Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA
2011/8/4 > Of course DSC and DAC are the same when rankings are complete. I was only > going to use it to determine the first player, and with amalgamated factions > (almost surely) the rankings would be complete. > Yes, understood. I on the other hand was speaking of using this within SODA itself, not within your SODA-inspired method. In SODA, tied candidate preferences are legal. I'd call the resulting method SODA-DAC. Plain SODA still uses the order based on current approval total, for simplicity. The results are equivalent for up to 3 candidates, and generally speaking as long as the CW makes a strong initial showing (goes first, or goes second of 4, or ) > > Of course there are many variations of this DSV idea [e.g. we could use > chiastic approval to pick the first player], but the main contribution of > SODA is the idea of sequential determination of the approval cutoffs. That > eliminates the need for mixed (i.e. probabilistic) strategies. In other > words, it makes the DSV method deterministic instead of stochastic. > Again, understood. > I think a deterministic DSV method is easier to sell than a stochastic > one, even though personally I would be happy with "strategy A" applied to > the ballots one by one in some random order. In other words, the approval > cutoff on the current ballot is next to the current approval winner on the > side of the approval runnerup. If there is no CW, then the winner depends > on the random order of the ballot processing. The public might have a hard > time with that fact. > I agree. In particular, even I might have a hard time, if there weren't at least a deterministic pseudorandom number generator with a pre-declared seed. Even then, this process would be much more difficult to audit / recount than a deterministic one. So I agree that the player-order idea for making things deterministic is helpful. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA
Of course DSC and DAC are the same when rankings are complete. I was only going to use it to determine the first player, and with amalgamated factions (almost surely) the rankings would be complete. Of course there are many variations of this DSV idea [e.g. we could use chiastic approval to pick the first player], but the main contribution of SODA is the idea of sequential determination of the approval cutoffs. That eliminates the need for mixed (i.e. probabilistic) strategies. In other words, it makes the DSV method deterministic instead of stochastic. I think a deterministic DSV method is easier to sell than a stochastic one, even though personally I would be happy with "strategy A" applied to the ballots one by one in some random order. In other words, the approval cutoff on the current ballot is next to the current approval winner on the side of the approval runnerup. If there is no CW, then the winner depends on the random order of the ballot processing. The public might have a hard time with that fact. - Original Message - From: Jameson Quinn Date: Thursday, August 4, 2011 7:41 am Subject: Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA To: fsimm...@pcc.edu Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > I suspect that SODA would be Condorcet compliant (over ballots) > if the first > player was, not the DSC winner, but the DAC winner (re-ordering > between each > delegated assignment). > > I'll see if I can work up a proof on this. > > JQ > > 2011/7/30 > > > One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates > decide what > > their approval cutoffs will be.on > > behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting > as proxies. > > One of the many novel features > > is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the > candidates> make them sequentially with > > full knowledge of the decisions of the candidates preceding > them in the > > sequence. > > > > I wonder if anybody has ever tried a DSV (designated strategy > voting)> method based on these ideas. > > > > Here's one way it could go: > > > > Voters submit range ballots. > > > > Factions are amalgamated via weighted averages, so that each > candidate ends > > up with one faction that > > counts according to its total weight. For large electorates, > these faction > > scores will almost surely yield > > complete rankings of the candidates. > > > > From this point on, only these rankings will be used. The > ratings were > > only needed for the purpose of > > amalgamating the factions. If we had started with rankings, > we could have > > converted them to ratings via > > the method of my recent post under the subject "Borda Done > Right." In > > either case, once we have the > > rankings from the amalgamated factions we proceed as follows: > > > > Based on these rankings the DSC (descending solid coalitions) > winner D is > > found. The D faction ranking > > determines the sequential order of play. When it is candidate > X's turn in > > the order of play, X's approval > > cutoff decision is made automatically as follows: > > > > For each of the possible cutoffs, the winner is determined > recursively (by > > running through the rest of the > > DSV tentatively). The cutoff that yields the best (i.e. > highest ranked) > > candidate according to X's faction's > > ranking, is the cutoff that is applied to X's faction. > > > > After all of the cutoffs have been applied, the approval > winner (based on > > those cutoffs) is elected. > > > > It would be too good to be true if this method turned out to > be monotone. > > For that to be true moving up > > one position in the sequence of play could not hurt the > winner. Although I > > think that this is probably > > usually true, I don't think that it is always true. Anybody > know any > > different? > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA
I suspect that SODA would be Condorcet compliant (over ballots) if the first player was, not the DSC winner, but the DAC winner (re-ordering between each delegated assignment). I'll see if I can work up a proof on this. JQ 2011/7/30 > One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates decide what > their approval cutoffs will be.on > behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting as proxies. > One of the many novel features > is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the candidates > make them sequentially with > full knowledge of the decisions of the candidates preceding them in the > sequence. > > I wonder if anybody has ever tried a DSV (designated strategy voting) > method based on these ideas. > > Here's one way it could go: > > Voters submit range ballots. > > Factions are amalgamated via weighted averages, so that each candidate ends > up with one faction that > counts according to its total weight. For large electorates, these faction > scores will almost surely yield > complete rankings of the candidates. > > From this point on, only these rankings will be used. The ratings were > only needed for the purpose of > amalgamating the factions. If we had started with rankings, we could have > converted them to ratings via > the method of my recent post under the subject "Borda Done Right." In > either case, once we have the > rankings from the amalgamated factions we proceed as follows: > > Based on these rankings the DSC (descending solid coalitions) winner D is > found. The D faction ranking > determines the sequential order of play. When it is candidate X's turn in > the order of play, X's approval > cutoff decision is made automatically as follows: > > For each of the possible cutoffs, the winner is determined recursively (by > running through the rest of the > DSV tentatively). The cutoff that yields the best (i.e. highest ranked) > candidate according to X's faction's > ranking, is the cutoff that is applied to X's faction. > > After all of the cutoffs have been applied, the approval winner (based on > those cutoffs) is elected. > > It would be too good to be true if this method turned out to be monotone. > For that to be true moving up > one position in the sequence of play could not hurt the winner. Although I > think that this is probably > usually true, I don't think that it is always true. Anybody know any > different? > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA
Perhaps I should start by asking you to explain amalgamation. I have an idea of what you mean, but you didn't explain it in the initial post of this thread, and I don't want to write a detailed analysis based on a possibly-wrong supposition. JQ 2011/7/31 > Jameson, > > for my benefit could you elaborate on what you mean by hijacking strategy, > especially in the context of > amalgamation of factions. > > Is ordinary Range susceptible to hijacking? If not, then neither is > amalgamation of factions per se, since > Range scores are identical with or without amalgamation of factions. > > Forest > > - Original Message - > From: Jameson Quinn > Date: Saturday, July 30, 2011 4:35 pm > Subject: Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA > To: fsimm...@pcc.edu > Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > > 2011/7/30 > > > > > One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates > > decide what > > > their approval cutoffs will be.on > > > behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting > > as proxies. > > > One of the many novel features > > > is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the > > candidates> make them sequentially with > > > full knowledge of the decisions of the candidates preceding > > them in the > > > sequence. > > > > > > I wonder if anybody has ever tried a DSV (designated strategy > > voting)> method based on these ideas. > > > > > > Here's one way it could go: > > > > > > Voters submit range ballots. > > > > > > Factions are amalgamated via weighted averages, so that each > > candidate ends > > > up with one faction that > > > counts according to its total weight. For large electorates, > > these faction > > > scores will almost surely yield > > > complete rankings of the candidates. > > > > > > From this point on, only these rankings will be used. The > > ratings were > > > only needed for the purpose of > > > amalgamating the factions. If we had started with rankings, > > we could have > > > converted them to ratings via > > > the method of my recent post under the subject "Borda Done > > Right." In > > > either case, once we have the > > > rankings from the amalgamated factions we proceed as follows: > > > > > > Based on these rankings the DSC (descending solid coalitions) > > winner D is > > > found. The D faction ranking > > > determines the sequential order of play. When it is candidate > > X's turn in > > > the order of play, X's approval > > > cutoff decision is made automatically as follows: > > > > > > For each of the possible cutoffs, the winner is determined > > recursively (by > > > running through the rest of the > > > DSV tentatively). The cutoff that yields the best (i.e. > > highest ranked) > > > candidate according to X's faction's > > > ranking, is the cutoff that is applied to X's faction. > > > > > > After all of the cutoffs have been applied, the approval > > winner (based on > > > those cutoffs) is elected. > > > > > > It would be too good to be true if this method turned out to > > be monotone. > > > For that to be true moving up > > > one position in the sequence of play could not hurt the > > winner. Although I > > > think that this is probably > > > usually true, I don't think that it is always true. Anybody > > know any > > > different? > > > > > > > > > I'm pretty certain that even if a method like this could be > > monotone, the > > amalgamation in the first step breaks it, because of a > > "candidate hijacking" > > strategy. > > > > I have no opinion if some other way to do this step would give > > monotonicity.I'd like to think so, but I wouldn't bet on it. > > > > JQ > > > > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > > for list info > > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA
Jameson, for my benefit could you elaborate on what you mean by hijacking strategy, especially in the context of amalgamation of factions. Is ordinary Range susceptible to hijacking? If not, then neither is amalgamation of factions per se, since Range scores are identical with or without amalgamation of factions. Forest - Original Message - From: Jameson Quinn Date: Saturday, July 30, 2011 4:35 pm Subject: Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA To: fsimm...@pcc.edu Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > 2011/7/30 > > > One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates > decide what > > their approval cutoffs will be.on > > behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting > as proxies. > > One of the many novel features > > is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the > candidates> make them sequentially with > > full knowledge of the decisions of the candidates preceding > them in the > > sequence. > > > > I wonder if anybody has ever tried a DSV (designated strategy > voting)> method based on these ideas. > > > > Here's one way it could go: > > > > Voters submit range ballots. > > > > Factions are amalgamated via weighted averages, so that each > candidate ends > > up with one faction that > > counts according to its total weight. For large electorates, > these faction > > scores will almost surely yield > > complete rankings of the candidates. > > > > From this point on, only these rankings will be used. The > ratings were > > only needed for the purpose of > > amalgamating the factions. If we had started with rankings, > we could have > > converted them to ratings via > > the method of my recent post under the subject "Borda Done > Right." In > > either case, once we have the > > rankings from the amalgamated factions we proceed as follows: > > > > Based on these rankings the DSC (descending solid coalitions) > winner D is > > found. The D faction ranking > > determines the sequential order of play. When it is candidate > X's turn in > > the order of play, X's approval > > cutoff decision is made automatically as follows: > > > > For each of the possible cutoffs, the winner is determined > recursively (by > > running through the rest of the > > DSV tentatively). The cutoff that yields the best (i.e. > highest ranked) > > candidate according to X's faction's > > ranking, is the cutoff that is applied to X's faction. > > > > After all of the cutoffs have been applied, the approval > winner (based on > > those cutoffs) is elected. > > > > It would be too good to be true if this method turned out to > be monotone. > > For that to be true moving up > > one position in the sequence of play could not hurt the > winner. Although I > > think that this is probably > > usually true, I don't think that it is always true. Anybody > know any > > different? > > > > > I'm pretty certain that even if a method like this could be > monotone, the > amalgamation in the first step breaks it, because of a > "candidate hijacking" > strategy. > > I have no opinion if some other way to do this step would give > monotonicity.I'd like to think so, but I wouldn't bet on it. > > JQ > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA
2011/7/30 > One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates decide what > their approval cutoffs will be.on > behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting as proxies. > One of the many novel features > is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the candidates > make them sequentially with > full knowledge of the decisions of the candidates preceding them in the > sequence. > > I wonder if anybody has ever tried a DSV (designated strategy voting) > method based on these ideas. > > Here's one way it could go: > > Voters submit range ballots. > > Factions are amalgamated via weighted averages, so that each candidate ends > up with one faction that > counts according to its total weight. For large electorates, these faction > scores will almost surely yield > complete rankings of the candidates. > > From this point on, only these rankings will be used. The ratings were > only needed for the purpose of > amalgamating the factions. If we had started with rankings, we could have > converted them to ratings via > the method of my recent post under the subject "Borda Done Right." In > either case, once we have the > rankings from the amalgamated factions we proceed as follows: > > Based on these rankings the DSC (descending solid coalitions) winner D is > found. The D faction ranking > determines the sequential order of play. When it is candidate X's turn in > the order of play, X's approval > cutoff decision is made automatically as follows: > > For each of the possible cutoffs, the winner is determined recursively (by > running through the rest of the > DSV tentatively). The cutoff that yields the best (i.e. highest ranked) > candidate according to X's faction's > ranking, is the cutoff that is applied to X's faction. > > After all of the cutoffs have been applied, the approval winner (based on > those cutoffs) is elected. > > It would be too good to be true if this method turned out to be monotone. > For that to be true moving up > one position in the sequence of play could not hurt the winner. Although I > think that this is probably > usually true, I don't think that it is always true. Anybody know any > different? > I'm pretty certain that even if a method like this could be monotone, the amalgamation in the first step breaks it, because of a "candidate hijacking" strategy. I have no opinion if some other way to do this step would give monotonicity. I'd like to think so, but I wouldn't bet on it. JQ > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA
One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates decide what their approval cutoffs will be.on behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting as proxies. One of the many novel features is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the candidates make them sequentially with full knowledge of the decisions of the candidates preceding them in the sequence. I wonder if anybody has ever tried a DSV (designated strategy voting) method based on these ideas. Here's one way it could go: Voters submit range ballots. Factions are amalgamated via weighted averages, so that each candidate ends up with one faction that counts according to its total weight. For large electorates, these faction scores will almost surely yield complete rankings of the candidates. >From this point on, only these rankings will be used. The ratings were only >needed for the purpose of amalgamating the factions. If we had started with rankings, we could have converted them to ratings via the method of my recent post under the subject "Borda Done Right." In either case, once we have the rankings from the amalgamated factions we proceed as follows: Based on these rankings the DSC (descending solid coalitions) winner D is found. The D faction ranking determines the sequential order of play. When it is candidate X's turn in the order of play, X's approval cutoff decision is made automatically as follows: For each of the possible cutoffs, the winner is determined recursively (by running through the rest of the DSV tentatively). The cutoff that yields the best (i.e. highest ranked) candidate according to X's faction's ranking, is the cutoff that is applied to X's faction. After all of the cutoffs have been applied, the approval winner (based on those cutoffs) is elected. It would be too good to be true if this method turned out to be monotone. For that to be true moving up one position in the sequence of play could not hurt the winner. Although I think that this is probably usually true, I don't think that it is always true. Anybody know any different? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
