Mike, I think your example applies to all acquiescing coalition methods that we have considered. The failure is caused by someone leap frogging over others to get to the top position.
But I think that most of these methods satisfy this FBC like property: If the winner changes when (on some ballot) candidate X is moved to the top slot along with all of the candidates that were ranked above X, then the new winner will be X or one of the other candidates that were raised on that ballot. This seems like a reasonable substitue for the FBC, since it builds into it a consistency requirement, namely that if you raise X. then sincerity requires raising to the same level or higher all candidates that you prefer over X. Forest > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF > To: > Subject: [EM] Forest: I found an FBC failure for Minimal Aquiescing > Majorities-Top > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > > Forest-- > > Say it's like the ABE, except that there's one more candidate, D. > > In the ABE, you were an A voter, but now, with D in the > election, you like D best, > with A your 2nd choice. > > (Say all the A voters vote as you do) > > The B voters, while willing to middle-rate A for a majority > coalition, wouldn't > be willing to miiddle-rate D. > > If you vote A & D together in 1st place, then your top-rating > for D means that > {A,B} is no longer a winning set, because you vote D over B. > > If you vote in that way, C wins. > > But you can at least make A win, because the B voters are > willing to middle-rate A. > > You can do that by top-rating only A. You can middle-rate D if > you want to. > > Then, {A,B} wins, and, in that set, A wins with the most top votes. > > You can get your best possible outcome (the election of A) only > by voting someone over > your favorite. > > Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info