[EM] ACF grade voting
Forest, Why are your suggested grade options labelled A, C, F and not A, C, E? You can make the same wonderful argument that 2-slot ballots can work just as well as 3-slot ballots. And why limit the voters to one coin-toss each per candidate? A voter who wishes to give candidate x a grade of B on the scale A-B-C-D-E can first toss a coin to decide between A and C on an imaginary A-C-E ballot and if that comes up A then approve x on the actual 2-slot ballot but if it comes up C then toss the coin again to decide between approving x or not. Chris Benham Forest Simmons wrote (30 Dec 2011): Suppose the ballot limits grade options to A, C, and F, but a sizeable faction would like to award a grade of B to a particular candidate. If half of them voted a grade of A and the other half a grde of C, the resulting grade points would be the same. So in elections with large electorates there is no need to have grade ballots with all five grade options. Those who want to award a B grade can flip a coin to decide between A and C. Those who would like to award a grade of D can decide between C and F with a coin toss. The grade averages will come out the same as if the higher resolution grade ballots were used. If two or more candidates are statistically tied, the tied candidate with the greatest number of A's and C's should be elected. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] ACF grade voting
On 12/30/2011 05:51 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Suppose the ballot limits grade options to A, C, and F, but a sizeable faction would like to award a grade of B to a particular candidate. If half of them voted a grade of A and the other half a grde of C, the resulting grade points would be the same. So in elections with large electorates there is no need to have grade ballots with all five grade options. Those who want to award a B grade can flip a coin to decide between A and C. Those who would like to award a grade of D can decide between C and F with a coin toss. The grade averages will come out the same as if the higher resolution grade ballots were used. If two or more candidates are statistically tied, the tied candidate with the greatest number of A's and C's should be elected. Does this trick work with Majority Judgement and its tiebreaker too? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Kristofer: MMPO objections
Kristofer: First, let me agree that "not-valid" is only a subjective opinion. I was using it as shorthand to mean that I don't consider the objection to be important. So I don't deny the subjective-only value of "not-valid" when I said it. Of course I wasn't saying that we can't consider the A plumpers and B plumpers as a class. I merely meant that the bad-example isn't as bad. I don't deny that, ideally, the winner really should be A or B. It would be preferable. A voters say: "I wanted my favorite to win!" I reply: "You mean your favorite whom about half the voters consider no better than the candidate who won?" I'm not saying that the A and B voters, as a class aren't wronged. I'm saying, "How serious is it really,considering the above hypothetical conversation?" Let me put it differently: I'm just not seeing the problem that you're seeing. When I say "problem", I mean a strategy dilemma like the need for favorite-burial, or the co-operation/defection problem. When I speak of a "problem", I'm referring to a genuine, big, problem to voters. A practical problem. A problem that will keep the electorate from achieving the change that they want. You haven't shown that Kevin's MMPO bad-example is a problem in that sense. What I see in Kevin's MMPO bad-example is an un-plurality-like outcome. We want results better than those of Plurality. The more improvements we want over Plurality, the more our results might sometimes depart from what we're used to in Plurality. Especially if we're greedy for the super-brief definition of MMPO, or its great flexibility as a full-rankings method, or the simplicity of only requiring unqualified unilateral support, and its better job of electing unfavorite CWs. So, when asking for so much, yes I admit that the method's results could depart from those of Plurality so as to bother people who are accustomed to Plurality. MMPO and MDDTR get their advantages from their big departures from Plurality. I don't deny that those departures from Plurality could cause a problem for a public enactment proposal. That's why I consider my conditional-middle-ratings proposals to be better public proposals. Those proposals are extensions of Approval, which, itself, is a freedom-extension of Plurality. Plurality is points system that makes you give a point to one candidate, and zero points to the rest. Approval gives you the additional freedom to point-rate each candidate--one point or zero points. MTA, MCA, MTAOC, MMT, MMTA, etc. are all extensions of Approval. Some of those add conditionality. (It could be optional). But the point is that the coalition that must be mutual in MMT or MMTA, etc., doesn't even exist in Plurality. These methods aren't taking anything away from what we now have. They're merely adding benefits. Not taking anything away. Even when the mutuality requirement is automatic instead of optional. But when it's optional, it's even less criticizable. Someone on this list was terribly bothered by the mutuality-requirement, referring to it as "sordid". He'll think this is terribly sordid, but if a faction of voters want coalition support for their candidate, why would it be important to them that they not support that coalition? They want to not help the people whose help they need? Oh what a cruel strategy-need to burden someone with! :-) You said: Saying "nonvalid" right out just seems to imply more than a mere difference of points of view about what tradeoffs to make. [endquote] I agree. It was unfortunate wording. I meant "unimportant in my opinion". Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Ways for MTA & MCA as Approval options. AERLO in MTA or MCA.
First, the reason I talk about MCA, MTA and ABucklin is because they can be used with the conditional-middle-ratings provisions that I've been describing. ...And of course, also, they're extensions of Approval, which, itself, is a freedom-extension of Plurality. And of course they can be used as options in an Approval election. I should say something about the conditional-middle-ratings provisions: Any one of them could be automatic in a method's rule, or the voter could have the option to use one of them, or maybe any one of them, as the voter chooses. That conditionality could be separately optional for each candidate to whom the voter gives a middle-rating--in other words, any middle rating could be conditional. And the voter could even choose which conditionality s/he wants to use in hir conditional middle ratings. Here are at least some of the kinds of conditionality that I've described: 1. Mutuality requirement as in MTAOC. 2. Mutuality requirement by mutual-approval set, as in MMTA. 3. Faction-size: Give the middle rating only if the other candidate has at least as many top-ratings as one (or all?) of your top-rated candidates. 4. Hypothetical co-operation (or noncooperation): If all middle ratings were unconditional; and if all the ballots rating one of your top candidates, and not candidate B at top, rated (or didn't rate) candidate B above bottom; and if all the ballots rating candidate B, but none of your top-rated candidates, at top, rated (or didn't rate) any of your top-rated candidates above bottom, then give the middle rating only if , under those conditions, B would have more above-bottom ratings than any of your top-rated candidates. [end of list of conditionality provisions] Obviously #4 is a bit wordy, and maybe therefore not so good in a public proposal. Second, I said that MCA is 2-stage ABucklin. That's true, when: 1. It's used alone or 2. It's used as an Approval option without ABucklin being offered as an option. But, when MCA and ABucklin are both offered as options in an Approval election, MCA is different from 2-stage ABucklin, because MCA immediately counts all the middle ratings as soon as it's determined that no one has a top-majority. Of course, when MCA and ABucklin are offered as options in an Approval election, the voter should be able to choose whether to call hir ballot an ABucklin ballot or an MCA ballot. Of course if it has more than two rank (or rating) levels, it's not an MCA ballot. Ways for MTA and MCA as options in an Approval election: There are two ways those methods could be offered as options in an Approval election: 1. Bucklin-like 2. Separate top-ratings What those mean: 1. Bucklin-like means that MTA's and MCA's top-ratings, only, are counted at first, and only as approvals. So, MTA and MCA only give an approval to their top-rated candidates at first. Of course, if no candidate yet has approvals (votes on Approval ballots, and top-ratings in MTA & MTA) greater in number than half the number of voters, then MCA and MTA ballots give approvals to their middle-rated candidates too. Then the candidate with the most approvals wins. Say one or more candidates have approvals greater in number than half the number of voters: For the MCA ballots, nothing changes. They've given all they will, to their top-rated candidates. MTA ballots give a middle rating (counted, of course, as approvals) to all of their middle-rated candidates who have a majority, as described above. The candidate with the most approvals wins. I've assumed that MCA and MTA ballots couldn't or wouldn't be options, together in the same Approval election, but maybe they could be, when MCA and MTA are offered as options Bucklin- like. 2. Separate top-ratings: The top-ratings of MCA and MTA ballots are all that are counted when looking for majority candidates. If one or more candidates have top ratings greater in number than half the number of voters, then, if the option is MCA, the candidate with the most top-ratings wins. If the option is MTA, then the majority-top candidate with the most approvals wins (where an approval is a vote on an Approval ballot, or an MTA top or middle rating). If no candidates have top-ratings greater in number than half the number of voters, then the winner is the candidate with the most approvals (where an approval is a vote on an Approval ballot, or an MCA or MTA top or middle rating). [end of definitions of Bucklin-like and separate top-ratings] I'd probably suggest, when using MCA as an option with Approval, that it only be used Bucklin-like. In fact, Bucklin-like would probably be better for MTA too, when used as an option with Approval. For both methods, that's because separate top-ratings gives less role to the Approval ballots. If only MTA or MCA were used as an added option in an Approval election, I'd prefer MTA. But it seems to me that Bucklin-like MTA and MCA could both option
[EM] ACF grade voting
Suppose the ballot limits grade options to A, C, and F, but a sizeable faction would like to award a grade of B to a particular candidate. If half of them voted a grade of A and the other half a grde of C, the resulting grade points would be the same. So in elections with large electorates there is no need to have grade ballots with all five grade options. Those who want to award a B grade can flip a coin to decide between A and C. Those who would like to award a grade of D can decide between C and F with a coin toss. The grade averages will come out the same as if the higher resolution grade ballots were used. If two or more candidates are statistically tied, the tied candidate with the greatest number of A's and C's should be elected. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
