Re: [EM] Cubicle-society. Withdrawing Intermediate FBC-2.
Mike Ossipoff wrote in part: But here's something that many people seem to miss: Even when it isn't shown that a count is fraudulent, the count is still non-legitimate if it isn't vefifiable. A political system's use of a non-verifiable machine-count is ridiculous. Maybe it could be somehow possible for a machine-count to be verifiable. But, untiil then, a handcount is necessary. That's another disadvantage of rank-balloting voting systems--Most of them aren't feasibly hand-countable. (End partial quote) There are actually two aspects to verification: 1) were all votes cast COUNTED (this has been a big problem in my precinct in Mississippi) and 2) was the counting done correctly. There's technology available that could be applied that does not require hand counting of ranked ballots. I use a very weak version to conduct polls for a college football/basketball/baseball top 25 fans poll. The was the counting done correctly (2) bit just requires that all the ranked ballots that were counted be published. Once we have every ranked ballot published anybody who knows the counting method and has a programmatic implementation of it can use theirs to validate the official counting program's results since they have the same input. So validation only depends upon how available the ranked ballots are. A more subtle test of legitimacy is the Did they count my vote or not? question. (1) Here's what I would do to satisfy both objectives. For each voting-place (precinct) define a public key that is unique to that voting place. For instance 2^state-code times 3^county-code times 5^precinct number. (Credit to Godel for the for-instance - uniqueness is guaranteed by the fundamental theorem of algebra.) The machine that records the voter's ballot can generate a private key unique to every ballot cast at that location (it doesn't matter how that is generated as long as every ballot cast at that location has a unique identifier) and prints that on the voter's receipt that confirms the ballot was recorded. The published record includes every ranked ballot with so that the accuracy of the counting-by-whatever-method can be independently verified while protecting the anonymity of the voter. But any individual voter can find out which of their ballots is theirs by providing their private key and the components used to create the public key (i.e. I voted in this precinct in this county in this state) and if their ballot is either not provided with those keys or does not match the printed record of their ranked ballots then ANY voter would be able to declare the election fraudulent. I guess there's a third angle to verifiability, namely that a vote was counted under my voter ID should match my ballot. This is actually the most important to me as a voter. If a vote were counted under my voter ID I need a way to see that what was counted was the same as the record I got when I voted. I should be able to compare the counted ballot to the one I submitted. And that gets to why I think hand counting is no longer useful as verification - what is there to hand count when there are no paper ballots except those printed by the machines that we're auditing? . Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Cubicle-society. Withdrawing Intermediate FBC-2.
Michael Ossipoff said: In reply to a posting that just apeared, with its link to a website,, I suggest that we actually have what amounts very nearly to the cubicle-society described in that posting's website-reference. People rely on the mass-media to tell them how other people feel on issues, and how those other people will vote. I think you refer to the paragraph beginning One might counter: http://zelea.com/project/autonomy/a/fau/fau.xht#FAU-S -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Cubicle-society. Withdrawing Intermediate FBC-2.
The difference between Intermediate FBC and Intermediate FBC-2 is about whether or not it might be necessary to insincerely uprank some bottom-deserving candidates from bottom to to 2nd-to-bottom, in order to maximally help to defeat another one which is left at bottom. The matter that is relevant to FBC criteria is the the top end consideration of insincerely downranking one's favorite from top.So, though Intermediate FBC-2 might distinguish among some methods, it doesn't do so in a way that differs importantly from Intermediate FBC. So I withdraw my suggestion of Intermediate FBC-2 as a possible useful criterion. Intermediate FBC is suggested as an awkward attempt to look at difficult distinctions that were impliled when FBCs of differing strengths were brought up. The Weak (ordinary) FBC and Strong FBC are more simply-defined anyway. Ordinary (Weak) FBC, which I've been citing for a long time, makes a useful distinction, when it is shown that most methods, includng Condorcet, Kemeny, and IRV, fail even that most lenient, easily-passed, FBC. Approval passes Strong FBC, but I don't claim to know what, if any, other method(s) pass Strong FBC. No one has suggested or demonstrated that any method other than Approval passes Strong FBC. Cubicle society: In reply to a posting that just apeared, with its link to a website,, I suggest that we actually have what amounts very nearly to the cubicle-society described in that posting's website-reference. People rely on the mass-media to tell them how other people feel on issues, and how those other people will vote. That's why nearly everyone seems to believe it when the media tell us what the two choices are. Several authors, including Noam Chomsky, and probably the historian MIchael Parenti, have pointed out that each person, believing the media, believes that s/he is alone in her preferences, positions, beliefs and social poliicy wishes. Each perfson therefore feels resigned and hopeless. Plurality's peculiar all-but-one-at-bottom rule is necessary to protect that misinformation. Of course open and honest media, reflecting genuine, unfiltered, unmodified, input from the public, would tell a very different story. But when voters are allowed to express approval for more than one candidate, the election results will show public preferences very different from those in our big-money-controlled media. I know, I've already said that, but it's relevent to the cublcle society described in the website. But, not only is the information regarding the preferences and wishes of the other voters distorted by media, but, additionally, now at least, the count of the actual votes is unverified, and therefore not legimiate. Look at the issues of _Harper's_ magazine that appeared soon after the 2004 presidential election. Harpers described many pieces of evidence that the 2004 election count was falsified. As you may remember, there was much similar fraudulent-count evidence described regarding the 2000 election as well. But here's something that many people seem to miss: Even when it isn't shown that a count is fraudulent, the count is still non-legitimate if it isn't vefifiable. A political system's use of a non-verifiable machine-count is ridiculous. Maybe it could be somehow possible for a machine-count to be verifiable. But, untiil then, a handcount is necessary. That's another disadvantage of rank-balloting voting systems--Most of them aren't feasibly hand-countable. Mike Ossipoff . Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
