[Election-Methods] Best electoral system under real circumstances
I've read in this list that possibly the worst electoral system used is Brazilian open list PR. In this year, Brazilian Congress discuted the change of electoral law to closed lists, single member plurality or MMP. Presidents, Governors and Mayors are elected by top-two runoff. I think this method is sufficiently good. Maybe ranked methods are not suitable for Brazilian voters' degree of skill, and for voting machines. Federal, State and Muncipal representatives are elected according open lists. The main problem of this method is the excessive district magnitude (8 in least populated states up to 70 in São Paulo) and resulting high number of candidates. Transfers of surpluses are unpredictable. My suggestions for improvements of this system are: - reduce district size to 3, 4 or 5; - limit number of candidates by party. Candidates should be nominated by primary elections. - prohibit surplus transfers among different parties. - adoption of STV in the future. Do you agree with these measures? ___ Diego Renato dos Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] MMPO: the best 'transitional' method?
As a newbie in this list, I have no preference about the best voting method. I am aware that instinctively Condorcet criterion is desirable if consensus does not exist, but approval or range can produce good results too. However, based in Bucklin experiences in USA, I think that any method that violates later-no-harm (except asset voting) is likely to provide incentive to bullet vote and became a costly version of plurality. If later-no-harm is indispensable for a transitional method, MMPO seems the best alternative because it is nearly Condorcet-efficient and still easy to understand. After people be accustomed with multi-option voting, and depending of the detected flaws, other method may be considered, like SSD. (This thought does not violate my previous opinion about advantages of Improved Approval Runoff in low-knowledge populations). I apologize for any error. My English is poor. Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
2007/8/23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Dear Rob! It is possible (otherwise I would not have posted this challenge :-) But of course it is not possible with a majoritarian method (that's what you observed). Keep on, one of the possible solutions is really simple (though not very good in other respects)... Yes, it is not possible with a majoritarian method, but supermajoritarian methods can work good! My first suggestion is a modified form of bucklin voting with 2/3 threshold. If no candidate reaches a double majority, a new election is held. If no candidate has 2/3 of the votes after add all preferences, bullet votes are proportionally completed. I dislike any undeterministic method, except for tie-braking Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
2007/8/23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I dislike any undeterministic method, except for tie-braking And I dislike methods that give all power to only one half of the voters and can be used to oppress 49% of the electorate :-) In most societies, the majority dictatorship is not a major problem because electors' preferences shift along time, and the 49% can became the majoritarian faction in the next elections. In divided societies for ethnic, cultural or religious system, where consensus is desirable, proprotional representation for legislatures and supermajoritarian methods for single-winner elections (as for head of state in many parliamentary republics) are better than probabilistic methods. Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
2007/8/18, Gervase Lam: [With a reweight of 0 a] concern [is] that if you approve your compromise candidate, who ends up being the most approved, you can weaken your votes for your favorite candidate and cause him to fail to qualify for the second round. The ideal way to sort out this concern would be have the reweighting be 1 instead of 0. However, having a reweighting of 1 means that a faction could get a turkey candidate into the second round, as Chris has pointed out. The compromise between a reweighting of 0 and 1 is 1/2! Personally, I agree with dropping rule #2 but would keep the reweighting at 1/2. I devised an example where a reweighting of 0 results CW fail to run second round ( is approval cutoff): 33: Right Center Left 8: R C L 7: C R L 8: C R L 8: C L R 8: C L R 7: L C R 21: L C R First count: R: 48; C: 46; L: 36 Second count: C: 38,5; L: 36 (IAR), C: 31; L: 36 (Chris' proposal) Under IAR, candidates from right and center compete in the second round, and centrist wins. Under Crhis' method, the competitors are from right and left, and rightist wins. I agree that dropping rule #2 is better. However, as Dave said, runoffs are expensive. In parliamentary systems, 50%+ support is sufficient to maintain a head of government, because this i thought a winner in same conditions is not a bad outcome. Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
