Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 103, Issue 1
Jonathan, In addition to Ualabio's argument that cutting down the number of candidates is good so as not to overwhelm voters, I believe that almost every voting system ever invented can benefit from winnowing down candidates that are _too similar_ before the election. Political parties seem like the natural steward of this responsibility. For reforming partisan elections, I promote approval voting in the primary and approval voting in the general. Also acceptable would be approval voting in the general and letting the parties choose their nominees however they like. To me, this means that those who vote in one party's primary should be, generally, of a shared ideology. They should be the guardians of that party's label in the general election. Voters should choose to participate in the party primary for the ideology they are closest to. If they feel divorced from both (or all) parties, then they can refuse to participate in the primary. Then they should focus on getting a good independent candidate to run. The good news is that with approval voting, independents will do much better in general elections. I don't really see a good way for voters to support one person in the Republican primary and another person in the Democratic primary at the same time. ~ Andy On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 9:12 AM, Jonathan Denn i...@agreater.us wrote: Greetings! As I've mentioned previously, I am on the board of a nonprofit that will be announcing a Clean Government Alliance shortly. It will have two prominent far left/ far right reformers, probably another pair of center left/right will be joining them. The purpose is to draft a Constitutional Amendment for omnibus electoral reform. For these people everything is on the table. We had to pass on another household name because that person wouldn't put Term Limits on the table. I have been flying your flag: Ban Single Mark Ballots, and I have to say, that these sophisticated folk need it explained to them. Anyway, and I have asked this question before, What is the solution for primaries? This is the biggest open item in the work that has to be done. 40% of the electorate are independents, probably centrists. We cannot vote in primaries in almost all states. It's a gaping yaw in a democratic republic. I've used this example before. I did live in CT until a few weeks ago, now MA, in the last Senate election there was a great Republican Brian K Hill, a reformer. And the former Democratic Sec of State Susan Byceiwicz was also an interesting candidate. I would have liked to vote for both in the primary, and would have loved to seen them in the general election against each other. Instead we had a plutocrat running against a billionaire. In the end the oligarchs won. I expect the amendment will begin being drafted in DC in a few weeks, so please, load me up with the arguments. Cheers, Jon Denn @jmdenn Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Survey of Multiwinner Methods
Hey, I'd like to get a sense of what sorts of multiwinner methods are currently known that are reasonably good and don't require districts, parties, or candidates that are capable of making decisions (I'm looking at you, asset voting). I had an idea for a variant of STV where the elimination order for candidates is the reverse of how often they are approved (i.e. given a rank on the ballot instead of no rank). This method may already have been proposed some time ago, but I think it warrants attention regardless. This somewhat changes the interpretation of an STV ballot because a truncated ballot is no longer strictly less powerful than a non-truncated one. Since the elimination order is fixed from the beginning and doesn't depend on subsequent decisions, I suspect this modification to STV would at least reduce non-monotonic behavior (however one might quantify degree of monotonicity). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Comments on MJ discussion
Removing a losing candidate from the ballots and from the election, and then re-counting the ballots, shouldn't change the winner. Approval and Score pass. Michael, I find it very inconsistent for you to argue so adamantly for voters to use maximal strategy [endquote] I was just saying that there's no reason to expect people to vote other than optimally, based on their perceptions. A voting system shouldn't be promoted based on an assumption of suboptimal voting. You continued: and then to use a criterion that doesn't allow them to adjust their ballot when one candidate is dropped. [endquote] Suppose we held an election, and the Democrat won, and right after the election the Republican said I want to retroactively withdraw from the election. Let's pretend that I hadn't been in the election. I want you to conduct another balloting, without me in the election. For one thing, of course s/he wouldn't do that. And, if s/he did, we could reasonably say, Well, you should have thought of that sooner, shouldn't you. But, at least in that instance, another election would be fine with me, because a lot of progressives would vote Green instead of Democrat. But I can't say that a withdrawer has a right to insist on a new election. Of course s/he certainly has a right to advocate one, and circulate initiative petitions calling for an up/down vote on holding a new election. But that isn't really the issue of IIAC. IIAC merely says that removal of a losing candidate shouldn't change the result. IIAC says nothing about whether there should be another election if a losing candidate calls for one without hir in it.. IIAC is merely about consistent count-mechanics, given an unchanging set of ballots. Mike Ossipoff If voters even do so much as re-normalize their ballot when a losing candidate is dropped, that can ruin independence of irrelevant alternatives. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Comments on MJ discussion
IIAC merely says that removal of a losing candidate shouldn't change the result. IIAC says nothing about whether there should be another election if a losing candidate calls for one without hir in it.. IIAC is merely about consistent count-mechanics, given an unchanging set of ballots. Well, you're arguing for a definition of IIAC that even plurality passes. I find it lacking, and do not accept it for my definition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. ~ Andy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Comments on MJ discussion (IIAC)
Andy: IIAC merely says that removal of a losing candidate shouldn't change the result. IIAC says nothing about whether there should be another election if a losing candidate calls for one without hir in it.. IIAC is merely about consistent count-mechanics, given an unchanging set of ballots. Well, you're arguing for a definition of IIAC that even plurality passes. Yes. One nice thing about Approval and Score is that they pass every criterion that Plurality passes. That can't be said for MJ or any Condorcet version. That means that no one can say that there is any way in which Approval or Score could be called worse than Plurality. That's important for enactment proposals. I think that my definition of IIAC is only one that's been precisely and completely defined. You continued: I find it lacking [endquote] It isn't the most demanding criterion, and it's met by Plurality, and so no one can claim that meeting IIAC makes a method adequate. In fact, meeting IIAC, Participation, Mono-Add-Top, Mono-Add-Unique-Top, Consistency, Non-Dictatorshiip and Mono-Raise obviously doesn't make a method adequate, since Plurality meets all of those criteria. But just because Plurality meets a criterion doesn't make it irrelevant. Non-Dictatorship is a desirable criterion, even though Plurality meets it. . You continued: , and do not accept it for my definition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. [endquote] But won't it have to do until someone offers a different complete and precise definition of IIAC? I have nothing against there being two kinds of IIAC. They'd have to be named differently. Maybe the new one could be called Strong IIAC. It might be a very desirable and worthwhile criterion, when someone defines it. If someone already has, I invite someone to post it. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Survey of Multiwinner Methods
At 04:04 PM 1/7/2013, Greg Nisbet wrote: Hey, I'd like to get a sense of what sorts of multiwinner methods are currently known that are reasonably good and don't require districts, parties, or candidates that are capable of making decisions (I'm looking at you, asset voting). Right. We only want to elect candidates not capable of communicating and negotating on behalf of the public. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Survey of Multiwinner Methods
2013/1/7 Greg Nisbet gregory.nis...@gmail.com Hey, I'd like to get a sense of what sorts of multiwinner methods are currently known that are reasonably good and don't require districts, parties, or candidates that are capable of making decisions (I'm looking at you, asset voting). Like Abd, I wonder at the basis for your criteria. I think that for reform in most English-speaking countries, districts are usually an advantage, parties arguably so, and intelligent candidates always. Also, this thread gives me an excuse to mention a thought I've recently had. In between purely majoritarian methods and truly proportional ones, there is a third option: median-preserving ones. That is, the legislature is not proportional, but if the voters and candidates are on a 1D (or N-dimensional single-peaked?) spectrum, then the median representative in the winning set is the one closest to the median voter in the electorate. The only example I've thought of so far is NP-complete (MJ ballots, each voter has their individual threshold set as high as possible so that they approve 1/2 of the winning slate) but I'm sure that there are other methods which would do this. And such methods might have political advantages in certain contexts. Jameson I had an idea for a variant of STV where the elimination order for candidates is the reverse of how often they are approved (i.e. given a rank on the ballot instead of no rank). This method may already have been proposed some time ago, but I think it warrants attention regardless. This somewhat changes the interpretation of an STV ballot because a truncated ballot is no longer strictly less powerful than a non-truncated one. Since the elimination order is fixed from the beginning and doesn't depend on subsequent decisions, I suspect this modification to STV would at least reduce non-monotonic behavior (however one might quantify degree of monotonicity). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Survey of Multiwinner Methods
On 1/7/13 4:04 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote: Hey, I'd like to get a sense of what sorts of multiwinner methods are currently known that are reasonably good and don't require districts, parties, or candidates that are capable of making decisions (I'm looking at you, asset voting). I will once again mention that there is a Condorcet multiwinner method implemented in the CIVS voting system that you can try out right this instant if you are so inclined. In fact, this proportional method gets used pretty frequently by the rather numerous CIVS users. See: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/w8/~andru/civs/proportional.html By the way, I am happy to host other methods if people want to integrate them into the CIVS code base, which is publicly available. -- Andrew attachment: andru.vcf Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Survey of Multiwinner Methods
2013-01-07T01:04:52Z, “Greg Nisbet” gregory.nis...@gmail.com: Hey, I'd like to get a sense of what sorts of multiwinner methods are currently known that are reasonably good and don't require districts, parties, or candidates that are capable of making decisions (I'm looking at you, asset voting). ¡KISS!: ¡Keep It Simple, Oh Stupid! I would stick with Asset-Voting. It is a good thing that you look at Asset-Voting already. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
