rating someone can never help hir against your
favorite(s).
Chris continues:
I think a very reasonable tenet is that if, based on the information on
the ballots, candidate X utterly dominates
candidate Y then we should not elect Y.
[endquote]
Yes, there are many reasonable tenets among the aesthetic criteria.
Chris continues:
For several reasons (for those who can pooh-pooh this as "merely
aesthetic"): electing Y gives the supporters
of X a very strong post-election complaint with no common-sense or
philosophically cogent answer, X is highly
likely to be higher Social Utility (SU), Y's victory will have
compromised legitimacy.
[endquote]
Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B, and C.
How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not majority-defeated, A
has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate.
Chris continues:
The Plurality criterion is one very reasonable criterion that says that
C is so much stronger than A that the election
of A can't be justified. .
[endquote]
There are lots of aesthetic criteria that say things like that, and they all
sound
aesthetically reasonable. How great is their practical strategic importance?
Chris continued:
There are other criteria I find reasonable
that say the same thing:
"Strong Minimal Defense": If the number of ballots on which both X is
voted above bottom and Y isn't is greater than
the total number of ballots on which Y is voted above bottom, then don't
elect Y.
[endquote]
But can you word that in such a way that it isn't met by Plurality?
What sort of strategic guarantees are protected by the criteria
that you propose in this posting?
Chis continues:
The election of A is unacceptable because C's domination of A is
vastly more impressive than A's pairwise win over
B. The Plurality criterion plus the three other criteria I define above
all loudly say "not A".
[endquote]
In other words, it looks bad from those perspectives.
The election of A is justified by its being consistent with FBC, SFC or SFC3,
freedom from dilemma about middle-rating a compromise, and either
Later-No-Harm or non"failure" in Kevin's MMPO bad-example. --things that are
guaranteed by MMPO and MDDTR.
Additionally, as I was showing to Jameson, electing A in these methods
isn't really wrong.
> The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the
> co-operativeness and
> responsibility of the A voters:
Chris replies:
The plausibility of arbitrary claims about the voters' sincere
preferences and motivations
[endquote]
More a matter of "what if", rather than claims.
Chris continued:
can weighed in the light of the
used election method's incentives. How is it so "co-operative and
responsible" of the A voters to rank B when doing
so (versus truncating) can only help their favourite?
[endquote]
It's co-operative because it defeats the candidate commonly disliked by A
voters and B voters, in MCA, MDDTR and MMPO.
If neither did that, C would win.
If the A voters refused to, and, instead, the B voters co-operated, then it
would
be B would win, by being the defectors.
Chris continues:
And why would the
B voters be insincerely truncating ("defecting")
when doing so can only harm their favourite?
[endquote]
In MCA that defection could give their favorite the win, if the A voters have
co-operated, in spite of the A voters being more numerous.
In MPPO or MDDTR, the problem doesn't exist. The A voters can co-operate or
defect, and A will still win, having more to
Re: [EM] Reply to Chris regarding the Approval bad-example
True preferences: 49: C>B 27: A>C 24: B>C Clearly, C is the correct winner here, by a lot. And A is worst, again, by a lot. Actual votes under MMPO or MDDTR: 49: C (Truncating out of overconfident laziness, not strategy) 27: A>B (strategy) 24: B A wins. Bad result. And please don't tell me I'm not allowed to talk about this scenario because it doesn't meet your criterion. Jameson 2011/11/17 MIKE OSSIPOFF > > Chris said: > > Mike refers to this scenario: > > > The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it again here: > > > > Sincere preferences: > > > > 49: C > > 27: A>B > > > 24: B>A > > > > A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C. > > > > > > Actual votes: > > > > The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the > > co-operativeness and > > > responsibility of the A voters: > > > > 49: C > > 27: A>B > > 24: B > > > > I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a > just interventionist mind-reading God > > should award the election to A. > > [endquote] > > Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other instances? > > Chris continued: > > But a voting method's decisions and philosophical justification should > > be based on information that is actually > on the ballots, not on some guess or arbitrary assumption about some > maybe-existing "information" that isn't. > > [endquote] > > Why? Why shouldn't a voting system avoid a worst-case, if, by so doing, > > it hasn't been shown to act seriously wrongly in other cases? > > And MMPO & MDDTR don't just bring improvement in the Approval bad-example. > They, > in general, get rid of any strategy dilemma regarding whether you should > middle-rate > > a lesser-evil instead of bottom-rating hir. For instance, consider the > A 100, B 15, C 0 utility example. > > In MCA, there's a question about whether you should middle-rate or > bottom-rate B. In > MDDTR and MMPO, that dilemma is completely eliminated. > > In those methods, middle rating someone can never help hir against your > favorite(s). > > Chris continues: > > I think a very reasonable tenet is that if, based on the information on > the ballots, candidate X utterly dominates > > candidate Y then we should not elect Y. > > [endquote] > > Yes, there are many reasonable tenets among the aesthetic criteria. > > Chris continues: > > For several reasons (for those who can pooh-pooh this as "merely > > aesthetic"): electing Y gives the supporters > of X a very strong post-election complaint with no common-sense or > philosophically cogent answer, X is highly > likely to be higher Social Utility (SU), Y's victory will have > > compromised legitimacy. > > [endquote] > > Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B, and C. > > How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not majority-defeated, A > has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate. > > Chris continues: > > The Plurality criterion is one very reasonable criterion that says that > C is so much stronger than A that the election > of A can't be justified. . > > [endquote] > > There are lots of aesthetic criteria that say things like that, and they all > sound > > aesthetically reasonable. How great is their practical strategic importance? > > > Chris continued: > > There are other criteria I find reasonable > that say the same thing: > > "Strong Minimal Defense": If the number of ballots on which both X is > > voted above bottom and Y isn't is greater than > the total number of ballots on which Y is voted above bottom, then don't > elect Y. > > [endquote] > > But can you word that in such a way that it isn't met by Plurality? > > What sort of strategic guarantees are protected by the criteria > that you propose in this posting? > > Chis continues: > > The election of A is unacceptable because C's domination of A is > vastly more impressive than A's pairwise win over > > B. The Plurality criterion plus the three other criteria I define above > all loudly say "not A". > > [endquote] > > In other words, it looks bad from those perspectives. > > The election of A is justified by its being consistent with FBC, SFC or SFC3, > > freedom from dilemma about middle-rating a compromise, and either > Later-No-Harm or non"failure" in Kevin's MMPO bad-example. --things that are > guaranteed by MMPO and MDDTR. > > Additionally, as I was showing to Jameson, electing A in these methods > > isn't really wrong. > > > > > The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the > > co-operativeness and > > responsibility of the A voters: > > Chris replies: > > The plausibility of arbitrary claims about the voters' sincere > > preferences and motivations > > [endquote] > > More a matter of "what if", rather than claims. > > Chris continued: > > can weighed in the light of the > used election method's incentives. How is it so "co-operative and > > responsible" of the A voters to rank B when doing > so (versus truncating) can only help their favourite? > >
Re: [EM] Replies to two postings from Jameson Quinn
Reductio ad absurdem. One voter, two candidates. Preference-based criterion: "If the voter votes for A but actually prefers B, then B should win". But, people say, what if they meant to vote for A? Nope, you say, doesn't fit the criterion. So fine, I can find whether system X meets this criterion; but we can't have a reasonable conversation about it, because half of the relevant examples are somehow arbitrarily outlawed because they don't "fit". Preference-mentioning criterion: "Imagine the voter prefers B, but due to an epileptic seizure, votes for A. The correct winner in this case would be B. Therefore, whenever we see a vote for A, we should elect B." Now, it is easy to say why this is a silly criterion: "But if they meant to vote for A, then A is right." I'm not implying your criteria are this silly, or even silly at all. I'm just saying that a criterion can be justified on the basis of preferences, but, like the system itself, must ultimately speak in terms of ballots and results. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] An ABE solution.
Here’s my current favorite deterministic proposal: Ballots are Range Style, say three slot for simplicity. When the ballots are collected, the pairwise win/loss/tie relations are determined among the candidates. The covering relations are also determined. Candidate X covers candidate Y if X beats Y as well as every candidate that Y beats. In other words row X of the win/loss/tie matrix dominates row Y. Then starting with the candidates with the lowest Range scores, they are disqualified one by one until one of the remaining candidates X covers any other candidates that might remain. Elect X. For practical purposes this method is the same as Smith//Range. Where they differ, the member of Smith with the highest range score is covered by some other Smith member with a range score not far behind. This method resolves the ABE (approval bad example) in the following way: Suppose that the ballots are 49 C 27 A(top)>B(middle) 24 B No candidate covers any other candidate. The range order is C>B>A. Both A and B are removed before reaching candidate C, which is not covered by any remaining candidate. So the Smith//Range candidate C wins. If the ballots are sincere, then nobody can say that the Range winner was a horrible choice. But more to the point, if the ballots are sincere, the A supporters have a way of rescuing B: just rate hir equal top with A. Suppose, on the other hand that the B supporters like A better than C and the A supporters know this. Then the threat of C being elected will deter B faction defection, and they will rationally vote A in the middle: 49 C 27 A(top)>B(middle) 24 B(top)>A(middle) Now A covers both other candidates, so no matter the Range score order A wins. This completely resolves the ABE to my satisfaction. The method also allows for easy defense against burial of the CW. In the case 40 A>B (sincere A>C>B) 30 B>C 30 C>A where C is the sincere CW, the C supporters can defend C's win by truncating A. Then the Nash equilibrium is 40 A 30 B>C 30 C in which C is the ballot CW, and so is elected. Now for another topic... MTA vs. MCA I like MTA better than MCA because in the case where they differ (two or more candidates with majorities of top preferences) the MCA decision is made only by the voters whose ballots already had the effect of getting the ”finalists” into the final round, while the MTA decision reaches for broader support. Because of this, in MTA there is less incentive to top rate a lesser evil. If you don’t believe the fake polls about how hot the lesser evil is, you can take a wait and see attitude by voting her in the middle slot. If it turns out that she did end up as a finalist (against the greater evil) then your ballot will give her full support in the final round. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Reply to Chris regarding the Approval bad-example
49: C 27: A>B 24: B I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a just interventionist mind-reading God should award the election to A. [endquote] Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other instances? Yes. If the method used meets Later-no-Harm but fails Later-no-Help, i.e has a strong random-fill incentive like the MDD,TR method that Mike is advocating, there isn't any good reason to assume that the Middle ratings are sincere. So it could be that all the voters really have no interest in any candidate except their favourites and sincere is 49: C 27: A 24: B in which case C is the strong sincere Condorcet winner, or as Jameson pointed out it could be worse still and the A voters were Burying against C so sincere is 49: C 27: A>C 24: B Chris continues: Given the incentives of the MDD,TR method that Mike is advocating, it is only reasonable to assume that the truncators are all sincere [endquote] Wait a minute: I'm not saying that B truncation is a problem in MDDTR or MMPO. In fact, my point is that it is _not_. Truncation isn't a "problem" (for the full-rankers) as an "offensive strategy". The problem is that it isn't fair to the sincere truncators. Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B, and C. How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not majority-defeated, A has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate. Translation: "I love this arbitrary algorithm, so any winner it produces is by definition legitimate." A's win lacks legitimacy simply because there is another candidate that was vastly better supported on the ballots. If we add between 2 and 21 ballots that plump for A, then C's "majority-defeatedness" goes away and the winner changes from A to C, another failure of Mono-add-Plump. If we nonetheless accept that C but not A should be immediately disqualified, electing the undisqualified candidate with the most top-ratings is just another arbitrary feature of the algorithm. Why that candidate and not the one that is most approved? Based on the information actually on the ballots, no faction of voters has a very strong post-election complaint against B. Chris Benham 49: C 27: A>B 21: A (new voters, whose ballots change the MDD,TR winner from A to C) 24: B Mike Ossipoff wrote (17 Nov 2011): Chris said: Mike refers to this scenario: > The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it again here: > > Sincere preferences: > > 49: C > 27: A>B > 24: B>A > > A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C. > > > Actual votes: > > The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the > co-operativeness and > responsibility of the A voters: > > 49: C > 27: A>B > 24: B > I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a just interventionist mind-reading God should award the election to A. [endquote] Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other instances? Chris continued: But a voting method's decisions and philosophical justification should be based on information that is actually on the ballots, not on some guess or arbitrary assumption about some maybe-existing "information" that isn't. [endquote] Why? Why shouldn't a voting system avoid a worst-case, if, by so doing, it hasn't been shown to act seriously wrongly in other cases? And MMPO & MDDTR don't just bring improvement in the Approval bad-example. They, in general, get rid of any strategy dilemma regarding whether you should middle-rate a lesser-evil instead of bottom-rating hir. For instance, consider the A 100, B 15, C 0 utility example. In MCA, there's a question about whether you should middle-rate or bottom-rate B. In MDDTR and MMPO, that dilemma is completely eliminated. In those methods, middle rating someone can never help hir against your favorite(s). Chris continues: I think a very reasonable tenet is that if, based on the information on the ballots, candidate X utterly dominates candidate Y then we should not elect Y. [endquote] Yes, there are many reasonable tenets among the aesthetic criteria. Chris continues: For several reasons (for those who can pooh-pooh this as "merely aesthetic"): electing Y gives the supporters of X a very strong post-election complaint with no common-sense or philosophically cogent answer, X is highly likely to be higher Social Utility (SU), Y's victory will have compromised legitimacy. [endquote] Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B, and C. How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not majority-defeated, A has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate. Chris continues: The Plurality criterion is one very reasonable criterion that says that C is so much stronger than A that the election of A can't be justified. . [endquote] There are lots of aesthetic criteria that say things like that, and they all sound aesthetically reasonable. How gr
Re: [EM] Replies to two postings from Jameson Quinn
> > > 4. Allow candidate C to choose whether A or B is elected. (The SODA > solution) > > [endquote] > > So you're saying to let the election be decided by a faction who has a > majority defeat. > No thanks. > Yes, that's right. Candidate C should get only one vote, just like everyone else: 48999: C 1: C=A 27000: A>B 24000: B(>A sincere) Or: 48999: C 1: C=B 27000: A>B 24000: B(>A sincere) Who wins MMPO in the above scenarios? > And there is no way that the public, in any jurisdiction, will agree to > let the method rules > automatically give that decision to a candidate. What are you mixing in > your soda? The way SODA does this is not to arbitrarily let C decide. If C voters all approved C, but did not delegate their votes, C can do nothing. If C pre-approved B, then C can do nothing; C doesn't delegate, then A assigns delegated votes to B to prevent C from winning, and B wins. But if C pre-approved A, or if C truncated or otherwise equal-ranked both in their pre-declarations; assuming C has enough delegated votes to cover the margin between A and C (a bit less than half of C's votes); then C has the first option of assigning delegated votes to A, the candidate with the most approvals at the time of C's delegation. If C does so, then A wins. If C does not, then A will assign to B and B will win. I believe that, just like the pseudo-equivalent MMPO scenarios above, this is a fair way to resolve the problem. I believe that the fact that the problem has a solution, will prevent it from arising; that is, B will have a motive not to insincerely truncate, as they'd rather let the voters decide the close A/B race than hand that decision to the enemy C. I also think that your confidence that voters will reject this solution (which is not arbitrary, but follows the logic of delegation, and in fact is avoidable by either the voters or the candidates if they don't like it) is baseless. Personally, I think that the voters would welcome being told that there's no reason you wouldn't want to delegate to a candidate you agree with. Certainly it is the only method I know of where C does not win, and the C faction can express an A/B preference which affects the result but does not hurt C's chances to win in the case where the A and B factions sincerely truncate each other. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Reply to Chris regarding the Approval bad-example
I agree with Chris. But mostly, I'm writing to say that I would really like someone to fill in: http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MDDTR http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MTA Of course, redirects are fine. And you don't have to put in all sorts of sections for compliances and such if you don't know them, just a few sentences explaining the method itself is plenty. Thanks, Jameson 2011/11/17 C.Benham > > 49: C >> 27: A>B >> 24: B >> >> I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a >> just interventionist mind-reading God >> should award the election to A. >> >> [endquote] >> >> Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other instances? >> > > > Yes. If the method used meets Later-no-Harm but fails Later-no-Help, i.e > has > a strong random-fill incentive like the MDD,TR method that Mike is > advocating, there > isn't any good reason to assume that the Middle ratings are sincere. > > So it could be that all the voters really have no interest in any > candidate except their favourites > and sincere is > > 49: C > 27: A > 24: B > > in which case C is the strong sincere Condorcet winner, or as Jameson > pointed out it could > be worse still and the A voters were Burying against C so sincere is > > 49: C > 27: A>C > 24: B > > > Chris continues: >> >> Given the incentives of the MDD,TR method that Mike is advocating, it is >> only reasonable to assume that the truncators >> are all sincere >> >> [endquote] >> >> Wait a minute: I'm not saying that B truncation is a problem in MDDTR or >> MMPO. In fact, >> my point is that it is _not_. >> > > > Truncation isn't a "problem" (for the full-rankers) as an "offensive > strategy". The problem is that it > isn't fair to the sincere truncators. > > > Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B, and C. >> >> How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not majority-defeated, A >> has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate. >> > > > Translation: "I love this arbitrary algorithm, so any winner it produces > is by definition legitimate." > > A's win lacks legitimacy simply because there is another candidate that > was vastly better supported on > the ballots. > > If we add between 2 and 21 ballots that plump for A, then C's > "majority-defeatedness" goes away and > the winner changes from A to C, another failure of Mono-add-Plump. > > If we nonetheless accept that C but not A should be immediately > disqualified, electing the undisqualified > candidate with the most top-ratings is just another arbitrary feature of > the algorithm. > > Why that candidate and not the one that is most approved? Based on the > information actually on the ballots, > no faction of voters has a very strong post-election complaint against B. > > Chris Benham > > > 49: C > 27: A>B > 21: A (new voters, whose ballots change the MDD,TR winner from A to C) > 24: B > > > > > Mike Ossipoff wrote (17 Nov 2011): > > Chris said: > > Mike refers to this scenario: > > > The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it again here: > > > > Sincere preferences: > > > > 49: C > > 27: A>B > > 24: B>A > > > > A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C. > > > > > > Actual votes: > > > > The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the > > co-operativeness and > > responsibility of the A voters: > > > > 49: C > > 27: A>B > > 24: B > > > > I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a > just interventionist mind-reading God > should award the election to A. > > [endquote] > > Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other instances? > > Chris continued: > > But a voting method's decisions and philosophical justification should > be based on information that is actually > on the ballots, not on some guess or arbitrary assumption about some > maybe-existing "information" that isn't. > > [endquote] > > Why? Why shouldn't a voting system avoid a worst-case, if, by so doing, > it hasn't been shown to act seriously wrongly in other cases? > > And MMPO & MDDTR don't just bring improvement in the Approval bad-example. > They, > in general, get rid of any strategy dilemma regarding whether you should > middle-rate > a lesser-evil instead of bottom-rating hir. For instance, consider the > A 100, B 15, C 0 utility example. > > In MCA, there's a question about whether you should middle-rate or > bottom-rate B. In > MDDTR and MMPO, that dilemma is completely eliminated. > > In those methods, middle rating someone can never help hir against your > favorite(s). > > Chris continues: > > I think a very reasonable tenet is that if, based on the information on > the ballots, candidate X utterly dominates > candidate Y then we should not elect Y. > > [endquote] > > Yes, there are many reasonable tenets among the aesthetic criteria. > > Chris continues: > > For several reasons (for those who can pooh-pooh this as "merely > aesthetic"): electing Y gives the supporters > of X a very strong
Re: [EM] Poll for favorite multi-winner voting system
The poll for favorite multi-winner system ends on Sunday. Please get your votes in soon if you would like to participate. I will post a summary of results as I did for single-winner systems. On Sat, Nov 12, 2011 at 12:19 PM, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote: > Following up on last-month's poll for favorite single-winner voting > system, I am now doing a poll for favorite multi-winner voting system. > > Please go to this page to register and vote: > http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGJTHHww > Note that your email will not be shared with anyone and will not be used > for any purpose other than this poll. > > The candidates are: > -- Open list PR > -- Closed list PR > -- Mixed member PR > -- Cumulative voting > -- Limited voting > -- Plurality at-large voting > -- Meek STV > -- WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) > -- Other STV > -- Approval voting > > The poll will close on November 20 and I will report results shortly > thereafter. > > best, > Jeff > > _ > OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting > OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting > http://www.OpenSTV.org > http://www.OpaVote.org > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
