[EM] Chris: Regarding the criteriion failures you mentioned for MMT
Mike, In an earlier message of yours (the last one I responded to) you wrote: MAMT is an addition to the list of FBC/ABE methods to choose from. People should be looking into its properties. Tell me what you know, so far, about its properties, ... That is almost the only thing I did. You didn't ask me to confine myself to properties that I personally think are *important* or to explain why I think they are important. You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that coalition does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest. How is that a failure?? I assume you know what the criterion specifies and are asking me why meeting Later-no-Help is a good thing. Failing LNHelp while meeting LHHarm creates a random-fill incentive. One of the problems with that is that is unfair to sincere truncators. Why should they be penalised for declining to play silly games with candidates they don't care about? Another is that all methods that fail LNHelp are vulnerable to Burial strategy. You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd: I don't know what that criterion is. It is a weakened version of Smith that is compatible with LNHelp compliance (and so Burial Invulnerability) and also compliance with LNHarm. It says that that if there is a subset S of candidates that on more than a third of the ballots are voted strictly above all the outside-S candidates and all the S candidates pairwise-beat all the outside-S candidates then the winner must come from S. From your recent past statements I know I don't have to sell the desirability of compliance with this to you. I gave this example: 49: A 48: B 03: CB I can't take seriously any method that doesn't elect B here. Can you? Isn't this just the sort of small (probably wing) spoiler scenario that motivates many to support electoral reform? You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump: I've already commented on that a few times. Yes, and I obliquely responded to your comment. But to be blunt, if failure of Mono-add-Plump isn't self-evidently *completely ridiculous* (and so much so that anything not compatible with Mono-add-Plump compliance is thereby made a complete nonsense of), then I have no idea what is. The only way this view of mine could be dented (and I made a bit wiser and sadder) is if it was proved to me that compliance with Mono-add-Plump isn't compatible with some other clearly desirable (IMO) property or set of properties. This doesn't come anywhere near cutting it: Your favorite initially won only because of mutual majority support. The plumpers declined that mutual support, as is their right. Having declined mutual support, should it be surprising or unfair if they no longer have it? Is it surprising or unfair that some new voters should in effect have their ballots given negative weight because they refused to play silly games with some candidates they weren't interested in and maybe knew nothing about? Err*yes*. As Jameson said, the chicken dilemma, also called the co-operation/defection problem, or the ABE problem, is the most difficult strategy problem to get rid of. However, there are a number of methods that do get rid of it, while complying with FBC and furnishing majority-rule protection: You (Chris) proposed one some time ago. Does it meet the criteria that you require, in addition to FBC and avoidance of the co-operation/defection problem? Can it be worded in a brief and simple, and naturally and obviously motivated way, for public propsal? I've been distracted and thinking about other things. I'll get around to addressing those questions, along with my closer look at Forest's MMMPO method. Chris Benham Mike Ossipoff wrote (15 Dec 2011): Chris: You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump: I've already commented on that a few times. You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion: But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC. You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd: I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any case, to say that a failure of it is important, you'd have to justify the criterion in terms of something of (preferably) practical importance. You said that MMT fails Minimal Defense: Plurality meets Minimal Defense. So my answer will refer to the universally-applicable counterpart to Minimal Defense: 1CM. Of course MMT fails 1CM. MMT doesn't recognize one-sided coalitions. Rather than being an accidental failure, that is the point of MMT. To justify using 1CM against MMT, you'd need to tell why it's necessary to recognize one-sided coalitions. You'd need to justify it other than in terms of a criterion requiring that recognition. You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, mutually-supported, majority coalition.
[EM] Chris: Regarding the criteriion failures you mentioned for MMT
Chris: You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump: I've already commented on that a few times. You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion: But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC. You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd: I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any case, to say that a failure of it is important, you'd have to justify the criterion in terms of something of (preferably) practical importance. You said that MMT fails Minimal Defense: Plurality meets Minimal Defense. So my answer will refer to the universally-applicable counterpart to Minimal Defense: 1CM. Of course MMT fails 1CM. MMT doesn't recognize one-sided coalitions. Rather than being an accidental failure, that is the point of MMT. To justify using 1CM against MMT, you'd need to tell why it's necessary to recognize one-sided coalitions. You'd need to justify it other than in terms of a criterion requiring that recognition. You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that coalition does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest. How is that a failure?? In summary, you're citing those criteria as if their compliance is necessary, for its own sake. But when you do that, you need to say _why_ their compliance is necessary for its own sake. For one thing, that depends on what we want. If we choose MMT, we don't want one-sided support within a majority set of factions to be counted, when that would mean You help, you lose. Of course you could say that you don't want to avoid the cooperation/defection problem, and then tell why. As Jameson said in August, the chicken dilemma, also called the co-operation/defection problem, or the ABE problem, is the most difficult strategy problem to get rid of. However, there are a number of methods that do get rid of it, while complying with FBC and furnishing majority-rule protection: SODA, and several non-delegating methods: MMT, MTAOC, MMPO, MDDTR, and maybe a few others. Forest has just proposed one today, and so I haven't yet had the opportunity to study it. You (Chris) proposed one some time ago. Does it meet the criteria that you require, in addition to FBC and avoidance of the co-operation/defection problem? Can it be worded in a brief and simple, and naturally and obviously motivated way, for public propsal? We often cite criteria here. But, to a member of the public who looks here to evaluate a method proposed in hir jurisdiction, that will be a confusing jumble of mutually-contradictory requirements. That's why it's important that we also discuss _why_ we claim that a particular criterion is important. For instance, I've told why FBC is essential in the U.S. And I've told why it's important to avoid the co-operation/defection problem. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Chris: Regarding the criteriion failures you mentioned for MMT
Chris: You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump: I've already commented on that a few times. You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion: But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC. You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd: I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any case, to say that a failure of it is important, you'd have to justify the criterion in terms of something of (preferably) practical importance. You said that MMT fails Minimal Defense: Plurality meets Minimal Defense. So my answer will refer to the universally-applicable counterpart to Minimal Defense: 1CM. Of course MMT fails 1CM. MMT doesn't recognize one-sided coalitions. Rather than being an accidental failure, that is the point of MMT. To justify using 1CM against MMT, you'd need to tell why it's necessary to recognize one-sided coalitions. You'd need to justify it other than in terms of a criterion requiring that recognition. You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that coalition does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest. How is that a failure?? In summary, you're citing those criteria as if their compliance is necessary, for its own sake. But when you do that, you need to say _why_ their compliance is necessary for its own sake. For one thing, that depends on what we want. If we choose MMT, we don't want one-sided support within a majority set of factions to be counted, when that would mean You help, you lose. Of course you could say that you don't want to avoid the cooperation/defection problem, and then tell why. As Jameson said in August, the chicken dilemma, also called the co-operation/defection problem, or the ABE problem, is the most difficult strategy problem to get rid of. However, there are a number of methods that do get rid of it, while complying with FBC and furnishing majority-rule protection: SODA, and several non-delegating methods: MMT, MTAOC, MMPO, MDDTR, and maybe a few others. Forest has just proposed one today, and so I haven't yet had the opportunity to study it. You (Chris) proposed one some time ago. Does it meet the criteria that you require, in addition to FBC and avoidance of the co-operation/defection problem? Can it be worded in a brief and simple, and naturally and obviously motivated way, for public propsal? We often cite criteria here. But, to a member of the public who looks here to evaluate a method proposed in hir jurisdiction, that will be a confusing jumble of mutually-contradictory requirements. That's why it's important that we also discuss _why_ we claim that a particular criterion is important. For instance, I've told why FBC is essential in the U.S. And I've told why it's important to avoid the co-operation/defection problem. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Chris: Regarding the criteriion failures you mentioned for MMT
Chris: You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump: I've already commented on that a few times. You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion: But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC. You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd: I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any case, to say that a failure of it is important, you'd have to justify the criterion in terms of something of (preferably) practical importance. You said that MMT fails Minimal Defense: Plurality meets Minimal Defense. So my answer will refer to the universally-applicable counterpart to Minimal Defense: 1CM. Of course MMT fails 1CM. MMT doesn't recognize one-sided coalitions. Rather than being an accidental failure, that is the point of MMT. To justify using 1CM against MMT, you'd need to tell why it's necessary to recognize one-sided coalitions. You'd need to justify it other than in terms of a criterion requiring that recognition. You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that coalition does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest. How is that a failure?? In summary, you're citing those criteria as if their compliance is necessary, for its own sake. But when you do that, you need to say _why_ their compliance is necessary for its own sake. For one thing, that depends on what we want. If we choose MMT, we don't want one-sided support within a majority set of factions to be counted, when that would mean You help, you lose. Of course you could say that you don't want to avoid the cooperation/defection problem, and then tell why. As Jameson said, the chicken dilemma, also called the co-operation/defection problem, or the ABE problem, is the most difficult strategy problem to get rid of. However, there are a number of methods that do get rid of it, while complying with FBC and furnishing majority-rule protection: SODA, and several non-delegating methods: MMT, MTAOC, MMPO, MDDTR, and maybe a few others. Forest has just proposed one today, and so I haven't yet had the opportunity to study it. You (Chris) proposed one some time ago. Does it meet the criteria that you require, in addition to FBC and avoidance of the co-operation/defection problem? Can it be worded in a brief and simple, and naturally and obviously motivated way, for public propsal? We often cite criteria here. But, to a member of the public who looks here to evaluate a method proposed in hir jurisdiction, that will be a confusing jumble of mutually-contradictory requirements. That's why it's important that we also discuss _why_ we claim that a particular criterion is important. For instance, I've told why FBC is essential in the U.S. And I've told why it's important to avoid the co-operation/defection problem. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info