Kevin:
You said:
In practice [preference-mentioning criteria] usually have to be translated into
votes-only criteria in order to figure out how to use or test them.
[endquote]
So what? Regardless of your procedure for applying the criteria, my criteria
apply to all methods. Votes-only criteria often
do not, unless you say that Plurality passes Condorcet's criterion.
You continued:
Well, in my mind a votes-only criterion is independent.
[endquote]
Independent of what? Either you stipulate that Condorcet's Criterion applies
only to certain methods and not
to others, or CC gives results that are not as you or anyone else intend.
You continued:
Usually the two versions aren't quite equivalent or can't be easily proven to
be equivalent.
[endquote]
Of course they're not equivalent. Preference criteria are
universally-applicable.
You continued:
I think part of the disagreement on this issue is based on who the audience is.
[endquote]
Irrelevant.
You continued:
On this list we don't generally have problems with most people using an
implied Woodall-ish conception of methods and criteria.
[endquote]
That fact that it can be guessed what someone means when using those votes-only
criteria doesn't answer my
criticisms of them.
You continue:
If someone wanted to argue that FPP actually does satisfy Condorcet we would
just tell them they're doing it wrong
[endquote]
You could...and you'd be incorrect thereby.
If there is something wrong with how I interpreted votes-only Condorcet's
Criterion, for instance,
when saying that Plurality meets CC, then I invite you to say what is wrong
with that interpretation of CC.
Tell us how you define CC, minimal defense, and Majority for Solid Coalitions,
without mentioning
preference. And then tell what's wrong with the interpretation of those
criteria whereby Plurality meets
them.
You continue:
no big deal. Mike seems to be paranoid about people understanding
criteria contrary to their original intention.
[endquote]
Is that what I said? I thought that I merely said that Plurality meets those
criteria.
Oh yes, I did also say that your votes-only criteria often rule contrary to
your intention. That makes nonsense out
of them and their use.
You continue:
The inconvenient thing about e.g. SDSC is mostly the should have a way of
voting wording.
[endquote]
How is that inconvenient? It sounds to me as if the meaning is quite plain.
If a majority prefer x to y,
then there should be a way of voting whereby that majority can vote that will
insure that
y won't win, without any member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate
equal to or over a more-liked one.
(other than equal-bottom-ranking them).
The use of the word should is commonly used on EM as an expression of the
criterion's requirement for a method to
meet the criterion. Is that what you're objecting to. I suppose I could have
said, A method meets SDSC if...
...or divided the criterion text into premise and requirement as I did with
CD.
You continue:
In practice this way of voting is almost always truncation
It typically requires voting x above bottom, but not y.
You continue:
(which definitely is possible to define within Mike's scheme, as he doesn't
consider truncation of two candidates to be voting them equal).
[endquote]
For some time I've been including that exception in the criterion's wording.
You continued:
I wonder if SDSC can really be seamlessly applied to any ballot format though.
Mike seems to assume it is unambiguous what it means to vote a candidate above
or equal to or below another candidate.
[endquote]
I defined that some years ago. Someone else suggested a much simpler
definition, which I posted today. I agreed that that definition
was briefer, and that it was fine with me till such time as someone found a
problem with it.
If it can be shown that you've found such a problem, then I'll discard that
briefer definition, and return to the use of my
longer definition, the one that speaks, more generally, of an election with
arbitrarily many voters and candidates.
You continue:
If he has a definition for these I imagine it's based on some very specific
test that wouldn't necessarily reflect general method behavior.
[endquote]
See the definition that I posted today.
You continued:
For example, what if under some method the majority preferring A to B can make
B lose by ranking B top?
[endquote]
Let's say that that ranking x higher than y means that you write that
candidate's name closer to the top of a piece of paper or the top of your
computer screen, and that ranking B top means ranking B over everyone who
isn't ranked as B is.
Then, in your questionably-proposable method, and by the definition that I
posted today, ranking B, but not A, at top
qualifies as voting A over B, if that would defeat B even if you were the only
voter and A B were the only candidates.
If not, then we'd need to know more about the
