[EM] SodaHead online Approval Voting poll
I know that online polls are silly. But thousands of people see them, and if they see that the idea actually has support, some of them will be more open to consider if it has merit. Jameson -- Forwarded message -- Subject: [CES #4978] SodaHead Asks Readers about Approval Voting This is a poll that SodaHead posted. It has a bunch of comments, most of pretty low quality. Feel free to change that. Link: http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/should-voters-be-allowed-to-pick-multiple-candidates/question-2526939/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SodaHead online Approval Voting poll
Well, I made my voice heard. It's funny how many think Approval voting is too complicated, when there is an obvious example of it (the thumbs-up to the right of comments) on the SodaHead webpage. :) Mike I know that online polls are silly. But thousands of people see them, and if they see that the idea actually has support, some of them will be more open to consider if it has merit. Jameson -- Forwarded message -- Subject: [CES #4978] SodaHead Asks Readers about Approval Voting This is a poll that SodaHead posted. It has a bunch of comments, most of pretty low quality. Feel free to change that. Link: http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/should-voters-be-allowed-to-pick-multiple-candidates/question-2526939/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Some Lomax statements that I hadn't gotten to yet
Abd: I'd said that, in Plurality, voting for an agreed-upon compromise can be valid strategy, but that people shouldn't vote for an evil, even if a lesser one. You said: That depends on the definition of evil, doesn't it? [endquote] I don't define an evil. Nor do I use the term, except when referring to what others have said, when they use that term. Here is how dictionaries typically define the noun phrase an evil: Something morally reprehensible, or something that causes sorrow, distress, calamity, harm, misfortune, or destruction. Many or most people who vote for a Democrat candidate refer to hir as a lesser-evil, and to the Republican candidate as the greater evil. It's fair to assume that those Democrat voters are using an evil with the above-quoted meaning. If you're _absolutely sure_ that the only two winnable candidates are both evils, as defined above, then of course you could argue that it's pragmatic to vote for the lesser one. Two things wrong with that: 1. You don't really know that the Democrat and the Republican are the only winnable candidates. Could it be that they always win only because you and the other lesser-evil suckers keep voting for them because you think that they're the only winnable candidates? Yes. Self-fulfilling pessimism. Read about Myerson-Weber equilibrium. Read about Duverger's theorem. If you think that the Democrat and the Republican are both what the Democrat voters are calling them (via the above-quoted definition), then could it be that you shouldn't base your vote on the _guess_ that they're the only candidates who could win, even if people voted honestly? 2. There's such a thing as principle too. Even if it were certain that the only candidates who could win are as described in the above-quoted definition, are you really so without principle that you'd endorse them by voting for one of them? --even though they're virtually identical? You continued by saying that the Democrat voters who call the Democrat a lesser-evil (and then vote for hir) have cut [themselves] off from humanity. You tend toward over-dramatic hyperbole. If you said that they've cut themselves off from their own feelings and judgement, then I might agree with you. Then you said: After all, if a candidate is evil, and might win, and spread his evil, then killing him would become morally justified [endquote] ...only according to _your_ beliefs. I disagree. I don't share your beliefs, Abd Ul. Maybe your beliefs call for killing those whom you label evil, but not many here would agree with you. I suggest, instead, that it's sufficient to not vote for them. How much harm can they do when we don't vote for them, and they're no longer in office? You continued: This is the province of obsession and insanity, its a form of paranoia [and a run-on sentence], that readily identifies the other as evil. [endquote] All these strong words for the Democrat voters who refer to the Democrat candidate as the lesser-evil? I don't use the term evil (except, as I said, when quoting and commenting on what Democrat voters say). That word is too emotionally-loaded, too dramatic, and has too many meanings. I've referred to the Republocrat candidates and parties as corrupt, bought, sleazy, dishonest, etc. I feel that such more-clearly-defined and less emotional words are more expressive and useful as a practical description. And no, you're mistaken if you don't think that others agree with me about that description. Only someone like a drug-dealer is respected as little as a (Republocrat) politician. The corruption, dishonesty, sleaze and bought-ness of Republocrat politicians is common-knowledge. I didn't find this part of this posting of yours until now, because, when I first replied to it, there wasn't time to get this far into the posting. Suggested Plurality strategy: Find the sincere CW. If there is one, and s/he is acceptable to you: Communicate with the people whose favorite is that CW or candidates whom you prefer to hir. Get an agreement among those people to vote for that sincere CW. If there isn't a sincere CW (due to a sincere cycle), or if s/he is unacceptable to you: Communicate with the people who pretty much agree with you about what and who is acceptable. Determine which of those mutually acceptable candidates can get the most votes. Get an agreement among that set of voters to vote for hir. [end of suggested Plurality strategy] How to find the sincere CW? I've suggested this before: Do pre-election polling. Preferably by rank balloting. Progressives around the country could do polls in their areas. In my first posting on this topic, I described the process in detail. It isn't necessary to poll in every community. There might not be that many poll volunteers. I discussed how to aggregate their results. I made that suggestion in a posting that I posted soon after returning to this mailing list in October or November of
Re: [EM] SodaHead online Approval Voting poll
Without experiential knowledge the crazies will dominate and sure enough that is exactly what appears to be happening in the comments to the poll. The recipe for change (IMHO of course) in the US is as follows: 1. choose the minimal change that will fix the problem. 2. create a site where people can play with the new option along side plurality. 3. have a suite of sound bites available to fight off the mind numbingly stupid objections that will come in. Repeat them often and loud. The only viable method is approval. I put together a site intended to allow playing with approval side by side with plurality (www.approvalvote.org) but never finished it. There are lots of others I imagine. Maybe I'll finish mine ... Sound bites might include things like: Imagine one hundred candidates on the ballot, what is your one vote worth in that situation? I'm sure this list can come up with much better ones... Matt -=- (sent from my phone, please pardon any spelling errs) - Original message - I know that online polls are silly. But thousands of people see them, and if they see that the idea actually has support, some of them will be more open to consider if it has merit. Jameson -- Forwarded message -- Subject: [CES #4978] SodaHead Asks Readers about Approval Voting This is a poll that SodaHead posted. It has a bunch of comments, most of pretty low quality. Feel free to change that. Link: http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/should-voters-be-allowed-to-pick-multiple-candidates/question-2526939/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Jameson: Sure, I basically agree about conditional methods
Jameson: You wrote: The basic chicken dilemma is: 35 AB 25 BA 40 C This is, indeed, resolved by AOC. But what about: 39 A 39 B 22 C If C voters AOC-approve A and B, then A and B are in a chicken-like position. Whichever one of them gives C more AOC approvals will win; but if they both give 20 or more, then C wins. [endquote] Something similar could happen in the ABE that I've been using too (the 27,24,49 example), as you pointed out later in your posting. You continued: I think that C winning in the normal chicken dilemma is at least a bit justifiable. C winning in this upside-down scenario is totally wrong. [endquote] Ok, it gets ridiculous, doesn't it. And complicated. But that's what I consider an _advantage_ of the conditional methods. The chicken dilemma, in ordinary Approval (and other non-defection-resistant methods) I refer to as the primary C/D problem. The chicken dilemma that remains in the defection resistant methods, when people continue to defect, in the new situation, I refer to as a secondary C/D problem. Secondary C/D problems are so ridiculous and complicated that I don't think that people will be likely to vote in that way. Approval's primary C/D problem only requires the natural and instinctive strategy of not assisting a rival. That will likely happen. The secondary C/D problem of AOC, and the other conditional methods, requires voting that is so ridiculous, complicated, counter-intuitive and unnatural, that it will happen a lot less. So, that's why I say that the conditional methods complicate and alleviate the C/D problem. Ridiculous defection strategies? Sure. Complicated defection strategies? Sure. Less appealing defection strategies too. I readily admit that I, too, don't like the ridiculous and complicated nature of that secondary C/D problem. But it might be better than the primary C/D problem. ...or maybe not. After all, in a posting a few days ago, I listed five ways that Approval's primary C/D problem can be dealt with in Approval. So it isn't a hopeless irremediable problem. I don't know if any such solutions exist for AOC's secondary C/D problem. So, it may well be better to stick with plain ordinary Approval and ABucklin (and MTA MTA), and their solvable primary C/D problem. Thanks for the persistance that brought the secondary C/D problem to my attention. I'm inclined now to just prefer ordinary Approval. Maybe ABucklin /or MTA or MCA as options in the Approval election. Especially if people demand more than ordinary Approval. Speaking for myself, I'd be content if the method were ordinary Approval, without the other voting options. I'd also have no objection to the options either. Certainly ordinary Approval should be the first proposal. And if options are not later added to it, and ordinary Approval remains the method in use, that would be fine. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Jameson: Sure, I basically agree about conditional methods
At 12:01 PM 3/20/2012, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: Certainly ordinary Approval should be the first proposal. And if options are not later added to it, and ordinary Approval remains the method in use, that would be fine. Well, not entirely fine, but we don't need to go there at this point. Approval is simply Count All the Votes. Years ago, I started calling this a no-brainer. If a voter wants to add multiple approvals, why not count them? I see no reason that survives examination, not in a deterministic election, non-ranked Approval. There are issues when more than one candidate is being elected, I'm not going there at this point. Approval-at-Large isn't a great method ... but still better than Plurality-at-Large. The habit of vote-for-one came from deliberative process and standard elections under Robert's Rules, where a winner was required to gain a majority, and the election was *repeated* if nobody did. So the necessary compromise process took place outside the polling itself. Approval could make this more efficient, that's all (and, historically, approval was used this way for the election of popes, where a two-thirds majority was required to approve the election.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Societal ranking from incomplete pairwise information. (Pinewood derby.)
Andy Jennings elections at jenningsstory.com Sat Mar 17 11:16:51 PDT 2012 The question is what to do if you want to run more than n rounds, or if the number of cars is not exactly a power of two. I think the idea of dividing them into tiers (or brackets) and racing them against other cars in the same tier is still good, but using just their win-loss record is not enough. Lots of tiers will have an odd number of cars, so we need to know which are the best and worst cars in each tier and have a few inter-tier races. So we can think of it as needing to come up with a secondary sort criterion to use inside the win-loss tiers. Or we can generalize and say that after each round we just come up with a full societal ranking and then race the first against the second, the third against the fourth, the fifth against the sixth, etc. The above is more or less what the Swiss tournament is, which is used extensively in chess (and other) tournaments with a large number of participants. Win/Loss records (with 1/2 point been given for drawn games) are used to determine the brackets in subsequent rounds. Those with the same or similar Win/Loss records are paired up in subsequent rounds. The complication comes in trying to avoid repeat pairings. The Swiss-system tournament wikipedia page has examples of how the pairings are done using the two main Swiss variants. From what I read about it in another mailing list, Swiss seems to be good at ordering the best and worst participants. However, determining who are the best of those in the middle is a bit random. Thanks, Gervase. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
