Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Jameson Quinn,

please explain why Score DSV satisfies
monotonicity in the 4-candidate case
when the Dutta set is used instead of
the Smith set.

Markus Schulze



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Score DSV JQ edit

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

I reread this part:

--- En date de : Dim 30.8.09, Kevin Venzke  a écrit :
> > Ouch. That passage is obviously unclear. I meant
> > "strategy" in the sense of "declared
> > strategy". I was not considering any strategy at all
> > from the actual voters on the ballots they would input
> to
> > Score DSV, but virtual "declared" strategy on the
> > output (imaginary) renormalized ballots, which are
> intended
> > to be equivalent to (the probabilistic average of)
> their
> > strategic Range ballots if their input ballots are
> honest
> > and if they knew the true Smith set but nothing else.
> In
> > other words: if there is a condorcet winner, the
> correct
> > Range strategy for those who know that winner (and
> nothing
> > else) is to vote approval-style for that person and
> all
> > better candidates, thus Score DSV chooses the CW. It
> is a
> > Condorcet method, even though it does not satisfy the
> Smith
> > criterion (if there is no CW, it could potentially
> elect the
> > condorcet loser, if that candidate had a high
> renormalized
> > utility).

When I try again, to understand strategy as something the method is
doing by itself, I see that you want to explain why the CW always wins,
not explain how voters can guarantee that he wins.

I think there's an odd assumption in the method's logic though: What if
the CW is my last choice? It's not obvious that I should start giving 
him votes. Really, when there is only one choice left, my best strategy 
is to stay home!

Kevin Venzke


  


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Score DSV JQ

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

--- En date de : Sam 29.8.09, Jameson Quinn  a écrit :
>> Issues:
>> 
>> 1. If you don't use Warren's methodology and
>> assumptions, it's not clear
>> that your results will be convincing to a Range crowd. (And
>> other crowds
>> don't care as much.)

> The part about Range partisans being wedded to Warren's
> assumptions I understand, though I don't necessarily
> agree. The part about other partisans not caring about
> utility seems stranger to me. Why not?

Mostly because other crowds don't consider utility very easy to measure.
It could still be interesting.

> Anyway, I'm proposing having each virtual voting group
> evaluate whether strategy will help them, given different
> levels of true information. I think this is feasible
> computationally, and I don't see how anybody in any camp
> could argue that finding utility in this case is not
> relevant.
> 
>> 2. When Range voters vote approval-style and Condorcet
>> voters use
>> reasonably sane strategies, Range/Approval is known to be
>> worse, as the
>> number of viable candidates increases. So it won't be
>> that novel to show
>> that your method is better than Range
>> here.
>> Where are you getting this?

Warren practically said this himself in his "Range Voting" paper from
years ago. But he doesn't find this very important because he doesn't
believe Condorcet voters will use anything like sane strategies.

The fact that Approval gets worse as the number of viable candidates
increases I guess I take mostly from my own simulations. I may have
overstated how "known" it is.

>> 3. Given the nature of the differences between Approval and
>> Condorcet,
>> it seems that Score DSV's consideration of ratings is
>> more likely to
>> hurt it than help it here.
> With honest votes, or considering strategy? I can't see
> why you'd say this. Score DSV is more like Range than
> your average condorcet system.

Considering strategy.

>> Well, here are some comments going over the page
>> quickly.
>> "If there's a Condorcet winner, all voters'
>> ideal strategy will be to
>> vote approval-style, and the Condorcet winner will win,
>> thus this method
>> satisfies the Condorcet criterion."
>> 
>> I wrote out a whole long thing here but eventually realized
>> that you
>> aren't ruling out non-Smith candidates from winning.
>> And that is why you
>> are talking about strategy above.
>> 
>> Fortunately or unfortunately depending on your perspective,
>> you have to
>> evaluate Condorcet compliance based on cast votes. If a
>> voted CW doesn't
>> necessarily win, then Score DSV isn't a Condorcet
>> method.
> 
> Ouch. That passage is obviously unclear. I meant
> "strategy" in the sense of "declared
> strategy". I was not considering any strategy at all
> from the actual voters on the ballots they would input to
> Score DSV, but virtual "declared" strategy on the
> output (imaginary) renormalized ballots, which are intended
> to be equivalent to (the probabilistic average of) their
> strategic Range ballots if their input ballots are honest
> and if they knew the true Smith set but nothing else. In
> other words: if there is a condorcet winner, the correct
> Range strategy for those who know that winner (and nothing
> else) is to vote approval-style for that person and all
> better candidates, thus Score DSV chooses the CW. It is a
> Condorcet method, even though it does not satisfy the Smith
> criterion (if there is no CW, it could potentially elect the
> condorcet loser, if that candidate had a high renormalized
> utility).

I don't understand. You need to be able to say "if there is a CW,
then the CW is elected." What is this talk about strategy? Either
the CW necessarily wins in this method or he doesn't. It can't depend
on what the voters choose to do.

>> I don't remember (and won't examine presently) the
>> precise wording of
>> SFC (strategy-free criterion), but Score DSV doesn't
>> seem to satisfy
>> the votes-only shortcut interpretation, because it can
>> elect B with
>> these rankings:
>> 
>> 49 b (a and c rated zero)
>> 24 a>b
>> 27 c>a
>> 
>> The criticism is that the A>B voters can give away
>> victory to B, when
>> 
>> assuming no order reversal, A might be the "sincere
>> CW" but B definitely
>> is not.
>> This case has a CW, so Score DSV would choose that winner.

> There is no condorcet cycle. You need at least 4 of the b
> voters to vote b>c for your example to work. Then your
> example is no longer covered by the SFC, which states:
> "If a Condorcet candidate exists, and if a majority
> prefers this
> candidate to another candidate, then the other candidate
> should not win
> if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter
> falsifies
> any preferences.
> In a ranked method, it is nearly equivalent to say:
> If more than half of the voters rank x above
> y, and there is no candidate z whom more than
> half of the voters rank above x, then y must
> not be elected." 

I don't follow. The voted cycle is A>B>C>A.

>> It doesn't satisfy the votes

Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Jameson Quinn]

2009/8/30 Terry Bouricius 

>  Jameson,
>
> You asked: "The part about other partisans not caring about utility seems
> strange to me. Why not?"
> ...
>
Because the principle of Bayesian regret is in direct conflict with the
> principle of majority rule, many people reject it. Individuals can differ on
> the value of majority rule vs. utility, but it is a reason often cited.
>

I understand a little better, but still find this odd. Aren't voting
theorists used to trying to maximize on contradictory goals already? And, if
you're looking for a single overarching principle, "best utility in spite of
strategy" is much clearer than piling up some set of other criteria which
only talk about specific situations.

Clearly, any system which allows minority rule in the name of utility is
inevitably badly manipulable, and thus will end up with worse overall
utility in the long run. But that's no more reason to reject utility as a
valid comparison, than Arrow's theorem is a reason to reject
non-dictatorship.


>
> There are of course many other considerations that cause many scientists to
> reject utility as a meaningful measuring system, such as the proven natural
> non-linear logarithmic scoring tendency of the human brain, the
> unreliability of scoring compared to ranking and either or comparisons
> (which is why eye doctors use Condorcet logic and ask whether lens 1 or 2 is
> better repeatedly, rather than asking you to score all the lens options),
> etc.
>

Again, valid points. Still, they arguably don't apply to a computer model
based on utility. It does seem clear that, whatever preference system is
inside voters, it something that does not fit into a simple rank-order
model, so a more-general utility model is likely to capture it better (if
not perfectly). And it would be surprising to find some other quality metric
that got worse as the model improved.

Jameson

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Terry Bouricius]

Jameson,

You asked: "The part about other partisans not caring about utility seems 
strange to me. Why not?"

I don't want to engage in a debate on this on this list about the value of 
utility as a criterion, but can answer your question...Political scientists and 
many other social scientists (who approach election theory from a different 
angle than economists or social choice theorists) generally dismiss utility or 
Bayesian regret as a meaningful election assessment tool for several reasons. 
The quickest to understand is simply that there could be a candidate who is 
preferred over all other candidates by a large majority, yet another 
minority-favored candidate could be the utility maximizer (average utility), 
simply because the minority of voters really hate the majority winner and 
strongly like the other, while the majority think the winner is better, but not 
great. Because the principle of Bayesian regret is in direct conflict with the 
principle of majority rule, many people reject it. Individuals can differ on 
the value of majority rule vs. utility, but it is a reason often cited.

There are of course many other considerations that cause many scientists to 
reject utility as a meaningful measuring system, such as the proven natural 
non-linear logarithmic scoring tendency of the human brain, the unreliability 
of scoring compared to ranking and either or comparisons (which is why eye 
doctors use Condorcet logic and ask whether lens 1 or 2 is better repeatedly, 
rather than asking you to score all the lens options), etc.

Terry Bouricius

- Original Message - 
  From: Jameson Quinn 
  To: Kevin Venzke 
  Cc: election-meth...@electorama.com 
  Sent: Sunday, August 30, 2009 12:30 AM
  Subject: Re: [EM] Score DSV





  2009/8/29 Kevin Venzke 

Hello,

--- En date de : Sam 29.8.09, Jameson Quinn  a 
écrit :

>> I don't see why you would guess that Score DSV
>> would have better Bayesian Regret than Range. It looks like you tried
>> to make a method that helps a voter get the best result for himself,
>> which isn't the same as
>> getting the best result overall.
>
> I tried to make a method where honesty was strategic. That
> means allowing voters to usefully distinguish
> A>B>>C from A>>B>C or A=B>>C for any
> A, B, and C. This method does that, which removes any need
> for strategy at all in many cases, and gives defensive
> strategizers a chance to punish it in many more.


Yes. Making honesty the best strategy is a common goal. But for BR it is
a bad thing with sincere votes.


>> Warren defines BR in such a way that Range is unbeatable
>> given sincere votes.
> Absolutely, which is why I stated my BR challenge in terms
> of rational voters where at least half have an attainable
> strategy threshold.
>  
>> If he measured your method, admitting strategic votes, he
>> would make
>> strategy assumptions that would make it look terrible.
>
> Yep, which is why I (implicitly) offered to do the
> programming.


Warren makes his sim available. I'm not sure if it can easily do this
method, but probably.


> My strategy assumption is that voters will use
> strategy iff it has an expected value greater than some
> threshold. This is a very easy bar to meet in the case of
> Score voting (approval-style strategy is a painless win) and
> much harder in the case of good Condorcet methods (where
> "good method", in my definition, means that they
> reduce the cases in which strategy works, and increase the
> cases in which it backfires, to the point where almost any
> voter with less-than-perfect information has a negative
> expected value for strategy, and even under perfect
> information only a tiny fraction of voters can benefit from
> strategy). Therefore, *rational* strategic voters will be
> more strategic under Score than under a good Condorcet
> method, giving the Condorcet method a possible margin for
> victory. Score DSV, because it takes the actual utilities
> into account sometimes, should have the widest victory, if
> the differences are significant.


Issues:
1. If you don't use Warren's methodology and assumptions, it's not clear
that your results will be convincing to a Range crowd. (And other crowds
don't care as much.)

  The part about Range partisans being wedded to Warren's assumptions I 
understand, though I don't necessarily agree. The part about other partisans 
not caring about utility seems stranger to me. Why not?

  Anyway, I'm proposing having each virtual voting group evaluate whether 
strategy will help them, given dif

Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Jameson Quinn]

2009/8/29 Kevin Venzke 

> Hello,
>
> --- En date de : Sam 29.8.09, Jameson Quinn  a
> écrit :
> >> I don't see why you would guess that Score DSV
> >> would have better Bayesian Regret than Range. It looks like you tried
> >> to make a method that helps a voter get the best result for himself,
> >> which isn't the same as
> >> getting the best result overall.
> >
> > I tried to make a method where honesty was strategic. That
> > means allowing voters to usefully distinguish
> > A>B>>C from A>>B>C or A=B>>C for any
> > A, B, and C. This method does that, which removes any need
> > for strategy at all in many cases, and gives defensive
> > strategizers a chance to punish it in many more.
>
> Yes. Making honesty the best strategy is a common goal. But for BR it is
> a bad thing with sincere votes.
>
> >> Warren defines BR in such a way that Range is unbeatable
> >> given sincere votes.
> > Absolutely, which is why I stated my BR challenge in terms
> > of rational voters where at least half have an attainable
> > strategy threshold.
> >
> >> If he measured your method, admitting strategic votes, he
> >> would make
> >> strategy assumptions that would make it look terrible.
> >
> > Yep, which is why I (implicitly) offered to do the
> > programming.
>
> Warren makes his sim available. I'm not sure if it can easily do this
> method, but probably.
>
> > My strategy assumption is that voters will use
> > strategy iff it has an expected value greater than some
> > threshold. This is a very easy bar to meet in the case of
> > Score voting (approval-style strategy is a painless win) and
> > much harder in the case of good Condorcet methods (where
> > "good method", in my definition, means that they
> > reduce the cases in which strategy works, and increase the
> > cases in which it backfires, to the point where almost any
> > voter with less-than-perfect information has a negative
> > expected value for strategy, and even under perfect
> > information only a tiny fraction of voters can benefit from
> > strategy). Therefore, *rational* strategic voters will be
> > more strategic under Score than under a good Condorcet
> > method, giving the Condorcet method a possible margin for
> > victory. Score DSV, because it takes the actual utilities
> > into account sometimes, should have the widest victory, if
> > the differences are significant.
>
> Issues:
> 1. If you don't use Warren's methodology and assumptions, it's not clear
> that your results will be convincing to a Range crowd. (And other crowds
> don't care as much.)


The part about Range partisans being wedded to Warren's assumptions I
understand, though I don't necessarily agree. The part about other partisans
not caring about utility seems stranger to me. Why not?

Anyway, I'm proposing having each virtual voting group evaluate whether
strategy will help them, given different levels of true information. I think
this is feasible computationally, and I don't see how anybody in any camp
could argue that finding utility in this case is not relevant.


>
> 2. When Range voters vote approval-style and Condorcet voters use
> reasonably sane strategies, Range/Approval is known to be worse, as the
> number of viable candidates increases. So it won't be that novel to show
> that your method is better than Range here.


Where are you getting this?


>
> 3. Given the nature of the differences between Approval and Condorcet,
> it seems that Score DSV's consideration of ratings is more likely to
> hurt it than help it here.


With honest votes, or considering strategy? I can't see why you'd say this.
Score DSV is more like Range than your average condorcet system.



>
>
> > I realize this is all hot air until I actually program
> > this. Yet it is at least falsifiable hot air.
> >
> >> Your wiki page seems to be lacking some
> >> proofs.
> >
> > As in, all of them? :)
> >
> > Guilty as charged. Which proofs would you like to see
> > first? I make about 25 provable/disprovable claims on the
> > page, that's a lot of work and it would help if I knew
> > which ones y'all wanted me to start with. (I already got
> > Marcus to disprove one of my claims for me by posting here,
> > so my evil plot worked... thanks, Dr. Schulze :)
>
> Well, here are some comments going over the page quickly.
>
> "If there's a Condorcet winner, all voters' ideal strategy will be to
> vote approval-style, and the Condorcet winner will win, thus this method
> satisfies the Condorcet criterion."
>
> I wrote out a whole long thing here but eventually realized that you
> aren't ruling out non-Smith candidates from winning. And that is why you
> are talking about strategy above.
>
> Fortunately or unfortunately depending on your perspective, you have to
> evaluate Condorcet compliance based on cast votes. If a voted CW doesn't
> necessarily win, then Score DSV isn't a Condorcet method.
>

Ouch. That passage is obviously unclear. I meant "strategy" in the sense of
"declared strategy". I was not considering a

Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

--- En date de : Sam 29.8.09, Jameson Quinn  a écrit :
>> I don't see why you would guess that Score DSV
>> would have better Bayesian Regret than Range. It looks like you tried 
>> to make a method that helps a voter get the best result for himself, 
>> which isn't the same as
>> getting the best result overall.
>
> I tried to make a method where honesty was strategic. That
> means allowing voters to usefully distinguish
> A>B>>C from A>>B>C or A=B>>C for any
> A, B, and C. This method does that, which removes any need
> for strategy at all in many cases, and gives defensive
> strategizers a chance to punish it in many more.

Yes. Making honesty the best strategy is a common goal. But for BR it is
a bad thing with sincere votes.

>> Warren defines BR in such a way that Range is unbeatable
>> given sincere votes.
> Absolutely, which is why I stated my BR challenge in terms
> of rational voters where at least half have an attainable
> strategy threshold.
>  
>> If he measured your method, admitting strategic votes, he
>> would make
>> strategy assumptions that would make it look terrible.
> 
> Yep, which is why I (implicitly) offered to do the
> programming.

Warren makes his sim available. I'm not sure if it can easily do this
method, but probably.

> My strategy assumption is that voters will use
> strategy iff it has an expected value greater than some
> threshold. This is a very easy bar to meet in the case of
> Score voting (approval-style strategy is a painless win) and
> much harder in the case of good Condorcet methods (where
> "good method", in my definition, means that they
> reduce the cases in which strategy works, and increase the
> cases in which it backfires, to the point where almost any
> voter with less-than-perfect information has a negative
> expected value for strategy, and even under perfect
> information only a tiny fraction of voters can benefit from
> strategy). Therefore, *rational* strategic voters will be
> more strategic under Score than under a good Condorcet
> method, giving the Condorcet method a possible margin for
> victory. Score DSV, because it takes the actual utilities
> into account sometimes, should have the widest victory, if
> the differences are significant.

Issues:
1. If you don't use Warren's methodology and assumptions, it's not clear
that your results will be convincing to a Range crowd. (And other crowds
don't care as much.)
2. When Range voters vote approval-style and Condorcet voters use
reasonably sane strategies, Range/Approval is known to be worse, as the
number of viable candidates increases. So it won't be that novel to show
that your method is better than Range here.
3. Given the nature of the differences between Approval and Condorcet,
it seems that Score DSV's consideration of ratings is more likely to
hurt it than help it here.

> I realize this is all hot air until I actually program
> this. Yet it is at least falsifiable hot air.
> 
>> Your wiki page seems to be lacking some
>> proofs.
>
> As in, all of them? :)
> 
> Guilty as charged. Which proofs would you like to see
> first? I make about 25 provable/disprovable claims on the
> page, that's a lot of work and it would help if I knew
> which ones y'all wanted me to start with. (I already got
> Marcus to disprove one of my claims for me by posting here,
> so my evil plot worked... thanks, Dr. Schulze :)

Well, here are some comments going over the page quickly.

"If there's a Condorcet winner, all voters' ideal strategy will be to 
vote approval-style, and the Condorcet winner will win, thus this method
satisfies the Condorcet criterion."

I wrote out a whole long thing here but eventually realized that you
aren't ruling out non-Smith candidates from winning. And that is why you
are talking about strategy above.

Fortunately or unfortunately depending on your perspective, you have to
evaluate Condorcet compliance based on cast votes. If a voted CW doesn't
necessarily win, then Score DSV isn't a Condorcet method.

The fact that voters have a defensive counterstrategy isn't remarkable
or reassuring in itself; we would want to know what it is and whether it
is intuitive to use it. When we talk about the larger group being a
majority, I'm not sure we can design a Condorcet method where there isn't
a defensive counterstrategy.

It would be nice to see reasoning as to why Score DSV would outperform
Condorcet methods wrt favorite betrayal incentive.

By the way, it's controversial to say that favorite betrayal is a typical
strategy in Condorcet methods. Compared to other rank methods Condorcet
is generally good at this, and Schulze(wv) was nearly perfect when I
tested it.

I don't remember (and won't examine presently) the precise wording of
SFC (strategy-free criterion), but Score DSV doesn't seem to satisfy
the votes-only shortcut interpretation, because it can elect B with
these rankings:
49 b (a and c rated zero)
24 a>b
27 c>a

The criticism is that the A>B voters can give away victory to B,

Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

--- En date de : Sam 29.8.09, Jameson Quinn  a écrit :
> I expect that Score DSV will have lower Bayesian Regret
> than any other system, even score (aka range) voting, given
> voters with any reasonable amount of non-false information
> making a rational choice of strategies, with any given
> (ideologically-biased or -unbiased) mix of minimum
> expected-benefit thresholds for voting strategically rather
> than honestly, as long as at least half of voters have an
> "attainable" strategic threshold.

I don't see why you would guess that Score DSV would have better
Bayesian Regret than Range. It looks like you tried to make a method that
helps a voter get the best result for himself, which isn't the same as
getting the best result overall.

Warren defines BR in such a way that Range is unbeatable given sincere
votes.

If he measured your method, admitting strategic votes, he would make 
strategy assumptions that would make it look terrible.

Your wiki page seems to be lacking some proofs.

Kevin Venzke


  


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Jameson Quinn]

Good catch. Of course, this means that there must be more than 3 members of
the Smith set, as well as some other conditions (generally, of the voters
who consider A as neither worst nor best of the original Smith set, a larger
or "stronger" group must consider B as last than the group which considers B
as first; so this limits the number of voters who could see non-monotonic
results).

So you're right. Score DSV is only monotonic up to 3 (serious) candidates.
Make that 4 if you use the Dutta set (which cannot have 4 members) instead
of the Smith set. That is a better system generally except that it's more of
a pain to explain. Still, you've pointed to a clear advantage for Schulze.

So, how do you respond to the two things I see as clear advantages for Score
DSV over Schulze: the "defensive participation criterion" (*If a given
election chooses X, and new voters are added who prefer X over Y, then the
set of voters who prefer X over Y have some way of voting to make sure Y
does not win without reversing any preferences or falsely voting any
candidates equally.)* and the "ultra-strong defensive criterion"
(*non-dishonest
defensive strategies are always available to larger and/or more-motivated
groups (where motivation is counted relative to the Smith set) than the
corresponding offensive strategies*).

2009/8/29 Markus Schulze 

> Hallo,
>
> it seems to me that Score DSV does not satisfy
> monotonicity. It seems to me that the following
> scenario is possible:
>
>   Candidate A is the original winner.
>
>   Suppose some voters rank candidate A higher
>   without changing the order in which they
>   rank the other candidates relatively to
>   each other. Then it is possible that some
>   other candidate B is kicked out of the Smith
>   set and that, after renormalizing the ballots,
>   candidate A is worse off.
>
> Markus Schulze
>
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Markus Schulze]

Hallo,

it seems to me that Score DSV does not satisfy
monotonicity. It seems to me that the following
scenario is possible:

   Candidate A is the original winner.

   Suppose some voters rank candidate A higher
   without changing the order in which they
   rank the other candidates relatively to
   each other. Then it is possible that some
   other candidate B is kicked out of the Smith
   set and that, after renormalizing the ballots,
   candidate A is worse off.

Markus Schulze



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Score DSV

[Jameson Quinn]

>
> (Note: I actually do believe that this method is objectively better, but I
> can easily imagine intelligent good-faith disagreements, so I'm
> intentionally being a wee bit trollish by stating it so unequivocally. I do
> not intend to give offense, though, and I would be happy to be corrected if
> I'm wrong.)


Oh, one more qualification to my semi-trollishness. I of course believe that
both Shulze and Score/Range are excellent systems overall and would
enthusiastically support a movement to put either of them into practice at
any level. In fact, that's why I'm comparing Score DSV to those methods; you
don't win the championship by challenging the also-rans.

Cheers.

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Score DSV

[Jameson Quinn]

I've just put up a page on the electorama wiki for Score
DSV(aka Range DSV), a
condorcet/score voting single-winner method in which a
voter's score ballot is counted as if they'd used the "*D*eclared *S*trategy"
of renormalizing so that the Smith set spanned from 0 (minimum score) to 100
(maximum score).

I'm going to say some provocative things about this method, to ensure that
Marcus and Warren will respond and so to start the debate.

Score DSV is superior, theoretically, to Schulze. Looking at compliance with
results-based criteria, it either complies or does better than compliance
with all the same criteria, and comes closer to complying with the
participation criterion. The only way that Schulze is clearly better is the
summability criterion (which is not a results-based criterion); Score DSV
requires (at most) two rounds of counting, though it does have a variant
which is order-3 summable (that is, using a cube-like matrix instead of most
Condorcet methods' square one). Note that "better than compliance" includes
either compliance with a stricter criterion (in the case of the Strong
Defense Criterion) or non-compliance which actually results in a
higher-utility winner (in the case of: Smith criterion, Mutual majority
criterion , local
independence from irrelevant
alternatives,
Schwartz criterion , and
the Generalized
Strategy-Free 
criterion
.)

I expect that Score DSV will have lower Bayesian Regret than any other
system, even score (aka range) voting, given voters with any reasonable
amount of non-false information making a rational choice of strategies, with
any given (ideologically-biased or -unbiased) mix of minimum
expected-benefit thresholds for voting strategically rather than honestly,
as long as at least half of voters have an "attainable" strategic threshold.
Obviously, this is an empirical question, and "put up or shut up" is a
reasonable response (Warren, what's the link for your source code and for a
clear explanation of your monte carlo models for voter utility?)

(Note: I actually do believe that this method is objectively better, but I
can easily imagine intelligent good-faith disagreements, so I'm
intentionally being a wee bit trollish by stating it so unequivocally. I do
not intend to give offense, though, and I would be happy to be corrected if
I'm wrong.)

Jameson

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