Re: [Election-Methods] Measuring power in a multi winner election
Howard Swerdfeger wrote: |-|--||-| | YEAR | PropRep | PropPower | System | |-|--||-| | 1993 | 18.3| 54.0 | FPTP | | 1996 | 6.0| 10.2 | MMP | | 1999 | 4.7| 12.2 | MMP | | 2002 | 3.9| 24.2 | MMP | | 2005 | 1.3| 16.4 | MMP | |-|--||-| In all cases lower numbers are Better or more proportional. as the number is actually a measure of Dis-proportionality. Sorry if this was not clear in my first email Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] Measuring power in a multi winner election
I know that this list is primarily single winner elections but I thought given the low volume as of late a slight change of topic would be welcome. with that, I was wondering about multi winner elections. specifically the parliamentary kind typical of most former British colonies. Do to the inadequacies of the FPTP system in creating a government many of these countries are looking at alternative systems, New Zealand moved to MMP, Scotland as well, BC tried to once, and will try again move to STV, Ontario is looking at MMP. The drive behind thes moves it usually that the old system fails to translate votes into seats fairly. (Votes != Seats) but most of these reforms fail to recognize that that Seats do not equal power. So we are still still stuck with a similar problem (votes != power) I was looking into 2 methods of measuring power in a weighted voting system. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banzhaf_Power_Index http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shapley-Shubik_power_index I was wondering first if there are any methods of measuring power in a legislature that I am unaware of? Secondly if anybody has tried to design a generic system where by votes are kept proportional to power, via allocation of seats? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions
Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Abd ul-Rahman, In a Range poll, social utility is maximized if everyone votes *absolute* utilities, accurately. Only if social utility is defined so that your statement becomes true by definition (and becomes a triviality thus). Absolute utilities means that the utilities are commensurable. Yes, it is a tautology. But it still should be said, because a great deal is written that ignores this. You mean, many people ignore that you choose to define social utility as the sum of individual utilities, while others define it otherwise? Welfare economics, however, does not define social utility as the sum of individual utility, it rather defines social welfare in some more sophisticated ways which we already discussed earlier several times. That is also true. There can be utilities that combine in a nonlinear way. But how complicated do you want to make it? We have enough trouble getting a method in place that will optimize, to the degree that Range does, linear utilities, and many forms of utility *are* commensurable linearly. What do you mean by commensurable linearly? The question is simple, is it better for society when one has 100 and the other 0 or when both have 50. If the latter is considered better for society, then social utility is obviously not the sum of individual utilities. That's what welfare economics is about. Not to insert myself in a private conversation. But, I was under the impression that that an individual utility (Ui) function was usually defined as the log of some trade-able commodity. example Ui = Log($) So by extension welfare economics would still have reason to exist if the social utility (SU)was defined as SU = Sum(Ui) The trick is in my opinion identifying the trade-able commodity, in relation to elections. My guess at place to start would be something like a Gaussian of the distance between a candidate and each voter...or something like that Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions
Sorry about The formatting Its a re post the first one got rejected by the server! Assume all Quotes are down one Level. thanks! Howard Swerdfeger wrote: Put all your eggs in one basket and watch that basket like a hawk! General advise: If you do this, in any respect you must be reasonably certain that if some threat does come to your eggs you have 1. The ability to see the danger coming, 2. The ability to act and move your eggs to a safe location, before danger strikes. even if you watch it like a hawk. That's right. Now, if we have, as described in another post, assigned proxies for all electors -- that's simple, it is part of the required registration process -- then it's not true that all the eggs are in one basket, for if that basket is destroyed, there are clones of the eggs ready to step up I believe we have made an abrupt left hand turn with this analogy. buy destroying the eggs, I intended that would happen if you voted in a manner (on any bill) that you did not approve of. Not, that my first proxy got hit by the #96 bus going out to Kanata, or some such thing, and I needed a fall back proxy. However, if we look at DP, which is *very* similar, we can see that voting for the big famous influential person would generally be a mistake. How sure are you of that voting for famous influential person would be a mistake in a liquid/proxy/asset voting system? What factors do you believe would lead to this being the best strategy for most voters? Your vote can and will get there eventually, but it's far more effective to have someone you can talk to. What most people have is a model of a very isolating process, and they think of election methods in this context. They don't think about, Can I call up and talk to my representative? Once a month if I want to? Who do I tallk to if I have a idea that I think worth considering? Did you want me to answer that in context of liquid/proxy/asset voting, or my current democratic system (Westminster system, Canada) or yours? I also think if you are going to choose someone who has a small number of votes that you are best to split it up, as you are farther down the decision tree and are thus more likely to have your vote perverted away from your desires. but then again after splitting it up my votes would again merge at a higher levelAll roads lead to Rome, after all. Again, I understand that people think this way. But if you really think that your own opinions are sufficiently researched that them being followed up to a high level is important (to you!), then you really should register as an elector and vote for yourself. Then, you might well cast your vote for that important influential fellow. But you might consider, it might be better to vote for someone who has *access* to that fellow, whereas you, with one vote, won't. er.. perhaps you did not understand me. In the above paragraph I never mentioned that I thought my own opinion would be sufficiently researched, on the contrary I would fully take advantage of the proxy nature of voting. I was stating that if I did choose to split my vote that both my proxies might choose not to vote and give there vote to the same person. thus It would have the same effect as if I did not split my vote and instead voted for that super proxy instead. Thus I would come back to the original problem I had or a single point of failure in my personal proxy chain. When the big important fellow votes a way that you don't like, wouldn't you want to be able to talk to him about it? *Maybe he had a reason* that would convince you if the opportunity were there.* Or are you rigid in your own ideas? You have a right to be but it is also dangerously foolish. Now, practically by definition, you can't call the big guy up. But you can call someone who can. which is why I would probably vote for a second rung guy. or a first rung guy if I found one that voted in a way that I approved of. I would not vote for a 3rd or 4th level guy. Cause calling Sue, to ask bob, to tell bill, to leave a message for God that he is not voting the way I like is not going to be effective. besides with 10 people on the first level and 100 on the second it is highly likely that I would find somebody in those 2 levels who vote in accordance with my wishes 95% of the time. I may not have direct access to Level 2 guys but I can switch my vote when I am not happy. Once again, what Asset is setting up is a deliberative system, but some persist in thinking of it as an election method. It's understandable, because if the candidate set is restricted, it looks somewhat like an election method. But it is much more -- and much less. It depends on being a public process, otherwise there would be no way to negotiate the vote transfers, and it is this negotiation and agreement that makes it work to not waste votes
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Jobst Heitzig wrote: A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! approval, would work if voters approval cutoff is below 80, as would honest range. The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... dang! I would suggest using one of the above methods and removing any knowledge from the voter of how any of the other voters will vote. No Media coverage. No predictions by political analysts. No talking with your family/friends/co-workers about who you will vote for. This would limit the voters ability to vote strategically. i.e. if the group of 55 voters don't know they have a majority they would probably vote honest in order to get the best result. Good luck have fun :-) Jobst _ In 5 Schritten zur eigenen Homepage. Jetzt Domain sichern und gestalten! Nur 3,99 EUR/Monat! http://www.maildomain.web.de/?mc=021114 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Jobst Heitzig wrote: A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... If the majority is close (ie 55-45) and you randomly select only a small number of ballots (say 10ish). It is possible that B will have more supporters selected. fear of this will lead supporters of A to vote true preference, as will the reverse in B supporters. Then we can use approval or Range. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
