Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Dear Kristofer Munsterhjelm, you wrote (19 Jan 2009): > So voters prefer MAM winners to Beatpath winners > more often than vice versa. What method is the > best in that respect? Copeland methods are the best methods in this respect. The fact, that the ranked pairs winner usually pairwise beats the Schulze winner in random simulations, is a direct consequence of the facts, that the Schulze winner is usually identical to the MinMax winner and that the MinMax winner usually has a very low Copeland score (compared to the winners of other Condorcet methods). Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Steve Eppley wrote: Hi, On 1/18/2009 10:52 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote: Your promotion of IRV discourages for, while its ballots would be valid Condorcet ballots, its way of counting sometimes fails to award the deserved winner (even when there is no cycle making the problem more complex). I do not promote IRV. IRV+Withdrawal is not IRV. The withdrawal option allows candidates to correct for IRV's tendency to undermine centrist compromise. Candidates would have the incentive to withdraw because they and their supporters would prefer centrist compromises over "greater evils." See the example below. That the indicated winner could withdraw does not really help, for that candidate does not necessarily know whether IRV has erred. I don't see why Dave wrote about the "indicated winner" withdrawing. The point of withdrawal is to allow *spoilers* to withdraw after the votes are cast. Also, it would quickly become clear whether IRV has "erred." The votes would be published soon after the election day polls close. Then the candidates would be given days after the votes are published to decide whether to withdraw. During that period of time, the candidates (and other interested people) can download the published votes and privately tally who will win if no one withdraws and who will win if they and/or other candidates do withdraw. Could this lead to informal coalitions? Say that IRV (deservedly) elects a right-of-center candidate. Could all the left-of-center candidates determine who's most suited among them and thus all but that one withdraw to cause the result to go either to that candidate, or at least to a candidate closer to the left? I suppose a counter to that would be that withdrawal can only correct unfair vote-splitting, and inasfar as IRV is cloneproof, it shouldn't make a difference when the initial result was "fair" in the first place. I'm not sure, though. Is it possible? Therefore I still wait to hear from others as to whether MAM deserves backing, though it properly handled your simple cycle example. MAM satisfies all the desirable criteria satisfied by Beatpath Winner (aka Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping--CSSD for short--aka Schulze's method). It also satisfies some criteria that Beatpath Winner fails: Immunity from Majority Complaints (IMC, which is satisfied only by MAM), Immunity from 2nd-Place Complaints (I2C) and Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (LIIA). Furthermore, simulations by several people have shown that over the long run, more voters rank MAM winners over Beatpath winners than vice versa, and a majority rank the MAM winner over the Beatpath winner more frequently than a majority rank the Beatpath winner over the MAM winner. (Those simulations suggest MAM comes a little closer than Beatpath Winner to satisfying Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives criterion.) See www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley for more information about MAM and criteria it satisfies or fails. So voters prefer MAM winners to Beatpath winners more often than vice versa. What method is the best in that respect? If it is Kemeny, then perhaps even more Kemeny-like methods (like Short Ranked Pairs) would be even better. They're more complex, though. Also, to my knowledge, River passes Independence of Pareto-Dominated Alternatives while MAM does not. Is River better than MAM? As far as I can tell, the reason some groups have adopted Beatpath Winner rather than MAM is because there used to be a website co-written by Mike Ossipoff in which he claimed it will be easier to explain CSSD than MAM. (Mike used the name Ranked Pairs instead of MAM, but he definitely meant MAM, not the pairwise margins-based voting method that Nicolaus Tideman invented and named Ranked Pairs in 1987/1989.) Mike based his conclusion on a few personal anecdotes, which I think can be attributed to his own greater familiarity with the Schwartz set that made him more comfortable explaining in terms of subsets of candidates. (I could forward emails from Mike where he acknowledges MAM is at least as good as Beatpath Winner.) As my previous message about the ease of explaining MAM illustrated, Mike was mistaken about which is easier to explain. Judge for yourselves. From a computational and recursive point of view, Schulze (by the Beatpath heuristic) might be simpler to describe than MAM or its variants, but in general I agree, since most people don't have that point of view. Rephrasing from condorcet.org (which seems to be down), you'd have a computational definition like this: If X either beats or ties Y pairwise, then X has a path to Y of strength equal to the number of voters ranking X over Y. If X has a path to Y of strength a, and Y has a path to Z of strength n, then X has a path to Z equal to the minimum of a and b (that's the kinda-recursion). Of all the paths from X to Y, if the path of greatest strength from X to Y i
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Hallo, Steve Eppley wrote (18 Jan 2009): > I haven't confirmed the results in the articles > by Jobst and Norm cited by Markus, but clearly > he has misrepresented their results, since Minmax > (aka Simpson-Kramer) was not one of the methods > they simulated in those articles. They simulated > Smith//Minmax, which is a different method that > does NOT minimize the number of voters who prefer > a different winner. When the MinMax method chooses a candidate from outside the Smith set, then the winners of both methods, the Schulze method and the ranked pairs method, differ from the winner of the MinMax method. Therefore, such instances have no impact on the result of Norman Petry's simulations. Steve Eppley wrote (18 Jan 2009): > Markus also erred when he wrote that Minmax and > Beatpath Winner always pick the same winner when > there are 4 candidates. Recall the classic example > that shows Minmax fails clone independence is a > 4 candidate scenario. In that scenario, Minmax > elects the candidate outside the top cycle because > the 3 candidates in the top cycle are in a "vicious" > cycle of large majorities. Beatpath Winner elects > within the top cycle (as does MAM). I didn't write that the MinMax method and the Schulze method always pick the same candidate. I only wrote that, in all of Heitzig's instances, the MinMax method and the Schulze method chose the same candidate (Jobst Heitzig: "Beatpath and Plain Condorcet are unanimous in all these examples!") while, in 96 instances, the ranked pairs method chose a different candidate. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Hi,
I haven't confirmed the results in the articles by Jobst and Norm cited
by Markus, but clearly he has misrepresented their results, since Minmax
(aka Simpson-Kramer) was not one of the methods they simulated in those
articles. They simulated Smith//Minmax, which is a different method
that does NOT minimize the number of voters who prefer a different winner.
Markus also erred when he wrote that Minmax and Beatpath Winner always
pick the same winner when there are 4 candidates. Recall the classic
example that shows Minmax fails clone independence is a 4 candidate
scenario. In that scenario, Minmax elects the candidate outside the top
cycle because the 3 candidates in the top cycle are in a "vicious" cycle
of large majorities. Beatpath Winner elects within the top cycle (as
does MAM).
Minmax's best feature, I think, is its simplicity. Minmax+Withdrawal
would be a fine method, since any of the candidates in the vicious cycle
could withdraw to defeat the candidate outside the top cycle, and at
least one of them would be pressured to do so.
I don't see any validity in Markus' argument that Beatpath Winner is
better than MAM because BeatpathWinner elects the Smith//Minmax winner
more often than MAM does. Simulations support the conclusion that MAM
is better than both: More voters rank MAM winners over Beatpath winners
than vice versa, and more voters rank MAM winners over Smith//Minmax
winners than vice versa. Norm was one of the people whose simulations
corroborated these results.
By the way, http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf didn't load
properly for me using either Firefox or Internet Explorer. It quickly
crashed Firefox and displayed nothing in IE.
Regards,
Steve
On 1/18/2009 1:18 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
Steve Eppley wrote (18 Jan 2009)
MAM satisfies all the desirable criteria satisfied
by Beatpath Winner (aka Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential
Dropping--CSSD for short--aka Schulze's method).
Many people consider the Simpson-Kramer MinMax method
to be the best single-winner election method because it
minimizes the number of overruled voters. The winner of
the Schulze method is almost always identical to the
winner of the MinMax method, while the winner of the
ranked pairs method differs needlessly frequently from
the winner of the MinMax method.
For example, Norman Petry made some simulations and
observed that the number of situations, where the
Schulze method and the MinMax method chose the same
candidate and the ranked pairs method chose a different
candidate, exceeded the number of situations, where the
ranked pairs method and the MinMax method chose the same
candidate and the Schulze method chose a different
candidate, by a factor of 100:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-November/004540.html
Jobst Heitzig made a thorough investigation of the
4-candidate case. In no situation, the Schulze method
and the MinMax method chose different candidates.
("Beatpath and Plain Condorcet are unanimous in all
these examples!") But in 96 situations, the ranked
pairs method and the MinMax method chose different
candidates:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-May/012801.html
There are even situations where the winner of the
ranked pairs method differs from the winner of the
MinMax winner without any plausible reason. See
section 9 of my paper:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Hallo, the links to Norman Petry's and Jobst Heitzig's mail have changed. Norman Petry's mail is now here: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-November/004541.html Jobst Heitzig's mail is now here: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-May/012838.html Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Hallo,
Steve Eppley wrote (18 Jan 2009):
> MAM satisfies all the desirable criteria satisfied
> by Beatpath Winner (aka Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential
> Dropping--CSSD for short--aka Schulze's method).
Many people consider the Simpson-Kramer MinMax method
to be the best single-winner election method because it
minimizes the number of overruled voters. The winner of
the Schulze method is almost always identical to the
winner of the MinMax method, while the winner of the
ranked pairs method differs needlessly frequently from
the winner of the MinMax method.
For example, Norman Petry made some simulations and
observed that the number of situations, where the
Schulze method and the MinMax method chose the same
candidate and the ranked pairs method chose a different
candidate, exceeded the number of situations, where the
ranked pairs method and the MinMax method chose the same
candidate and the Schulze method chose a different
candidate, by a factor of 100:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-November/004540.html
Jobst Heitzig made a thorough investigation of the
4-candidate case. In no situation, the Schulze method
and the MinMax method chose different candidates.
("Beatpath and Plain Condorcet are unanimous in all
these examples!") But in 96 situations, the ranked
pairs method and the MinMax method chose different
candidates:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-May/012801.html
There are even situations where the winner of the
ranked pairs method differs from the winner of the
MinMax winner without any plausible reason. See
section 9 of my paper:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Hi, On 1/18/2009 10:52 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote: Your promotion of IRV discourages for, while its ballots would be valid Condorcet ballots, its way of counting sometimes fails to award the deserved winner (even when there is no cycle making the problem more complex). I do not promote IRV. IRV+Withdrawal is not IRV. The withdrawal option allows candidates to correct for IRV's tendency to undermine centrist compromise. Candidates would have the incentive to withdraw because they and their supporters would prefer centrist compromises over "greater evils." See the example below. That the indicated winner could withdraw does not really help, for that candidate does not necessarily know whether IRV has erred. I don't see why Dave wrote about the "indicated winner" withdrawing. The point of withdrawal is to allow *spoilers* to withdraw after the votes are cast. Also, it would quickly become clear whether IRV has "erred." The votes would be published soon after the election day polls close. Then the candidates would be given days after the votes are published to decide whether to withdraw. During that period of time, the candidates (and other interested people) can download the published votes and privately tally who will win if no one withdraws and who will win if they and/or other candidates do withdraw. Here's an example to illustrate. Suppose there are 3 candidates: Left, Center and Right. Suppose the voters vote as follows: 40% 5% 10% 45% LeftCenter Center Right Center LeftRight Center Right Right LeftLeft When the votes are published, everyone can see that IRV will elect Right if no one withdraws, and will elect Center if Left withdraws. Since Left and Left's supporters prefer Center over Right, Left has a strong incentive to withdraw, electing the Condorcet winner. Left is not the "indicated winner." The only way Left could win is if both Center and Right withdraw or do not run, which would be crazy. Left is just a spoiler. If Left didn't compete, Center would win outright with 55% of the votes (neglecting the effect of possible changes in voter turnout). Therefore I still wait to hear from others as to whether MAM deserves backing, though it properly handled your simple cycle example. MAM satisfies all the desirable criteria satisfied by Beatpath Winner (aka Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping--CSSD for short--aka Schulze's method). It also satisfies some criteria that Beatpath Winner fails: Immunity from Majority Complaints (IMC, which is satisfied only by MAM), Immunity from 2nd-Place Complaints (I2C) and Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (LIIA). Furthermore, simulations by several people have shown that over the long run, more voters rank MAM winners over Beatpath winners than vice versa, and a majority rank the MAM winner over the Beatpath winner more frequently than a majority rank the Beatpath winner over the MAM winner. (Those simulations suggest MAM comes a little closer than Beatpath Winner to satisfying Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives criterion.) See www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley for more information about MAM and criteria it satisfies or fails. An alternate description of MAM is to find the order of finish that minimizes the size of the largest "thwarted" majority, where a thwarted majority is defined as a majority who ranked x over y when the order of finish does not rank x over y. It's been proved that the 2 different descriptions of MAM are equivalent. I'm mentioning this alternate description just in case there are some people who will find it easier to understand. I prefer describing MAM in terms of constructing the order of finish a piece at a time by considering the majorities one at a time from largest to smallest, since I think more people will understand it and that's how MAM is actually implemented in software. (It's computationally much quicker than finding the best order of finish by comparing all possible orders of finish.) As far as I can tell, the reason some groups have adopted Beatpath Winner rather than MAM is because there used to be a website co-written by Mike Ossipoff in which he claimed it will be easier to explain CSSD than MAM. (Mike used the name Ranked Pairs instead of MAM, but he definitely meant MAM, not the pairwise margins-based voting method that Nicolaus Tideman invented and named Ranked Pairs in 1987/1989.) Mike based his conclusion on a few personal anecdotes, which I think can be attributed to his own greater familiarity with the Schwartz set that made him more comfortable explaining in terms of subsets of candidates. (I could forward emails from Mike where he acknowledges MAM is at least as good as Beatpath Winner.) As my previous message about the ease of explaining MAM illustrated, Mike was mistaken about which is easier to
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Your promotion of IRV discourages for, while its ballots would be valid Condorcet ballots, its way of counting sometimes fails to award the deserved winner (even when there is no cycle making the problem more complex). That the indicated winner could withdraw does not really help, for that candidate does not necessarily know whether IRV has erred. Therefore I still wait to hear from others as to whether MAM deserves backing, though it properly handled your simple cycle example. DWK On Sat, 17 Jan 2009 19:40:35 -0800 Steve Eppley wrote: > Hi, > > [I'm not subscribed to rangevot...@yahoogroups.com, so I won't see > replies posted only there.] > > On 1/9/09 Dave Ketchum wrote: > >> Extended now to EM - I should have started this in both. >> On Fri, 09 Jan 2009 15:40:58 - Bruce R. Gilson wrote: >> >>> --- In rangevot...@yahoogroups.com, Dave Ketchum wrote: >>> We need to sort thru the possibilities of going with Condorcet. I claim: Method must be open - starting with the N*N matrix being available to anyone who wants to check and review in detail. If the matrix shows a CW, that CW better get to win. Cycle resolution also better be simple to do. We need to debate what we document and do here such as basing our work on margins or vote counts. >>> >>> >>> Yes. My biggest gripe with Condorcet is that cycle resolution in many >>> systems is so complex that it does not seem that a typical voter (as >>> opposed to people like us who are personally interested in electoral >>> systems) could understand what is being done. >> > -snip- > > I think there's no need to gripe or fret. Resolving cycles doesn't need > to be complex. Here are 2 solutions. > > 1) The "Maximize Affirmed Majorities" voting method (MAM) is an > excellent Condorcet method and is very natural. Here's a simple way to > explain how it works and why: > > The basis of the majority rule principle is that the more people there > are who think candidate A is better than candidate B, the more likely > it is that A will be better than B for society. (Regardless of whether > they think A is best.) > > Since majorities can conflict like "rock paper scissors" (as shown > in the > example that follows) the majority rule principle suggests such > conflicts > should be resolved in favor of the larger majorities. > > Example: Suppose there are 3 candidates: Rock, Paper and Scissors. > Suppose there are 9 voters, who each rank the candidates from best > to worst (top to bottom): > > 432 > Rock Scissors Paper > Scissors PaperRock > PaperRock Scissors > > 7 voters (a majority) rank Scissors over Paper. > 6 voters (a majority) rank Rock over Scissors. > 5 voters (a majority) rank Paper over Rock. > > By paying attention first to the larger majorities--Scissors over > Paper, > then Rock over Scissors--we establish that Scissors finishes over Paper > and then that Rock finishes over Scissors: > > Rock > Scissors > Paper > > It can be seen at a glance that Rock also finishes over Paper. > The smaller majority who rank Paper over Rock are outweighed. > > Since Rock finishes over both Scissors and Paper, we elect Rock. > > I think that's not too complex. (How did anyone reach the dubious > conclusion that beatpaths or clone-proof Schwarz sequential dropping > will be easier than MAM to explain?) I think the only operational > concept that will take work to explain is that there is more than one > majority when there are more than two alternatives. (Analogous to a > round robin tournament, common to all Condorcet methods, and not really > hard to explain.) Most people already know what an order of finish is, > and I think most people are familiar enough with orderings that they > will recognize the transitive property of orderings when it's presented > visually. > > Jargon terms such as "Condorcet winner," "beats pairwise" and "winning > votes" are unnecessary. Their use may interfere with moving ahead. > > Top-to-bottom orderings are more intuitive than the left-to-right > orientation many other writers use in their examples. Two common > meanings of "top" are "best" and "favorite." Two common meanings of > "bottom" are "worst" and "least favored." In those contexts, "over" > means "better" or "more preferred." Left-to-right offers no such > friendly connotations (except to the "leftist" minority, and the > opposite to the "rightist" minority). Left-to-right becomes even worse > when symbols like the "greater than" sign (>) are used, since a lot of > people are repelled by math symbols. Left-to-right rankings may > interfere with moving ahead. > > 2) One could promote the variation of Instant Runoff (IRV) that allows > candidates to withdraw from contenti
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Hi, [I'm not subscribed to rangevot...@yahoogroups.com, so I won't see replies posted only there.] On 1/9/09 Dave Ketchum wrote: Extended now to EM - I should have started this in both. On Fri, 09 Jan 2009 15:40:58 - Bruce R. Gilson wrote: --- In rangevot...@yahoogroups.com, Dave Ketchum wrote: We need to sort thru the possibilities of going with Condorcet. I claim: Method must be open - starting with the N*N matrix being available to anyone who wants to check and review in detail. If the matrix shows a CW, that CW better get to win. Cycle resolution also better be simple to do. We need to debate what we document and do here such as basing our work on margins or vote counts. Yes. My biggest gripe with Condorcet is that cycle resolution in many systems is so complex that it does not seem that a typical voter (as opposed to people like us who are personally interested in electoral systems) could understand what is being done. -snip- I think there's no need to gripe or fret. Resolving cycles doesn't need to be complex. Here are 2 solutions. 1) The "Maximize Affirmed Majorities" voting method (MAM) is an excellent Condorcet method and is very natural. Here's a simple way to explain how it works and why: The basis of the majority rule principle is that the more people there are who think candidate A is better than candidate B, the more likely it is that A will be better than B for society. (Regardless of whether they think A is best.) Since majorities can conflict like "rock paper scissors" (as shown in the example that follows) the majority rule principle suggests such conflicts should be resolved in favor of the larger majorities. Example: Suppose there are 3 candidates: Rock, Paper and Scissors. Suppose there are 9 voters, who each rank the candidates from best to worst (top to bottom): *_4__3__2_ Rock Scissors Paper Scissors PaperRock PaperRock Scissors** * 7 voters (a majority) rank Scissors over Paper. 6 voters (a majority) rank Rock over Scissors. 5 voters (a majority) rank Paper over Rock. By paying attention first to the larger majorities--Scissors over Paper, then Rock over Scissors--we establish that Scissors finishes over Paper and then that Rock finishes over Scissors: *Rock Scissors Paper** * It can be seen at a glance that Rock also finishes over Paper. The smaller majority who rank Paper over Rock are outweighed. Since Rock finishes over both Scissors and Paper, we elect Rock. I think that's not too complex. (How did anyone reach the dubious conclusion that beatpaths or clone-proof Schwarz sequential dropping will be easier than MAM to explain?) I think the only operational concept that will take work to explain is that there is more than one majority when there are more than two alternatives. (Analogous to a round robin tournament, common to all Condorcet methods, and not really hard to explain.) Most people already know what an order of finish is, and I think most people are familiar enough with orderings that they will recognize the transitive property of orderings when it's presented visually. Jargon terms such as "Condorcet winner," "beats pairwise" and "winning votes" are unnecessary. Their use may interfere with moving ahead. Top-to-bottom orderings are more intuitive than the left-to-right orientation many other writers use in their examples. Two common meanings of "top" are "best" and "favorite." Two common meanings of "bottom" are "worst" and "least favored." In those contexts, "over" means "better" or "more preferred." Left-to-right offers no such friendly connotations (except to the "leftist" minority, and the opposite to the "rightist" minority). Left-to-right becomes even worse when symbols like the "greater than" sign (>) are used, since a lot of people are repelled by math symbols. Left-to-right rankings may interfere with moving ahead. 2) One could promote the variation of Instant Runoff (IRV) that allows candidates to withdraw from contention after the votes are published. (I'm not suggesting eliminating the secret ballot. The corresponding voters' identities would not be published.) The withdrawal option mitigates the spoiling problem of plain IRV. It reduces incentives for voters to misrepresent preferences (true also for Condorcet methods, but I think not true for Range Voting, Approval or Borda). I expect IRV+Withdrawal would exhibit a solid Condorcetian tendency to elect within the sincere top cycle, since supporters of spoilers would pressure them to withdraw when needed to defeat their "greater evil." Obviously, its promotion could leverage the efforts of the promoters of plain IRV. It can even be argued that IRV+Withdrawal satisfies the spirit
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
a range voting list? It started as such, but where do you draw a proper fence around the edges? Management of this list has been quite tolerant. I have this same thread on Election-methods, and this post will go to both. Range vs Condorcet? Range voters rate candidates, and difference in a voter's rating of two such shows strength of relative approval. Sum of all these rating differences shows strength of A>B or B>A. Condorcet voters rank each pair as A>B or B>A or (A=B if neither is ranked over the other). Count of rankings decides winner. I see each as having merit, but prefer Condorcet. I mentioned IRV in a side discussion where I was responding to a suggestion that Plurality would properly resolve Condorcet cycles. I offered IRV as better than Plurality for this purpose, WITHOUT agreeing that IRV would be good for this purpose. On Fri, 16 Jan 2009 14:50:05 -0500 (EST) Dale Sheldon wrote: On Fri, 16 Jan 2009, Dave Ketchum wrote: Condorcet/IRV would make a better pair since the voters would do the same ranking for both, and IRV would, usually, pick the CW when such exists. Just so we're clear, you mean: * Elect the Condorcet winner, if one exist. * If one does not exist, elect the IRV winner (presumably from among the set of leading candidates tied into the cycle, i.e., the Smith set). Anyway, trying for a better method (the proper goal) would start with ranked voting Apologies if this has been covered recently (I did just join the list earlier this week, and tried to read back a reasonable time frame, but I may have missed something vital), but what is your basis for this assumption? Why is range voting (I thought this was a range voting list :) being discarded out of hand? Probably not possible to find a uniquely best cycle resolution It is, infact, provably impossible. Huh? Certainly there are rejects and lemons, but what prevents having a best? -- da...@clarityconnect.compeople.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Extended now to EM - I should have started this in both. On Fri, 09 Jan 2009 15:40:58 - Bruce R. Gilson wrote: --- In rangevot...@yahoogroups.com, Dave Ketchum wrote: We need to sort thru the possibilities of going with Condorcet. I claim: Method must be open - starting with the N*N matrix being available to anyone who wants to check and review in detail. If the matrix shows a CW, that CW better get to win. Cycle resolution also better be simple to do. We need to debate what we document and do here such as basing our work on margins or vote counts. Yes. My biggest gripe with Condorcet is that cycle resolution in many systems is so complex that it does not seem that a typical voter (as opposed to people like us who are personally interested in electoral systems) could understand what is being done. Tossing a coin seems good for resolving true ties - and candidates involved should have right to verify such got done. BTW, fact that we are doing a tournament is worth bragging about. I am against runoffs. Plurality needs them because its voters cannot completely express their desires; Condorcet permits more complete stating of desires via ranking. I totally agree. Abd-el-Rahman Lomax quickly lost me with his incessant calls for runoffs, and even runoffs with write-ins permitted, so that an ordinary voter is going to have to come out and vote over and over again. Once is enough, I think. (Actually even so it's twice, as we would need primaries in any system, whether plurality or Condorcet.) Primaries are worth more thought: Parties preparing for Plurality elections desperately need something, such as primaries, to protect their backers from splitting their votes. Condorcet has no such need since voters are each allowed to vote for more than one of its candidates at the major election. Note that parties may have their own other reasons for doing primaries. -- da...@clarityconnect.compeople.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
