Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
Maybe this should be published. If the party system isn't about to fall apart - if the argument can be refuted or undermined - then we want to know that in advance. An academic paper plus a Web teaser would probably force the issue one way or another; either prove us wrong on paper, or give us the resources to run the experiment. Alexander Praetorius said: An elector who participates in the open primaries will probably want to vote for an open party. The elector need not participate in the primaries, of course, but open primaries are more meaningful and interesting (c and d) than closed primaries. Yes, but WHY should anyone become an elector who participates in the open primaries in the first place? By elector, I mean someone who is eligible to vote on election day. So most citizens of age are already electors. But it no longer matters what party the elector votes for (open or not). The election results are more-or-less the same regardless (c). (e) The mass media will inform people of this strange news. People will want to know what it means. Journalists will explain: The parties are dying. No, i dont think so. They only started to cover pirates, when they had a lot of voters voting for them. Currently they dont cover pirate stuff at all. The media covers those things which have impact to some degree and impact means, a lot of people are affected by something. So if you have open primaries and two open paper parties, that means, its still a lifeless construct. Media will not cover it. ... You missed point (c), Alex. The open candidate list is largely elected to the Bundestag even if nobody votes for an open party on election day. The votes could all go to the Union, SPD, etc. as usual, and *still* the open list would be largely elected. In that sense, the open parties always win. They are unbeatable. That's food for thought if it's true, and it's also newsworthy. I think the motivation is (d). Nowhere else can I (a German citizen) discuss and vote on the membership of the Bundestag, the candidacy of the Chancellor, and the thousands of official appointments (direct and indirect) of the Chancellor's office. yes you can. join the pirates and you can discuss and vote on the membership. ... Not for the government as whole, you can't. The Pirate Party's candidate list is not the assured membership of the entire Bundestag; nor is the Pirate's leader the assured Chancellor; nor are any of the other primary nominees of the party assured of appointment in the government. These assurances can be provided only by open electoral primaries, and the Pirate Party is not hosting any (d). So the way to move forward is to bring two toolsets together to eliminate the primary network effect (i.e. host an open primary). That's the fastest way I can see. yes, but which two toolsets? I feel the community aspect should be added. In addition to what you've said, there should be communities chosen for strategic reasons. ...to make it even faster. (That will not prevent any other communities from using any one of the two first toolsets, but at least it will make sure, that the communities targeted in the first place are huge, so the features are catered to their needs) Yes, maybe a community can help in bringing two toolsets together. This has been my hope for AG MFT and other Pirates. It's worth a try. But the Pirate Party has not adopted an open primary (d). ... They have. An open primary cannot be anonymous. People have to authenticate themselves in some way. Pirates do not deny people to join in :-) You can participate in crafting the party program, even if you are not member of the pirates. ... If the primary votes of outsiders were counted equal to the member's votes *and* could be cast on facilities beyond the control of the Pirate Party (or any other organization), then that would be an open *program* primary. It would enable the German citizens to craft consensus programs for the government as a whole. Further, if it were backed by open *electoral* primaries, then the consensus programs would be assured of implementation. But none of this is the case. The Pirate Party does not (at least not yet) enable any of this. ... The same is true of the CDU/CSU Union and the SPD. So the Pirate Party is not applying any pressure to these other parties in favour of open primaries. (Conceivably it might by first destroying itself, but I think that's too much to expect of any party organization.) The CDU/CSU and will never use digital tools in order to enable all of their members to participate. ... It wouldn't help them to do so. As noted previously (quoted below), Union members will feel compelled to join in the open electoral primaries *regardless* of what the Union does. Open primaries are necessarily beyond Union control. So it no longer matters what kind of tooling a party organization supports (or does not
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
Hi Alex, First I summarize some points. (a) Candidate-wise, the open list primary is also open to party candidates, not just to non-party candidates. So Union, SPD and Pirate candidates may receive primary votes of support, too. http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/assembly_election/multi-winner Same for the open executive primary. It is open to the current party leaders. So maybe Cx here is the Union's Merkel, and Dx the SPD's Steinbrück: http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/power_structuring#SN (b) Voter-wise, both open primaries are open to party members, too. Any German elector may vote in the open primaries, with or without having joined a party. (c) The open primaries are continuous, running year in and year out in advance of the upcoming election (say 2017). The purpose of the list primary is to agree on all the members who will sit in the Bundestag after that election. http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/assembly_election/multi-winner#E So that diagram is incomplete. The lists should show additional candidates above A, below I, and maybe in between. Those candidates (not shown) are elected to the 11 greyed-out seats by electors who vote for the Union, SPD, Pirate Party, and so forth. But note that those party supporters could just as easily have voted for one of the open parties. The results would have been more-or-less the *same* regardless. This is the crucial point. It follows from (a) and (b), as I explain further below. It doesn't matter how many people vote for open parties vs closed parties on election day; the open party list is elected regardless. (d) No political party hosts an open electoral primary (neither a list primary nor an executive). All primaries hosted by parties are closed primaries, including those of the Pirate Party. Points (a-c) do not apply to those primaries. Yes, that's technically a nice approach [open primaries]. Other parties could join this system if they drop their candidate lists and instead use the open list, right? Yes. They must also accept the current leader of the open executive primary as the formal party leader. So if any one of them wins a plurality of seats, then the President (I guess it's he) will invite that leader to be Chancellor. ... But although i can see it working technically, i fail to see how this will become a reality, because no matter if there are 1, 2 or 10 or even more open parties on the ballot on election day, nobody would vote for them. An elector who participates in the open primaries will probably want to vote for an open party. The elector need not participate in the primaries, of course, but open primaries are more meaningful and interesting (c and d) than closed primaries. In germany, you normally have a dozen or several dozen of electable parties on the ballot on election day, but most people will never vote for anything else than what they already know. The first time the pirates were electable, many people laughed when they read the ballot and for the first time in their life learned about the pirate party ;-) personell had to remind them, that they please be quit and not comment on any parties :D But it no longer matters what party the elector votes for (open or not). The election results are more-or-less the same regardless (c). (e) The mass media will inform people of this strange news. People will want to know what it means. Journalists will explain: The parties are dying. yes, i understand the technical approach and i like it very much. What i still fail to see is how people will start using the tools. I have a feeling that they wont. In order to have real users using the tools and spreading the word, the usability has to be very very good and people should be able to re-use knowledge they got from their previously used tools (e.g. wiki, facebook, email, mailinglists, forum, twitter, etc...) ... A tool developer likes to see unfinished tools, especially tools with high potential impact. So this is no serious obstacle. If it's only developers using the primary toolsets at first, then no problem. They will get it ready for others ASAP. yes, [the open parties] are a technical hack right from the beginning in order to inject the open primaries into the current system. Thats a good thing, but still, its necessary to gather users which use the open primaries and spread the word about which technical vehicles to elect on election day. This whole thing can only take off the ground, if there is a MOVEMENT behind it, thus a lot of users with similar motivation which makes them use open primaries to change the world for the better. I think the motivation is (d). Nowhere else can I (a German citizen) discuss and vote on the membership of the Bundestag, the candidacy of the Chancellor, and the
[EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
Hi Alex, If no second party were willing to help, then we might create a new party. yes, BUT :-) ...to build a party and trust, so that many people are willing to vote for it is a very tough thing to do. ... The parties we need are relatively easy to obtain. (We're speaking here of Germany, or other states with proportional representation.) We need formal parties empty of all party content. Call these open parties. We want the party name to appear on the ballot on election day, that's all. These open parties will all share the same leader and candidate list as determined through the open primaries. On election day, a given elector may vote for any one of the open parties, and the effect will be the same regardless. It's not really a vote for a party at all, but rather for the candidate list and leader (the would-be Chancellor or Bundeskanzler) that were previously agreed in the open primaries. Do you see? All we have to build are the open primaries. We do that using the primary toolsets. By mirroring the primary votes across all toolsets, we ensure the primaries are truly open; not belonging to any party organization. ... I am very happy, that the pirates exist. Luckily, the pirates are a kind of anti party :-) Their role is to vanish, I think you said. But the open parties I just described are already vanished. But the actual toolset doesn't matter so much. NO! ...IT DOES MATTER A LOT! It's very true, that its extremly important to break the network effect and enable people to move freely between tools, but in order for people to actually USE ANY Tool AT ALL .. there have to be NON-CRAPPY Tools. All i have seen until today, is total crap! Toolset user interfaces (UIs) are expensive. Before coding them, we need to be certain of the design, which means being certain of the practice that's to be supported by the tools. No practice for e-democracy has yet been fully developed. (Maybe Votorola is the closest, but it's not good enough.) That's why you don't see production toolsets yet. ... So in order to make open toolset plattforms interesting, there has to be at least ONE party, which supports them ... At least two, I think. We'll eliminate the network effect that binds the users to the bigger toolset/party. there must be the elimination of the network effect, but before it can work in practice, there must be pressure [from the Pirate Party] to force others tools into that kind of thinking. ... ;^) The pressure's too much for Votorola. We surrender! In order to demonstrate this, however, we require at least two parties. Immediately both parties will be destroyed *as parties*. That's necessary, because otherwise nothing changes and the world just yawns. ;^) I don't think anything will happen immediately. I agree with all u have said in the long term, but in the short term, its all about people and their observations which eventually lead to changes of habits, but that takes time. ... From the perspective of a sales person (even if no money is involved at all), the sales person has to offer something. What is it that could be offered in terms of immediate solutions? ... An open executive primary, for one. German citizens may start reaching consensus on Chancellor (Bundeskanzler), Foreign Minister (Bundesminister des Auswärtigen) and thousands of other direct and indirect appointments of the Chancellor's office. That's never happened before. It cannot happen until we eliminate the network effect between two primary toolsets, and invite others to join. ... It has to start with something small. It has to solve some problem but it has to solve it better than all the other alternatives out there. its then possible to add a second thing that will be solved equally awesome and then a third... and so forth. Yes, I think that's how it will go. there was an assumption. IF two parties join THEN they will be destroyed. ...but how do you get even a single party to join in in the first place? ... As mentioned, they need not be real parties. Two paper parties with no members are sufficient. There must be two primary toolsets behind them, of course, but that's not much of a barrier. A single developer can code the vote translations for both toolsets if necessary. True, [the open parties] can expect to receive more votes in the next election, but never again can a party candidate *as such* be elected to office. The open parties all share the same candidate list, which they discuss and vote using their primary toolsets. yes, but thats again long term vision. in the beginning that will not be the case i believe. The pirates will use the toolset to vote for its issues and its candidates. Then maybe, because many people join that plattform, because they have more power than with the traditional approach, it might grow and sooner or later the network effect might kick in. The primary network effect
[EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
Alex and Marc, Alex said: It will happen fast. Enabling people to move freely among toolset platforms (by a solution we haven't yet discussed), will necessarily enable them to move among political parties *without political consequences*. This will destroy the party system. ... I feel the same. Once, people can move freely among toolset plattforms, this will be the case, but at least in germany, the pirate party, as a toolset plattform in itself, will probably be the only political party, which is open to such a solution. ... If no second party were willing to help, then we might create a new party. We could equip it with a position-forming (primary) toolset of its own, preferably something different than the Pirates are currently prototyping. Votorola is available for this purpose, for instance. But the actual toolset doesn't matter so much. What matters is that we enable the individual users (members) to range freely across toolsets/parties and settle where they prefer. ... So in order to make open toolset plattforms interesting, there has to be at least ONE party, which supports them ... At least two, I think. We'll eliminate the network effect that binds the users to the bigger toolset/party. In order to demonstrate this, however, we require at least two parties. Immediately both parties will be destroyed *as parties*. That's necessary, because otherwise nothing changes and the world just yawns. ;^) If the Pirates cannot stomach this (it's a bitter pill to swallow), then we might create two new parties expressly for this purpose. ... so people eventually vote for the pirates in order to get the results of the open toolset plattforms into laws, which might force the other parties to open up too, and as soon as they do, the party system will be destroyed. ... Yes, but already the demonstration above has politically destroyed the two parties. True, they can expect to receive more votes in the next election, but never again can a party candidate *as such* be elected to office. The open parties all share the same candidate list, which they discuss and vote using their primary toolsets. So the elected candidates are independent of all parties. (If it's the Pirates then, you see how quickly you are destroyed as a party. No Pirate *as such* will ever again be elected to office. You commit to that.) Likewise, the open parties all share the same leader. The leader has no authority as such within the parties. His/her only function is to become Chancellor when the parties win the federal election - then to make a huge number of official appointments, directly and indirectly. Those appointments too are discussed and voted using the primary toolsets years in advance of the election. This attracts users, and this is where the party system starts to seriously fall apart. Those users are not going to turn around and vote for a conventional party on election day. They will instead vote for one of the open parties (no matter which, the effect is always exactly the same) and that too will be known years in advance of the election. Anyway, this how we figured it. So two parties (as such) are destroyed immediately. The party system as a whole is not seriously shaken until the primary toolsets start to gain users. The timing depends, therefore, on how many developers we can attract to push the toolsets into beta. But if we attract just a few more developers, then that'll be a vote of confidence in what we predict, and we'll attract more on that basis. It'll snowball. Can anyone see a flaw? Please point to anything that seems doubtful. Which is the election methods list? I'd like to join that list :-) Here it is, Alex. http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/ Marc said: I am not sure about the speed things will fall apart. But in general it will happen. And YES - let's move forward into this direction with joined forces. We are already on the same track, but we need to shape our minds. Let's do it! Good! I see no problem with the standards for porting user data that you described. I don't think we'll get stuck on those. I'm more concerned about the method of eliminating the network effect. I think there's only one feasible method, but I want to hear your thoughts. Should we discuss sometime by Mumble? My hours this coming week are roughly 0800 to 2000 UTC. Or 1200 to 2400 the week after. Mike Alexander Praetorius said: On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 11:18 AM, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote: (cc AG Politik, Election Methods, apologies for cross-posting) Marc said: Sorry that I have put it this way. Unfortunately it is realy hard for me to express my thoughts in english language, because it's not my mother language and sometimes I feel like lost in translation... I appreciate the effort you're putting into this lengthy thread. You must have other important things to work on, too. But I assure
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
(cc AG Politik, Election Methods, apologies for cross-posting) Marc said: Sorry that I have put it this way. Unfortunately it is realy hard for me to express my thoughts in english language, because it's not my mother language and sometimes I feel like lost in translation... I appreciate the effort you're putting into this lengthy thread. You must have other important things to work on, too. But I assure you, your English is excellent. I understand your words. I don't think our misunderstanding is about words, but rather about larger concepts. I hope we can clear it up shortly. Please refer once more to the two choices we, as technicians, have for obtaining users: * ** (1) Eliminate the network effects between platforms, thus leveling the playing field and enabling the users to range freely from platform to platform. Beseitigen Sie die Netzwerk-Effekte zwischen den Plattformen, so Einebnung des Spielfeldes und ermöglicht den Benutzern, reichen frei von Plattform zu Plattform. (2) Rely on network effects to force all users onto our own platform, thus establishing it as a de-facto monopoly. auf Netzwerk-Effekte Vertrauen, um alle Benutzer auf die eigene Kraft Plattform und schafft so als einer de-facto-Monopol. I am fine with (1) and therefore (a). We are close to an understanding, then. We both want (1) and (a). Let's move on to discussing the solution. This is where it gets interesting for the Pirate Party. But thinking one step beyond, (b) and (c) are NOT conflicting with (a) from my point of view. . . . The SOLUTION should... a) ... enable free choice of the tooling for every users. b) ... cover all parts of the decision making process. c) ... make all discourse related data entered by any user available to others. You understand that user freedom (a) cannot be realized except by eliminating (1) the network effects that underpin toolset lock-in. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_effect http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netzwerkeffekt In obtaining users for our tools, therefore, how do you propose to eliminate those network effects? What is your solution for that? (And again the future of the Pirate Party is bound up in this, even if they don't see it yet. So altogether it's a very interesting topic.) Unfortunately from time to time it seems to me you are baked into old belief systems. The Pirate Party is just a vehicle to ride with for a while. It's necessary to speed up things. Not more. Not less. Things will go very fast indeed if we keep on talking, so much so that the party (as such) won't be able to handle the speed. But nor will the other parties, particularly the mainstream ones with members in the Bundestag and state assemblies. All will be shaken to pieces. Do you know why? My own thinking on this has improved in the last month, thanks to discussions in the Election Methods list. Last month, you said: What should I say? I have currently no crystal ball around to predict the future. The only thing I know about the future is that it never comes like I thought. Just look at the present for what it is *technically* and you will see the future. The future hinges on something you already understand in the present: position forming (Standpunktbildung), or primary voting as I call it. A political party is just a vehicle for position forming. Technically speaking, it is nothing but a toolset platform for that purpose. Here I don't mean just the Pirate Party and other online parties, but *all* parties. Look at them through a technicians eyes. All are toolset platforms. But mainly the process of changing democracy will take up to three generations of man. Today our society is not prepared to take over the power. So that's nothing I want to take care about right now... It will happen fast. Enabling people to move freely among toolset platforms (by a solution we haven't yet discussed), will necessarily enable them to move among political parties *without political consequences*. This will destroy the party system. Immediately it will begin to fall apart at the seams. In technical terms, it will become rationalized into purely technical functions on the one hand, and purely political on the other. The political parties as we know them will have vanished. Are you comfortable with this? Should we make it happen? Mike * We must be clear on this issue. A platform cannot succeed without users. There are two ways to obtain those users: (1) Eliminate the network effects between platforms, thus leveling the playing field and enabling the users to range freely from platform to platform. This is the right way. (2) Rely on network effects to force all users onto our own platform, thus establishing it as a de-facto monopoly. This is harmful and unnecessary, and therefore wrong. These
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
PS - Oh dear, I misquoted Alex's translation. I gave the Google one instead. Sorry about that. Here's Alex's real translation: Wir müssen uns darüber klar werden: Eine Plattform kann ohne Benutzer nicht erfolgreich sein. Es gibt nur zwei Wege Nutzer zu bekommen: (1) Den Netzeffekt zwischen Plattformen beseitigen, also gleiche Wettbewerbsbedingungen schaffen und Nutzern ermöglichen die Plattform jederzeit zu wechseln. Das ist der richtige Weg. (2) Sich auf Netzeffekte verlassen um alle Nutzer auf die eigene Plattform zu zwingen, also ein de facto Monopol zu errichten. Das ist schädlich und unnötig und deshalb falsch. Diese beiden Wege sind die einzigen Wege. Es gibt keine Kompromisse zwischen diesen beiden Alternativen. Wenn wir uns nicht für Weg (1) entscheiden, dann entscheiden wir uns für Weg (2) und kein verantwortungsvoller Ingenieur wird dann mit uns zusammenarbeiten. Statt dessen wird ein solcher uns auf die Gefahren hinweisen und uns davor warnen weiter zu machen. (1) oder (2)? Was sollten wir tun? Mike Michael Allan said: (cc AG Politik, Election Methods, apologies for cross-posting) Marc said: Sorry that I have put it this way. Unfortunately it is realy hard for me to express my thoughts in english language, because it's not my mother language and sometimes I feel like lost in translation... I appreciate the effort you're putting into this lengthy thread. You must have other important things to work on, too. But I assure you, your English is excellent. I understand your words. I don't think our misunderstanding is about words, but rather about larger concepts. I hope we can clear it up shortly. Please refer once more to the two choices we, as technicians, have for obtaining users: * ** (1) Eliminate the network effects between platforms, thus leveling the playing field and enabling the users to range freely from platform to platform. Beseitigen Sie die Netzwerk-Effekte zwischen den Plattformen, so Einebnung des Spielfeldes und ermöglicht den Benutzern, reichen frei von Plattform zu Plattform. (2) Rely on network effects to force all users onto our own platform, thus establishing it as a de-facto monopoly. auf Netzwerk-Effekte Vertrauen, um alle Benutzer auf die eigene Kraft Plattform und schafft so als einer de-facto-Monopol. I am fine with (1) and therefore (a). We are close to an understanding, then. We both want (1) and (a). Let's move on to discussing the solution. This is where it gets interesting for the Pirate Party. But thinking one step beyond, (b) and (c) are NOT conflicting with (a) from my point of view. . . . The SOLUTION should... a) ... enable free choice of the tooling for every users. b) ... cover all parts of the decision making process. c) ... make all discourse related data entered by any user available to others. You understand that user freedom (a) cannot be realized except by eliminating (1) the network effects that underpin toolset lock-in. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_effect http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netzwerkeffekt In obtaining users for our tools, therefore, how do you propose to eliminate those network effects? What is your solution for that? (And again the future of the Pirate Party is bound up in this, even if they don't see it yet. So altogether it's a very interesting topic.) Unfortunately from time to time it seems to me you are baked into old belief systems. The Pirate Party is just a vehicle to ride with for a while. It's necessary to speed up things. Not more. Not less. Things will go very fast indeed if we keep on talking, so much so that the party (as such) won't be able to handle the speed. But nor will the other parties, particularly the mainstream ones with members in the Bundestag and state assemblies. All will be shaken to pieces. Do you know why? My own thinking on this has improved in the last month, thanks to discussions in the Election Methods list. Last month, you said: What should I say? I have currently no crystal ball around to predict the future. The only thing I know about the future is that it never comes like I thought. Just look at the present for what it is *technically* and you will see the future. The future hinges on something you already understand in the present: position forming (Standpunktbildung), or primary voting as I call it. A political party is just a vehicle for position forming. Technically speaking, it is nothing but a toolset platform for that purpose. Here I don't mean just the Pirate Party and other online parties, but *all* parties. Look at them through a technicians eyes. All are toolset platforms. But mainly the process of changing democracy will take up to three generations of man. Today our
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
At 04:41 AM 3/18/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: On 03/18/2013 03:49 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 05:29 PM 3/17/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Given that there has been zero experience with the use of liquid democracy for the exercise of power, yes, I am asserting something on which there is zero experience. There's zero experience either way. I'm not proposing liquid democracy for the actual exercise of power, precisely because it's untested. Alright, I think there's been some confusion here. Let's clear it up. Great idea. Since I was talking about this in the connection of the primary mentioned by Allan in the parliamentary compromising thread, I was thinking of liquid democracy in the sense of a continuous election for the purpose of exercise of power. And, in fact, you and Michael Allen may also have been talking past each other. Or at least one past the other, and does it matter which one? No, let's just get it clear. Allan was referring to what he calls a primary. This is *not*, I expect, the kind of primary we see in two-round runoff, where options in the second round are limited and maybe a decision is made in the primary. He uses the term primary to refer to a discussion and process that, among other things, measures the degree of consensus among participants on some issue. It does not, itself, decide the issue. Someone or something else does that. In all the more-complete structures I've proposed, a more traditional structure is hybridized with a delegable proxy structure, such that the latter is *purely advisory.* While advice can be powerful, if it is trusted, the decision of what to trust is left to those who are going to *act* (or not act), whether the action is voting in an election, making some decision using executive power, or voting in an assembly on some issue, whatever. In a free association of shareholders, the delegable proxy process would advise shareholders individually, and they choose the degree to which they want to trust their own proxy in the DP process. The process does not officially assign their corporate proxy (unless a corporation decides to automatically do it, which is a kind of decision I'd not yet recommend, until we know much more about how delegable proxy *actually works*. The inconvenience of actually needing to personally and individually assign a share proxy is small, compared to the security of not tossing everything into the care of an untested system. This is a concept which reserves power for individuals. That's why it is relatively secure, by design. Yes, if there is some *binding character* to delegable proxy discussions and polls, that's dangerous. There is then an attractive target for corruption. While a highly trusted proxy might be targeted, that's just normal talk to power. I.e., through the proxy, talk to the entire natural caucus. It's the caucus itself that has the power, not the proxy who defines the caucus. The problems of trust in the proxy are the problems that we routinely face in life. Do we trust our physician, knowing that the physician might be tempted to advise according to standards of care If you're arguing that my objections do not hold when liquid democracy is used in an advisory setting, then we're talking past each other; and then I should repeat that I agree with your suggestions of what to do. Let's use liquid democracy to produce advice. Let's see what happens, and gain experience. Perfect. If, on the other hand, you're arguing that even though there has been no experience in the use of liquid democracy for the exercise of power, my objections to it are inapplicable for logical reasons, then I can explain and elaborate on my reply. No, there are reasons to object. We could argue about how *strong* they are, but that's actually speculative no matter which way we slant. The objections may be valid in one context and not in another. There may be some problem that none of us can anticipate. FA/DP is *actually revolutionary,* but I noticed something about prior revolutions, where they were developed first in thought and abstranct analysis. When applied as if the thinking and analysis were truth, the results were sometimes totally horrific. I'm thinking of the communist revolutions in particular. It is not necessarily that the analysis and abstractions were wrong, but that they were incomplete and did not understand all the details of how human societies function -- and fail. Instead of being implemented with caution, they were implemented with force and such certainty that it was considered legitimate to kill for them. That was hubris, and the results were disastrous, and we still have not completely recovered from the damage. That does not mean that, what, laissez-faire capitalism is perfect. It isn't. But some aspects of it work, and have worked for a long time. In order to replace what we have without great harm, we need to
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
On 3/15/2013 1:27 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 04:16 AM 3/14/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: On 03/13/2013 05:09 AM, Michael Allan wrote: If the experts in the Election Methods list can't find a serious fault with this method, then it might be possible to bring down the party system in as little as a few years. Mind you, it would be no bad thing if it took a while longer, given the disruption it might cause. Regarding liquid democracy methods in general, I think the vote-buying problem is pretty serious. Or rather, that's not the worst part of it, but it's a symptom of a more general aspect. Kristofer is asseting as a serious problem something on which there is zero experience. It's not clear that vote-buying is *ever* a serious problem.[...] Vote-buying would become quite serious if liquid democracy (direct voting on issues) were adopted. Many years ago I lived in a neighborhood that the police often had to visit, and I saw that the illegal behavior that the police responded to was just the tip of the iceberg. Just making vote-buying and vote-selling illegal would not stop low-income people from selling their vote. An underground (black) market would develop. Trying to stop it would have the same non-success as trying to stop the use of illegal drugs. Also consider that the reason elections require people to appear in person to cast their votes is that it greatly reduces voter fraud, which is common without that requirement. Of course there are exceptions. Here in Oregon everyone votes by mail, but that approach would not work in most other states because they are noticeably more corrupt. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
On 03/15/2013 09:27 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 04:16 AM 3/14/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: On 03/13/2013 05:09 AM, Michael Allan wrote: If the experts in the Election Methods list can't find a serious fault with this method, then it might be possible to bring down the party system in as little as a few years. Mind you, it would be no bad thing if it took a while longer, given the disruption it might cause. Regarding liquid democracy methods in general, I think the vote-buying problem is pretty serious. Or rather, that's not the worst part of it, but it's a symptom of a more general aspect. Kristofer is asseting as a serious problem something on which there is zero experience. It's not clear that vote-buying is *ever* a serious problem. A system that seeks broad consensus, where possible, is only vulnerable to *truly massive vote-buying, where it is more like negotiation than vote buying. I.e., Walmart will donate $100,000 to the town if voters allow a store to be sited there. Much more likely to be successful than trying to pay voter $100 or whatever and run legal risks. Given that there has been zero experience with the use of liquid democracy for the exercise of power, yes, I am asserting something on which there is zero experience. There's zero experience either way. Since I make the assertion, I should provide something on which to base it, though. And my assertions are based on analogous systems. In the matter of vote-buying and coercion, that analogous system is simply the election of candidates for office. Vote-buying and coercion were here serious enough problems that one moved from the initially open ballot onto a secret ballot. Clearly enough, openness at the lower end was not a good thing. The same arguments you provide against vote-buying and coercion could be applied to a regular election. You say that vote-buying is illegal. Yes, so it is in regular elections, but we still have secret ballots. You say that if the small town is too oppressive, then just move. You could say that about public balloting for candidate elections, too. And since we still have secret ballots, it would seem that those arguments for a public ballot are not considered sufficiently strong. Would you prefer public (open) ballots for regular elections? If not, what's the difference between your arguments as applied to liquid democracy, and as applied to regular elections? For that matter, liquid democracy (for the exercise of power) could need more protection than ordinary elections. The argument would go something like: if a minority is being oppressed in a small town, then it doesn't matter because the majority will win anyway. However, being a consensus system, liquid democracy needs to protect minorities as well, so that it is safe to be a proxy and thus to pull the center of political gravity in the right direction. First of all, Kristoger is assuming exercise of power through delegable proxy. I don't recommend it for that, not without substantial experience first. I recommend it for *advisory structures.* With this (except for the spelling of my name :-), I do agree. If experience is the most solid evidence, then let's get some of that evidence. And since it's an optional matter whether one follows advice, the stakes should be lesser. I mentioned liquid democracy in the sense of exercising power because that was what I was discussing in the parliamentary compromising problem thread. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
At 05:29 PM 3/17/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: On 03/15/2013 09:27 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 04:16 AM 3/14/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: On 03/13/2013 05:09 AM, Michael Allan wrote: If the experts in the Election Methods list can't find a serious fault with this method, then it might be possible to bring down the party system in as little as a few years. Mind you, it would be no bad thing if it took a while longer, given the disruption it might cause. Regarding liquid democracy methods in general, I think the vote-buying problem is pretty serious. Or rather, that's not the worst part of it, but it's a symptom of a more general aspect. Kristofer is asseting as a serious problem something on which there is zero experience. It's not clear that vote-buying is *ever* a serious problem. A system that seeks broad consensus, where possible, is only vulnerable to *truly massive vote-buying, where it is more like negotiation than vote buying. I.e., Walmart will donate $100,000 to the town if voters allow a store to be sited there. Much more likely to be successful than trying to pay voter $100 or whatever and run legal risks. Given that there has been zero experience with the use of liquid democracy for the exercise of power, yes, I am asserting something on which there is zero experience. There's zero experience either way. I'm not proposing liquid democracy for the actual exercise of power, precisely because it's untested. Since I make the assertion, I should provide something on which to base it, though. And my assertions are based on analogous systems. In the matter of vote-buying and coercion, that analogous system is simply the election of candidates for office. Vote-buying and coercion were here serious enough problems that one moved from the initially open ballot onto a secret ballot. Clearly enough, openness at the lower end was not a good thing. I don't think the history as presented is sound. Secret ballot has been used for a long, long time. And major vote corruption occurred in secret ballot systems. Open voting *on issues* is still done in all legislative bodies, and that includes Town Meeting, where ordinary citizens directly vote. They *never* use secret ballot for this, and it's probably illegal. However, by law, some issues have to be decided by registered voters in an election by secret ballot, not by Town Meeting. (In Massachusetts, I've only seen this for debt overrides.) The same arguments you provide against vote-buying and coercion could be applied to a regular election. You say that vote-buying is illegal. Yup. Yes, so it is in regular elections, but we still have secret ballots. You seem to think that I'm opposed to secret ballots. We do have secret ballots, but only for general public voting. In the systems I've proposed, hybrid representative/direct democracy, electors would be empowered by secret ballot. These would be able to vote directly, in some versions, on issues. The same electors would vote publicly for seats in a deliberative body. There is *lots* of precendent for open voting by those enabled as representatives, indeed, it is *always* done that way. And, yes, these people can be bought, sometimes. But we don't allow representatives to vote secretly to prevent them from being corrupted! You say that if the small town is too oppressive, then just move. No. I said that this is a bigger problem than vote coercsion. Sometimes you can't move. Essentially, if one is in a situation where one would suffer from the expression of opinion, publically, one would not run to be an elector, just as one would not run to be a member of the city council. Unless willing to take the heat. You could vote in an Asset election for someone who was willing. And pay them, if you like. That's actually legal, as long as you don't attempt to influence legislation with the money. You could say that about public balloting for candidate elections, too. Only by electors. Not by general voters. Again, we elect Presidential electors, state by state in the U.S.. They vote publically. And since we still have secret ballots, it would seem that those arguments for a public ballot are not considered sufficiently strong. Would you prefer public (open) ballots for regular elections? No. If not, what's the difference between your arguments as applied to liquid democracy, and as applied to regular elections? I don't recommend elections at all by liquid democracy. Basically, Kristoger, I suspect you've understood hardly anything I've written. I recommend delegable proxy for *advisory organizations.* For public elections, I recommend Asset Voting, as the ultimate reform. The electors *may use* delegable proxy to help guide them how to vote, but that's *advisory* and optional. What is unusual about this concept is that a deliberative body is created that could be very large. Anyone who does not want to be
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
At 04:16 AM 3/14/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: On 03/13/2013 05:09 AM, Michael Allan wrote: If the experts in the Election Methods list can't find a serious fault with this method, then it might be possible to bring down the party system in as little as a few years. Mind you, it would be no bad thing if it took a while longer, given the disruption it might cause. Regarding liquid democracy methods in general, I think the vote-buying problem is pretty serious. Or rather, that's not the worst part of it, but it's a symptom of a more general aspect. Kristofer is asseting as a serious problem something on which there is zero experience. It's not clear that vote-buying is *ever* a serious problem. A system that seeks broad consensus, where possible, is only vulnerable to *truly massive vote-buying, where it is more like negotiation than vote buying. I.e., Walmart will donate $100,000 to the town if voters allow a store to be sited there. Much more likely to be successful than trying to pay voter $100 or whatever and run legal risks. First of all, Kristoger is assuming exercise of power through delegable proxy. I don't recommend it for that, not without substantial experience first. I recommend it for *advisory structures.* Advice *can* be powerful, but with advice, created by -- and validated or transmitted through proxies, who can advise differently than the majority, there is essentially no danger of vote-buying, I covered this years ago, the buyer, would, at great expense, end up with a mouthful of hair. Most likely. We can't say impossible to anything. This general aspect is that the network of delegation can't decide when the power vested in a person is sufficiently great that he should be public, and conversely, when the voters have sufficiently little power that they should be anonymous. I've made two proposals: first, delegable proxy in NGOs, advisory in nature. I strongly recommend that all proxy assignments in this organization be public. The other proposal is for NGOs and for governmental organizations, running public elections, and that's Asset Voting. There is a tweak for what I've called difficult situations, meaning places and circumstances where an isolated individual with certain views might be in physical danger, but Asset Voting, I generally assume, does have a secret ballot input. The *electors* empowered by this election would, I assume, vote publically, except under very unusual and very dangerous situations. These situations do not exist in major democracies. (And there are ways to address this issue, but they complicate matters greatly. I don't recommend anything but electors being public voters, under ordinary circumstances. Note that I've lived in a small town meeting town, and how citizens vote on issues before the Town Meeting is very visible. And, yes, it can take courage to confront a fake consensus; basically you need to know what's real, and one of the things that an FA/DP organization that is *not* in control can do is to measure consensus. And it can do it with process that is largely hidden, i.e., is only direct communication between proxies and clients.) Intuitively, for proxies with great power, the need for transparency outweighs the repercussions of doing so, while for individual voters the opposite is the case. But the voting method has no way of knowing where one changes into the other. Beyond a possible initial assignment of voting power through Asset Voting, I *highly recommend* total transparency, while not preventing or even discouraging private discussion between willing participants. What I expect would naturally arise when there are large numbers of voters, and no inhibition on candidate numbers, is that the number of *initial voters* per candidate will stabilize at a ratio of voters/elector that optimizes communication efficiency, generally. Some voters with low interest might add to that, without increasing communication burden on the elector. You get what you pay for. Thus there seems to be two standard solutions. The first is to keep everything private, and the second is to keep everything public. And the hybrid, where initial assignments are secret. For FA/DP organizations that, as Free Associations, do not collect and exercise power by majority vote, but operate to structure and negotiate and collect and report on consensus, I *highly* recommend that it all be public, within the organization. I.e., any recognized member may access the proxy table. It's essential for the most efficient and effective communication model. The first is rather more difficult than the second, since one has to know something about the proxies in order to subscribe to them; and neither is really desirable. Open is highly desirable. Imagine an open system. Not *everything* is open. There is a web site, say. There are rules for registration, these are essentially membership rules. In a
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
On 03/13/2013 05:09 AM, Michael Allan wrote: If the experts in the Election Methods list can't find a serious fault with this method, then it might be possible to bring down the party system in as little as a few years. Mind you, it would be no bad thing if it took a while longer, given the disruption it might cause. Regarding liquid democracy methods in general, I think the vote-buying problem is pretty serious. Or rather, that's not the worst part of it, but it's a symptom of a more general aspect. This general aspect is that the network of delegation can't decide when the power vested in a person is sufficiently great that he should be public, and conversely, when the voters have sufficiently little power that they should be anonymous. Intuitively, for proxies with great power, the need for transparency outweighs the repercussions of doing so, while for individual voters the opposite is the case. But the voting method has no way of knowing where one changes into the other. Thus there seems to be two standard solutions. The first is to keep everything private, and the second is to keep everything public. The first is rather more difficult than the second, since one has to know something about the proxies in order to subscribe to them; and neither is really desirable. I should clarify that vote-buying is only one side of the transparency/anonymity problem. If you have a version where everything is public, then vote-buying is not the only weakness. There could also be vote coercion (subscribe to this proxy or else) or small-town effects (try being a liberal proxy in a particularly conservative town in the Deep South). Now, some people say that this isn't a problem, and more broadly that complete disclosure is no problem. I've had that discussion on EM before, and I know of people who think that, more broadly, Brin's Transparent Society would be a good thing. Both from small-town effects[1] and from vote-buying, I disagree. If only one could solve this problem, liquid democracy could be really good. I imagine it would be possible with judicious use of crypto, but that would obscure the system quite a bit. You'd also have to code into the system the sorites decision of where power becomes great enough that transparency outweighs privacy. - [1] The Law of Jante is a Scandinavian term, after all. Similar things exist elsewhere, e.g. the Japanese nail that sticks up. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
