Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
On Fri, Oct 17, 2008 at 5:03 PM, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > But hey, follow your passion. There are plenty of good things to do and we > should do them all and I think we're most effective when we're working on > what we personally care most about and in coalition with the right allies > even if they're focusing on different aspects of the movement. Well, being Irish, I don't have to do anything, since we already have PR-STV :). Though if I was bothered, maybe I would try to have the constituency sizes increased. However, that is also sorta happening automatically too. Gormley is the Minister for the Enviroment (responsible for setting the election boundary guidelines) and Green Party (i.e. a small party) leader and he has modified them so that the constituency commission should aim for larger constituencies for the council elections. Some of the supporters of the larger parties have called it "Gormley-mandering" ... because more proportionality is clearly evil. Ofc, they officially object to the loss of local representation (which moving from a 3 seater to a 5 seater clearly weakens). > I'm still going for changing single-winner election methods as the biggest > change, and likely biggest bang-per-buck we can get out of changes to work > on. Hopefully, improved electoral methods would help dull the benfits of gerrymandering and increase the risks. The majority party in a two party system have a large incentive to gerrymander as its members are guaranteed to win the gerrymandered districts. Given that voters would have more power to remove legislators with better voting systems, this is potentially higher risk as it makes your party look dishonest. Also, if no party has an outright majority it becomes harder still. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
On Oct 17, 2008, at 9:44 AM, Raph Frank wrote: Anyway, you would rank PR-STV behind single winner election methods? As a priority of things to do? Yeah kinda. It's substantially a separate issue. There will be single winner elections (mayor, governor, president, other one-off seats), and there will be multi- member bodies and some of those should be converted to a PR system, and for the time being getting better single winner elections could apply to all those districted elections. So I think getting ranking/ ratings ballots on single winner votes is the single biggest change we could make to the electoral system. But hey, follow your passion. There are plenty of good things to do and we should do them all and I think we're most effective when we're working on what we personally care most about and in coalition with the right allies even if they're focusing on different aspects of the movement. CPO-STV (or maybe Schulze-STV) are obvious improvements, but with big costs in complexity. I do think that vote management is a weakness of PR-STV (I wonder if Schulze STV would stop parties bothering to try). Also, the district sizes need to be reasonable (say 5+). In Ireland, there are 3.86 seats per constituency on average, which I think is to low. Oops, I may have written imprecisely. I meant "PR-STV" to mean the general philosophy of having Proportional Representation governing bodies, likely elected by a variation on STV. Also, if you could make one change, would you implement IRNR or redistricting reform? Unfortunately, with extreme gerrymandering, I think most methods would still elect a member of one of the two parties. I'm still going for changing single-winner election methods as the biggest change, and likely biggest bang-per-buck we can get out of changes to work on. Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
On Fri, Oct 17, 2008 at 3:29 PM, James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Raph Frank > Sent: Friday, October 17, 2008 2:45 PM >> Anyway, you would rank PR-STV behind single winner election methods? > > This is an illogical question. By definition, "single winner elections > methods" are for electing single winners. By definition > "PR-STV" is for obtaining proportionality of the voters for which several > winners must be elected together. So you are not > comparing like with like. Fair enough, I meant would you elect a legislature via single winner or PR. > Single winner voting systems should, of course, be used only for > single-office elections, like city mayor or state governor. Single > winner voting methods should never be used to elect assemblies, like a city > council or a state legislature. Ok, then we are in agreement. Actually, I would see the reviewing House of the legislature as less important in this regard, but the primary/government linked House should be PR based. > There is, of course, a separate debate about the nature of assemblies elected > by PR voting systems (of different kinds) and those > elected by single-winner voting systems. But that is essentially a political > debate about how representative or how distorted you > want the assembly to be, and about some of the other effects of some > single-winner voting systems, such as the tendency of some > single-winner voting systems to manufacturing single-party majorities within > the assembly even when no such majority exists among > the voters. Some see such distortion of the voters' wishes as highly > undesirable, while others see that distortion as highly > desirable, indeed, as an essential feature of the political system for "good > and effective government". True, some see the solid majorities given by plurality as one of its main benefits. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
Raph Frank > Sent: Friday, October 17, 2008 2:45 PM > Anyway, you would rank PR-STV behind single winner election methods? This is an illogical question. By definition, "single winner elections methods" are for electing single winners. By definition "PR-STV" is for obtaining proportionality of the voters for which several winners must be elected together. So you are not comparing like with like. Single winner voting systems should, of course, be used only for single-office elections, like city mayor or state governor. Single winner voting methods should never be used to elect assemblies, like a city council or a state legislature. In contrast, PR-STV is a voting system that in its PR form can be use only to elect an assembly, either at large or in parts (from two or more multi-member electoral districts). There is, of course, a separate debate about the nature of assemblies elected by PR voting systems (of different kinds) and those elected by single-winner voting systems. But that is essentially a political debate about how representative or how distorted you want the assembly to be, and about some of the other effects of some single-winner voting systems, such as the tendency of some single-winner voting systems to manufacturing single-party majorities within the assembly even when no such majority exists among the voters. Some see such distortion of the voters' wishes as highly undesirable, while others see that distortion as highly desirable, indeed, as an essential feature of the political system for "good and effective government". James Gilmour No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com Version: 8.0.173 / Virus Database: 270.8.1/1729 - Release Date: 16/10/2008 19:12 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
On Fri, Oct 17, 2008 at 2:09 PM, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > That's like asking the oft asked question, 'which candidate is electable?' > and I HATE that question. > It's like suggesting that we prematurely compromise and compress our > election reform advocacy down to a single method to push for when I'd much > rather say that I support: 1. IRNR, 2. Condorcet, 3. IRV, 4. Approval. And > sometimes I want a side of PR-STV, redistricting and elimination of bad > voting machines. That is a good point, for a group that all accepts plurality is bad, it is still in effect used for polling purposes. I would probably go 1: Approval (slightly ahead of condorcet) 1: Condorcet 2: IRNR 3. IRV I don't think IRNR is sufficiently examined to really know where to put it though. It might have serious strategy issues. Anyway, you would rank PR-STV behind single winner election methods? I would rate PR-STV as one of, if not the best voting system (and certainly one of the best system that is actually in use). It also has the added advantage that it is also a redistricting reform (or at least makes redistricting less important). CPO-STV (or maybe Schulze-STV) are obvious improvements, but with big costs in complexity. I do think that vote management is a weakness of PR-STV (I wonder if Schulze STV would stop parties bothering to try). Also, the district sizes need to be reasonable (say 5+). In Ireland, there are 3.86 seats per constituency on average, which I think is to low. Also, if you could make one change, would you implement IRNR or redistricting reform? Unfortunately, with extreme gerrymandering, I think most methods would still elect a member of one of the two parties. > In my few years of election reform advocacy, nearly everyone I've talked to > agrees that 'rankings ballots' or 'ranked choice voting' is a good idea. > Probably 80-90% of people I talk to I've been able to convince that IRV is > severely suboptimal (but better than nothing) and that Condorcet methods are > better. Maybe I should try to write down the elevator pitches/stump > speechs/good lines/patter that seem to work and put together a pamphlet for > election reform advocates. Can't hurt. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
On Oct 16, 2008, at 10:11 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote: Which system do you think would work best that is actually achievable? That's like asking the oft asked question, 'which candidate is electable?' and I HATE that question. It's like suggesting that we prematurely compromise and compress our election reform advocacy down to a single method to push for when I'd much rather say that I support: 1. IRNR, 2. Condorcet, 3. IRV, 4. Approval. And sometimes I want a side of PR-STV, redistricting and elimination of bad voting machines. In my few years of election reform advocacy, nearly everyone I've talked to agrees that 'rankings ballots' or 'ranked choice voting' is a good idea. Probably 80-90% of people I talk to I've been able to convince that IRV is severely suboptimal (but better than nothing) and that Condorcet methods are better. Maybe I should try to write down the elevator pitches/stump speechs/good lines/patter that seem to work and put together a pamphlet for election reform advocates. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
Greg Nisbet wrote: > Which system would be the most bang for the buck? What system would take the > least amount of convincing for the greatest gain? > ... > Which system do you think would work best that is actually achievable? Don't forget cascade voting, because: a) cost = zero bucks b) no need to convince voters up front (they can just try it out), nor get approval from government nor parties (they have no say) c) actually achievable, because we're doing it now (but yet to prove popularity) d) works best in theory, so I think (but, again, yet to prove) http://zelea.com/project/votorola/home.xht Anyway, it's something different to consider. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
Interesting. What I meant was what is the best method that actually has some reasonable chance of being implemented. IRV has been implemented in some cities and both Obama and McCain have stated that they support it, I would say that qualifies as a reasonable chance. However, if you think that Condorcet methods have a reasonable chance of being implemented, think again! Given the public as it is, would you suggest that Condorcet would actually be implemented? Condorcet is a reasonable system, far better than FPTP or TRS, but I think the public would demonstrtate considerable aversion to it. The nice thing about TRS is, you don't have to convince anyone about anything they do not already believe. On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 8:41 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: > I argue for Condorcet, include Range, Approval, and IRV in my discussion, > ad claim it to be the best for single winners. > > For all these I talk of Best, Soso, Worst, and other unnamed candidates. > > Pick the one or more candidates you would like to vote for. > > Proceed by method: > Approval: You are giving them equal indication of desirability. B is > obvious. S is questionable - including it would be doing your best to elect > either B or S, though you want S ONLY if you cannot get B. > Range: With ratings you can rate B as best and S as less desirable. > Deciding on ratings gets tricky if you vote for several. > Condorcet: Scoring ballots as in a tournament. It's ranks have > neither the power of ratings, nor the pain of trying to use them. Here you > rank candidates according to how well you like them, including equals if you > like two equally well. > IRV: Almost the same ballot as Condorcet, except no equals. Its way > of counting sometimes awards the win to someone most would agree is not > deserving. > > Back to scoring Condorcet. If 5 rank A>C and 6 rank C>A, C is on the way > to winning - and will win if outranking each other candidate. > As in sports tournaments, there can be headaches such as A>C, C>E, and > E>A, and no clear winner. These have to be provided for but do not have to > be studied in detail to understand the method. > > DWK > > > On Thu, 16 Oct 2008 19:11:47 -0700 Greg Nisbet wrote: > > As I?m sure all of you have noticed, if you attempt to explain a voting > > system that is better than FPTP to some average person/non-nerd they > > will either: > > a) say they don't understand it > > b) attack you with some flawed conception of OMOV > > c) say that the current system will never be changed > > > > Which system would be the most bang for the buck? What system would take > > the least amount of convincing for the greatest gain? > > > > I'd say the two round system. It is really easy to convince people that > > it is better, simply say that they deserve the right to be able to vote > > for whom they wish on the first go without having to fear wasting their > > vote. You are not stepping on the FPTP is bad landmine. TRS is arguably > > better than IRV and plurality and it has, IMO, the best chance of > > passing. It breaks two party domination reasonably well and people > > understand it. It isn't monotone (Oh well), but it gets the important > > stuff done. > > > > Approval, although simple, takes effort to convince people of. They seem > > to think it is unfair to the people who only voted for one person if > > someone else can vote for two. It is like your vote is counting twice, > > according to them. > > > > Range I have actually managed to do. > > > > I tried Schulze, once, it failed miserably. You have to explain what a > > Condorcet matrix is, what a beatpath is, and a lot of concepts that make > > it sound foreign (a) and therefore bad (c). > > > > Which system do you think would work best that is actually achievable? > > > -- > [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek > Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 >Do to no one what you would not want done to you. > If you want peace, work for justice. > > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Populism and Voting Theory
I argue for Condorcet, include Range, Approval, and IRV in my discussion, ad claim it to be the best for single winners. For all these I talk of Best, Soso, Worst, and other unnamed candidates. Pick the one or more candidates you would like to vote for. Proceed by method: Approval: You are giving them equal indication of desirability. B is obvious. S is questionable - including it would be doing your best to elect either B or S, though you want S ONLY if you cannot get B. Range: With ratings you can rate B as best and S as less desirable. Deciding on ratings gets tricky if you vote for several. Condorcet: Scoring ballots as in a tournament. It's ranks have neither the power of ratings, nor the pain of trying to use them. Here you rank candidates according to how well you like them, including equals if you like two equally well. IRV: Almost the same ballot as Condorcet, except no equals. Its way of counting sometimes awards the win to someone most would agree is not deserving. Back to scoring Condorcet. If 5 rank A>C and 6 rank C>A, C is on the way to winning - and will win if outranking each other candidate. As in sports tournaments, there can be headaches such as A>C, C>E, and E>A, and no clear winner. These have to be provided for but do not have to be studied in detail to understand the method. DWK On Thu, 16 Oct 2008 19:11:47 -0700 Greg Nisbet wrote: > As I?m sure all of you have noticed, if you attempt to explain a voting > system that is better than FPTP to some average person/non-nerd they > will either: > a) say they don't understand it > b) attack you with some flawed conception of OMOV > c) say that the current system will never be changed > > Which system would be the most bang for the buck? What system would take > the least amount of convincing for the greatest gain? > > I'd say the two round system. It is really easy to convince people that > it is better, simply say that they deserve the right to be able to vote > for whom they wish on the first go without having to fear wasting their > vote. You are not stepping on the FPTP is bad landmine. TRS is arguably > better than IRV and plurality and it has, IMO, the best chance of > passing. It breaks two party domination reasonably well and people > understand it. It isn't monotone (Oh well), but it gets the important > stuff done. > > Approval, although simple, takes effort to convince people of. They seem > to think it is unfair to the people who only voted for one person if > someone else can vote for two. It is like your vote is counting twice, > according to them. > > Range I have actually managed to do. > > I tried Schulze, once, it failed miserably. You have to explain what a > Condorcet matrix is, what a beatpath is, and a lot of concepts that make > it sound foreign (a) and therefore bad (c). > > Which system do you think would work best that is actually achievable? > -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Populism and Voting Theory
As I'm sure all of you have noticed, if you attempt to explain a voting system that is better than FPTP to some average person/non-nerd they will either: a) say they don't understand it b) attack you with some flawed conception of OMOV c) say that the current system will never be changed Which system would be the most bang for the buck? What system would take the least amount of convincing for the greatest gain? I'd say the two round system. It is really easy to convince people that it is better, simply say that they deserve the right to be able to vote for whom they wish on the first go without having to fear wasting their vote. You are not stepping on the FPTP is bad landmine. TRS is arguably better than IRV and plurality and it has, IMO, the best chance of passing. It breaks two party domination reasonably well and people understand it. It isn't monotone (Oh well), but it gets the important stuff done. Approval, although simple, takes effort to convince people of. They seem to think it is unfair to the people who only voted for one person if someone else can vote for two. It is like your vote is counting twice, according to them. Range I have actually managed to do. I tried Schulze, once, it failed miserably. You have to explain what a Condorcet matrix is, what a beatpath is, and a lot of concepts that make it sound foreign (a) and therefore bad (c). Which system do you think would work best that is actually achievable? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
