Re: [EM] Instead of Top 2
On 04/20/2013 12:09 AM, Forest Simmons wrote: Suppose the two methods were IRV and Approval, and that each voter could choose which of the two methods to vote on their strategic ballots, and then rank the candidates non-strategically as well for the choice between the two method winners. We would learn something about the popularity of the two methods, which one chose the final winner the most often, which one elicited the most order reversals, etc. The same experiment could be done with any two methods. For that matter, the experiment could be done with ordinary runoff to check if the voters change their minds between the rounds of the runoff. The experiment would go like this: first round, the voters vote using the two methods in question, and also give a honest preference ordering for a virtual runoff. Second round, they vote in the actual runoff between the winner candidates (or some complex tiebreak if the winner is the same for both methods). Then one compares the preference orderings with the runoff results. If the runoff is A vs B, A won, but the preference ordering says B should have won, there's your reversal. And I've mentioned it before, but I suppose I can do so again, since we're talking about two-method runoffs :-) From time to time I've thought about the idea of having a runoff using a strategy-resistant method and a method that provides good results under honesty. This could be useful in a society where people have become used to strategizing. If they strategize wildly, then the honest method fails but the resistant method keeps the result from being too bad; and if they don't, then the honest method's candidate wins the runoff and all is good. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Instead of Top 2
Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2 Plurality, Top 2 Bucklin, etc. have problems that we are all familiar with, in particular clones mess them up. But what if our method elects the pairwise preference between the method A winner and the method B winner? If the two winners are the same, then the common winner is elected. This idea seems to avoid the problems associated with top2 methods. What would you suggest for methods A and B? I would suggest MJ type grade ballots. Then some good possibilities for Method A or B would be MJ itself, XA (chiastic approval), Approval with various possibilities for approval cutoff level, etc. My personal favorite version is to elect the pairwise preferred of the XA winner and the candidate with the fewest F's. Forest Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Instead of Top 2
Suppose the two methods were IRV and Approval, and that each voter could choose which of the two methods to vote on their strategic ballots, and then rank the candidates non-strategically as well for the choice between the two method winners. We would learn something about the popularity of the two methods, which one chose the final winner the most often, which one elicited the most order reversals, etc. The same experiment could be done with any two methods. On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 12:56 PM, Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2 Plurality, Top 2 Bucklin, etc. have problems that we are all familiar with, in particular clones mess them up. But what if our method elects the pairwise preference between the method A winner and the method B winner? If the two winners are the same, then the common winner is elected. This idea seems to avoid the problems associated with top2 methods. What would you suggest for methods A and B? I would suggest MJ type grade ballots. Then some good possibilities for Method A or B would be MJ itself, XA (chiastic approval), Approval with various possibilities for approval cutoff level, etc. My personal favorite version is to elect the pairwise preferred of the XA winner and the candidate with the fewest F's. Forest Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
