Re: [EM] Electoral Experimentation
On 12/15/2011 12:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: dlw: Within the third parties themselves, there'd need to be used single-winner elections to determine their candidates/leaders/positions. In these regards, there'd be great scope for experimentation with single-winner election rules, especially since they'd have no commitment to a particular single-winner election rule. You said that experimentation opportunities would be a good reason to strategically support IRV. Presumably IRV would be used for both internal voting to determine their candidates/leaders/positions and for choosing candidates for public elections. Why would IRV-chosen party leaders be motivated to try any other voting method (for either internal or candidate-selection use)? Richard Fobes On 12/15/2011 12:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: -- Forwarded message -- From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org To: election-meth...@electorama.com mailto:election-meth...@electorama.com Cc: Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 23:26:59 -0800 Subject: [EM] Electoral experimentation On 12/14/2011 12:59 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great labs for experimentation with electoral reform. This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we can trust that with changes, there'll be more scope for experimentation and consideration of multiple alternatives to FPTP. dlw I doubt that electoral experimentation would follow the adoption of any new election method. Why? Consider that elected representatives tend to defend whatever election method they got elected under. So if American Proportional Representation -- or any other method -- were used by a third party to elect its leaders, the elected representatives would be unlikely to support experimenting with other election methods. dlw: Within the third parties themselves, there'd need to be used single-winner elections to determine their candidates/leaders/positions. In these regards, there'd be great scope for experimentation with single-winner election rules, especially since they'd have no commitment to a particular single-winner election rule. It's analogous to a door to a treasure room that gets closed and locked after the first people pass through. People who gain access to power naturally want to preserve whatever electoral system got them elected. dlw: Third parties (in a 2 party dominated system) aren't so much about getting into power as making democracy work, turning over the center Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Electoral Experimentation
-- Forwarded message -- From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org To: election-meth...@electorama.com Cc: Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 12:39:23 -0800 Subject: Re: [EM] Electoral Experimentation On 12/15/2011 12:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: dlw: Within the third parties themselves, there'd need to be used single-winner elections to determine their candidates/leaders/positions. In these regards, there'd be great scope for experimentation with single-winner election rules, especially since they'd have no commitment to a particular single-winner election rule. Fobes: You said that experimentation opportunities would be a good reason to strategically support IRV. Presumably IRV would be used for both internal voting to determine their candidates/leaders/positions and for choosing candidates for public elections. dlw: There'd be no need for such. The point is that if there were many LTPs, local third parties, they'd have their own rules and could use IRV[or another alternative to FPTP] to choose which rules they'd use for internal voting and the determination of their candidates in elections. Why would IRV-chosen party leaders be motivated to try any other voting method (for either internal or candidate-selection use)? dlw: Because it'd be the American forms of PR, not IRV, that would give the LTPs license to win representation and to have more voice. I said strategically support IRV for single-winner, not because it's a god-send but because bickering endlessly about the best single-winner election rule takes away from pushing for the aforementioned reform that would then bring about many venues for electoral experimentation. There's no good reason to presuppose that these smaller parties would be beholden to IRV so as not to consider other options. And that is why it's worthwhile to put aside the infinite number of other election rules and focus on getting Am forms of PR plus IRV as key parts of the renewal of the US's democracy. dlw Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Electoral experimentation
On 12/14/2011 12:59 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great labs for experimentation with electoral reform. This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we can trust that with changes, there'll be more scope for experimentation and consideration of multiple alternatives to FPTP. dlw I doubt that electoral experimentation would follow the adoption of any new election method. Why? Consider that elected representatives tend to defend whatever election method they got elected under. So if American Proportional Representation -- or any other method -- were used by a third party to elect its leaders, the elected representatives would be unlikely to support experimenting with other election methods. It's analogous to a door to a treasure room that gets closed and locked after the first people pass through. People who gain access to power naturally want to preserve whatever electoral system got them elected. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
