[EM] Electorama/wiki

[Stéphane Rouillon]

 How do we save Edits on the electowiki?
I can't see changes I made to the Proportional Representation page..

On 2011-11-18 00:18, Jameson Quinn wrote:

I agree with Chris.

But mostly, I'm writing to say that I would really like someone to 
fill in:


http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MDDTR
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MTA

Of course, redirects are fine. And you don't have to put in all sorts 
of sections for compliances and such if you don't know them, just a 
few sentences explaining the method itself is plenty.


Thanks,
Jameson

2011/11/17 C.Benham >



 49: C
 27: A>B
 24: B

 I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike
specifies then a
just interventionist mind-reading God
should award the election to A.

[endquote]

Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in
other instances?



Yes. If the method used meets Later-no-Harm but fails
Later-no-Help, i.e has
a strong random-fill incentive like the MDD,TR method that Mike is
advocating, there
isn't any good reason to assume that the Middle ratings are sincere.

So it could be that all the voters really have no interest in any
candidate except their favourites
and sincere is

49: C
27: A
24: B

in which case C is the strong sincere Condorcet winner, or as
Jameson pointed out it could
be worse still and the A voters were Burying against C so sincere is

49: C
27: A>C
24: B


Chris continues:

Given the incentives of the MDD,TR method that Mike is
advocating, it is
only reasonable to assume that the truncators
are all sincere

[endquote]

Wait a minute: I'm not saying that B truncation is a problem
in MDDTR or MMPO. In fact,
my point is that it is _not_.



Truncation isn't a "problem" (for the full-rankers) as an
 "offensive strategy". The problem is that it
isn't fair to the sincere truncators.


Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B, and C.

How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not
majority-defeated, A
has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate.



Translation: "I love this arbitrary algorithm, so any winner it
produces is by definition legitimate."

A's win lacks legitimacy simply because there is another candidate
that was vastly better supported on
the ballots.

If we add between 2 and 21 ballots that plump for A, then C's
"majority-defeatedness" goes away and
the winner changes from A to C, another failure of  Mono-add-Plump.

If we nonetheless accept that C but not A should be immediately
disqualified, electing the undisqualified
candidate with the most top-ratings is just another arbitrary
feature of the algorithm.

Why that candidate and not the one that is most approved?  Based
on the information actually on the ballots,
no faction of voters has a very strong post-election complaint
against B.

Chris Benham


49: C
27: A>B
21: A   (new voters, whose ballots change the MDD,TR winner from A
to C)
24: B




Mike Ossipoff wrote (17 Nov 2011):

Chris said:

Mike refers to this scenario:

> The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it
again here:
>
> Sincere preferences:
>
> 49: C
> 27: A>B
> 24: B>A
>
> A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C.
>
>
> Actual votes:
>
> The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the
> co-operativeness and
> responsibility of the A voters:
>
> 49: C
> 27: A>B
> 24: B
>

I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a
just interventionist mind-reading God
should award the election to A.

[endquote]

Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other
instances?

Chris continued:

But a voting method's decisions and philosophical justification should
be based on  information that is actually
on the ballots, not on some guess or  arbitrary assumption about some
maybe-existing "information" that isn't.

[endquote]

Why? Why shouldn't a voting system avoid a worst-case, if, by so
doing,
it hasn't been shown to act seriously wrongly in other cases?

And MMPO & MDDTR don't just bring improvement in the Approval
bad-example. They,
in general, get rid of any strategy dilemma regarding whether you
should middle-rate
a lesser-evil instead of bottom-rating hir. For instance, consider the
A 100, B 15, C 0 utility example.

In MCA, there's a question about whether you should middle-rate or
bottom-rate B. In
MDDTR and MMPO, that dilemma is completely eliminated.

In those methods, middle rating someone can never help hir

[EM] David Wetzel, re:

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

David:

MO:1. Proportional Representation is obsolete, now that we have
technology to easily implement Proxy Direct Democracy. (I discussed
Proxy DD in a fairly recent post).

You said:

dlw: I will look into it if you ask me kindly to do so and provide me
a link to a good summary of it.

[endquote]

I don't ask you kindly to do so. That's up to you. But I will tell you this: A 
good summary of it
can be found in a recent posting by me at this forum. I'll look up the date
of the posting, and will post that date, and a copy of the Proxy DD discussion
in that posting.

MO: 2. Largest Remainder, with the Hare quota, doesn't favor small parties. It's


unbiased with respect to party-size. But it's also not very proportional.

You said:

  Unlike most forms of PR,
it [your Hare Largest Remainder] doesn't require quotas.

Then it isn't Largest Remainder. The designation "Hare" refers to
the use of the Hare quota.

MO:It has lots of random deviation from proportionality.

You said:

dlw:*Random?*   

[endquote]

Yes. I don't know what you're calling Largest Remainder, but real Largest 
Remainder
randomly deviates from proportionality.


You said:

...  That is
what I mean when it favors small parties.  

[endquote]

Fine. Then it isn't Largest Remainder with the Hare quota.

You said:

It is not a random
deviation from proportionality.

[endquote]

Again, then it ish't LR.

  

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Kevin's other posting on votes-only criteria vs preference criteria.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Kevin:

You said:

In practice [preference-mentioning criteria] usually have to be translated into 
votes-only criteria in order to figure out how to use or test them.

[endquote]

So what? Regardless of your procedure for applying the criteria, my criteria 
apply to all methods. Votes-only criteria often
do not, unless you say that Plurality passes Condorcet's criterion.

You continued:

>Well, in my mind a votes-only criterion is independent.

[endquote]

Independent of what? Either you stipulate that Condorcet's Criterion applies 
only to certain methods and not
to others, or CC gives results that are not as you or anyone else intend.

You continued:

Usually the two versions aren't quite equivalent or can't be easily proven to 
be equivalent.

[endquote]

Of course they're not equivalent. Preference criteria are 
universally-applicable.


You continued:

>I think part of the disagreement on this issue is based on who the audience is.

[endquote]

Irrelevant.

You continued:

On this list we don't generally have problems with most people using an 
implied Woodall-ish conception of methods and criteria.

[endquote]

That fact that it can be guessed what someone means when using those votes-only 
criteria doesn't answer my
criticisms of them.

You continue:

If someone wanted to argue that FPP actually does satisfy Condorcet we would 
just tell them they're doing it wrong

[endquote]

You could...and you'd be incorrect thereby.

If there is something wrong with how I interpreted votes-only Condorcet's 
Criterion, for instance,
when saying that Plurality meets CC, then I invite you to say what is wrong 
with that interpretation of CC.

Tell us how you define CC, minimal defense, and Majority for Solid Coalitions, 
without mentioning
preference. And then tell what's wrong with the interpretation of those 
criteria whereby Plurality meets
them.



You continue:


no big deal. Mike seems to be paranoid about people understanding 
criteria contrary to their original intention.

[endquote]

Is that what I said? I thought that I merely said that Plurality meets those 
criteria.

Oh yes, I did also say that your votes-only criteria often rule contrary to 
your intention. That makes nonsense out
of them and their use.

You continue:

>
>The inconvenient thing about e.g. SDSC is mostly the "should have a way of 
>voting" wording.

[endquote]

How is that inconvenient? It sounds to me as if the meaning is quite plain. 

If a majority prefer x to y, 
then there should be a way of voting whereby that majority can vote that will 
insure that
 y won't win, without any member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate 
equal to or over a more-liked one. 
(other than equal-bottom-ranking them).

The use of the word "should" is commonly used on EM as an expression of the 
criterion's requirement for a method to 
meet the criterion. Is that what you're objecting to. I suppose I could have 
said, "A method meets SDSC if..."

...or divided the criterion text into "premise" and "requirement" as I did with 
CD.


You continue:

In practice this "way of voting" is almost always truncation 

It typically requires voting x above bottom, but not y.

You continue:

(which definitely is possible to define within Mike's scheme, as he doesn't 
consider truncation of two candidates to be voting them equal).

[endquote]

For some time I've been including that exception in the criterion's wording.

You continued:

>I wonder if SDSC can really be seamlessly applied to any ballot format though. 
>Mike seems to assume it is unambiguous what it means to vote a candidate above 
>or equal to or below another candidate. 

[endquote]

I defined that some years ago. Someone else suggested a much simpler 
definition, which I posted today. I agreed that that definition
was briefer, and that it was fine with me till such time as someone found a 
problem with it.

If it can be shown that you've found such a problem, then I'll discard that 
briefer definition, and return to the use of my
longer definition, the one that speaks, more generally, of an election with 
arbitrarily many voters and candidates.

You continue:

If he has a definition for these I imagine it's based on some very specific 
test that wouldn't necessarily reflect general method behavior.

[endquote]

See the definition that I posted today.

You continued:

For example, what if under some method the majority preferring A to B can make 
B lose by ranking B top? 

[endquote]

Let's say that that "ranking x higher than y" means that you write that 
candidate's name closer to the "top" of a piece of paper or the top of your 
computer screen, and that "ranking B top" means ranking B over everyone who 
isn't ranked as B is.

Then, in your questionably-proposable method, and by the definition that I 
posted today, ranking B, but not A, at top
qualifies as voting A over B, if that would defeat B even if you were the only 
voter and A & B were the only candidates.

If not, then we'd need 

[EM] Re to KM wrt 3 seat Largest Remainder Hare andLoring Ensemble Rule.

[David L Wetzell]

On Fri, Nov 18, 2011 at 7:14 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_el...@lavabit.com> wrote:

> David L Wetzell wrote:
>
>> I blogged about this at my blog a while back in response to the args
>> given by the Electoral Reform Society of the UK against ordered party list
>> forms of PR.  http://anewkindofparty.**blogspot.com/2011/05/**
>> electoral-reform-society-**united-kingdom.html
>>
>> I think a better way to do a mixed method parliamentary election than
>> what is done in Germany is to have a large number of 4 seat
>> super-districts, where 3 seats would be elected with a 3 seat LR Hare and
>> the 4th seat would be elected by some [deliberately unspecified]
>> single-winner election rule besides FPTP.
>>
>
> That sounds a lot like the Loring Ensemble Rule. You might be interested
> in reading about it at 
> http://www.accuratedemocracy.**com/e_ler.htm.
>

dlw:thankyou, you are far more polite than Mike O. I did look at it.  It's
similar to the second version that has essentially two separate elections,
rather than using the ranking info twice.

>
> Loring argues that Plurality councils can swing wildly and deny
> representation to people who should be represented, while PR councils can
> still be off-center due to kingmaker scenarios, and that one should
> therefore pick a center that can break ties while not giving any voting
> bloc undue power.
>

My approach replaces STV with LR Hare, I guess I don't really care whether
rankings get used or not, but I do like having fewer seats with PR with a
Hare Quota, so we can avoid those arbitrary percentage restrictions.  It
lets third parties decide who's the party-in-power but helps the
party-in-power get more seats so they can get things done if they are
generally popular, or able to win many of the single-winner elections.

>
> He then proposes to use STV, but shield the CW from losing. The Condorcet
> winner represents the center or common consensus position, while the other
> winners represent the diversity of opinion among the people. Because the
> process is done inside a single method, in the case the CW is off-center,
> the proportional representation aspect of the algorithm will even this out
> by compensating.
>

The link you gave me though tends to weigh stronger for the 2nd version,
which is easier to explain to voters by virtue of how it combines two
already existing elections...

>
> The same sort of shielding could be used in any type of multiwinner
> system. If it's sequential, you just keep the CW from being eliminated. If
> it's combinatorial (like Schulze STV), you only consider those sets of
> winners that include the CW.
>

dlw:If I was gung-ho on getting the CW elected that'd be really great, but
I don't expect great things of the ranking choices of low-info voters like
we have a lot of in the US.  Does it matter the ratios?  Cuz I really like
3:1 multi-winner and single-winner.


dlw

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Re to Mike O wrt 3 seat LR Hare.

[David L Wetzell]

MO:1. Proportional Representation is obsolete, now that we have
technology to easily implement Proxy Direct Democracy. (I discussed
Proxy DD in a fairly recent post).

dlw: I will look into it if you ask me kindly to do so and provide me
a link to a good summary of it.


MO: 2. Largest Remainder, with the Hare quota, doesn't favor small parties. It's


unbiased with respect to party-size. But it's also not very proportional.

dlw: 3 seat LR Hare is the form of PR I prescribe for "more local"
elections that are typically never competitive and consequently rarely
interesting.  It is almost like 1 seat LR Hare, or First-Past
the-Post.  It has one candidate per party and one voter per voter.
Most of the time, the top three vote-getters will get one seat each.
However, if the top vote-getter were to beat their third place
vote-getter by more than 1/3rd of the total vote then (s)he would get
to appoint a vice-candidate to the 2nd seat for their party and the
2nd place vote-getter would get the third seat.  If the top
vote-getter were to beat the 2nd place vote-getter by more than 2/3rds
of the vote, then (s)he would get to appoint two vice-candidates to
hold the other two seats.  It's that simple.  Unlike most forms of PR,
it doesn't require quotas.

MO:It has lots of random deviation from proportionality.

dlw:*Random?*   If the vote percents were 40-30-20-10 then the top
three would win one seat each.  If they were 50-35-10-5 then the top
vote-getter would get two seats.  But this means that if the top vote
getter were to get 43.3 or less of the vote then the third place
candidate could win a seat with as little as 10% of the vote.  That is
what I mean when it favors small parties.  It is not a random
deviation from proportionality.

And, I don't think proportionality matters.  So long as we continue to
use single-winner elections that favor bigger parties then we should
be willing to use multi-seat elections that favor smaller parties.
It's karma.  The opposite biases will tend to even out over time...

So if this was just using 3-seat LR Hare, like for a state
representative election with 40,000 potential voters and 20,000
typical voters.  Let's say there were two major parties, D and R who
get 50 and 40% of the typical vote or 10,000 and 8,000 die-hard
supporters.   By virtue of these supporters, the major parties are
guaranteed that their candidates will win a seat.  However, since the
third seat is in play.  So let's say there are 2 third parties vying
for the third seat.  And let's say they succeed in grass/net-working
among family/friends to persuading 20% each of the non-typical voters,
or 4,000 voters to vote for them and they get split the remaining 10%
of the typical vote 60-40%.  Then, the Percent totals among the five
parties would become

50/140=35.7% - 40/140=28.6% - 26/140 =18.6% - 24/140%=% - 17.1%.

As a result, the third party that does the best wins a seat and gets
to help decide which of the two major parties is effectively in power.
 But if there was a single-seat election that was going on at the same
time as this election and the two third parties voted strategically in
that "less local" election, they would be the swing voters.  In both
cases, they would get attention to their issues by the two major
parties and influence would be decentralized.

MO: Sainte-Lague is the proportional PR.

dlw:1. LR Hare is mathematically designed to minimize the absolute
value of the difference between the percent of the vote received and
the percent of the seats won by all of the parties in an election.


2. As stated above, if PR is used in conjunction with single-winner
elections that are biased in favor of bigger parties then it does not
need to hug proportionality.  As I understand from "Choosing an
electoral system", the best predictor of proportionality in practice
is the number of contested seats, but greater numbers of contested
seats in PR elections make for fewer competitive seats and less
interesting elections...


MO:PR is unwinnable in the U.S, where electoral reform, in addition to
efforts for Proxy DD, should be about a better
single-winner method.


dlw: why is PR unwinnable in the US?  In 1870, we adopted 3-seat
quasi-PR for IL state representative elections.  It's an easy way to
kill lots of birds at once.

MO:Of course, with Proxy DD, all decisions will be single-winner
decisions, among all kinds of sets of alternatives.


dlw: Why then is Proxy DD what makes PR obsolete?
dlw

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Kevin: Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Kevin:

You wrote:

You say it is inelegant to specify assumptions about methods to which criteria 
apply.

[endquote]

Yes.

You continue:

But
 your alternative is criteria that have to discuss not just sincere 
preferences but also the degree to which voting may be insincere.

[endquote]

Some
 of my criteria stipulate sincere voting by some or all voters. Some of 
them stipulate other preference/vote relations, such as
not having to
 vote someone equal to or over one's favorite; or not having to vote 
someone over one's favorite; or not having to vote
a less-liked candidate equal to or over a more-liked one.

However my criteria don't discuss degrees of insincerity. My criteria use one, 
and only one, definition of sincere voting.

You continue:

And you need to define these concepts in a universal way, irrespective of 
ballot format. 

[endquote]

I have. I posted that definition years ago. I re-posted that definition within 
the last few weeks.

Sincere voting:

A voter has votes sincerely iff s/he doesn't falsify a preference or fail to 
vote a genuine preference that the voting system in
use would have allowed hir to vote in addition to the preferences that s/he 
actually did vote.

[end of definition of sincere voting]

To falsify a preference is to vote x over y without preferring x to y.

To vote a genuine preference is to vote x over y when one prefers x to y.

[end of definitions of falsifying a preference and voting a genuine preference]

I defined voting x over y in a wordy way that spoke of an election with 
arbitrarily many candidates and voters.
But someone else suggested a much briefer definition:

A voter votes x over y iff the relation of x's and y's status on hir ballot is 
such that, if s/he were the only voter,
and if x and y were the only candidates, then, with that relation of x's and 
y's status on hir ballot, x would win.

[end of someone else's brief definition of voting x over y]

I
 don't know if I like that as much as my longer definition, because of 
the awkwardness, and possible ambiguity, of speaking of a relation
of 2 candidates' status on a ballot. Well, the relations described in the 
following paragraph are such status relations.

Of
 course, in Approval, that means approving x but not y. In Plurality it 
means voting for x, which implies not voting for y. In a rank method
it means ranking x over y. In Range Voting, it means giving a higher rating to 
x than to y. 

Explicitly specifying those things would be a perfectly adequate definition 
too, but I prefer
a completely method-disregarding definition.

You continued:

I don't feel this is more elegant. Possibly better-def... [the rest of what you 
said didn't copy]

[endquote]

What
 don't you feel is more elegant? Using one universal definition of 
sincere voting that applies to all ballot-formats and methods? 

Or do think that it isn't more elegant for a criterion to apply seamlessly to 
all methods?

Mike Ossipoff 
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] An ABE solution.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Hi Forest--

Thanks for answering my question about MTA vs MCA. Your argument on that 
question is convincing, and
answers my question about the strategy difference between those two methods.

Certainly, electing C in the ABE avoids the ABE problem. I'd been hoping that 
the election of C can be attained
without diverging from Plurality's results enough to upset some people, as MMPO 
and MDDTR seem to
do.

So the method that you describe might avoid the public relations (non)problems 
of methods that elect
A.

I have a few questions about the method that you describe:

1. What name do you give to it? In this post I'll call it "Range till 
cover-winner" or RCW


2. The covering relation doesn't look at pairwise ties?

3. Does the ballot ask the voter for cardinal ratings of the candidates, or is 
the range score
calculated a la Borda? 

4. How does it do by FBC? And by the criteria that bother some people here 
about MMPO (Kevin's
MMPO bad-example) and MDDTR (Mono-Add-Plump)?  

There's much hope that, by electing C instead of A, RCW can avoid those 
criticisms.

I'm also interested in how it does by 1CM and 3P, but I'll look at that, instead
of asking you to do everything for me, especially since I'm the one promoting 
those
two criteria.

Mike




Here’s my current favorite deterministic proposal: Ballots are Range Style, say 
three slot for simplicity.

When the ballots are collected, the pairwise win/loss/tie relations are
determined among the candidates.

The covering relations are also determined.  Candidate X covers candidate Y if X
beats Y as well as every candidate that Y beats.  In other words row X of the
win/loss/tie matrix dominates row Y.

Then starting with the candidates with the lowest Range scores, they are
disqualified one by one until one of the remaining candidates X covers any other
candidates that might remain.  Elect X.

For practical purposes this method is the same as Smith//Range.  Where they
differ, the member of Smith with the highest range score is covered by some
other Smith member with a range score not far behind.

This method resolves the ABE (approval bad example) in the following way:
Suppose that the ballots are

49 C
27 A(top)>B(middle)
24 B

No candidate covers any other candidate.  The range order is C>B>A.  Both A and
B are removed before reaching  candidate C, which is not covered by any
remaining candidate.  So the Smith//Range candidate C wins.

If the ballots are sincere, then nobody can say that the Range winner was a
horrible choice.  But more to the point, if the ballots are sincere, the A
supporters have a way of rescuing B: just rate hir equal top with A.

Suppose, on the other hand that the B supporters like A better than C and the A 
supporters know this.  Then the threat of C being elected will deter B faction 
defection, and they will rationally vote A in the middle:

49 C
27 A(top)>B(middle)
24 B(top)>A(middle)

Now A covers both other candidates, so no matter the Range score order A wins.

This completely resolves the ABE to my satisfaction.

The method also allows for easy defense against burial of the CW.

In the case

40 A>B (sincere A>C>B)
30 B>C
30 C>A

where C is the sincere CW, the C supporters can defend C's win by truncating A. 
 Then the Nash equilibrium is

40 A
30 B>C
30 C

in which C is the ballot CW, and so is elected.


Now for another topic...


MTA  vs. MCA

I like MTA better than MCA because in the case where they differ (two or more
candidates with majorities of top preferences) the MCA decision is made only by
the voters whose ballots already had the effect of getting the ”finalists” into
the final round, while the MTA decision reaches for broader support.
Because of this, in MTA there is less incentive to top rate a lesser evil.  If
you don’t believe the fake polls about how hot the lesser evil is, you can take
a wait and see attitude by voting her in the middle slot.  If it turns out that
she did end up as a finalist (against the greater evil) then your ballot will
give her full support in the final round.
  
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?

[Kevin Venzke]

Jameson/Mike,
 

De : Jameson Quinn 
>>>À : Kevin Venzke  
>>>Cc : em  
>>>Envoyé le : Jeudi 17 Novembre 2011 12h48
>>>Objet : Re: [EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV 
>>>squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>2011/11/17 Kevin Venzke  
>>>..In practice [preference-mentioning criteria] usually have to be translated 
>>>into votes-only criteria in order to figure out how to use or test them.
>>>Yes, this is another (better?) way of putting what I said about "Criteria 
>>>which apply to ballots and mention preferences".
>>>
>>>Jameson
>>>
>>
>>
>> 
>Well, in my mind a votes-only criterion is independent. Usually the two 
>versions aren't quite equivalent or can't be easily proven to be equivalent.
>
>I think part of the disagreement on this issue is based on who the audience 
>is. On this list we don't generally have problems with most people using an 
>implied Woodall-ish conception of methods and criteria. If someone wanted to 
>argue that FPP actually does satisfy Condorcet we would just tell them they're 
>doing it wrong and shrug them off, no big deal. Mike seems to be paranoid 
>about people understanding criteria contrary to their original intention.
>
>The inconvenient thing about e.g. SDSC is mostly the "should have a way of 
>voting" wording. In practice this "way of voting" is almost always truncation 
>(which definitely is possible to define within Mike's scheme, as he doesn't 
>consider truncation of two candidates to be voting them equal). Mike's wording 
>does allow a method to satisfy the criterion alternatively using an explicit 
>approval cutoff or something. So I recognize that he is getting something 
>additional, that is not useless, from his choice of wording.
>
>I wonder if SDSC can really be seamlessly applied to any ballot format though. 
>Mike seems to assume it is unambiguous what it means to vote a candidate above 
>or equal to or below another candidate. If he has a definition for these I 
>imagine it's based on some very specific test that wouldn't necessarily 
>reflect general method behavior. For example, what if under some method the 
>majority preferring A to B can make B lose by ranking B top? One could say 
>(see definition below) that this is no good, because B is being ranked "over" 
>A. But how do we know whether that's "over"? Based on this one very 
>counterintuitive result, it doesn't look like "over."
>
>What if voters can vote cycles? What if they put candidates in color-coded 
>buckets and the outcome is determined by even vs. odd vote counts? I think at 
>some point, any criterion scheme has to say "use your head, you know what I'm 
>trying to say," and where it says that is mostly a matter of taste.
>
>For reference, this is SDSC:
>If a majority of all the voters prefer A to B, then they should have a way of 
>voting that will ensure that B won't win, without any member of that majority 
>voting a less-liked candidate equal to or over a more-liked candidate.
>
>Kevin
>
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[EM] Largest-Remainder doesn't favor small parties, but isn't very proportional either. PR is obsolete now that Proxy DD is available.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

1. Proportional Representation is obsolete, now that we have technology to 
easily
implement Proxy Direct Democracy. (I discussed Proxy DD in a fairly recent 
post).

2. Largest Remainder, with the Hare quota, doesn't favor small parties. It's
unbiased with respect to party-size. But it's also not very proportional.
It has lots of random deviation from proportionality. 

Sainte-Lague is the proportional PR. 

Sainte-Lague is known, in Congressional apportionment discussion, as "[Daniel] 
Webster's method".
It has a different implementation-rule definition from that of Sainte-Lague, 
but it's the same
method, giving the same apportionment.

Largest Remainder is known, in Congressional apportionment discussion as 
"[Alexander] Hamilton's method".

Both of those methods have been used to apportion the U.S. House of 
Representatives.

Of course both are used for PR too.

If you don't believe that Sainte-Lague is the most proportional PR method, then 
look at my
Sainte-Lague PR article at Barnsdale's electoral website.

I think that the URL is something like http://www.Barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/PR

PR is unwinnable in the U.S, where electoral reform, in addition to efforts for 
Proxy DD, should be about a better
single-winner method.

Of course, with Proxy DD, all decisions will be single-winner decisions, among 
all kinds of sets of alternatives.

Mike Ossipoff



  
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Re: [EM] JamesonQ, wrt critical part of re: Kristofer Munsterhjelm

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
> As long as you also point to AmPR, it doesn't matter that you also push
> SODA and what-not..., but if AmPR gets hot, because of FairVote's
> comparative advantage at marketing electoral reform to US_Americans, and
> your products don't, it might be time to shift tactics.
>

Great. As long as you continue to oppose plurality, I'll graciously allow
you to continue what you're doing, too. :)

Jameson

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Re: [EM] JamesonQ, wrt critical part of re: Kristofer Munsterhjelm

[David L Wetzell]

On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 4:01 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

>
>
> 2011/11/17 David L Wetzell 
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 12:01 PM, Jameson Quinn 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> JQ:Unfortunately, I think it's hard to build a national or even a local
>>> movement for a complicated, multi-step reform plan. You have to be able to
>>> say what you want in about four words, tops.
>>
>>
>> dlw: It helps if you use alliteration or variations on existing
>> slogans...God Bless(We Need) American Proportional Representation(PR)!
>>
>>
>>>  Plan A:
>>> 1. Local elections using PR. ("But I don't care about local
>>> elections...")
>>>
>> Re: that's cuz they're (almost) never competitive.
>>
>
> JQ:Really? You think the only reason that people spend more time talking
> about the president than the city council is that the presidential election
> is more competitive?
>

dlw: I didn't say that.  I implied the main reason that people don't talk
about city council is that the city council elections are rarely
competitive.

>
>
>> The reason why is because we don't use PR.
>> If we use PR, it will make them competitive, which will make us care
>> about them and it will help in lots of ways (increased local activism,
>> where we're more effectiveand so on...)
>>
>>
>>> 2. Increases power of third parties ("But I don't care about third
>>> parties...")
>>>
>> Alternatives: (start with) Handicap major party rivalry (End Incentive
>> for Grid-Lock)
>>
>
> People are very good at asking "cui bono".
> Reformer: "End gridlock incentive" (good slogan, by the way)
> Person: "How?"
> Reformer: "By giving you a third choice."
>
dlw: "By making it impossible for either to get a permanent majority"


> Person: "Oh, you're one of those third-party freaks. Greens are dirty
> hippies, libertarians are unrealistic Ayn Rand cultists or antisemitic
> conspiracy theorists [I know, that's actually Larouche, but people get
> confused]. I would never want to elect those people."
>

dlw: Who'd benefit?  Do we not all benefit (holistically, if not
economically) when our economic, ethnic and ideological minorities' rights
are protected?  And how is that s'posed to happen if we don't handicap
major party rivalry and give third parties a constructive role to play?
 I'm not saying we give them a realistic chance of being in power, I'm
saying we let them decide which of our two major parties are in power so
that they get the chance to raise their issues!

>
> I know, this is a hurdle for any election reform path. But the longer the
> path, the less you can convince people to keep their eye on the prize and
> jump the hurdles.
>

It's not that long a path and your arg can kill any election reform,not
just mine.  You can't meaningfully change the rules without raising
someone's hackles.   My proposal does not help

>
> or Give  third parties a role/part-to-play/chance or "Let us Play Coy
>> (Politically)"
>>
>>
>>> 3. More spoiled or near-spoiled elections increase pressure for
>>> single-winner reform ("Huh?")
>>>
>> Alternative: Meaningful Multi-seat elections mean More Voices.  More
>> voices means more reforms, including electoral reforms.
>>
>

> JQ:This argument goes both ways - from PR to single-winner, or vice versa.
>

dlw: That is our area of diff.  You claim it goes both ways, but  I'm
skeptical.  I think that "more local" PR has a stronger case of leading to
single-winner than vice-versa.  I also think political cultural changes
dwarf both venues .   But perhaps you can spell out for me how really good
single-winner reform(as opposed to IRV3/AV3) would get us PR.

>
>
>>
>>
>>> 4. Single-winner reform implemented ("But IRV was the wrong reform, we
>>> should have gone for system X")
>>>
>> Re: With IRV, there'll be room for more than one electoral reform at a
>> time!
>>
>
> ???
>

The rational strategy in a FPTP system is often to vote strategically and
there can only be two contenders: the status quo and a single alternative.
 If we were using IRV then it'd be easier for there to be more alternative
election rules getting more consideration.

>
>
>>
>> [JQ]6. One day, we have a competitive, more-than-two-way race for
>>> representative, senator, president, or mayor
>>> 7. Corruption withers.
>>>
>>> See how many people you lose before you get to steps 6 and 7?[/JQ]
>>>
>>
>> dlw: Not as many as you all tend to lose when you talk about your
>> alphabet soups of characteristics of single-winner election rules.
>>
>
> That's when we're talking to each other.
>

dlw: But can you keep it colloquial and explain why "she's the one"???

>
>
>>
>>> JQ:I think this works better:
>>> Plan B:
>>> 1. Empower a commission (like the one in Rhode Island now... which
>>> hasn't been constituted yet although it was supposed to start working in
>>> September) to pick a good single-winner system.
>>>
>> [/endquote]
>>
>> how is this commission "empowered" and how do they pick the criterion
>> that is decisive for picking a good single-winner system?
>>
>
> As in Rh

Re: [EM] Poll for favorite multi-winner voting system

[Juho Laatu]

I have some problems in putting these methods in the order of preference. In 
both single-winner and multi-winner methods I tend to think that the answer is 
often different for different needs and different societies.

I'm used to open lists. I wouldn't recommend changing them to STV because that 
would take away some of the good features that people are used to in open 
lists. For similar reasons STV societies might not benefit of changing to open 
lists. These two approaches are at their best in different environments e.g. 
with respect to number of candidates, size of districts, and level of 
proportionality. So it all depends on what we want, what we are used to, and 
which steps are politically feasible next steps.

One general purpose system that I like, that can be highly proportional, that 
may work in multiple environments, with different targets, and that may be 
politically acceptable in many environments, is a mixture of open lists and STV 
style ranking based proportional methods (where ranking is used to implement 
proportionality within the parties). One could also support trees to allow 
small parties / groups to form alliances.

(Actually I'm already almost talking about a generic system that can be 
parameterized to meet different needs.)

Juho



On 18.11.2011, at 8.20, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:

> The poll for favorite multi-winner system ends on Sunday.  Please get your 
> votes in soon if you would like to participate.  I will post a summary of 
> results as I did for single-winner systems.
> 
> On Sat, Nov 12, 2011 at 12:19 PM, Jeffrey O'Neill  
> wrote:
> Following up on last-month's poll for favorite single-winner voting system, I 
> am now doing a poll for favorite multi-winner voting system.
> 
> Please go to this page to register and vote:
> http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGJTHHww
> Note that your email will not be shared with anyone and will not be used for 
> any purpose other than this poll.
> 
> The candidates are:
> -- Open list PR
> -- Closed list PR
> -- Mixed member PR
> -- Cumulative voting
> -- Limited voting
> -- Plurality at-large voting
> -- Meek STV
> -- WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV)
> -- Other STV
> -- Approval voting
> 
> The poll will close on November 20 and I will report results shortly 
> thereafter.
> 
> best,
> Jeff
> 
> _
> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting
> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting
> http://www.OpenSTV.org
> http://www.OpaVote.org
> 
> 
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


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Re: [EM] 3 seat Largest Remainder Hare avoids the pit-falls of most ordered party-list elections.

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

David L Wetzell wrote:
I blogged about this at my blog a while back in response to the args 
given by the Electoral Reform Society of the UK against ordered party 
list forms of PR.  
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html


I think a better way to do a mixed method parliamentary election than 
what is done in Germany is to have a large number of 4 seat 
super-districts, where 3 seats would be elected with a 3 seat LR Hare 
and the 4th seat would be elected by some [deliberately unspecified] 
single-winner election rule besides FPTP.  


That sounds a lot like the Loring Ensemble Rule. You might be interested 
in reading about it at http://www.accuratedemocracy.com/e_ler.htm .


Loring argues that Plurality councils can swing wildly and deny 
representation to people who should be represented, while PR councils 
can still be off-center due to kingmaker scenarios, and that one should 
therefore pick a center that can break ties while not giving any voting 
bloc undue power.


He then proposes to use STV, but shield the CW from losing. The 
Condorcet winner represents the center or common consensus position, 
while the other winners represent the diversity of opinion among the 
people. Because the process is done inside a single method, in the case 
the CW is off-center, the proportional representation aspect of the 
algorithm will even this out by compensating.


The same sort of shielding could be used in any type of multiwinner 
system. If it's sequential, you just keep the CW from being eliminated. 
If it's combinatorial (like Schulze STV), you only consider those sets 
of winners that include the CW.



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Re: [EM] Addenda: Who is wronged in MMPO bad-example? MCA protection of top-rated from middle-rated. 3-slot SFC. The 100, 15, 0 example.

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:

Kristofer:

I'd said:


MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Who is wronged in Kevin's MMPO bad-example? 
---


Yesterday I asked how bad C can be, in that example, if nearly all 
the A voters are indifferent between B and C, and the only one not 
indifferent prefers C to B.


I'd like to additionally ask who is wronged in that example.
Someone who is indifferent between the winner and the other top
candidate? Hardly.

Surely the "wrongness" of a result must be judged by whether or not
 someone is wronged by it.

Kevin's MMPO bad-example, MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure, are 
Plurality-prejudice aesthetic matters.


You replied:


If some candidate gets more first place votes than another candidate
 gets any place votes, it seems only reasonable to not elect the
latter. Call it aesthetic if you want



Yes.



You continued:


, but anything that breaks it that flagrantly will seem really
unintuitive to the voters.


[endquote]

Perhaps, but, as I've pointed out, every rank method is going to act
counterintuitively or unaesthetically sometimes. We don't choose a
rank method for all-the-time aesthetics. We choose one for the
_practical_ guarantees that it can offer. Ways that it can ease
voters' strategy dilemmas.


Not only strategy dilemmas. It's also important to know how the method 
behaves under honesty. A monotonicity failure like IRV's might be hard 
to wilfully exploit, but I still think that when it happens - when the 
actual ballot set is one of a pair that exhibits monotonicity failure - 
the method got the answer wrong.


As an extreme, although not in a criteria compliance fashion, Random 
Candidate is strategy-proof (with exception of strategic nomination), 
but in practice returns bad results.



As tell you what I told Chris Benham: I'm not saying that you're
wrong about the criteria that you judge by. That's an individual
matter. There's no reason why we should all have the same goals and
purposes with voting systems.

I'm more interested in practical guarantees for the voter, to
alleviate or avoid defensive strategy dilemma. But I can't, and
don't, criticize others for not sharing those same goals.

You continued:


So you ask who's wronged in the example. I would say that the
combined group of the A-first and B-first voters are wronged


[endquote]



But you know that won't do. You can't say that the A voters are
wronged. They're nearly all indifferent between B and C (except for
the one who prefers C to B). For the same reason, you can't say that
the B voters are wronged.


Sure it will. Many criteria deal with coalitions of voters. The clone 
independence criterion ensures all the clone voters - who many not be 
ranking the clones in the same order - that the presence of those clones 
won't affect the outcome. The mutual majority criterion similarity gives 
guarantees to a majority voting the same set of candidates first (not 
necessarily in the same order), and the Condorcet and Smith criteria 
tell voters of different groups that if a majority - not necessarily the 
same majority in every case - ranks X ahead of some other candidate Y, 
and all other candidates take the place of Y, then X wins.



...by electing someone they like no less than the other candidate?

If the A voters aren't wronged, and the B voters aren't wronged, then
certainly the A and B voters are not wronged.


I don't agree. To use an analogy, say you have some cake. There are two 
groups. The first group, A, wants to have the cake, but doesn't want 
anyone else to have it. The same goes for the second group, B. So you go 
over to a random person and give him the cake instead (this person 
represents the 2 preference for C-top-equal preferences).


Now A says "hey, you could have given it to us instead", and B says 
"hey, you could have given it to *us* instead". By giving the cake to 
the random person instead of letting one of the groups have it, you have 
made both groups unhappy.


You could of course argue that "if I gave it to B, A would have been 
just as unhappy, and if I gave it to A, B would have been just as 
unhappy, so I dare you to show me the particular group that has been 
wronged by this". I still think that you can say that you wronged the 
two groups as a whole - hence my statement of "how you traded off  
voters to please two".



You wrote:


Pleasing the two A=C and B=C voters is not worth  votes.


[endquote]

I've emphasized that I don't justify MMPO's result by saying that
it's for those two voters. MMPO's rule's purpose is to meet FBC, SFC
or SFC3, Later-No-Harm, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump.

And the cost of those big advantages is...what? The election of
someone that over whom no one prefers anyone other than their
favorite?


So to be more precise, you're pleasing the two voters at the cost of the 
 others so that you can pass the criteria above. If you highly value 
the FBC, I can see that the criteria could outweigh the bizarre resu