[EM] Automatic algorithm for coalition building
rs to vote for all the coalition parties Before any other party. This system would only really come into play if none of the coalitions would amass a majority. In that case, it would be the job of the voters to put together one of the preannounced coalitions with one or more parties that they did not want. I think that such enforced nearness would sharpen the minds of the politicians. An example of this would be the most recent parliamentary election in Sweden. Before it, the conservatives, liberals, farmer party, and christian democrats announced that they were a 4-party coalition. On the other side, the labor party, the greens, and the left party were in it together, but in a somewhat less formalized structure. Beside those 7 parties, there was one more party with a reasonable chance of getting into the parliament - the Sweden Democrats. None of the 7 old parties would touch the SD party, and the latter was harshly treated in media. What happened was that the 4-party coalition got the largest bloc of seats, and they now form a minority govt which is not toppled by the SD party, even if the latter could do so at any time by Calling a no confidence vote. Under the system outlined above, there would be some coalition building, so that at one point 3 plocs would be formed. None of those would have a majority of seats. Then, in the next stage of automated coalition-building, one of the 3 possible coalitions would gain a majority, and politicians would be forced to work together with people that they do not like. That would be something that I would like to see. One county In Sweden had at one time 8 parties in the county parliament, which had 33 seats. The labor party had 16 of those, but the other 7 parties formed a coalition govt. with 17 seats. That had required quite a bit of haggling, and it was difficult to keep the coalition together for the entire period. If there would have been an automated coalition building system in place, and no form of premature elections, then it would have held together with less work. Peter Gustafsson > Juho > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] "Top 2+1 Approval" primaries
Jameson: I am not a Quora member, and I am not about to sign up. That said, if you want to use the text and answer it there, do go ahead. Yours, Peter Gustafsson > From: jameson.qu...@gmail.com > Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2013 05:09:58 -0600 > Subject: Re: [EM] "Top 2+1 Approval" primaries > To: mining...@hotmail.com > > Would you be willing to make this as a comment on Quora? I'm trying to > get more activity there, since it's a broader forum with more potential > to pull in new users than the mailing list. If for any reason you'd > rather not, I'd be happy to answer on the list, but I thought it > couldn't hurt to ask. > > 2013/7/26 Peter Gustafsson > mailto:mining...@hotmail.com>> > from: jameson.qu...@gmail.com<mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com> > Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 12:54:09 -0600 > To: > election-methods@lists.electorama.com<mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com>; > > electionscie...@googlegroups.com<mailto:electionscie...@googlegroups.com> > Subject: [EM] "Top 2+1 Approval" primaries > Here's a simple proposal for a top-two-like mechanism for primaries, > copied from an answer of mine on Quora: > The simplest good solution would be "Top 2+1 approval". That is: > a primary using approval voting > the top two advance to the general election, plus the top vote-getter > outside that party if they're both from the same party > then a general election using approval voting. > SNIP > > Note that, although this system is built to allow only two parties in > the general election, that does not mean it would perpetuate two-party > domination. A leftist district could easily have Democrat(s) and Green > in the general, and a conservative district could easily have > Republican(s) and Libertarian. And if the "minor" party actually had > more support, they would go on to win the seat. > > Certainly you could propose complex systems that could be better than > this proposal in some ways. For instance, you could use a proportional > representation system such as Bucklin Transferrable Voting (BTV) for > the first round. But this proposal is a simple balance of the > requirements: nonpartisan voting, a balance of candidates and parties > in the general election, yet focused attention on a few strong > candidates. > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for > list info > --- > > Jameson: > Your Quora post was very well put, considerably better than anything > that I have put together. That said: > > In it, you mention Gerrymandering and Duverger pathologies.But what > will this 2+1 system do to break that? From my cursory glance, it > appears that if the system would be enacted you would get these kind of > districts: > 1. Super-right electorate: no dems in the top-3, general election > between 2 GOP and one libertarian/constitution party/whatever. GOP wins > most of those districts. > 2. 1. Super-left electorate: no GOP in the top-3, general election > between 2 dem and one Green/workers party/whatever. Dem wins most of > those districts. > 3. Competitive district: One GOP, one Dem candidate goes to the general > election. Voters who prefer left-of-Dem, or right-of-GOP, > parties/candidates will vote Dem/GOP according to the "least of evils" > thinking, *even* if that is faulty thinking in this case. Meanwhile, > voters favoring 3rd party candidates that are politically situated > between the two big parties will find that their party experiences > massive center squeeze. > > As I see it, this would result in a Congress that has 2 dominant > parties, plus a smattering of "extremists" on both sides. Those 3rd and > 4th party representatives would come from areas which are well out of > the country norm, so it would be easy for the big parties to stick it > to those places. No pork for you, if you vote small party! The > "extremists" would have very few tactical options - mostly they would > be forced to vote with the big party closest to them, lest they > alienate their voter base. > > Then, when districts are up for redrawing, they would be Gerrymandered > out of existence. If a district is held by a Green, the GOP will know > that they have no chance of winning it, but they would probably be > pleased if the Dem took it - lesser of evils thinking, but from the > other direction. The Dem´s OTOH, would see such a district as a big > juicy target, since many of its voters have previously voted Dem and > consider the Dems as 2nd best alternative. A Little bit of border > redrawing between that district and an adjoining district that is also > Dem but has less core support for the Greens, and the Dem party has 2 > districts instead of one. Likewise on the other side of the political > spectrum. > > Yours, > > Peter Gustafsson > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] "Top 2+1 Approval" primaries
from: jameson.qu...@gmail.com Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 12:54:09 -0600 To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com; electionscie...@googlegroups.com Subject: [EM] "Top 2+1 Approval" primaries Here's a simple proposal for a top-two-like mechanism for primaries, copied from an answer of mine on Quora: The simplest good solution would be "Top 2+1 approval". That is: a primary using approval voting the top two advance to the general election, plus the top vote-getter outside that party if they're both from the same party then a general election using approval voting. SNIP Note that, although this system is built to allow only two parties in the general election, that does not mean it would perpetuate two-party domination. A leftist district could easily have Democrat(s) and Green in the general, and a conservative district could easily have Republican(s) and Libertarian. And if the "minor" party actually had more support, they would go on to win the seat. Certainly you could propose complex systems that could be better than this proposal in some ways. For instance, you could use a proportional representation system such as Bucklin Transferrable Voting (BTV) for the first round. But this proposal is a simple balance of the requirements: nonpartisan voting, a balance of candidates and parties in the general election, yet focused attention on a few strong candidates. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info --- Jameson: Your Quora post was very well put, considerably better than anything that I have put together. That said: In it, you mention Gerrymandering and Duverger pathologies.But what will this 2+1 system do to break that? From my cursory glance, it appears that if the system would be enacted you would get these kind of districts: 1. Super-right electorate: no dems in the top-3, general election between 2 GOP and one libertarian/constitution party/whatever. GOP wins most of those districts. 2. 1. Super-left electorate: no GOP in the top-3, general election between 2 dem and one Green/workers party/whatever. Dem wins most of those districts. 3. Competitive district: One GOP, one Dem candidate goes to the general election. Voters who prefer left-of-Dem, or right-of-GOP, parties/candidates will vote Dem/GOP according to the "least of evils" thinking, *even* if that is faulty thinking in this case. Meanwhile, voters favoring 3rd party candidates that are politically situated between the two big parties will find that their party experiences massive center squeeze. As I see it, this would result in a Congress that has 2 dominant parties, plus a smattering of "extremists" on both sides. Those 3rd and 4th party representatives would come from areas which are well out of the country norm, so it would be easy for the big parties to stick it to those places. No pork for you, if you vote small party! The "extremists" would have very few tactical options - mostly they would be forced to vote with the big party closest to them, lest they alienate their voter base. Then, when districts are up for redrawing, they would be Gerrymandered out of existence. If a district is held by a Green, the GOP will know that they have no chance of winning it, but they would probably be pleased if the Dem took it - lesser of evils thinking, but from the other direction. The Dem´s OTOH, would see such a district as a big juicy target, since many of its voters have previously voted Dem and consider the Dems as 2nd best alternative. A Little bit of border redrawing between that district and an adjoining district that is also Dem but has less core support for the Greens, and the Dem party has 2 districts instead of one. Likewise on the other side of the political spectrum. Yours, Peter Gustafsson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Proposed bullet-voting prohibition criterion
Kristoffer:
Thanks for pointing out those possibilities for how a big party can instruct
its voters on how to thwart the intent of this proposed criterion. Obviously,
BVP is not sufficient to ensure the transition from a two-party environment to
a multiparty environment. What are your ideas on how make a stronger set of
criteria to that end?
As to your note about range voting: If the rule allows a vote in which one
candidate gets 99 points, another 1 point, and all others get 0 points - then
that is so close to bullet voting so that it should for all intents and
purposes be considered such. I want the voting system to be designed so that
valid votes are significantly different from a bullet vote.
> Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2013 23:23:04 +0100
> From: km_el...@lavabit.com
> To: mining...@hotmail.com
> CC: election-meth...@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Proposed bullet-voting prohibition criterion
>
> On 01/27/2013 03:45 PM, Peter Gustafsson wrote:
> >
> > There are lots of voting system criteria that have been described,
> > but I have not seen this one - or any one like it - described
> > before.
> >
> > Bullet-voting prohibition Criterion: "A voting system should not be
> > constructed in such a way so that it is both legal and rational for a
> > voter to fill in a ballot with only one party or candidate name, so
> > that the voter refuses to order by preference all candidates that are
> > not his first preference."
>
> This criterion seems to be two combined. These are:
>
> - It should not be possible to submit a ballot listing only one party
> ("legal")
> - For any ballot that includes only one party, there should exist at
> least one other ballot that lists more than one party and which doesn't
> make the voter worse off if he were to vote that ballot instead
> ("rational").
>
> I think the second here is pretty much Later-no-harm, though I share
> Benham's opinion regarding methods that only pass LNHarm or LNHelp (and
> not both or neither). That is, a method that passes only LNHarm
> encourages random-fill (the voter adding more parties or candidates in a
> random order because it can't hurt), and a method that passes only
> LNHelp encourages bullet-voting.
>
> As for the first criterion, that's reasonable enough, but I think the
> intent can be thwarted.
>
> > Since FPTP enforces bullet voting, it obviously fails the BVP
> > criterion. In Approval voting, it is legal to vote for only one
> > candidate, so it fails also. In score voting, it is legal to give 99
> > points to one candidate and 0 points to all others, so it also fails.
> > All other voting systems (that I can think of right now) can be made
> > compatible with this proposed BVP criterion by adding a rule that the
> > voter must supply at least 4 (or whatever number sufficiently high)
> > most preferred candidates, otherwise the vote is spoiled.
>
> It's easy to modify Approval and Range/score to pass the "legal" part of
> the criterion, though. Just say that the Approval ballot is only valid
> if at least two candidates are approved, or that the Range ballot is
> only valid if, after removing a candidate given max score, there are
> candidates with non-min score left.
>
> > So, what would happen if a voting system with a BVP-criterion
> > enforcement would be introduced? I see two possible scenarios:
> >
> > 1. The big parties split into several very similar parties, so that
> > hidebound voters of that party can vote a complete list of only party
> > members.
> > 2. The big parties do not split, and the voters of those
> > parties engage in mutual burying. Their voters vote their party #1,
> > then supply a long list of minor parties, so that they do not have to
> > give any help to the hated other big party. Meanwhile, many 3rd party
> > voters will vote one big party at the bottom, and several will
> > tactically vote both big parties at #1 and #2 from the bottom.
>
> There's a third possibility. The parties may produce "decoy lists" that
> aren't expected to get much support at all and are thus easily
> controlled by the parent parties. Party voters could then vote for a
> party and a randomly picked decoy list to get around the BVP limitation.
>
> For instance, say that party X introduces 12 pseudoparties (one for each
> month) and instructs their voters to vote for X and the pseudoparty
> corresponding to the voter's birth month. Then, in a majoritarian
> system, the pseudoparties won't get their candidates elected (because
> the parent party will always have significantly more support); and in a
> proportional representation system, the method would give seats to the
> parent parties and these parties' voters would be considered represented
> by them, thus again giving the pseudoparties few seats.
>
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Proposed bullet-voting prohibition criterion
There are lots of voting system criteria that have been described, but I have not seen this one - or any one like it - described before. Bullet-voting prohibition Criterion: "A voting system should not be constructed in such a way so that it is both legal and rational for a voter to fill in a ballot with only one party or candidate name, so that the voter refuses to order by preference all candidates that are not his first preference." Since FPTP enforces bullet voting, it obviously fails the BVP criterion. In Approval voting, it is legal to vote for only one candidate, so it fails also. In score voting, it is legal to give 99 points to one candidate and 0 points to all others, so it also fails. All other voting systems (that I can think of right now) can be made compatible with this proposed BVP criterion by adding a rule that the voter must supply at least 4 (or whatever number sufficiently high) most preferred candidates, otherwise the vote is spoiled. Why do I consider the BVP criterion necessary? Two reasons: 1. It makes impossible some strategies that could otherwise be used by voters who are in favor of one of the top-2 parties, and want to ensure a two-party duopoly, even after the FPTP system is scrapped. I hold it for necessary that any change of the voting laws that scrap FPTP should not only mandate a better voting system, but also make it impossible for hidebound big-party voters to continue in their old mindset of "vote up my party, loathe the other big party, and pay no attention to any other party." 2. (Intertwined to reason #1) Elections shall, IMO, be occasions of public civics lessons. The voters should be forced to consider several different opinions, and no go reflexively party-list on every issue. By forcing voters to rank at least 4 alternatives, the voters would be forced to not only evaluate the other big party in relation to the minor parties, but also evaluate minor parties in relation to each other. That would force low-information voters to either throw away their vote, read up on policy positions, or random-rank their preferences #2 and below. So, what would happen if a voting system with a BVP-criterion enforcement would be introduced? I see two possible scenarios: 1. The big parties split into several very similar parties, so that hidebound voters of that party can vote a complete list of only party members 2. The big parties do not split, and the voters of those parties engage in mutual burying. Their voters vote their party #1, then supply a long list of minor parties, so that they do not have to give any help to the hated other big party. Meanwhile, many 3rd party voters will vote one big party at the bottom, and several will tactically vote both big parties at #1 and #2 from the bottom. In the first case, the big parties run a risk of the different daughter parties becoming entities of their own, that become difficult to control. That is a good thing. In the second case, the most centrist 3rd party will get a big boost, which is a good thing also. It is entirely possible that a new centrist party would be formed, peeling center-leaning voters off both present big parties. Then those big parties would become smaller, and with a much smaller span of political opinions within them, they would be more cohesive and we would get fewer intramural fights. All good IMO. Peter Gustafsson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Testing solution to faulty line wrap rendering - no real content
Moderators - please let this post stay for a few days, so that I can check whether it came out as I wanted. This post has the sole purpose to test whether it is possible for me to post on electowiki and manually enforce line wraps at the correct positions by using the "plain text" option in hotmail. If it goes as I hope, the text below will consist of three lines of characters, and come out that way. If it works, I will start posting. If not, I will go back to lurking. AA BB CC Peter Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Societal ranking from incomplete pairwise information. (Pinewood derby.)
To all readers: When I have been posting, I see my own posts as one very long line, with no line breaks despite the fact that I have used them when I composed the message. If it looks like that to you also, please advise me of that unfortunate fact and, is possible, tell me how I shall format my responses so that they look good on this board. Strangely enough, I have not had that problem on any other board that I post on. From: electi...@jenningsstory.com Date: Sat, 17 Mar 2012 11:16:51 -0700 To: election-meth...@electorama.com Subject: [EM] Societal ranking from incomplete pairwise information. (Pinewood derby.) Kristofer, (and others too) If I recall, you were recently experimenting with how to best determine a winner (or was it a full ranking) from incomplete pairwise information. What are the methods that you (or others) consider best for that? It seems like Kemeny would be a good fit (if it weren't computationally prohibitive): for each pairwise contest you have data on, you just add one point to each possible societal ranking which agrees with that pairwise contest. If your pairwise information has a notion of defeat strength, then you can sum the defeat strengths to get a Borda-like method. Otherwise you can count the pairwise defeats and have a Copeland-like method. But for those last two each candidate should have about the same number of contests, right? Does the Schulze method extend naturally to incomplete data? In your experimentation, were you the one who decided which pairwise contests to run or was it decided by some other actor and you just had to live with whatever data was generated? A couple weeks ago, I found myself keeping score for a pinewood derby, where 8-11 year old boys race wooden cars down a track. When we thought there were only 20 entrants, we were going to try to run the entire pairwise matrix (190 races). When 28 boys showed up, that became impossible. I quickly drew up a racing schedule. Each boy got a number and ended up racing against the next five and the previous five cars (mod 28). (Then we did a quick tournament afterwards.) It occurred to me that it would be better to use the outcomes of the early races to decide who races against each other in the later races. (Let A>B signify that A has raced and won against B.) If A>B, A>C, B>D, and C>D, then there is really no point racing A against D. You really want to use the early race outcomes to determine which cars are comparable and race those cars against each other. This increases the information content of each outcome. It also contributes to the enjoyment by racing cars of the same caliber and getting every boy a win if possible. I've been thinking about good methods for attacking this. One other important constraint is that all cars should have about the same amount of races, which rules out an "insertion-sort" type algorithm. If the number of cars is 2^n, then I think the first n rounds are pretty obvious. For 32 cars, for example: (Assuming no ties) First round: Just pair them up randomly and race them. There will be 16 winners and 16 losers.Second round: Race the 16 winners against each other (randomly) and the 16 losers against each other (randomly). Third round: Race the 8 undefeated cars against each other (randomly), the 8 winless cars against each other (randomly), and the 16 one-and-one cars against each other (randomly).etc.What you are describing is quite similar to the Monrad system used in chess tournaments, with the simplification that you do not have to worry about black or white. However, Monrad works partly because chess players generally only play one game per day in most competitions, so the organizers have ample time to calculate the matchups between days. However, in your competition, that is not the case. You need an algorithm that is fast, and transparent to the competitors - and their parents. Here is one that should fit the bill:1. List the competitor names, completely at random.2. Put all names into a direct elimination bracket of 32. With 28 competitors, there will be 4 that have a bye to the next round.3. Run the 12 races in the 1st round. The losers, and the 4 who had byes, are demoted to the round of 16. If a race concludes with the competitor who is listed lower in the list of stage#1 winning, then the two competitors in that race switch places. If the winner is the one who is listed higher, they keep their places. In no case should the competitors not taking part of a race have their listing affected by that race.4. Run the round of 16, demoting the losers to the round of 8.5. Repeat stage 4 until there is an ultimate loser. He takes place #28 in the total tally, and does not compete anymore. His name is taken out of the list in stage#1.6. Construct a new DE bracket. All competitors who were placed in odd-numbered placements of the first DE bracket retain their places. Those that originally
Re: [EM] Newbie to the list here
O gosh. Lame question: What am I doing wrong with the line breaks? There are line breaks in the text that I posed from my email account. Yours, Nordic Voting Nerd Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Newbie to the list here
Hi! I hope this post gets put in the right thread. 1. I live in Sweden, but am interested in voting systems all over the world.2. I do not do twitter - I detest trying to shoehorn complex ideas into 150 characters. I do not even read twitter.3. I think that plurality is the worst possible of the voting systems that do not involve randomness, except for antiplurality voting.4. I have been checking in the electowiki archives once in a blue moon for some time, and finally decided to subscribe.5. I follow another discussion board, which has a "politics" subfolder. In it, board members (who were attracted to the board not due to its politics, but due to it being the by far larget discussion board covering its topic, a sport) discuss politics, usually from an American POV. The board members would from time to time lament on this or that pathology of the US. political system. I, as one of the few board members from a country that uses proportional representation, pointed out - repeatedly - that they were due to the pathologies inherent of FPTP, and the behaviors that it engenders among the politicians who work within its framework. I wrote about other election systems, their characteristics, and different types of pathologies as a public education mission. I had very limited sucess in getting people to think in new ways, which frustrated me greatly. Considering that the sport that the discussion board is all about strongly selects for brains (dumb people simply can not get any more than quite limited success in the sport, no matter how good physical specimens they are), this made me even more disheartened. I have therefore decided to greatly tone down my public education efforts on that board, and to find a hopefully more receptive group of people.6. I am interested in all sorts of voting systems, though single-winner more that multiwinner. I am also planning to present an idea on a voting system for TV voting events that is resistant to multiple-voting efforts by fans that phone in many times, without the system having to indentify the voters who vote/phone in multiple times. I also have a bunch of other ideas on various voting system topics that I am planning to put up on the board so that fresh eyes can tear them down if they have any holes in them that I have overlooked.7. I have not seen any (not that I have looked for it all that studiously) FAQ being reposted. What is the best way of knowing whether a topic has been flogged to death before one posts on it yet again? Yours, Nordic Voting Nerd From: jameson.qu...@gmail.com Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 05:08:26 -0600 Subject: Re: [EM] Newbie to the list here To: mining...@hotmail.com CC: election-methods@lists.electorama.com I don't believe there is a standard way to introduce yourself, yet; but I think there should be. So: welcome to the list! What I'd like to know about you and other newbies is:-What country or countries are you involved in? -What's your twitter handle if any? (Mine, for voting-related matters, is bettercount_us).-Any comments on your positions on voting methods? Favorite method, more interested in single/multi winner, more interested in rated/ranked methods, etc. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Newbie to the list here
Hi! I have read some archived discussions before, but this is my first post. I have not yet seen any post in which a newbie introduces himself, so I do not know the etiquette for doing that on this list. If there are any formal (or unformal) rules pertaining to that for this list, I would be most grateful if I were directed to them. Yours, Nordic Voting Nerd Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
