Re: [EM] Oops! IRV.
I choke when I see IRV called "fine" - it too easily ignores parts of what the voters say. For example, look at what can happen with A being much liked, yet IRV not always noticing: 20 A 20 B>A 22 C>A Joe ? Condorcet would see A elected by 62 votes (plus, perhaps, Joe's 63rd). IRV would be affected by Joe's vote: . A - 63 votes with B and C discarded. . B - 22 for C after 20A and 21B&20A discarded. . C - 23 votes with A and B discarded. DWK On Apr 14, 2012, at 3:51 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: I said: "With an electorate that doesn't need FBC, and who are clear and honest with themselves about what they consider to be acceptable--that's when and how FBC can be a fine method. "...because it is entirely defection-proof, and because it meets the Mutual Majority Criterion." Of couse, when I said "FBC" the 2nd time, near he end of that 1st paragraph, I meant "IRV". Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Oops! Typo.
I said: "With an electorate that doesn't need FBC, and who are clear and honest with themselves about what they consider to be acceptable--that's when and how FBC can be a fine method. "...because it is entirely defection-proof, and because it meets the Mutual Majority Criterion." Of couse, when I said "FBC" the 2nd time, near he end of that 1st paragraph, I meant "IRV". Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Kristofer reply, 4/14/12
>**>>* You keep saying anything without FBC is automatically a no-go. How >do*>>* you know that?*>**>* [endquote]*>**>* It is a country-specific >observation, regarding the electorate of the U.S., where I*>* reside. I don't >know that about any other country, though there is evidence for it in >various*>* countries where people are used to Plurality voting.*>**>* Yes this >is "anecdotal", but I've personally observed favorite-burial in Condorcet >voting.*>**>* A safe and prudent rule is "Never underestimate the voter's >inclination for resigned over-compromising*>* give-away, if there's any chance >that it could help a compromise against someone worse."* Yet that isn't absolute. Again, consider Burlington. The Burlington voters, thinking they could now vote as they wished, ranked the candidates in a manner suggesting a relatively close race between the three major candidates. They didn't discover this was a bad idea until after the election, but a Condorcet method would have given them the right winner. [endquote] Sure, Condorcet will only rarely violate FBC. It will only rarely make someone regret that they didn't favorite-bury. But I'm saying that the mere _possibility_ of benefit from favorite-burial has been (in staw-polling) and will probably often be, sufficient to make people favorite-bury, ranking compromise over favorite. You continued: Given that observation, would not Condorcet acting properly have encouraged the voters to vote in a non-compromising manner in later elections? [endquote] Some of them, sure. Not all of them. Not the diehard no-exceptions compromisors. The only thing that could assure them would be a method in which it was _obvious_ that it would be impossible to need or ever benefit from favorite-burial. A method in which it was quite clear that you have no reason to not fully support your favorite. You see, there are methods for which we can assure people that it's been proven that no one can benefit from favorite-burial. That would help, and maybe it would be enough to avoid a favorite-burial problem. But here, again, Approval is incomparably better, because it's so obvious that giving top (Approved) rating to your favorite can't possibly hurt your compromise, to whom you also give top rating. But what about a method for which it isn't even possible to ask people to take our word for that assurance? Methods like Condorcet, for which we have to admit that sometimes favorite-burial will save a compromise and prevent someone worse from winning. Without Approval's transparency and simplicity, FBC compliance might not be enough. But lack of FBC compliance certainly won't be enough. You continued: Or do you prefer the voting method to give an ironclad assertion that there won't ever be a favorite betrayal problem, so you can be *sure*? [endquote] Most definitely. But it isn't I who must be sure. It's the over-timid, compromise-conditioned voter. As I said, my own voting would be ok even in IRV, which utterly fails FBC. In Condorcet, I'd completely disregard the possibility of FBC failure.But wouldn't it be nice (for me) if everyone voted like me? You continued: I can see that. Since I'm in a country where favorite betrayal isn't a problem, I don't really feel the need to be absolutely sure. That, and I like Condorcet :-) [endquote] More important, you don't feel a need for _the other voters_ in your country to be completely sure, because (unlike here) they aren't compromise-conditioned to give it all away. Yes, it depends entirely on the electorate. What I'm saying about the need for FBC applies only to this country, and probably to some other countries where people are used to Plurality voting. And, as I was saying, it isn't that _I_ need FBC. Millions of other voters in this country need it very badly. *I'd said: * >* Never choose IRV as a way to attain the voter median. For that, I recommend >ICT*>* for public political elections. Condorcet(wv), maybe Beatpath, would be >ok for organizations.* You replied: If it fails to acquire the voter median even when voters aren't overcompromising, how can IRV be a fine method? With an electorate that doesn't need FBC, and who are clear and honest with themselves about what they consider to be acceptable--that's when and how FBC can be a fine method. ...because it is entirely defection-proof, and because it meets the Mutual Majority Criterion. As for failure to find the voter median, sure, sincere voting won't do that. But I might not vote sincerely in IRV. Expectation-maximizing strategy in FBC might require insincere rankings, sometimes including favorite-burial. I'd probably sometimes favorite-bury in in IRV. But favorite-buriers who really know what they consider "acceptable" aren't going to really make a mess by favorite-burial in IRV. As we discussed, someone could rank the acceptables in order of their ability to thereby take victory from an unacceptable. That isn't bad, if the voter doesn't think t
[EM] Jameson reply #2, 4/14/12
Jameson: You wrote the 3 paragraphs quoted immediately below. But noice that, immediately below your 3 paragraphs, in your own posting, and in my copy below, are the words wich which I had just finished answering an objection about the same as yours, and clarifying what i was talking about: Your objection: I disagree. Yes, you can make up plausible stories where Condorcet, MJ, or Range could give pathological results in a case where Plurality could have gotten it right. Such a result is orders of magnitude less probable than the reverse, but it's possible. Not so for SODA. Yes, SODA is more complicated, and so some people will not trust it. But I still contend that it is strictly better in all regards (including both results and voter simplicity) than approval, which is in turn strictly better than plurality. I'm not claiming here that SODA is better, on the whole, than the other advanced systems I named. Since there are advantages on either side, that's a judgment call. But between SODA and approval, all the advantages except simplicity of definition lie with SODA. [endquote] Wrong. SODA violates FBC. Admittedly it does so in a way that isn't as problematic as most other FBC failures. You say that if the voters are alert and savvy enough, they'll know when they do and don't have to compromise. That might not be enough to make SODA's FBC failure harmless. As for the rest of what you said above: Here is what I had just finished saying, and what was quoted immediately below your words in your own posting: * *>* No doubt, Condorcet, Kemmeny, MJ, etc., are improvements on Plurality. You know that.*>* I know that. Nearly no one knows that.*>**>* An elaborate contraption like Condorcet or Kemmeny will be viewed as likely to have*>* un-forseen consequences--as, in fact, rank methods do tend to have. People won't know*>* if it's really an improvement on Plurality, or whether, instead, it will bring some*>* dreadful problem that will create disaster.*>**>* Media, opponents and self-serving politicians will, of course pick that up and run with it.*>**>* They're sure to say, "That will require a lot more study". Translation: It will never*>* be enacted. I hope that answers your objection. I'm not denying that various complicated methods improve on Plurality. You're mistaken if you think that SODA will be an easy sell. You can say, "But no one has to delegate. It's only an option." The answer will be, "Optional or otherwise, I don't want politicians doing the voting to elect politicians." Yes, they have to abide by their own rankings, but writing their rankings amounts to candidate-choosing power in the hands of politicians (even if it's only really in their hands when a voter puts it there). Also, you said that the politicians could negotiate among themselves. How reassuring to you think that is? Would they negotiate in smoke-filled rooms? Mike Ossipoff * Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Jameson reply #1, 4/14/12
I'd said: >* That would be much better than the electowiki, where anything that anyone*>* >posts can be deleted, replaced or modified. Someone on EM*>* told me that you >mis-defined a method at the electowiki.*>** You said: I'd love to know what you're talking about. [endquote] You mean about the mis-defined method at electowiki? I'll try to find it in old correspondence-pages. But I can tell you this much: It wasn't SODA. How many methods did you define on electowiki? If you tell me that, and what they were, then we can narrow it down. Maybe it was DMC. Did you define that on electowiki? Or, if it wasn't DMC, then maybe it was MCA. Just guessing. What method(s), other than SODA, did you define at electowiki? I won't violate confidentiality by telling you who told me of the mi-sdefined method at electowiki. You continued: But still, are you really complaining that electowiki contains mistakes, and simultaneously complaining that it can be edited? [endquote] Do you think that those two complaints would somehow contradict each other? On the contrary, together, they mean that there can also be erroneous editing modifications. But I wasn't complaining. I was merely telling why electowiki isn't a good place to post information. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A modification to Condorcet so that one can vote against monsters.
On 4/14/2012 5:42 AM, Andrew Myers wrote: On 4/14/12 8:31 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: On 4/14/12 3:45 AM, ?U(alabio? wrote: ¡Hello! ¿How fare you? It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster is on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field is so polarized that the voters idiotically refuse to rank other serious candidates other than their candidate and the evil candidate has followers, the bad candidate might win. I suggest that Condorcet should have a dummy-candidate: 0 The ranked candidates. 1 The unranked candidates. 2 The dummy-canditate. 3 The monsters. All unranked candidates have higher ranks than the monsters. One can then rank the monsters by how terrible they are. Basically, it is a way to vote against monsters in Condorcet without having to rank all of the hundreds of also-rans. all this is complicated crap that gunks up elections. it has an ice-cube's chance in hell. I've been observing experimentally how people use a Condorcet election system in practice over the past ten years (since 2003) and in fact the use of a dummy candidate to signal approval has become increasingly common. It seems to be intuitive, at least to web users, and effective. I do agree that trying to distinguish 0 vs. 1 is probably overly complicated. -- Andrew Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info You could say "Rank all candidates you approve of" or even "List the candidates you like in order of preference. Ignore all other candidates." Such a ballot would be easier for the average voter to understand and fill out. If there are fifteen people running for office, and you like three, hate three, and don't know anything about the remaining nine, you can just say the equivalent of A>B>C, and ignore the rest. No dummy candidate would be necessary Sure, it wouldn't give as much information as a ballot that has all of the candidates ranked, but it would make certain forms of strategic voting (such as burying) more tedious and less attractive. Then just use the ballots to find the Condorcet winner. Such a ballot could be used with Approval-Completed Condorcet or Ranked Approval Voting, or any other completion method that takes into account Approval votes. For example, you could say "If there is a cycle, compare the two candidates with the lowest Approval score in the cycle, and drop the pairwise loser. Continue until there is a single winner." Or whatever. Mike Rouse Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A modification to Condorcet so that one can vote against monsters.
2012-04-14T12:31:48Z, “Robert Bristow-Johnson” : > all this is complicated crap that gunks up elections. it has an > ice-cube's chance in hell. I disagree. Perhaps I am unclear: 1: Lincoln 2: Washington 3: Evil-Indicator Candidate 4: Stalin 5: Hitler Let us suppose that so much bad blood exists between Washington and Lincoln that their supporters refuse to rank the other candidate and that Hitler and Stalin have supporters. Unless one ranks the hundreds of also-rans so that one can make certain that Hitler and Stalin are ranked last, they will be equally ranked with the olso-rans and their supporters might make them win. The Evil-Indicator Candidate gets a rank less than all unranked candidates. Any candidate beneath the Evil-Indicator Candidate automatically gets a rank less than all unranked candidates. This is easier than ranking hundreds of also-rans and will hopefully keep Hitler and Stalin from winning. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A modification to Condorcet so that one can vote against monsters.
2012/4/14 Andrew Myers > On 4/14/12 8:31 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > >> On 4/14/12 3:45 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote: >> >>> ¡Hello! >>> >>> ¿How fare you? >>> >>> It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster is >>> on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field is so >>> polarized that the voters idiotically refuse to rank other serious >>> candidates other than their candidate and the evil candidate has followers, >>> the bad candidate might win. I suggest that Condorcet should have a >>> dummy-candidate: >>> >>> 0 The ranked candidates. >>> 1 The unranked candidates. >>> 2 The dummy-canditate. >>> 3 The monsters. >>> >>> All unranked candidates have higher ranks than the monsters. One can >>> then rank the monsters by how terrible they are. >>> >>> Basically, it is a way to vote against monsters in Condorcet without >>> having to rank all of the hundreds of also-rans. >>> >> >> all this is complicated crap that gunks up elections. it has an >> ice-cube's chance in hell. >> >> I've been observing experimentally how people use a Condorcet election > system in practice over the past ten years (since 2003) and in fact the use > of a dummy candidate to signal approval has become increasingly common. It > seems to be intuitive, at least to web users, and effective. I do agree > that trying to distinguish 0 vs. 1 is probably overly complicated. > > -- Andrew > Good response. A few examples would be even better. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A modification to Condorcet so that one can vote against monsters.
On 4/14/12 8:31 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: On 4/14/12 3:45 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote: ¡Hello! ¿How fare you? It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster is on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field is so polarized that the voters idiotically refuse to rank other serious candidates other than their candidate and the evil candidate has followers, the bad candidate might win. I suggest that Condorcet should have a dummy-candidate: 0 The ranked candidates. 1 The unranked candidates. 2 The dummy-canditate. 3 The monsters. All unranked candidates have higher ranks than the monsters. One can then rank the monsters by how terrible they are. Basically, it is a way to vote against monsters in Condorcet without having to rank all of the hundreds of also-rans. all this is complicated crap that gunks up elections. it has an ice-cube's chance in hell. I've been observing experimentally how people use a Condorcet election system in practice over the past ten years (since 2003) and in fact the use of a dummy candidate to signal approval has become increasingly common. It seems to be intuitive, at least to web users, and effective. I do agree that trying to distinguish 0 vs. 1 is probably overly complicated. -- Andrew <> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] ¿Why do some absolutely hate ScoreVoting and insist on Ranked Ballots?
On 4/14/12 3:42 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote: >but your mapping makes the ranked ballot synonymous with the score ballot. that is my point. In all voting systems, one counts votes at some point. ScoreVoting is just more explicit about it. no, Score voting does *not* count votes. it totals scores or ratings. Olympic judges are *not* voting for their favorite contestant. they are scoring or rating them, ostensibly objectively. but we go into the voting booth as *partisans* and we put *all* of the voting power we have (that is limited by "One person, one vote") behind the candidates that represent our political interests. it's not the same. The ballot could allow ranking or ratings with equal rankings or ratings allowed. The rankings would then be converted to ratings like thus: >so you're saying that we can have our choice between rating and ranking, as long as we choose rating. Frankly, I do not see what the big deal is, given that at some point one must quantify, anyway. it's called "bait-and-switch", Ŭalabio. you say "here is a method that should accommodate both you Ranked-Choice advocates and us Score advocates", but when we buy the product, we find that it is only a Score ballot. in a system that quantifies according to the principle of One-person-one-vote, it doesn't matter that you like your candidate much more than i like my candidate. our votes count equally anyway. the ranked ballot is there *only* to deal with voter contingencies. unless it's Borda, then the ranked ballot is there to score the candidates in a crude manner. that's why Borda is a crappy way to tabulate ranked ballots. gotta go to New Hampshire (a possible swing state, Vermont is safe) to campaign for Obama. talk to you guys later. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A modification to Condorcet so that one can vote against monsters.
On 4/14/12 3:45 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote: ¡Hello! ¿How fare you? It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster is on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field is so polarized that the voters idiotically refuse to rank other serious candidates other than their candidate and the evil candidate has followers, the bad candidate might win. I suggest that Condorcet should have a dummy-candidate: 0 The ranked candidates. 1 The unranked candidates. 2 The dummy-canditate. 3 The monsters. All unranked candidates have higher ranks than the monsters. One can then rank the monsters by how terrible they are. Basically, it is a way to vote against monsters in Condorcet without having to rank all of the hundreds of also-rans. all this is complicated crap that gunks up elections. it has an ice-cube's chance in hell. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Comments on some rank methods
On 4/14/12 5:13 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 04/10/2012 10:20 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
On 04/09/2012 11:31 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
I've said seemingly contradictory things about IRV. It's particularly
flagrant FBC failure makes it entirely inadequate for
public political elections, more so than Condorcet, which, too, is
inadequate due to FBC failure.
You keep saying anything without FBC is automatically a no-go. How do
you know that?
[endquote]
It is a country-specific observation, regarding the electorate of the
U.S., where I
reside. I don't know that about any other country, though there is
evidence for it in various
countries where people are used to Plurality voting.
Yes this is "anecdotal", but I've personally observed favorite-burial
in Condorcet voting.
A safe and prudent rule is "Never underestimate the voter's
inclination for resigned over-compromising
give-away, if there's any chance that it could help a compromise
against someone worse."
Yet that isn't absolute. Again, consider Burlington. The Burlington
voters, thinking they could now vote as they wished, ranked the
candidates in a manner suggesting a relatively close race between the
three major candidates. They didn't discover this was a bad idea until
after the election, but a Condorcet method would have given them the
right winner.
what you say is true. the CW would be, IMO, the "right winner" and in
*some* ways would have been perceived to be more acceptable to the GOP
voters, *but* if we had Condorcet in 2009, they would have complained
that the "3rd place" candidate had won. but the Democrats would have
shut up (since it was their candidate who would have won with Condorcet).
there is, IMO, a general dishonesty in the GOP that exists for
self-serving purposes, and as long as they had the fig-leaf that their
candidate won the plurality of 1st-choice votes ("Keep voting simple.
The guy with the most votes wins."), they would have complained as
loudly about Condorcet, even though they would have been less
dissatisfied with the Democrat winning than they were with the Prog.
bujt the Dems nor the Progs would have joined them in any repeal attempt
and Condorcet (if we had it instead of IRV) would have survived a repeal
effort.
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Comments on some rank methods
On 04/10/2012 10:20 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: Kristofer: You wrote: On 04/09/2012 11:31 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: I've said seemingly contradictory things about IRV. It's particularly flagrant FBC failure makes it entirely inadequate for public political elections, more so than Condorcet, which, too, is inadequate due to FBC failure. You keep saying anything without FBC is automatically a no-go. How do you know that? [endquote] It is a country-specific observation, regarding the electorate of the U.S., where I reside. I don't know that about any other country, though there is evidence for it in various countries where people are used to Plurality voting. Yes this is "anecdotal", but I've personally observed favorite-burial in Condorcet voting. A safe and prudent rule is "Never underestimate the voter's inclination for resigned over-compromising give-away, if there's any chance that it could help a compromise against someone worse." Yet that isn't absolute. Again, consider Burlington. The Burlington voters, thinking they could now vote as they wished, ranked the candidates in a manner suggesting a relatively close race between the three major candidates. They didn't discover this was a bad idea until after the election, but a Condorcet method would have given them the right winner. Given that observation, would not Condorcet acting properly have encouraged the voters to vote in a non-compromising manner in later elections? Although there's no hard evidence, it seems reasonable. Or do you prefer the voting method to give an ironclad assertion that there won't ever be a favorite betrayal problem, so you can be *sure*? I can see that. Since I'm in a country where favorite betrayal isn't a problem, I don't really feel the need to be absolutely sure. That, and I like Condorcet :-) And I also said that IRV would be a fine method, were it not for the public's inclination towards resigned, cowed overcompromise, and their very sad and disastrous lowering of standards for acceptability. "Vote for the least bad of the corrupt candidates, because they're the winnable ones". I disagree. Look at Burlington with its center squeeze again. The Burlington voters didn't strategize (much or effectively). Yet instead of picking the candidate closest to the median voter, IRV threw that one away because it didn't have enough first-place votes and picked the largest wing instead. [endquote] Never choose IRV as a way to attain the voter median. For that, I recommend ICT for public political elections. Condorcet(wv), maybe Beatpath, would be ok for organizations. If it fails to acquire the voter median even when voters aren't overcompromising, how can IRV be a fine method? You continued: How about this zero-info: Rank all the acceptables in alphabetical order. Rank the unacceptables in random order after the acceptables. [of course, in that situation, there'd be no need to rank the unacceptables, unless the rules require ranking everyone] Some IRV implementations require that the voters rank everyone, so the strategy might have to take that into account. If the voters don't have to rank everyone, then I agree with you. Since IRV passes both LNHarm and LNHelp, the only reason you'd rank unacceptables would be if you had some preference between them. ...if the rules require ranking everyone. You'd be preferentially helping the unacceptables least likely to benefit from that help. But, by the time your vote gets to the unacceptables, the acceptables must have all been eliminated. So, if you're going to rank the unacceptables, wouldn't it be best to rank them in order of preference (in reverse order of unacceptability)? There's a good case for not bothering to rank them, if the all-important thing is keeping an unacceptable from winning. But, by ranking them, you could at least try to help the least bad of them against the worst of them. That's a good point. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] A modification to Condorcet so that one can vote against monsters.
¡Hello! ¿How fare you? It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster is on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field is so polarized that the voters idiotically refuse to rank other serious candidates other than their candidate and the evil candidate has followers, the bad candidate might win. I suggest that Condorcet should have a dummy-candidate: 0 The ranked candidates. 1 The unranked candidates. 2 The dummy-canditate. 3 The monsters. All unranked candidates have higher ranks than the monsters. One can then rank the monsters by how terrible they are. Basically, it is a way to vote against monsters in Condorcet without having to rank all of the hundreds of also-rans. ¡Peace! -- “⸘Ŭalabio‽” Skype: Walabio An IntactWiki: http://intactipedia.org/ “You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts.” —— Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] ¿Why do some absolutely hate ScoreVoting and insist on Ranked Ballots?
2012-04-14T05:34:03Z, “Robert Bristow-Johnson” : > On 4/13/12 5:46 PM, “⸘Ŭalabio‽” wrote: >> 2012-04-13T:17:09Z, “Robert Bristow-Johnson” >> : >>> On 4/13/12 3:11 PM, “⸘Ŭalabio‽” wrote: I have had interactions with people on this list hating rated ballots. I have a question for them: >>> and my question for you is: how high should a voter rate his/her >>> contingency choice? >> As high or low as the voter likes. > doesn't answer the question. the voter likes Candidate A the best and > will, in a mano-a-mano race, vote for Candidate A against any other > candidate. Candidate C is Satan from hell. This voter will vote for > *anyone*, even Stalin, if such a candidate was in a two-person race against > Candidate C. Candidate B is someone else. voter doesn't like him as much as > A but certainly more than C. > how should this voter score Candidate B? this voter will have regrets > if he (and other voters like him) scored B too high and B defeated A. and > this voter will have regrets if he (and other voters like him) scored B too > low and C beat him and won the election. > Score voting *inherently* saddles the voters with a tactical voting > burden. So does Approval voting. No system is perfect. >>> he/she does not want to harm their favorite candidate (that would >>> indicate rating the 2nd choice with 0) and he/she does not want to help >>> their last choice (which would suggest ranking the 2nd choice higher). >> You have a legitimate point. That is why I favor multiple rounds. > oh, c'mon! multiple rounds? decisiveness is not a desirable property? Multiple rounds is a powerful tool for vetting. I admit that multiple rounds is annoying, but, in situations where hundreds of candidates run, and I only have time to research a score of them, multiple rounds is a good thing. If the ballot would allow both ratings and rankings, ?would that be acceptable? >>> sounds simple. i'm sure the electorate or the legislature will go for >>> that. >> I like sarcasm. > sorry. No need to apologize. I was not sarcastic. I really do like sarcasm. >> I even wrote a post about this just a few days ago called >> “A procedure for handling large numbers of candidates using scorevoting >> with primaries and runoffs.” >> 2012-04-10T01:57:49Z >> If you do not have the post, I shall forward you a copy, at your >> request. > if you posted it here, lemme know the date and i'll look for it. or > else send it to me. The date is 2012-04-10T01:57:49Z. I was sarcastic just then in repeating the date. The intent is humor, not a putdown. I found the post in the archives: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-April/030163.html >>> it's also important to have a consistent rule that applies to every >>> voter. while every voter has a choice of ranking vs. rating, it's not >>> particularly consistent. it's consistent regarding the *choice* but the >>> actually quantitative measure is not >> I included a table as an example about how to quantify it. The >> algorithm is thus: >> 1 divided by ranking. Take the resulting fraction and multiply it by >> 99. Round the result to the nearest integer. > but your mapping makes the ranked ballot synonymous with the score > ballot. that is my point. In all voting systems, one counts votes at some point. ScoreVoting is just more explicit about it. The ballot could allow ranking or ratings with equal rankings or ratings allowed. The rankings would then be converted to ratings like thus: > so you're saying that we can have our choice between rating and > ranking, as long as we choose rating. Frankly, I do not see what the big deal is, given that at some point one must quantify, anyway. > because, given your system of quantifying it, it still boils down to > rating. it is *not* ranking where there *is* no information in the ranking > for how *much* you like Candidate A over Candidate B, only that you *do* like > A over B. that's the essential difference. Yes, but it is good to know how-much one likes candidate Alpha over Candidate Bravo. It seems an improvement to me. > your combination of rating and ranking becomes essentially rating. True, but I do not see this as a problem. > ¿Would this be acceptable? >>> as acceptable as Borda. >> The thing is that it is not Borda. > Borda is a form of Score ballot. it *is* like Borda. Many, such as Arrow, consider Borda a ranked system. at this point, we should distinguish between systems where the type of ballot and whether the ballot generates only preferences or scores: Plurality and approval use ballots of both score and ranking and give
Re: [EM] ¿Why do some absolutely hate ScoreVoting and insist on Ranked Ballots?
On 04/13/2012 09:11 PM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote: ¡Hello! ¿How fare you? I have had interactions with people on this list hating rated ballots. I have a question for them: If the ballot would allow both ratings and rankings, ¿would that be acceptable? The ballot could allow ranking or ratings with equal rankings or ratings allowed. The rankings would then be converted to ratings like thus: [snip] ¿Would this be acceptable? No, I don't think so. That is essentially a weighted positional system, and those are not very good at all. Every weighted positional system except Plurality fails the Majority criterion (unless you count DAC and DSC as weighted positional systems). No weighted positional system can satisfy the Condorcet criterion. Nor can they satisfy mutual majority (again, unless DAC and DSC count). As soon as you make it a ranked method, the ranked method has to prove its worth in comparison to other ranked methods. Weighted positional systems are not very good at doing that as a class -- unless you absolutely have to have certain criteria (like FBC for Antiplurality). More fundamentally, as Robert points out, people who dislike rating don't just dislike rating because they have some grudge against numbers. Robert dislikes rating - or rather, Score/Range - because it forces him to be strategic and because it's not clear how much he should rate someone even if he had been honest. If you convert rankings to ratings like you suggest, then anybody who ranks gets that choice made for them. The ratings are preset; but the prospective voter *knows* that he could pick more freely if he rated instead of ranked. So the choice is no choice at all. If you're going to reduce, reduce rating to ranking instead. Use cardinal weighted pairwise or approval weighted pairwise. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
