[EM] Electoral experimentation
On 12/14/2011 12:59 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great labs for experimentation with electoral reform. This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we can trust that with changes, there'll be more scope for experimentation and consideration of multiple alternatives to FPTP. dlw I doubt that electoral experimentation would follow the adoption of any new election method. Why? Consider that elected representatives tend to defend whatever election method they got elected under. So if "American Proportional Representation" -- or any other method -- were used by a third party to elect its leaders, the elected representatives would be unlikely to support experimenting with other election methods. It's analogous to a door to a treasure room that gets closed and locked after the first people pass through. People who gain access to power naturally want to preserve whatever electoral system got them elected. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Forest: MAMT
Chris and Mike,
I think I finally have the right version which I will call MSAC for Majority
Support Acquiescing Coalitions:
Definitions:
A coalition is a subset of the candidates.
A ballot acquiesces to a coalition of candidates iff it rates no candidate
outside the coalition higher than
any member of the coalition.
A Majority Support Acquiescing Coalition is a coalition that is acquiesced to
by more than half of the
ballots.
A Majority Support Acquiescing Coalition is minimal if it ceases to be a
Majority Support Acquiescing
Coalition when any one of its members is removed.
Method Definition for MSAC:
(1) First find all of the Minimal Majority Support Acquiescing Coalition.
(2) Among these call the one with the greatest support G.
(3) Elect the member of G with the greatest average rating.
- Original Message -
From: "C.Benham"
Date: Tuesday, December 13, 2011 11:19 am
Subject: Forest: MAMT
To: em
> Mike,
>
> I can see how MAMT tries to meet Mono-add-Plump, but it fails.
>
> 49: C
> 27: A>B
> 24: B>A
>
> MAMT (like all reasonable methods) elects A,
MSAC also elects A.
>But say we add 20
> ballots
> that plump for A.
>
> 49: C
> 27: A>B
> 24: B>A
> 20: A (new ballots)
>
> (120 ballots, majority threshold 61).
>
> Now there are two "minimal subset" acquiescing majorities: {AB}
> 71 and
> {CA}69. All three candidates are qualified so the most top-rated
> candidate (C) wins.
But under MSAC candidate A still wins, because the {A, B} coalition is the set
G, and the range winner
of this set is A.
Note also that the MSAC winner is C for the following set of ballots:
49: C
27: A>B
24: B ,
because in this case the coalition {B, C} is the value of G, and C is the range
winner of this coalition.
Forest
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Chris: The alternative to mutual majority
Chris: Sure, the alternatives to majority that you used in your alternatives to MTA worked well in those methods, though it made the methods' definitions somewhat more complicated. So, in a similar way, it may well be that the alternative to a mutual majority set that you described will work perfectly well in an MMT-like method. Of course that isn't something that one could know the answer to now, when that alternative set has just been described, but let's check out whether an FBC/ABE method as good as MMT can be based on it. Maybe such a method could avoid Mono-Add-Plump failure, and maybe that could avoid a criticism from opponents about that. But, as I was saying: How could anyone criticize MMT for failing Mono-Add-Plump?: Before you plump for your favorite, s/he is winning only because of mutual majority support. You arrive and decline that mutual support. So why should you be surprised if you no longer have it? Why should you still win because of mutual support that you decline? I believe that people will understand why the plumpers' candidate lost, because hir voters didn't sufficiently accept the mutual support coalition that otherwise would have helped hir to win. In general, all the criticisms that you spoke of (Mono-Add-Plump, Burial-incentive, random-fill incentive) don't describe a genuine problem for MMT, or a problem that people would regard as a problem, or a problem that wrongs anyone. As I said, with MMT, when examining the situations described under the criticism-headings of the previous paragraph, it always comes to: Some smaller factions choose to support and elect a more popular candidate, as a compromise. How can anyone criticize that? But if your new method meets Mono-Add-Plump, and is an FBC/ABE method, without adding too much complexity, with a wording that isn't too much less brief, simple, or naturally and obviously motivated, then it would be a fine public proposal too. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for.
Like Andy I prefer SODA as well, especially for a deterministic method. In some settings I prefer certain stochastic methods to deterministic methods. But my curiosity impels me to see what can be done while ignoring or putting aside the advantages of both chance and delegation. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Egg or Chicken.
if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great labs for experimentation with electoral reform. This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we can trust that with changes, there'll be more scope for experimentation and consideration of multiple alternatives to FPTP. dlw On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 2:04 PM, < election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com > > You can reach the person managing the list at >election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: SODA might be the method we've been looking for. > (Jameson Quinn) > > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: Jameson Quinn > To: Andy Jennings > Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:49:32 -0600 > Subject: Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for. > Further responses to Andy's advantage list: > > 2011/12/14 Andy Jennings > >> Jameson, >> >> Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than >> LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure. >> >> In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are: >> >> 1. The laziest possible voter, who just bullet votes for his favorite, is >> still casting a (nearly?) optimal vote that is fair to him and to the rest >> of society. >> > > It is less than optimal in only two cases that I know of: > 1. In certain circumstances when there's a set of 3 or more clones facing > a candidate who has more first-preferences than any of them. > 2. When there is a chicken dilemma which is NOT resolved by the opposing > candidate; that is, the candidate opposing the chicken cloneset has no > honest preference between the chicken candidates.* *(In this case the > lazy vote is individually suboptimal, but socially optimal; so I actually > hope that there will be enough lazy and/or altruistic voters to overwhelm > the "optimal" strategic voters.) > >> >> 2. Voters can vote approval style, instead, if they want. >> >> 3. The only people who have to rank all the candidates are the candidates >> themselves, who should be willing to do the work to come up with a full >> honest ranking. Their ratings are public, so we can call them out if they >> try to use turkey-raising or other dishonest strategies. >> > > Actually, turkey-raising is a meaningless/useless strategy in SODA. The > main thing you have to "worry" about is chicken-style truncation. And in > that case, it's not just the voters who can call them out (and vote > approval-style); it's the other clone candidate, who can respond by > retaliatory truncation, which gives the truncating a candidate a chance to > de-truncate. That is to say: there is a way to back down, even after one > candidate has attempted truncation. > > > >> >> 4. There is a "delegation" phase after the election where the candidates >> can negotiate an outcome, but their ability to negotiate back-room deals is >> severely limited because they have to use their pre-declared rankings and >> they have to play in an order determined by the votes. In fact, there will >> be a game-theory dominant equilibrium and the candidates will probably have >> very little power to change the outcome. Chicken scenarios are avoided >> because they know the play order, the other candidates' rankings, and >> exactly how much voting weight each one has. >> >> 5. If there is some super-weak Condorcet winner that is totally unfit to >> govern, then the others can indeed block him in the delegation phase. >> >> I don't see any huge theoretical downsides. Do others still have >> reservations about SODA? I realize that some people may be opposed to >> delegation, in principle. And others think delegable systems just don't >> have a chance of getting implemented. So I think these debates about which >> is the best voting system in the standard (non-delegable) model are still >> useful. I also think it's useful for Jameson to inject a plug about SODA >> every now and then. >> >> My main reservation about SODA at this point is that I see no practical >> path to adoption. It would be perfect for a large primary, like the >> current Republican presidential field, but there's no way to start at that >> level. We have to start small. But for small political elections, >> professional societies, open source decisions, elementary school elections >> etc. it seems too complicated. I had a long discussion
[EM] Forest: The example. Jameson: SODA
Forest: I find nothing wrong with electing C in the example below, unless someone can point out a strategy problem. 33 A 17A=C 17B=C 33 B Of course I also find nothing wrong with an A,B tie there either, as is given by some other good FBC/ABE methods, and by Approval. Either outcome seems perfectly ok. Jameson: I'm sure that there's nothing wrong with SODA's results. And methods like that can avoid strategy problems, by means of their unconventional use of delegates/proxies. If it can be enacted, it would be great. If there were an initiative petition for SODA, I'd sign it. If a SODA initiative were on the ballot, I'd vote for it. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Forest: I found an FBC failure for Minimal Aquiescing Majorities-Top
Forest--
Say it's like the ABE, except that there's one more candidate, D.
In the ABE, you were an A voter, but now, with D in the election, you like D
best,
with A your 2nd choice.
(Say all the A voters vote as you do)
The B voters, while willing to middle-rate A for a majority coalition, wouldn't
be willing to miiddle-rate D.
If you vote A & D together in 1st place, then your top-rating for D means that
{A,B} is no longer a winning set, because you vote D over B.
If you vote in that way, C wins.
But you can at least make A win, because the B voters are willing to
middle-rate A.
You can do that by top-rating only A. You can middle-rate D if you want to.
Then, {A,B} wins, and, in that set, A wins with the most top votes.
You can get your best possible outcome (the election of A) only by voting
someone over
your favorite.
Mike Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for.
Further responses to Andy's advantage list: 2011/12/14 Andy Jennings > Jameson, > > Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than > LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure. > > In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are: > > 1. The laziest possible voter, who just bullet votes for his favorite, is > still casting a (nearly?) optimal vote that is fair to him and to the rest > of society. > It is less than optimal in only two cases that I know of: 1. In certain circumstances when there's a set of 3 or more clones facing a candidate who has more first-preferences than any of them. 2. When there is a chicken dilemma which is NOT resolved by the opposing candidate; that is, the candidate opposing the chicken cloneset has no honest preference between the chicken candidates.* *(In this case the lazy vote is individually suboptimal, but socially optimal; so I actually hope that there will be enough lazy and/or altruistic voters to overwhelm the "optimal" strategic voters.) > > 2. Voters can vote approval style, instead, if they want. > > 3. The only people who have to rank all the candidates are the candidates > themselves, who should be willing to do the work to come up with a full > honest ranking. Their ratings are public, so we can call them out if they > try to use turkey-raising or other dishonest strategies. > Actually, turkey-raising is a meaningless/useless strategy in SODA. The main thing you have to "worry" about is chicken-style truncation. And in that case, it's not just the voters who can call them out (and vote approval-style); it's the other clone candidate, who can respond by retaliatory truncation, which gives the truncating a candidate a chance to de-truncate. That is to say: there is a way to back down, even after one candidate has attempted truncation. > > 4. There is a "delegation" phase after the election where the candidates > can negotiate an outcome, but their ability to negotiate back-room deals is > severely limited because they have to use their pre-declared rankings and > they have to play in an order determined by the votes. In fact, there will > be a game-theory dominant equilibrium and the candidates will probably have > very little power to change the outcome. Chicken scenarios are avoided > because they know the play order, the other candidates' rankings, and > exactly how much voting weight each one has. > > 5. If there is some super-weak Condorcet winner that is totally unfit to > govern, then the others can indeed block him in the delegation phase. > > I don't see any huge theoretical downsides. Do others still have > reservations about SODA? I realize that some people may be opposed to > delegation, in principle. And others think delegable systems just don't > have a chance of getting implemented. So I think these debates about which > is the best voting system in the standard (non-delegable) model are still > useful. I also think it's useful for Jameson to inject a plug about SODA > every now and then. > > My main reservation about SODA at this point is that I see no practical > path to adoption. It would be perfect for a large primary, like the > current Republican presidential field, but there's no way to start at that > level. We have to start small. But for small political elections, > professional societies, open source decisions, elementary school elections > etc. it seems too complicated. I had a long discussion with a party > district chairman here. He's interested in alternative voting systems to > fill his party positions but skeptical of complexity. I don't even think > I've pitched him on SODA because he's still thinking about Approval Voting. > > And with SODA, you can't just run a straw poll to show it off like you can > with so many other voting systems. You need the participation of the > actual candidates to choose their rankings beforehand and to do their > delegation afterwards. > You've hit on SODA's biggest weak point, I think. All I can respond is that there's no reason not to use SODA in local political elections. (For internal elections of private groups... yeah, it may be overkill; but even in that case, the benefits for dealing with lazy voters are significant) > > I know we haven't traditionally discussed implementation strategy on this > list (though that has changed some recently), but if you see a good > strategy for SODA adoption, please tell. > Step one is to make an online tool for running SODA elections smoothly... which I'll do if I ever get enough free time from my day job... I also plan (again, if I can find the time) to run an Amazon Turk-based behavioral-economics experiment to see which system allows the electorate to extract the most (small) monetary rewards (from me, the experimenter) in various chicken-dilemma and weak-condorcet situations. I don't expect SODA to do best at that (it may elect slightly more WCW than it should, and the experimenta
Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for.
Thanks, Andy, for the SODA endorsement. I agree with the advantages you list, but I would add the avoidance of the chicken dilemma (that is, the lack of either a self-reinforcing truncation incentive or hard-to-defend "mindreading"results that give a burial incentive) as an important advantage. Compromising favorite betrayal, truncation, and burial are the basic forms of strategy; and I don't know of any other system which is so resistant (and yet also resiliant) to all of these. Jameson ps. I realize I'm repeating myself a bit, but as Andy said, an occasional plug for SODA is worthwhile. 2011/12/14 Andy Jennings > Jameson, > > Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than > LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure. > > In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are: > > 1. The laziest possible voter, who just bullet votes for his favorite, is > still casting a (nearly?) optimal vote that is fair to him and to the rest > of society. > > 2. Voters can vote approval style, instead, if they want. > > 3. The only people who have to rank all the candidates are the candidates > themselves, who should be willing to do the work to come up with a full > honest ranking. Their ratings are public, so we can call them out if they > try to use turkey-raising or other dishonest strategies. > > 4. There is a "delegation" phase after the election where the candidates > can negotiate an outcome, but their ability to negotiate back-room deals is > severely limited because they have to use their pre-declared rankings and > they have to play in an order determined by the votes. In fact, there will > be a game-theory dominant equilibrium and the candidates will probably have > very little power to change the outcome. Chicken scenarios are avoided > because they know the play order, the other candidates' rankings, and > exactly how much voting weight each one has. > > 5. If there is some super-weak Condorcet winner that is totally unfit to > govern, then the others can indeed block him in the delegation phase. > > I don't see any huge theoretical downsides. Do others still have > reservations about SODA? I realize that some people may be opposed to > delegation, in principle. And others think delegable systems just don't > have a chance of getting implemented. So I think these debates about which > is the best voting system in the standard (non-delegable) model are still > useful. I also think it's useful for Jameson to inject a plug about SODA > every now and then. > > My main reservation about SODA at this point is that I see no practical > path to adoption. It would be perfect for a large primary, like the > current Republican presidential field, but there's no way to start at that > level. We have to start small. But for small political elections, > professional societies, open source decisions, elementary school elections > etc. it seems too complicated. I had a long discussion with a party > district chairman here. He's interested in alternative voting systems to > fill his party positions but skeptical of complexity. I don't even think > I've pitched him on SODA because he's still thinking about Approval Voting. > > And with SODA, you can't just run a straw poll to show it off like you can > with so many other voting systems. You need the participation of the > actual candidates to choose their rankings beforehand and to do their > delegation afterwards. > > I know we haven't traditionally discussed implementation strategy on this > list (though that has changed some recently), but if you see a good > strategy for SODA adoption, please tell. > > ~ Andy > > > > On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 6:55 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> I believe that LRV (Least Resentment Voting) is indeed quite a clever >> solution to the chicken dilemma. But once more, I'd like to remind people >> that there is a way to solve the chicken dilemma without risking a victory >> by the plurality winner/condorcet loser. I'm speaking of course of SODA. >> >> First, SODA meets the FBC. In fact, in any 3-candidate scenario, and I >> believe in any 4-candidate one, it is strategically optimal to bullet vote >> for a candidate if you agree with their declared preferences. This ability, >> not just to vote your favorite equal-top, but unique-top, is not shared by >> any other method I know of. (Perhaps we could call this UFBC3, unique FBC >> for 3 candidates.) >> >> How does it do with chicken dilemma scenarios? For the following, I'll >> give honest ratings, then discuss the likely strategic implications under >> SODA. >> >> 40 C >> 25 A>B >> 35 B>A >> >> If this is the honest situation, then candidates A and B have every >> reason to find a way to include each other in their predeclared preference >> lists. These predeclared lists are made openly, and so one side cannot >> betray the other without giving the other side a chance to retaliate. The >> chance for retaliation will make betrayal
Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for.
Jameson, Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure. In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are: 1. The laziest possible voter, who just bullet votes for his favorite, is still casting a (nearly?) optimal vote that is fair to him and to the rest of society. 2. Voters can vote approval style, instead, if they want. 3. The only people who have to rank all the candidates are the candidates themselves, who should be willing to do the work to come up with a full honest ranking. Their ratings are public, so we can call them out if they try to use turkey-raising or other dishonest strategies. 4. There is a "delegation" phase after the election where the candidates can negotiate an outcome, but their ability to negotiate back-room deals is severely limited because they have to use their pre-declared rankings and they have to play in an order determined by the votes. In fact, there will be a game-theory dominant equilibrium and the candidates will probably have very little power to change the outcome. Chicken scenarios are avoided because they know the play order, the other candidates' rankings, and exactly how much voting weight each one has. 5. If there is some super-weak Condorcet winner that is totally unfit to govern, then the others can indeed block him in the delegation phase. I don't see any huge theoretical downsides. Do others still have reservations about SODA? I realize that some people may be opposed to delegation, in principle. And others think delegable systems just don't have a chance of getting implemented. So I think these debates about which is the best voting system in the standard (non-delegable) model are still useful. I also think it's useful for Jameson to inject a plug about SODA every now and then. My main reservation about SODA at this point is that I see no practical path to adoption. It would be perfect for a large primary, like the current Republican presidential field, but there's no way to start at that level. We have to start small. But for small political elections, professional societies, open source decisions, elementary school elections etc. it seems too complicated. I had a long discussion with a party district chairman here. He's interested in alternative voting systems to fill his party positions but skeptical of complexity. I don't even think I've pitched him on SODA because he's still thinking about Approval Voting. And with SODA, you can't just run a straw poll to show it off like you can with so many other voting systems. You need the participation of the actual candidates to choose their rankings beforehand and to do their delegation afterwards. I know we haven't traditionally discussed implementation strategy on this list (though that has changed some recently), but if you see a good strategy for SODA adoption, please tell. ~ Andy On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 6:55 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > I believe that LRV (Least Resentment Voting) is indeed quite a clever > solution to the chicken dilemma. But once more, I'd like to remind people > that there is a way to solve the chicken dilemma without risking a victory > by the plurality winner/condorcet loser. I'm speaking of course of SODA. > > First, SODA meets the FBC. In fact, in any 3-candidate scenario, and I > believe in any 4-candidate one, it is strategically optimal to bullet vote > for a candidate if you agree with their declared preferences. This ability, > not just to vote your favorite equal-top, but unique-top, is not shared by > any other method I know of. (Perhaps we could call this UFBC3, unique FBC > for 3 candidates.) > > How does it do with chicken dilemma scenarios? For the following, I'll > give honest ratings, then discuss the likely strategic implications under > SODA. > > 40 C > 25 A>B > 35 B>A > > If this is the honest situation, then candidates A and B have every reason > to find a way to include each other in their predeclared preference lists. > These predeclared lists are made openly, and so one side cannot betray the > other without giving the other side a chance to retaliate. The chance for > retaliation will make betrayal a losing strategy. > > 40 C > 25 A > 35 B>A > > If the A camp is honestly indifferent between B and C, and candidate B > finds this indifference credible, then B can still decide not to retaliate, > that is, to ignore A's truncation and nonetheless declare a preference for > A. This enables A to win without B spoiling the election. > > (Any single-round method which elects A here is subject to the chicken > dilemma; electing B is, in my mind, crazy; and any method which elects C > here has been spoiled by candidate B, and so encourages shenanigans of the > republicans-funding-greens sort. Any method I know of except SODA fails in > one of these ways.) > > 40 C > 25 A>B > 35 B > > This is like the above situation, but since A had no chance of winning >
[EM] Forest: MAMT
In my last post (13 Dec 2011) I wrote: A better method would (instead of "acquiescing majorities") use the set I just defined in my last post. *If there is a solid coalition of candidates S (as measured by the number of ballots on which those candidates are strictly voted above all others) that is bigger than the sum of all its rival solid coalitions (i.e. those that contain some candidate not in S), then those candidates not in the smallest such S are disqualified. Elect the most top-rated qualified candidate.* That method I suggested wouldn't meet the FBC (it has now occurred to me), so I suspend my "..better method.." claim. In my other EM post the same day, I wrote: I propose a replacement for Mutual Majority which addresses this problem and also unites it with Majority Favourite. Preliminary definitions: A "solid coalition" of candidates of size N is a set S of (one or more) candidates that on N number of ballots have all been voted strictly above all outside-S candidates. Any given solid coalition A's "rival solid coalitions" are only those that contain a candidate not in A. Statement of criterion: *If one exists, the winner must come from the smallest solid coalition of candidates that is bigger than the sum of all its rivals.* [end criterion definition] This wording could perhaps be polished, and I haven't yet thought of a name for this criterion and resulting set. (Any suggestions?) It might be possible to use the set as part of an ok voting method. Thinking about it a bit more I now doubt that the last sentence is true, but still I think it wouldn't be as bad for that purpose as the usual "Mutual Majority set". Chris Benham Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
