Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
On 5.6.2012, at 1.52, James Gilmour wrote: >>> On 4.6.2012, at 19.18, James Gilmour wrote: A system that counts the proportions at national level (typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also gerrymandering can be avoided this way. >>> >>> Yes, the votes could be summed at national level and the seats >>> allocated at national level. But you do not need to go to national >>> level to achieve proper representation. Where the electors also want >>> some guarantee of local representation, a satisfactory compromise can >>> be achieved with a much more modest 'district magnitude' than one >>> national district. > >> Juho > Sent: Monday, June 04, 2012 7:48 PM >> In Finland there was a reform proposal that counted the >> proportions at national level, but the seats were still >> allocated in the existing districts. (Current government >> doesn't want to drive that proposal forward.) One can do this >> trick also with quite small districts. In Finland the size of >> the smallest districts is 6, but even smaller districts could work. >> >> Both targets can thus be met simultaneously, accurate >> proportionality and local(ish) representation. All systems >> will however have some "rounding errors". In this proposal >> the seats of the parties are allocated to the districts so >> that the total sum of seats per district and seats per party >> are exactly correct, which means that some of the last seats >> have to be "forced to go right", and this may violate the >> personal interests of some candidates (some other party may >> get the seat with fewer votes), but in a rather random / >> unpredictable / unbiased way that people are likely to >> accept. Political proportionality in the districts is also >> not as accurate as at the national level, but I guess the >> national level proportionality is the one that counts. >> >> In theory one could use this system also with single-member >> districts, but the "forcing" operations would already be quite >> violent. If current single-member district countries want to >> keep the idea of very local representation, one approach >> could be to use only slightly larger districts than today >> (maybe 3, 4), calculate proportionality at national level, >> and then allocate the seats to the districts using some >> similar algorithm as in the Finnish reform proposal. Just an >> idea, to keep as much of the familiar and maybe liked features >> of the existing system. > > Iceland currently uses a system that sounds very like the Finish proposal. > Votes are tallied at national level and in six > constituencies, each of which has nine constituency seats in parliament. > Nine additional "equalization seats" are distributed to > constituencies and allocated to political parties so that the parliamentary > representation of each party and each constituency will > reflect as closely as possible the total votes received. This is done by > solving a pair of simultaneous equations! It does have > the effect you describe, forcing out some "constituency winners" and > replacing them with "equalisation candidates". This seems to > be accepted because the constitution demands that every vote shall have equal > value. In the Finnish proposal there are no "equalization seats". There are only the regional seats that have been allocated to the districts in proportion to their population. > > But of course, you don't need to do it this way, nor does the proportionality > have to be just "party PR". With STV-PR in > multi-member districts the voters have the power to choose the winning > candidates on whatever PR basis matters to those voters. I > do appreciate that STV is totally unacceptable to quite a number of the more > vociferous members of this list, but STV-PR does > address effectively many of the issues that arise in electing properly > representative assemblies. "party PR" - can achieve accurate proportionality between parties - does not (usually) support accurate proportionality between different sections of a party - allows high number of candidates and seats per district - some methods allow votes to parties only, some allow votes to individual candidates "STV-PR" - can achieve accurate proportionality between parties - supports proportionality between different sections of a party - allows only smallish number of candidates and seats per district - allows voters to cast mixed votes that list candidates from more than one party - works also in (non-political) elections with no party structure Juho > > James > > > > > > > - > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2012.0.2178 / Virus Database: 2425/5044 - Release Date: 06/04/12 > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
> > On 4.6.2012, at 19.18, James Gilmour wrote: > >> A system that counts the proportions at national level > >> (typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also > >> gerrymandering can be avoided this way. > > > > Yes, the votes could be summed at national level and the seats > > allocated at national level. But you do not need to go to national > > level to achieve proper representation. Where the electors also want > > some guarantee of local representation, a satisfactory compromise can > > be achieved with a much more modest 'district magnitude' than one > > national district. > Juho > Sent: Monday, June 04, 2012 7:48 PM > In Finland there was a reform proposal that counted the > proportions at national level, but the seats were still > allocated in the existing districts. (Current government > doesn't want to drive that proposal forward.) One can do this > trick also with quite small districts. In Finland the size of > the smallest districts is 6, but even smaller districts could work. > > Both targets can thus be met simultaneously, accurate > proportionality and local(ish) representation. All systems > will however have some "rounding errors". In this proposal > the seats of the parties are allocated to the districts so > that the total sum of seats per district and seats per party > are exactly correct, which means that some of the last seats > have to be "forced to go right", and this may violate the > personal interests of some candidates (some other party may > get the seat with fewer votes), but in a rather random / > unpredictable / unbiased way that people are likely to > accept. Political proportionality in the districts is also > not as accurate as at the national level, but I guess the > national level proportionality is the one that counts. > > In theory one could use this system also with single-member > districts, but the "forcing" operations would already be quite > violent. If current single-member district countries want to > keep the idea of very local representation, one approach > could be to use only slightly larger districts than today > (maybe 3, 4), calculate proportionality at national level, > and then allocate the seats to the districts using some > similar algorithm as in the Finnish reform proposal. Just an > idea, to keep as much of the familiar and maybe liked features > of the existing system. Iceland currently uses a system that sounds very like the Finish proposal. Votes are tallied at national level and in six constituencies, each of which has nine constituency seats in parliament. Nine additional "equalization seats" are distributed to constituencies and allocated to political parties so that the parliamentary representation of each party and each constituency will reflect as closely as possible the total votes received. This is done by solving a pair of simultaneous equations! It does have the effect you describe, forcing out some "constituency winners" and replacing them with "equalisation candidates". This seems to be accepted because the constitution demands that every vote shall have equal value. But of course, you don't need to do it this way, nor does the proportionality have to be just "party PR". With STV-PR in multi-member districts the voters have the power to choose the winning candidates on whatever PR basis matters to those voters. I do appreciate that STV is totally unacceptable to quite a number of the more vociferous members of this list, but STV-PR does address effectively many of the issues that arise in electing properly representative assemblies. James - No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.2178 / Virus Database: 2425/5044 - Release Date: 06/04/12 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
On 4.6.2012, at 19.18, James Gilmour wrote: >> A system that counts the proportions at national level >> (typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also >> gerrymandering can be avoided this way. > > Yes, the votes could be summed at national level and the seats allocated at > national level. But you do not need to go to national > level to achieve proper representation. Where the electors also want some > guarantee of local representation, a satisfactory > compromise can be achieved with a much more modest 'district magnitude' than > one national district. In Finland there was a reform proposal that counted the proportions at national level, but the seats were still allocated in the existing districts. (Current government doesn't want to drive that proposal forward.) One can do this trick also with quite small districts. In Finland the size of the smallest districts is 6, but even smaller districts could work. Both targets can thus be met simultaneously, accurate proportionality and local(ish) representation. All systems will however have some "rounding errors". In this proposal the seats of the parties are allocated to the districts so that the total sum of seats per district and seats per party are exactly correct, which means that some of the last seats have to be "forced to go right", and this may violate the personal interests of some candidates (some other party may get the seat with fewer votes), but in a rather random / unpredictable / unbiased way that people are likely to accept. Political proportionality in the districts is also not as accurate as at the national level, but I guess the national level proportionality is the one that counts. In theory one could use this system also with single-member disticts, but the "forcing" operations would already be quite violent. If current single-member district countries want to keep the idea of very local representation, one approach could be to use only slightly larger districts tahn today (maybe 3, 4), calculate proportionality at national level, and then allocate the seats to the districts using some similar algorithm as in the Finnish reform proposal. Just an idea, to keep as much of the familiar and maybe liked feaures of the existing system. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
> >>> what is the scenario with two parties where FPTP is so flawed? > >> Only if you think that > >> third parties and independents should nor run, and there > >> should be only two parties, then Plurality is fine. > > On 4.6.2012, at 13.49, James Gilmour wrote: > > These contributions to this discussion take an extremely narrow view > > of representation of voters as it is clear this discussion is not > > about a single-winner election (state governor, city mayor) but about > > electing representative assemblies like state legislatures and city > > councils. There can be major problems of representation if such > > representative assemblies are elected by FPTP from single-member > > districts even when there are only two parties. > > > > Even when the electorates of the single-member districts are as near > > equal as possible and even when the turnouts are near equal, FPTP in > > single-member districts can deliver highly unrepresentative results if > > the support for the two parties is concentrated in particular > > districts - as it is in most electorates. Thus party A that wins 51 > > of the 100 seats in the assembly may win those seats by small margins > > (say 550 votes to 450 votes) but party B that looses the election with > > 49 of the 100 seats may have won its seats by overwhelming margins > > (say 700 votes to 300 votes). Thus the 51 A to 49 B result is highly > > unrepresentative of those who actually voted: 42,750 for party A but > > 57,250 for party B. > > > > These numbers are deliberately exaggerated to show the point, but here > > in the UK we see this effect in every UK General Election since 1945, > > where the "win small, loose big" effect of FPTP has consistently > > benefited the Labour Party at the expense of the Conservative Party. > > > > And where such vote concentration exists - at is does everywhere - > > the result can be greatly influenced by where the boundaries of the > > single-member districts are drawn. "Move the boundary, change the > > result". > > > > These are fundamental defects of FPTP in single-member districts that > > must be addressed if you want your elected assemblies to be properly > > representative of those who vote. > > > > Both of these defects has greater effect if the electorates are not so > > equal or if the turnouts vary with party support (as they certainly do > > in the UK). > > > > So even when there are only two parties, FPTP is very far from "fine". > Juho Sent: Monday, June 04, 2012 4:06 PM> > Yes, that makes sense. FPTP in single-member districts is not > fair in the sense that it gives only approximate results (due > to the inaccuracy of counting the seats in single-member > districts) and is vulnerable to gerrymandering. It is not a question of "not fair" (which can be a highly subjective assessment), it is simply that the result is not properly representative. And the distortion is not due to "inaccuracy" - the defect is inherent in the system as it is based on single-member districts. And it is a defect, given the purpose of the election - to elect a representative assembly.. Such a system is vulnerable to gerrymandering, i.e. to the DELIBERATE manipulation of the district boundaries. But the real point is that these boundary effects occur even when there is no gerrymandering, i.e. no deliberate manipulation. > A system that counts the proportions at national level > (typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also > gerrymandering can be avoided this way. Yes, the votes could be summed at national level and the seats allocated at national level. But you do not need to go to national level to achieve proper representation. Where the electors also want some guarantee of local representation, a satisfactory compromise can be achieved with a much more modest 'district magnitude' than one national district. > The discussed proposal of changing the Plurality/FPTP method > of the single-member districts to some other single-winner > method has still many of the discussed problems (inaccuracy, > gerrymandering). One could try to construct also two-party > systems or single-member district based systems that would > avoid those problems. But maybe proportional representation > is a more likely "ideal end result". Practical reforms may > however start with whatever achievable steps. All single-member district voting systems will have similar defects. But remember my comments were made in direct response to the statements quoted at the top: (more or less) "If there are only two parties, FPTP is fine".I think the problem with what may be regarded "achievable steps" is that many contributors to this list start in the wrong place. "Elections are for electors" - so where the objective is to elect a 'representative assembly' (state legislature, city council), the first requirement should be that the voting system delivers an assembly that
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
On 4.6.2012, at 13.49, James Gilmour wrote: I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should maybe also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and we should stick to the same two parties forever. >>> >>> I don't get it. >>> >>> of course, if there are only two candidates, there is no problem with >>> Plurality (because it's also a Majority). >>> >>> so how is Plurality so flawed if we accept that a two-party system is >>> fine and dandy? if not Third parties, for Independents? >>> >>> what is the scenario with two parties where FPTP is so flawed? >> >> I think you already said it. If you want a system that allows >> also third parties and independents take part in the >> election, then Plurality is flawed. Only if you think that >> third parties and independents should nor run, and there >> should be only two parties, then Plurality is fine. > > These contributions to this discussion take an extremely narrow view of > representation of voters as it is clear this discussion is > not about a single-winner election (state governor, city mayor) but about > electing representative assemblies like state legislatures > and city councils. There can be major problems of representation if such > representative assemblies are elected by FPTP from > single-member districts even when there are only two parties. > > Even when the electorates of the single-member districts are as near equal as > possible and even when the turnouts are near equal, > FPTP in single-member districts can deliver highly unrepresentative results > if the support for the two parties is concentrated in > particular districts - as it is in most electorates. Thus party A that wins > 51 of the 100 seats in the assembly may win those > seats by small margins (say 550 votes to 450 votes) but party B that looses > the election with 49 of the 100 seats may have won its > seats by overwhelming margins (say 700 votes to 300 votes). Thus the 51 A to > 49 B result is highly unrepresentative of those who > actually voted: 42,750 for party A but 57,250 for party B. > > These numbers are deliberately exaggerated to show the point, but here in the > UK we see this effect in every UK General Election > since 1945, where the "win small, loose big" effect of FPTP has consistently > benefited the Labour Party at the expense of the > Conservative Party. > > And where such vote concentration exists - at is does everywhere - the > result can be greatly influenced by where the boundaries > of the single-member districts are drawn. "Move the boundary, change the > result". > > These are fundamental defects of FPTP in single-member districts that must be > addressed if you want your elected assemblies to be > properly representative of those who vote. > > Both of these defects has greater effect if the electorates are not so equal > or if the turnouts vary with party support (as they > certainly do in the UK). > > So even when there are only two parties, FPTP is very far from "fine". > > James Gilmour Yes, that makes sense. FPTP in single-member districts is not fair in the sense that it gives only approximate results (due to the inaccuracy of counting the seats in single-member districts) and is vulnerable to gerrymandering. A system that counts the proportions at national level (typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also gerrymandering can be avoided this way. The discussed proposal of changing the Plurality/FPTP method of the single-member districts to some other single-winner method has still many of the discussed problems (inaccuracy, gerrymandering). One could try to construct also two-party systems or single-member district based systems that would avoid those problems. But maybe proportional representation is a more likely "ideal end result". Practical reforms may however start with whatever achievable steps. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
> >> I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the > >> single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should > >> maybe also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and > >> we should stick to the same two parties forever. > > > > I don't get it. > > > > of course, if there are only two candidates, there is no problem with > > Plurality (because it's also a Majority). > > > > so how is Plurality so flawed if we accept that a two-party system is > > fine and dandy? if not Third parties, for Independents? > > > > what is the scenario with two parties where FPTP is so flawed? > > I think you already said it. If you want a system that allows > also third parties and independents take part in the > election, then Plurality is flawed. Only if you think that > third parties and independents should nor run, and there > should be only two parties, then Plurality is fine. These contributions to this discussion take an extremely narrow view of representation of voters as it is clear this discussion is not about a single-winner election (state governor, city mayor) but about electing representative assemblies like state legislatures and city councils. There can be major problems of representation if such representative assemblies are elected by FPTP from single-member districts even when there are only two parties. Even when the electorates of the single-member districts are as near equal as possible and even when the turnouts are near equal, FPTP in single-member districts can deliver highly unrepresentative results if the support for the two parties is concentrated in particular districts - as it is in most electorates. Thus party A that wins 51 of the 100 seats in the assembly may win those seats by small margins (say 550 votes to 450 votes) but party B that looses the election with 49 of the 100 seats may have won its seats by overwhelming margins (say 700 votes to 300 votes). Thus the 51 A to 49 B result is highly unrepresentative of those who actually voted: 42,750 for party A but 57,250 for party B. These numbers are deliberately exaggerated to show the point, but here in the UK we see this effect in every UK General Election since 1945, where the "win small, loose big" effect of FPTP has consistently benefited the Labour Party at the expense of the Conservative Party. And where such vote concentration exists - at is does everywhere - the result can be greatly influenced by where the boundaries of the single-member districts are drawn. "Move the boundary, change the result". These are fundamental defects of FPTP in single-member districts that must be addressed if you want your elected assemblies to be properly representative of those who vote. Both of these defects has greater effect if the electorates are not so equal or if the turnouts vary with party support (as they certainly do in the UK). So even when there are only two parties, FPTP is very far from "fine". James Gilmour - No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.2178 / Virus Database: 2425/5044 - Release Date: 06/04/12 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
On 4.6.2012, at 6.38, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > On 6/3/12 5:08 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: >> On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >>> 2012/6/2 Juho Laatu mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk>> >>> ... >>> >>> One difference is that Approval is a compromise oriented method >>>while Plurality aims at electing from (and forming) large >>>parties. If our target is to establish a two-party system, >>>Plurality is our natural choice. >>> >>> >>> I strongly disagree. Even for a two-party system, plurality's flaws are >>> worse than its advantages. Even if two-party is your goal (and I'd argue >>> that's a bad goal, you can get the same actual beneficial ends without two >>> parties if you need to), IRV and/or official party primaries are the way to >>> get it. >> >> Problems of Plurality: >> - votes to third parties are pretty much lost votes >> - voting becomes very problematic when there are more than two potential >> winners >> >> Problems of Approval: >> - voters must find their best strategic vote (in competitive elections) >> - voting becomes very problematic when there are more than two potential >> winners >> >> Differences >> - Plurality elects from large parties >> - Approval elects compromise candidates (strategies may lead to something >> else too) >> >> Based on this ultra-quick analysis, all depends on what the targets are. >> >> I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the >> single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should maybe >> also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and we should >> stick to the same two parties forever. > > i don't get it. > > of course, if there are only two candidates, there is no problem with > Plurality (because it's also a Majority). > > so how is Plurality so flawed if we accept that a two-party system is fine > and dandy? if not Third parties, for Independents? > > what is the scenario with two parties where FPTP is so flawed? I think you already said it. If you want a system that allows also third parties and independents take part in the election, then Plurality is flawed. Only if you think that third parties and independents should nor run, and there should be only two parties, then Plurality is fine. Juho > > just curious. > > (i still reading what you guys have written.) > > -- > > r b-j r...@audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
2012/6/3 robert bristow-johnson > On 6/3/12 5:08 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: > >> On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >> 2012/6/2 Juho Laatu mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk>> >>> ... >>> >>> >>> One difference is that Approval is a compromise oriented method >>>while Plurality aims at electing from (and forming) large >>>parties. If our target is to establish a two-party system, >>>Plurality is our natural choice. >>> >>> >>> I strongly disagree. Even for a two-party system, plurality's flaws are >>> worse than its advantages. Even if two-party is your goal (and I'd argue >>> that's a bad goal, you can get the same actual beneficial ends without two >>> parties if you need to), IRV and/or official party primaries are the way to >>> get it. >>> >> >> Problems of Plurality: >> - votes to third parties are pretty much lost votes >> - voting becomes very problematic when there are more than two potential >> winners >> >> Problems of Approval: >> - voters must find their best strategic vote (in competitive elections) >> - voting becomes very problematic when there are more than two potential >> winners >> >> Differences >> - Plurality elects from large parties >> - Approval elects compromise candidates (strategies may lead to something >> else too) >> >> Based on this ultra-quick analysis, all depends on what the targets are. >> >> I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the >> single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should maybe >> also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and we should >> stick to the same two parties forever. >> > > i don't get it. > > of course, if there are only two candidates, there is no problem with > Plurality (because it's also a Majority). > > so how is Plurality so flawed if we accept that a two-party system is fine > and dandy? if not Third parties, for Independents? > > what is the scenario with two parties where FPTP is so flawed? > Small candidates spoiling the election. Yes, that can't happen with 2. parties, but it can happen with 2.01. And my larger point is that approval is strictly better than plurality. Even if you think 2 parties is just great (which as I've said before, is not a point I'm conceding; duopoly is bad and I can prove it), saying that therefore plurality is good is like saying that kids smarting off is bad so beating them regularly is good. Plurality maintains 2 parties with all stick, no carrot, and the bruises from that stick are a bigger negative than the biggest positive benefits anyone even claims plurality has. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
On 6/3/12 5:08 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2012/6/2 Juho Laatu mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk>> ... One difference is that Approval is a compromise oriented method while Plurality aims at electing from (and forming) large parties. If our target is to establish a two-party system, Plurality is our natural choice. I strongly disagree. Even for a two-party system, plurality's flaws are worse than its advantages. Even if two-party is your goal (and I'd argue that's a bad goal, you can get the same actual beneficial ends without two parties if you need to), IRV and/or official party primaries are the way to get it. Problems of Plurality: - votes to third parties are pretty much lost votes - voting becomes very problematic when there are more than two potential winners Problems of Approval: - voters must find their best strategic vote (in competitive elections) - voting becomes very problematic when there are more than two potential winners Differences - Plurality elects from large parties - Approval elects compromise candidates (strategies may lead to something else too) Based on this ultra-quick analysis, all depends on what the targets are. I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should maybe also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and we should stick to the same two parties forever. i don't get it. of course, if there are only two candidates, there is no problem with Plurality (because it's also a Majority). so how is Plurality so flawed if we accept that a two-party system is fine and dandy? if not Third parties, for Independents? what is the scenario with two parties where FPTP is so flawed? just curious. (i still reading what you guys have written.) -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
P.S. In Soda the Approval related problems with more than three potential winners might be easier to handle than in Approval. In Soda we may have all information of the voter approvals and the candidate preferences available, and this may lead to negotiations and consensus decision on how the candidates should vote. The decision may thus not be that much based on wild guesses on what the best strategy might be, but more on agreeing what a good result would be and then voting in line with that decision. Juho On 4.6.2012, at 0.08, Juho Laatu wrote: ... Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote: > 2012/6/2 Juho Laatu > On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> >> 2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My >> understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are >> only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three or more, the >> method pretty much fails >> >> Fails compared to what? At its worst, approval is still better than >> plurality; and depending on your voting model, it could be much better (for >> instance, honest probabilistic approval is range, with great BR). > I was just thinking that it "fails to work properly". > > Approval is more expressive than Plurality and it allows (small) third > parties to run without becoming spoilers. But I wouldn't say that it is > categorically better than Plurality since there are many needs and many uses > for election methods. One difference is that Approval is a compromise > oriented method while Plurality aims at electing from (and forming) large > parties. If our target is to establish a two-party system, Plurality is our > natural choice. > > I strongly disagree. Even for a two-party system, plurality's flaws are worse > than its advantages. Even if two-party is your goal (and I'd argue that's a > bad goal, you can get the same actual beneficial ends without two parties if > you need to), IRV and/or official party primaries are the way to get it. Problems of Plurality: - votes to third parties are pretty much lost votes - voting becomes very problematic when there are more than two potential winners Problems of Approval: - voters must find their best strategic vote (in competitive elections) - voting becomes very problematic when there are more than two potential winners Differences - Plurality elects from large parties - Approval elects compromise candidates (strategies may lead to something else too) Based on this ultra-quick analysis, all depends on what the targets are. I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should maybe also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and we should stick to the same two parties forever. That would be a very pure two-party system. I guess you want a system where third parties are allowed and they should also have some more important role in the system than just be a channel for protest votes. Let's then assume that we are interested in using an existing two-party oriented political system otherwise as it is, but replace Plurality with some other single-winner method in the single-member districts when we elect a representative body. Obviously we are also interested in allowing third parties to get seats. Plurality is out of question. A) With compromise seeking single-winner methods like Approval and Condorcet the size of the party is not very important. Small centrist parties/candidates may get lots of seats (more than it would get in proportional elections). B) With large party oriented single-winner methods like IRV (and others) the system stays closer to what it was. Higher number of representatives would come from large parties, but the new method would allow new parties to rise and replace the old large parties. I wrote this last part just to point out that the choice of the method will have a considerable impact on the dynamics of the system. Again we should agree first on what the targets are and only then say which methods are the best for our needs. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
2012/6/2 Juho Laatu > On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > >> 2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My >> understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are >> only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three or more, the >> method pretty much fails >> > > Fails compared to what? At its worst, approval is still better than > plurality; and depending on your voting model, it could be much better (for > instance, honest probabilistic approval is range, with great BR). > > Jameson > > > I was just thinking that it "fails to work properly". > > Approval is more expressive than Plurality and it allows (small) third > parties to run without becoming spoilers. But I wouldn't say that it is > categorically better than Plurality since there are many needs and many > uses for election methods. One difference is that Approval is a compromise > oriented method while Plurality aims at electing from (and forming) large > parties. If our target is to establish a two-party system, Plurality is our > natural choice. > I strongly disagree. Even for a two-party system, plurality's flaws are worse than its advantages. Even if two-party is your goal (and I'd argue that's a bad goal, you can get the same actual beneficial ends without two parties if you need to), IRV and/or official party primaries are the way to get it. Jameson > > Range and Approval (if seen as one Range variant) are good for certain > kind of elections. Typically we use majority based single-winner methods in > competitive political environments and utility based methods when we have > neutral non-competitive "judges" as voters. Also here the needs determine > which method is best. > > Juho > > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > 2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My > understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are > only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three or more, the > method pretty much fails > > Fails compared to what? At its worst, approval is still better than > plurality; and depending on your voting model, it could be much better (for > instance, honest probabilistic approval is range, with great BR). > > Jameson I was just thinking that it "fails to work properly". Approval is more expressive than Plurality and it allows (small) third parties to run without becoming spoilers. But I wouldn't say that it is categorically better than Plurality since there are many needs and many uses for election methods. One difference is that Approval is a compromise oriented method while Plurality aims at electing from (and forming) large parties. If our target is to establish a two-party system, Plurality is our natural choice. Range and Approval (if seen as one Range variant) are good for certain kind of elections. Typically we use majority based single-winner methods in competitive political environments and utility based methods when we have neutral non-competitive "judges" as voters. Also here the needs determine which method is best. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] My summary of the recent discussion
> > > 2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My > understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are > only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three or more, the > method pretty much fails > Fails compared to what? At its worst, approval is still better than plurality; and depending on your voting model, it could be much better (for instance, honest probabilistic approval is range, with great BR). Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] My summary of the recent discussion
As promised, here's a short summary of my findings in the recent lengthy email chain that discussed Approval, Condorecet and Plurality reform. 1) There was a proposal to replace the Plurality method with a compromise seeking single-winner method (e.g. Approval, Condorcet) in a two-party country. The reform would keep the single-member districts to elect representatives of the representative bodies. This proposal is unorthodox in the sense that it does not fall into the two traditional categories, two-party systems and proportional representation. The proposal is simple and therefore maybe an easy start. Time would tell how this kind of a "centrist representation oriented" system would change the dynamics of the political system. 2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three or more, the method pretty much fails since voters will have very hard time trying to find any reasonable way to vote. I made one case study of a problematic situation in http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-May/030437.html. 3) Mike Ossipoff presented a Condorcet strategy that is supposed to work in all Condorcet elections. The best description of the strategy that I got is: "if there are winnable unacceptable candidates and winnable acceptable candidates, find that winnable acceptable candidate that is most likely to win all the unacceptable candidates, and rank him alone at top". Terms "acceptable" and "unacceptable" refer simply to a larger than marginal preference gap between those candidate groups. In theory voters might be happy to bury their favourites if they have no chance to win in this election. And in theory not burying one's favourite might in some situations lead to a loop that would make the outcome worse from the voter's point of view. I analyzed this problem in one example case and concluded that in practical elections this strategy does not seem to pay off and therefore should not be followed. Further proposals of working Condorcet strategies that regular voters could implement and that are beneficial to them are welcome. As long as nobody presents such working strategies, sIncere strategy should be considered to be the best and recommended strategy for practical Condorcet elections. http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-May/030482.html In the discussions I wanted to make a clear distinction between theoretical vulnerabilities and practical vulnerabilities. A theoretical vulnerability means that there exists a set of sincere votes that can be modified (by one strategist with access to all the votes) so that the winner will change to a candidate that the strategic voters prefer to the sincere winner. This concept is still very far from a practical vulnerability, that requires a clear description of a strategy that can be implemented successfully in typical real life elections by normal voters, based on incomplete and conflicting poll information, continuously changing opinions, with possible other competing strategies, and that is likely to improve the outcome, and not be too risky. I also presented one additional strategy for Approval elections. That was just a sidetrack, but in case anyone is interested in how major parties could/should defend their strong position in Approval elections, here is a link. http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-May/030472.html Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
