Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 04:18 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>Dear Abd ul-Rahman,
>
>>I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the 
>>fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions;
>
>What exactly is "majority consent"? In my understanding "consent" 
>means *all* voters share some opinion...

No. That's consensus. Consent is individual acceptance of a result, 
majority consent refers to consent by a majority.


>>what do you call it when a minority imposes its will on a majority?
>
>It is not democratic whenever some group can impose its will on the 
>others (in the sense of making their preferred outcome certain). No 
>matter whether that group is a majority or a minority. From this it 
>follows that a method which is always deterministic cannot possibly 
>be democratic.

This is a serious error. It treats democracy as an absolute, when, in 
fact, it is relative. We have complete democracy, with respect to 
some decision, when everyone consents. And we have no democracy if 
nobody consents.

A situation is more democratic when not when a majority consent. This 
is the point where we can start to term the result "democratic." But 
its not fully democratic unless everyone consents.


>>Question: if the majority explicitly consents to this for a 
>>specific election, does the election method satisfy the Majority Criterion?
>
>If the system would have allowed the majority to decide otherwise, 
>the *system* is majoritarian.

No, that was not the question, which was quite specific. It's a bit 
rude not to answer the question! I did not ask if the system was 
"majoritarian," and that is not clearly defined.


>>> > I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is.
>>>
>>>Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power.
>>>By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually
>>>begin.
>>What I pointed out here was that the ratings given did not contain 
>>sufficient information to determine justice.
>
>Yes it does. I gave a reasoning why I consider C the more just 
>solution because everyone prefers it to the "democratic benchmark".

But your "democratic benchmark", apparently, requires consensus. Yet 
you would, it appears, impose the result of C even if the A voters 
don't consent. The word "justice" does not refer to any "democratic 
benchmark." Democracy and justice are not synonyms.


>>Again, without defining justice, but relying upon common 
>>understanding of it, we can easily construct scenarios that fully 
>>explain the ratings as sincere, but which have quite different 
>>implications regarding justice. In the challenge election, to repeat, we have
>>
>>55: A 100, B 0,   C 80
>>45: A 0,   B 100, C 80
>>
>>It was assumed that the ratings were "sincere," though that was not defined.
>
>I gave at least two interpretations of this, so it was defined. I 
>prefer the "preferences over lotteries" interpretation.

That's correct, a definition was given. My apologies. However, the 
central point is that these are relative ratings, not absolute ones. 
They are not commensurable, so aggregating them in this form is 
vulnerable to imbalances that can represent injustice. We'd see this 
if we were to implement an auction that created a transfer of value 
such that true utilities become known (Which would you prefer, a 
payment of +/-$X or the victory of A?).

If you are poor, you might prefer the money and then live with the 
inconvenience of, say, increased travel. That's fair! But you 
probably would not, even if poor, shift your vote significantly for $5.

>>Explicitly, Jobst stated that the ratings given were not utilities, 
>>and that he doesn't believe in utilities as having any meaning.
>
>Again, this is not true. I only stated that I don't believe in 
>*measurable* utilities or, most importantly, even in *commensurable 
>* ones. That does not mean I regard the term "utility" as 
>meaningless. When someone prefers some A to some B, I think we can 
>interpret this as A having "more" utility for her than B. But this 
>"more" need not be representable by real numbers.

Real utilities can be discovered by various means, and so made 
commensurable. It's not difficult to think of schemes for this, but 
it does not have to be part of the election method itself. Rather, it 
can be something that the public engages in voluntarily. Using it, we 
could make Plurality elections quite fair!

And fully democratic. If you can get the large majority of people to 
agree, and you should be able to do this through appropriate 
negotiation -- in general, not always -- then these people will 
simply vote in their own interest and in agreement and you will get 
more complete democracy


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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Gervase Lam]

> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jobst
> Heitzig
> Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2007 1:55 AM
> Subject: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when
> there'reonly 2 factions

>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
> 
> THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
> 
> The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...

One silly method is to use Range Voting except instead of summing the
"utilities", they are multiplied instead.  This results in:

A: 100^55 * 0^45 = 0
B: 100^45 * 0^55 = 0
C: 80^100

However, this similar to Veto Voting!  I had thought of this before as
it is a way of determining "consensus."  What would be nice if there
were a mathematical operator that is mixture of addition and
multiplication.  Or may be some other method to tone down the harshness
of multiplication.

As a compromise, what I thought of doing was to slowly increase the
minimum utilities of each ballot (possibly re-normalising the C
utilities while this happens) until two candidates get (equal) top
scores.  The two candidates then go to the second round of voting.

However, doing this in this scenario, it is inevitable that candidates A
and C will go to the second round...

Thanks,
Gervase.



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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[raphfrk]

Seems there's something seriously broken with copy/paste on AIM mail.

 

From: Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>



> > Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove
> > strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary
> > accomodations.
> 
> In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to 
> reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process.

Taking that analogy further.  If there was a civil war between a 
55/45 split of the popluation, there would be lots of damage to both
sides.

The 'nuclear option' doesn't quite simulate that.  However, it does
impose some cost on the majority, without preventing them from doing
whatever they want.

Another proposal I had was that the majority should be allowed to pass
bills without a supermajority, but the minority had the authority to 
delay them.

This prevents the minority rule effect, while still giving the minority
some power.

For example,

A proposal to pass a bill (or maybe just to bring it to a vote) can be passed by

- 1 count with 2/3 support

- 2 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 62.5% support in both counts

- 3 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 57.5% support in all counts

- 4 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 52.5% support in all counts

- 5 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with majority support in all counts

This allows 

a 1/3 minority to delay any bill by 1 month

a 37.5% minority to delay any bill by 2 months

a 42.5% minority to delay any bill by 3 months

a 47.5% minority to delay any bill by 4 months

>From the war analogy, a strong minority could delay the majority 
implementing its proposals immediately, even if they ultimately lost.

The next question is what would be acceptable to get the above rule 
implemented in the first place.  A referendum to modify the constitution
with 50%+1 support ?  

> > I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is. 
> 
> Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. 
> By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually 
> begin.

In Northern Ireland, they have a power sharing executive.  Each member
of the assembly declares as a member of a party.  Cabinet positions 
are then allocated using the d'Hondt method.  The party leader can 
assign anyone from the assembly to the cabinet position.

This somewhat discriminates against smaller parties as the largest
parties always gets to pick first.  Assuming that the seats aren't
all roughly equal, the best one or 2 will be assigned before a small
party gets a chance.

Also, there has been some strategic moves from one party to another
after the election.

I would probably have implemented it using Jan's tree structure.  Groups
of parties can form a super-party (and maybe some party members could 
form a sub-party).  The seats are assigned to the group using d'Hondt
and then between the parties in the group.

The parties in NI would probably split into groups, unionist, nationalist
and neither.  Strategic party changes have been used to shift total
cabinet seats between unionist and nationalist.

> Nope. Depends on situation. In my example, 49% have no power at all. 
> That everyone has 1 vote does not mean everyone has the same power. It 
> is only a formal equality.
 
It is actually equal, one vote is perfectally replacable by another.
The problem exists outside the individual voter.

The problem is caused when you have a majority that is block voting.
This is kinda like a monopoly in the free market.  The standard 
benefits break down.

Logrolling means that in Congress, there is a certain amount of vote
trading which means that the result is closer to utility optimal.
However, they don't always (ever?) actually look at what they are 
giving up in exchange for votes later on.

Also, in a non-2 party system, there is often more than one potential
coalition.  This leads to negotiation between the parties and again
that should lead to all opinions being considered.

Ofc, in practice, only certain coalition permutations are possible.
This can lead to some parties not having much power.

However, if a coalition was to form that was seriously a problem, 
the party members could break ranks and give their support to the least
bad option so that the worst doesn't happen.  This is a safety valve
that doesn't really occur.  Alternatively, they could go for something
like Germany's current grand coalition.

Also, even in parties with a strong tradition of cohesion, if the
party leadership was to agree to something unacceptable, they 
could break ranks.

Finally, even if none of the above applies, you don't want to 
alienate potential future coalition partners to much.

> > And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no
> > decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes
> > faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise,
> > it fails.
>
> What you call a "pur

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Abd ul-Rahman,

> I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the 
> fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions; 

What exactly is "majority consent"? In my understanding "consent" means 
*all* voters share some opinion...

> what do you call it when a minority imposes its will on a majority?

It is not democratic whenever some group can impose its will on the 
others (in the sense of making their preferred outcome certain). No 
matter whether that group is a majority or a minority. From this it 
follows that a method which is always deterministic cannot possibly be 
democratic.

> Question: if the majority explicitly consents to this for a specific 
> election, does the election method satisfy the Majority Criterion?

If the system would have allowed the majority to decide otherwise, the 
*system* is majoritarian.

>> > I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is.
>>
>> Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power.
>> By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually
>> begin.
> What I pointed out here was that the ratings given did not contain 
> sufficient information to determine justice. 

Yes it does. I gave a reasoning why I consider C the more just solution 
because everyone prefers it to the "democratic benchmark".

> Again, without defining justice, but relying upon common understanding 
> of it, we can easily construct scenarios that fully explain the 
> ratings as sincere, but which have quite different implications 
> regarding justice. In the challenge election, to repeat, we have
>
> 55: A 100, B 0,   C 80
> 45: A 0,   B 100, C 80
>
> It was assumed that the ratings were "sincere," though that was not 
> defined.

I gave at least two interpretations of this, so it was defined. I prefer 
the "preferences over lotteries" interpretation.

> Now, it's obvious that C is what we would ordinarily understand as the 
> best winner. But a majority will disagree, and thus the challenge. I 
> don't recall the exact wording, but is there a method which, if 
> adopted, would cause C to win, even if the A and B voters are selfish, 
> and we might assume, the A voters know that they are in the majority?
>
> The answer given was Borda with equal ranking prohibited. Now, when I 
> first read this, I did not properly understand it. I should repeat 
> what I did before, only correctly.
>
> Let me be explicit about how this could elect C. I will modify the way 
> Borda count from how it is usually stated to make it equivalent to a 
> Range 2 election (CR 3).
>
> Sincere votes.
>
> 55: A>C>B
> 45: B>C>A
>
> Counts: A, B, C
>
> 55: 2 0 1
> 45: 0 2 1
>
> totals:
>
> A 110, B 90, C 100. This does not elect C. However the B voters, if 
> they understand the situation, can vote
>
> 45: C>B>A
>
> or counts A, B, C:
> 45: 0 1 2
>
> totals:
> A 110, B 45, C 145. C wins, so it appears a quite desirable strategy 
> for the B voters, as we would understand the sincere ratings.
>
> Is there a counter-strategy? What if the A voters reverse their second 
> and third preferences?
>
> 55: 2 1 0
>
> With the strategic votes from the other side the totals are
>
> A 110, B 100, C 90; they defeat the compromise attempted by the B 
> voters. However, the gain is relatively small, it would seem (but 
> there is an assumption that a gain of 20 in rating is "small." Not 
> necessarily.)
>
> and with the original sincere Borda votes from the B voters, this 
> counterstrategy would give us
>
> totals
> A 110, B 135, C 90.
>
> So, somewhat off the topic, but interesting nevertheless, the B 
> voters, being not only selfish, but clever, mount a secret campaign to 
> get all the B voters to vote the strategy. However, they also arrange 
> to leak this information to the A voters, and, *supersecretly*, they 
> are not going to do that, they are going to vote sincerely. If the A 
> voters fall for it and vote strategically, to defeat the nefarious 
> stratagem of the B voters, and the B voters then simply vote 
> sincerely, B prevails, which is a disaster for the A voters and a 
> total victory for the B voters.
>
> The A voters are *probably* better off simply voting sincerely. And 
> that was Jobst's point. 

I don't think that was my point. In order to get a stable situation, 
i.e. a group strategy equilibrium, all voters should order reverse to 
make sure the other faction cannot reverse the outcome to their 
advantage. So the A voters are better off voting C>A>B. For this reason, 
I consider Borda a possible but not a good solution to the problem.

Juho's suggestion to use weights like 1.4, 1, and 0 improves this since 
with them C is already elected with sincere ballots.

> Explicitly, Jobst stated that the ratings given were not utilities, 
> and that he doesn't believe in utilities as having any meaning.

Again, this is not true. I only stated that I don't believe in 
*measurable* utilities or, most importantly, even in *commensurable * 
ones.

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 07:25 PM 8/29/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to
>reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process.

This is presuming a "meaning" to democracy disconnected from history 
and the forces creating it and making it attractive. I don't mind 
that, particularly, but am naturally skeptical about it.

Obviously, democracy can do more than "reproduce the result of a 
violent process," but, look around. "Democracy," when it ignores the 
power realities, and particularly when it fails to address the 
concerns *of the majority*, can easily fall back to violence. There 
is a hierarchy: consensus is more powerful than supermajority, 
supermajority is more powerful than majority, majority is more 
powerful than plurality, and plurality is more powerful than 
isolation and purely independent action.

The point was that plurality meant something. Refusing to look at 
that because of a distaste for violence is, well, refusing to look at 
the sources of things because we imagine that they "should" be some 
other way. We cannot make things better if we are not willing to 
start where we are. And to start where we are, we must understand 
where we are, and possibly how we got here.

I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the 
fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions; what do 
you call it when a minority imposes its will on a majority?

If the majority explicitly consents to the *process*, it's fine. That 
is, the majority could decide that this election will be decided by 
tossing a coin. Question: what level of majority should be required 
to allow this to be the rule?

More to the point, the majority could consent to using, say, Range, 
Bucklin, IRV, whatever, that it will accept the result. Question: if 
the majority explicitly consents to this for a specific election, 
does the election method satisfy the Majority Criterion?

(I'll answer this one: it does not; however it *does* satisfy the 
underlying principle, which is majority rule.)

Note that the fact we have passed a law regarding elections does not 
satisfy what I'm laying out as a standard for judging democratic 
decisions. That is a majority *at one time* making a decision for a 
*different* electorate at a *different* time. However, a question on 
the same ballot determining how the winner of the election will be 
determined, if it receives majority consent, *would* satisfy that.

> > I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is.
>
>Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power.
>By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually
>begin.

What I pointed out here was that the ratings given did not contain 
sufficient information to determine justice. Again, without defining 
justice, but relying upon common understanding of it, we can easily 
construct scenarios that fully explain the ratings as sincere, but 
which have quite different implications regarding justice. In the 
challenge election, to repeat, we have

55: A 100, B 0,   C 80
45: A 0,   B 100, C 80

It was assumed that the ratings were "sincere," though that was not defined.

Now, it's obvious that C is what we would ordinarily understand as 
the best winner. But a majority will disagree, and thus the 
challenge. I don't recall the exact wording, but is there a method 
which, if adopted, would cause C to win, even if the A and B voters 
are selfish, and we might assume, the A voters know that they are in 
the majority?

The answer given was Borda with equal ranking prohibited. Now, when I 
first read this, I did not properly understand it. I should repeat 
what I did before, only correctly.

Let me be explicit about how this could elect C. I will modify the 
way Borda count from how it is usually stated to make it equivalent 
to a Range 2 election (CR 3).

Sincere votes.

55: A>C>B
45: B>C>A

Counts: A, B, C

55: 2 0 1
45: 0 2 1

totals:

A 110, B 90, C 100. This does not elect C. However the B voters, if 
they understand the situation, can vote

45: C>B>A

or counts A, B, C:
45: 0 1 2

totals:
A 110, B 45, C 145. C wins, so it appears a quite desirable strategy 
for the B voters, as we would understand the sincere ratings.

Is there a counter-strategy? What if the A voters reverse their 
second and third preferences?

55: 2 1 0

With the strategic votes from the other side the totals are

A 110, B 100, C 90; they defeat the compromise attempted by the B 
voters. However, the gain is relatively small, it would seem (but 
there is an assumption that a gain of 20 in rating is "small." Not 
necessarily.)

and with the original sincere Borda votes from the B voters, this 
counterstrategy would give us

totals
A 110, B 135, C 90.

So, somewhat off the topic, but interesting nevertheless, the B 
voters, being not only selfish, but clever, mount a secret campaign 
to get all the B voters to vote the strategy. However, they also 
arran

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Abd ul-Rahman,

> The faction with the largest number of supporters could raise the
> largest army (other things being equal) and could overpower the
> others -- unless they cooperate, forming a larger faction.

I don't think you believe what you write here. Who could raise the 
largest army certainly depends on wealth. 

> Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove
> strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary
> accomodations.

In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to 
reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process.

> I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is. 

Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. 
By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually 
begin.

> What is the 
> standard? If we have electoral democracy, or direct democracy,
> everyone has the same power, one vote. 

Nope. Depends on situation. In my example, 49% have no power at all. 
That everyone has 1 vote does not mean everyone has the same power. It 
is only a formal equality.
 
> This entity that supposedly 
> has oppressive power is not a person, nor is it, generally, a
> faction. The "majority" is merely a grouping in any decision, the
> grouping that outnumbers the other.

Does that matter? It is a group that can rule without regard of the 
others. Often this group is known in advance and is pretty stable over 
time.

> And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no
> decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes
> faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise,
> it fails.

What you call a "pure democratic process" is just what I claim is not 
democratic at all, for the given reasons.

> Giving the "minority" a "share of power" means making decisions
> contrary to the consent of the majority. 

Of course, that's what it is all about: The majority will not get its 
will all the time, only more often than the minority.

> But "sharing power" is not a 
> goal of democracy; rather, the common welfare is. 

Who says so? And what is "common welfare" by the way? If I remember 
correctly, you were not very delighted when I proposed to use welfare 
economical measures in voting theory...

> The goal is to make 
> wise decisions; a rough standard of wisdom is consensus; but it is
> considered, sometimes, necessary to make decisions without consensus,
> so a *minimum* standard is set, and the minimum is obvious: a
> majority. 

Please look at the example again. The only thing that's obvious about is 
is that the majority is not a good approximation of consensus, whereas 
the compromise option C is a perfect consensus!

> Below that point, the thinking would go, it is more likely 
> that the proposed action is unwise than that it is wise.

This reminds me of Ramon Llulls reasoning that there will always be a 
beats-all-winner: He claimed that always at least half of the 
electorate will judge correctly what the god-wanted option is.

> Democracy uses, aggregates, the *judgement* of the people. It is not
> a grant of power; the people have their power, and it is not
> something given to them by government; 

By government? How does that come into play here?

> Jobst has not thought these matters through, it appears. 

Your appearance fails here.

> > > If C wins, the B supporters gain 60% utility, that's large. If
> > > they pay the A voters the equivalent of the A loss, 20%, they are
> > > still way ahead.
> >
> >You still assume that their is a "loss" to the A voters.
>
> Comparatively, yes. And I gave an example showing that.
>
> >  But that is just wrong: the A voters have no right to the election
> > of A, it is not their property which they can "loose".
>
> Lose.

I'm so sorry for my bad English and would prefer a discussion in German. 
However, I think you know what I meant.

> Let me put it this way: you assert this, but you have done nothing
> that establishes that the majority does *not* have the right to its
> preference. 

The old ontological problem: One claims something exists, the other 
claims it does not. Who must prove it?

> Every legislative body in actual existence, with actual sovereignty,
> gives the majority this power. On what basis do you assert that this
> is not a right?

What we are discussing here is (at least I thought so) the theory of 
election methods or, more generally, group decision methods. This is a 
normative discussion, i.e., we try to find out how things should be. 
For a normative discussion, it is usually quite irrelevant how things 
are now or have once been, only how they could be. Rights in this 
context are usually not based on actual behaviour but on a 
well-grounded theory which you could call philosophical. In my 
philosophy, everyone should have a right to influence decisions 
regardless whether she belongs to a majority or not.

> I agree that it is not an absolute ri

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 03:58 PM 8/27/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>A democratic decision system should not reproduce what would happen 
>in an anarchic world such as you describe but should instead protect 
>the weaker parts of society against the majority by giving them 
>their just share of power instead of letting the majority always 
>overrule them.

Missed here is the background. Oligarchical systems arose out of the 
state of nature because of their superior organization. I was today 
thinking about the theory behind plurality voting.

The faction with the largest number of supporters could raise the 
largest army (other things being equal) and could overpower the 
others -- unless they cooperate, forming a larger faction.

Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove 
strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary 
accomodations.

While we may think of the goal of democracy as being "to be more 
just," or whatever, it has to work on a power level, that is, if a 
democratic system attempts to take power from the powerful, it must 
have, itself, more power, or we end up with conflict that damages 
all. There is nothing worse than an even match in war, it can leave 
all sides demolished. It's quite possibly better to lose!

(And, obviously, much better not to fight if it can be avoided.)

I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is. What is the 
standard? If we have electoral democracy, or direct democracy, 
everyone has the same power, one vote. This entity that supposedly 
has oppressive power is not a person, nor is it, generally, a 
faction. The "majority" is merely a grouping in any decision, the 
grouping that outnumbers the other.

And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no 
decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes 
faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise, it fails.

(There is actually a bias against the participation of the presiding 
officer, who cannot generally vote to create a tie, he or she can 
only vote to break one. Ties in pure process are *not* resolved by 
tossing a coin! A tie means that the motion fails. A majority has not 
consented to it.)

Giving the "minority" a "share of power" means making decisions 
contrary to the consent of the majority. But "sharing power" is not a 
goal of democracy; rather, the common welfare is. The goal is to make 
wise decisions; a rough standard of wisdom is consensus; but it is 
considered, sometimes, necessary to make decisions without consensus, 
so a *minimum* standard is set, and the minimum is obvious: a 
majority. Below that point, the thinking would go, it is more likely 
that the proposed action is unwise than that it is wise.

Democracy uses, aggregates, the *judgement* of the people. It is not 
a grant of power; the people have their power, and it is not 
something given to them by government; rather, government derives its 
power from the people governed. And government is most effective and 
efficient and powerful the more it is true that the people consent to 
it and participate in it voluntarily.

Jobst has not thought these matters through, it appears. Good 
election methods do a good job of choosing, efficiently, from ballot 
analysis, what the people would choose if blessed with the time and 
opportunity to discuss and use full deliberative process. While this 
goal is *impossible*, because deliberative process is intelligent, it 
*develops* decisions rather than merely discovering them through 
counting, methods can approach, at least, what would be chosen if 
people stuck with their immediate opinions.

Deliberative process will choose the Condorcet winner but it will 
also discover Condorcet cycles and could deal with them -- but I've 
never heard of it happening. However, there is, sometimes, a better 
winner than the Condorcet winner based on naive preferences. 
Deliberative process will ordinarily bring this out.

I differ with at least one active Range proponent in disliking that a 
Range winner be imposed on an unwilling majority. But a true Range 
winner will almost always be accepted by a majority, even when the 
initial preferences of the majority would have indicated otherwise. 
And it has nothing to do with "altruism." It is, in fact, in the 
interest of all, generally, to do this.

There is an issue raised with this by a writer here who 
misunderstands what is being said. He thinks that Range advocates 
depend on "altruism," a not uncommon assertion. We don't. Indeed, 
Range functions quite well with maximally self-interested votes, and, 
contrary to common assertion, Approval-style voting or bullet voting 
are *not* always the optimal votes.

Based on narrow considerations, neglecting the multiple purposes that 
election serve, some assert that personal expected utility is always 
maximized by approval style voting. But if one looks closely, a more 
sincere vote can be just as efficient, and given the other pur

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 09:16 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>I don't think nearly half of the electorate should pay the other 
>half for getting what is the more just solution in my eyes. Perhaps 
>that is a difference in culture?

No. It's an understanding of what utilities mean. If A does not win, 
the supporters of A lose something. They are in the majority. If each 
of them grabs a B supporter and wrestles with him, or her, I suppose, 
the excess A supporters can then arrange things the way they like. A 
drastic picture, but actually part of the theory behind majority rule.

If C wins, the B supporters gain 60% utility, that's large. If they 
pay the A voters the equivalent of the A loss, 20%, they are still 
way ahead. It is a very good deal for the B voters and, in fact, the 
A voters might hold out for more, knowing this. Why shouldn't 
everyone benefit from the improved result?

A free negotiation would effectively generate a "bid" based on the 
*real* utilities, and these have been posited as stated. A free 
negotiation collapses what might be incommensurable utilities into 
whatever medium of exchange is used. Money is only one option, others 
are possible.

(And, strictly speaking, if it were a Clarke tax, the "payment" is a 
reduction in taxes, effectively.)

I'm not suggesting that this is practical, but rather pointing out 
that it is far more fair than we might, with certain knee-jerk 
responses, assume. We think of plutocracy when proposals like this 
are floated, but the scale is such that the truly large sums of money 
that are available to be transferred are mostly contributed by the 
average person.

Jobst regards it as unjust that the majority should be paid by the 
minority to get an outcome he regards as more just. However, he isn't 
looking at the utilities, he is simply regarding these numbers as 
representing, perhaps, some degree of consent. The actual 
consequences of the election are irrelevant to him.

Suppose this is not candidates for office being considered, but 
actual choices for the community. There are three projects, and it is 
considered that the community can only afford to build one. Let's 
even say that there is one project but three *sites*. Which site 
shall be chosen? If site A is chosen, the majority will find it 
maximally convenient, site C is almost as good, and site B is 
terrible. The B faction, the minority faces the reverse situation,

Sure, if we have an assumption of equal taxes and all the rest, and 
if the stated ratings are based, say, on travel cost and value of 
time spent driving, then site C is the best choice.

But this is a democracy. Sure, one can imagine systems where majority 
rule is not sufficient for making decisions, and many communities use 
them. Contrary to what Jobst might assume, I have a lot of experience 
with consensus communities, both positive and negative. My comments 
about majority rule proceed from that experience, they are not merely theory.

However, when you get down to the nuts and bolts of a system, 
*including how the system is implemented,* majority rule has proven 
itself to be practical *and* sustainable. Consensus systems get 
people all excited at first, particularly when they discover that 
obtaining full consent is not as difficult as many would think, it is 
exhilarating to sufficiently satisfy *everyone*. However, over years, 
going through what becomes tedious meeting process to do it gradually 
exhausts many members of the community, and, further, they start to 
discover what happens when the status quo favors a minority. Perhaps 
a decision was made some years back that did not anticipate the full 
impact it would have. It can't be changed without full consensus. I 
have seen this be literally oppressive, causing direct harm to a 
substantial minority (I've never seen it seriously harm the majority, 
probably because there are certain natural restraints. People can 
walk away from consensus communities and create standard ones, and 
sometimes the consensus rules are not legally enforceable. But I'm 
not aware of any legal tests of that.)

Point is, when you don't have majority rule, you have decisions being 
made by something *other* than the majority, even if it is only the 
default "decision" to change nothing. And a determined minority can 
then hold its right to withhold consent over the rest of the 
community, in order to get what it wants. Again, it would never, in 
that context, blatantly do this, but it happens, social dynamics do 
not disappear in consensus communities.

There is nothing magic about 50%, it is simply the point where there 
are more people on one side than another, there are more saying Yes 
to a motion than No. Or the reverse. In real communities, other than 
seriously unhealthy ones, the majority is restrained. It does not 
make decisions based on mere majority, ordinarily, it seeks broader 
consent, and deliberative process makes this happen.

As an example of how majority rule is modified in 

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:55 AM 8/22/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
>
>The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
>
>The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
>
>A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
>
>THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
>
>The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...

Okay, here is my solution. The B voters gain some very substantial 
advantage for the election of C over the favorite of the A voters, 
who have only a substantially smaller preference for A over C.

So the B voters offer something of value to the A voters to 
compensate them for their loss. As an example, they promise to donate 
to the public treasury an amount sufficient to compensate the A 
voters for their loss of value, thus, essentially, paying a 
differential tax in order to get what they want. The payment is 
either irrevocably secured, if C is elected, or on deposit with a trustee.

The original conditions assume commensurability of utilities, so the 
ability to pay is actually equal among the voters. Payment might not 
be in cash, but in terms of some other cooperation. (This is somewhat 
counter-intuitive, but I won't explain it here.)

In deliberative process, this happens all the time. "I'll vote for 
your bill if you will vote for mine." Logrolling, it's called, and it 
is a basic feature of democracy, making majority rule far more 
flexible than it might otherwise be. Sometimes common practices are 
there for a reason, and taking steps to outlaw them or make them 
difficult could actually harm the process far more than allowing it, 
and, perhaps, making it more explicit.



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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Brian Olson]

On Aug 22, 2007, at 2:55 AM, Jobst Heitzig wrote:

> A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
>
> The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
>
> The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
>
> A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
>
> THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
>
> The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
>
> Good luck & have fun :-)

With the raw true ratings voted, IRNR, Raw rating summation, and  
approval get the right answer:
http://betterpolls.com/et?vrr=-r&if=-d&cand=3&seats=1&data=*55+100% 
2C0%2C80%0D%0A*45+0%2C100%2C80%0D%0A

But to me the end of the strategy discussion is that the A faction  
could simply bullet vote and no system can recover from a simple  
majority of votes {A=100,B=0,C=0}.
http://betterpolls.com/et?vrr=-r&if=-d&cand=3&seats=1&data=*55+100% 
2C0%2C1%0D%0A*45+0%2C100%2C80%0D%0A


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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions]

[Dave Ketchum]

 Original Message 
Got lost?
Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2007 14:32:55 -0400

On  Wed, 22 Aug 2007 09:28:24 -0300 Diego Renato wrote:
 > 2007/8/22, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED] >:
 >
 > A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
 >
 > The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
 >
 > The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
 >
 > A concrete example: true ratings are
 >55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
 >45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
 >
 > THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
 >
 > The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
 >
 > Good luck & have fun :-)
 >
 >
 > Since A has a majority, no method is guaranteed to elect C. If both A
 > and B voters are not sure which faction is larger, it is possible vote
 > for their preferred candidate and C under approval voting, or put C
 > highly rated under range voting, and C be elected.

Diego lists both:
   Approval - at least 56 A and B voters also approving C - reducible
by some giving up on approving A or B.
   Range - similar adjustment via ratings.
NOT MENTIONED - Condorcet:
   46 A voters ranking C at top, without any giving up on the A vs B
competition - reducible by B voters cooperating in this.
 >
 > 
 > Diego Santos
-- 
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 09:05 AM 8/23/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> > (And, contrary to the assumptions, most people will *change* their
> > preference if they understand that others have strong preferences
> > compared to their own weak ones. We are social animals. So, again, if
> > the utilities given were accurate, and the electorate now knows this,
> > there is even more force toward C winning. A voters will change their
> > vote, and B voters will not, plus many A voters will abstain whereas
> > B voters will be highly motivated to turn out and vote. If I lived in
> > this society, I certainly would not be betting on A. If I were, I
> > would also be buying a ticket out with my winnings. This society
> > would be headed for major disaster, on the Ruanda scale. -- and if I
> > lost the bet, I'd breathe a huge sigh of relief.)
>
>That would be so wonderful if you were right here. My experience is 
>different, however.

Let me suggest the possibility that Jobst's experience can be viewed 
in two ways:

(1) It is narrow.

(2) It is broader than that, but he is overlooking the implications 
of some of his experience.

It is *routine* for people to give up a small benefit (or endure a 
small inconvenience, same thing) in order to generate a larger 
benefit for someone else. If you don't think this is routine, you 
have been leading a very sad life! The world must seem a cruel and 
mean place to you!

Sure, there are plenty of occasions where some people refuse to do 
this. In some places it can get pretty bad. An example is that you 
are waiting to make a turn onto a road with lots of traffic. The cars 
just zoom on by, never leaving you enough space to turn. Eventually, 
though, someone notices you and, in addition, decides to slow down 
and let you in.

There are places where you could practically bet that nobody would 
let you in for a long time, and other places where it would be the 
most common occurrence, and it would happen immediately, quite likely 
the first car that comes along. Which place would you choose to live 
in? More accurately, perhaps, how much would they have to pay you to 
induce you to live there? And if you *do* live there, do you realize 
how much you are losing?

Where is it particularly bad? Places where the social fabric has 
broken down, people are not connected with each other, they are all 
isolated. They will never see you again, nor you them, or at least it 
seems that way. The scale is such that everyone is a stranger, 
always, unless you retreat to very specific small-scale environments. 
Sometimes all your neighbors are strangers.

We lived in a house in California at the corner where a short street, 
a cul-de-sac, began. Everyone living there drove by our house, coming 
and going, every time. We lived there for three years. I think that 
in the three years, I was in a neighbors house *once*. They were 
having a yard sale. And only one of the neighbors, the woman across 
the street, ever talked to us. But she never invited us to come 
inside her house. Did we invite her? I'm not sure, I think she did 
come in once or twice.

People would drive by, and we would look up and smile and wave. They 
would look away and drive on. It happened again and again.

We moved to Cummington, a small Town Meeting town in western 
Massachusetts, population on the order of 1000. *Everybody* waved as 
we drove by. People smiled at strangers and friends. We moved onto a 
short section of street with about ten houses on it. Within a few 
months, we had been in all of them, eaten meals in all of them. We 
were invited to participate in the Town government.

In the California town, a really nice town in many ways, famously so, 
we would go to the grocery store. After three years, we would 
occasionally see someone we knew there. In Cummington, within weeks, 
we would go into the local grocery-store/deli and almost always we 
knew someone there, and people we would know came in and out while we 
sat there eating lunch.

I was born in California. But you'd have to pay me a lot to get me to 
move back there. There may be some places where people still have a 
stronger sense of connection. But it's increasingly rare, I think.


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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Diego Renato]

2007/8/23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > I dislike any undeterministic method, except for tie-braking
>
> And I dislike methods that give all power to only one half of the voters
> and can be used to oppress 49% of the electorate :-)
>

In most societies, the "majority dictatorship" is not a major problem
because electors' preferences shift along time, and the 49% can became the
majoritarian faction in the next elections.

In divided societies for ethnic, cultural or religious system, where
consensus is desirable, proprotional representation for legislatures and
supermajoritarian methods for single-winner elections (as for head of state
in many parliamentary republics) are better than probabilistic methods.


Diego Santos

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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Diego Renato]

2007/8/23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Dear Rob!
>
> It is possible (otherwise I would not have posted this challenge :-)
>
> But of course it is not possible with a majoritarian method (that's what
> you observed).
>
> Keep on, one of the possible solutions is really simple (though not very
> good in other respects)...



Yes, it is not possible with a majoritarian method, but  supermajoritarian
methods can work good!

My first suggestion is a modified form of bucklin voting with 2/3 threshold.
If no candidate reaches a double majority, a new election is held. If no
candidate has 2/3 of the votes after add all preferences, bullet votes are
proportionally completed.

I dislike any undeterministic method, except for tie-braking


Diego Santos

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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Juho]

Here's my first attempt. Let's use modified Borda. The points can be  
"balanced" e.g. by using square root.


X>Y>Z => (2, 1, 0) => (1.4, 1, 0)
X>Y=Z => (2, 1, 1) => (1.4, 1, 1)

55 A>C>B
45 B>C>A
A = 55 * 1.4 + 45 * 0.0 =  77.8
B = 55 * 0.0 + 45 * 1.4 =  63.6
C = 55 * 1.0 + 45 * 1.0 = 100.0

Juho

P.S. You didn't tell what the method should do with  55: A 100, C 20,  
B 0,  45: B 100, C 20, A 0  :-)



On Aug 22, 2007, at 9:55 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:


A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.

The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.

The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.

A concrete example: true ratings are
   55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
   45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0

THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!

The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...

Good luck & have fun :-)

Jobst
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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 11:38 AM 8/22/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
> > A concrete example: true ratings are
> >55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
> >45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
> >
> > THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
> >
>
>approval, would work if voters approval cutoff is below 80, as would
>honest range.

Of course. But that, of course, is not the problem he intends to present:


> > The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
>
>dang! I would suggest using one of the above methods and removing any
>knowledge from the voter of how any of the other voters will vote.

Use the handy-dandy Mind Eraser, patent pending.

Zero knowledge is, unfortunately, not part of election methods. It's 
a condition, not a method.

>No Media coverage.
>No predictions by political analysts.
>No talking with your family/friends/co-workers about who you will vote for.

No freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, why bother with voting 
at all? If you have the power to do all this, why are you running an 
election? You just take a poll, at most, if you want to please your 
subjects, and, of course, you let anyone know that if they lie on the 
poll as to their real preferences -- and you have spies everywhere -- 
you will shoot them.

>This would limit the voters ability to vote strategically. i.e. if the
>group of 55 voters don't know they have a majority they would probably
>vote honest in order to get the best result.

Probably. Zero knowledge strategy with those utilities -- which don't 
have to be in common units, they are simply relative for each voter 
-- would encourage, probably, approval-style voting in Range 
including C. Or so-called sincere Range, assuming that the Range 
method had an accurate choice. (Range 2 (CR-3) would not, the 
"approval" vote would be more accurate).


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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 11:38 AM 8/22/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
> > A concrete example: true ratings are
> >55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
> >45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
> >
> > THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
> >
>
>approval, would work if voters approval cutoff is below 80, as would
>honest range.

Of course. But that, of course, is not the problem he intends to present:


> > The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
>
>dang! I would suggest using one of the above methods and removing any
>knowledge from the voter of how any of the other voters will vote.

Use the handy-dandy Mind Eraser, patent pending.

Zero knowledge is, unfortunately, not part of election methods. It's 
a condition, not a method.

>No Media coverage.
>No predictions by political analysts.
>No talking with your family/friends/co-workers about who you will vote for.

No freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, why bother with voting 
at all? If you have the power to do all this, why are you running an 
election? You just take a poll, at most, if you want to please your 
subjects, and, of course, you let anyone know that if they lie on the 
poll as to their real preferences -- and you have spies everywhere -- 
you will shoot them.

>This would limit the voters ability to vote strategically. i.e. if the
>group of 55 voters don't know they have a majority they would probably
>vote honest in order to get the best result.

Probably. Zero knowledge strategy with those utilities -- which don't 
have to be in common units, they are simply relative for each voter 
-- would encourage, probably, approval-style voting in Range 
including C. Or so-called sincere Range, assuming that the Range 
method had an accurate choice. (Range 2 (CR-3) would not, the 
"approval" vote would be more accurate).


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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:55 AM 8/22/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
>
>The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.

Simple. I'm in charge. I dictate and sign the election result.

Oh! You want a democratic election method!

>The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
>
>A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0

"True ratings," I've been pointing out, is not clear in meaning. 
These ratings are obviously normalized, so they are not absolute 
ratings, and therefore we cannot tell what the SU winner would be. 
But if we assume that the "swing" is the same for all voters, and 
that the utilities are such that, say, a tax bid method would show 
those utilities, we do have a clear compromise winner.

>THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
>
>The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...

The method, of course, is a Range method. Ranked methods cannot 
detect the compromise winner, who, incidentally, violates the 
Majority and Condorcet Criteria.

However, Range does not convert the Moon into a big green cheese.

Let's assume that this is a full-knowledge election of a certain 
kind. The voters know at the outset the utilities of all the voters.

I have suggested Range with preference-triggered runoff. If the 
voters voted sincerely, there would be a runoff between A and C. The 
fact that a runoff occurs lessens the tendency that the voters would 
bullet vote, a tendency that would be otherwise strong.

(What election method would elect C if the voters decide to bullet 
vote, if they -- or the majority of them -- refuse to acknowledge 
their relatively high opinion of B? Voting with taxes might do it, 
which is an incentive to vote true utilities.)

>Good luck & have fun :-)

Now, suppose this were Range with preference runoff. This pattern, if 
voted, would trigger such a runoff.

The choice is now between A and C. As the conditions have been 
defined, the A voters will simply choose their preference.

But wait a minute! That is a weak preference, whereas the B voters 
now have a very strong preference. Range is no help, because both 
sets of voters would bullet vote, the B voters quite sincerely, and 
the A voters simply expressing their preference, which is normal. 
Unless, of course, there is a cost to voting that way, such as a tax 
you bid and pay if you win.

But this has largely been overlooked. If this is a public election, 
and people are going to the polls for a runoff -- which means that no 
other election is on the ballot -- turnout is normally low. The two 
groups, however, are now quite asymmmetrical in motivation to vote, 
the A supporters are only slightly motivated, whereas the B voters 
have high motivation.

So if there is a runoff, there is a very good chance that C will win.

However, this thinking may cause them to bullet vote in the original 
Range election. I'll point out, however, that if you have a majority 
so selfish as to be willing to take a huge overall hit in the degree 
to which elected officials enjoy broad support, in order to gain a 
small personal benefit, you have a society which is already in deep 
trouble. Frankly, I don't think that under current conditions and any 
that I can imagine, people are *that* selfish. Mostly, I think, in 
Range+PW, if we call it that, they would vote sincerely. The runoff 
would be held, which would test the preference strengths.

(And, contrary to the assumptions, most people will *change* their 
preference if they understand that others have strong preferences 
compared to their own weak ones. We are social animals. So, again, if 
the utilities given were accurate, and the electorate now knows this, 
there is even more force toward C winning. A voters will change their 
vote, and B voters will not, plus many A voters will abstain whereas 
B voters will be highly motivated to turn out and vote. If I lived in 
this society, I certainly would not be betting on A. If I were, I 
would also be buying a ticket out with my winnings. This society 
would be headed for major disaster, on the Ruanda scale. -- and if I 
lost the bet, I'd breathe a huge sigh of relief.)


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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[rob brown]

(temporarily exiting lurk mode since this one grabbed my attention)

I don't think it's possible, assuming the voters know what other voters'
preferences are, and that they know that the other voters have the same
information and will also vote optimally.

The 55% in the first group will know that candidate B will never win,
period.  So they have no incentive to compromise.  Since they don't have to
worry about B, their only motivation is to make sure A, not C, wins, and any
deterministic system will allow them to do just that.

Howard's suggestion, that you prevent them from knowing other's preferences,
is the only way it could select C.  But that is unrealistic and inherently
unstable in the real world.

-rob

On 8/21/07, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
>
> The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
>
> The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
>
> A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
>
> THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
>
> The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
>
> Good luck & have fun :-)
>
> Jobst
>

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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Dave Ketchum]

On  Wed, 22 Aug 2007 09:28:24 -0300 Diego Renato wrote:
> 2007/8/22, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED] >:
> 
> A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
> 
> The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
> 
> The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
> 
> A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
> 
> THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
> 
> The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
> 
> Good luck & have fun :-)
> 
>  
> Since A has a majority, no method is guaranteed to elect C. If both A 
> and B voters are not sure which faction is larger, it is possible vote 
> for their preferred candidate and C under approval voting, or put C 
> highly rated under range voting, and C be elected.

Diego lists both:
  Approval - at least 56 A and B voters also approving C - reducible 
by some giving up on approving A or B.
  Range - similar adjustment via ratings.
NOT MENTIONED - Condorcet:
  46 A voters ranking C at top, without any giving up on the A vs B 
competition - reducible by B voters cooperating in this.
> 
> 
> Diego Santos
-- 
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
  If you want peace, work for justice.




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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Howard Swerdfeger]

Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
> 
> The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
> 
> The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
> 
> A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
> 
> THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
> 
> The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
> 

If the majority is close (ie 55-45) and you randomly select only a small 
number of ballots (say 10ish). It is possible that B will have more 
supporters selected. fear of this will lead supporters of A to vote true 
preference, as will the reverse in B supporters.

Then we can use approval or Range.




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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Howard Swerdfeger]

Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
> 
> The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
> 
> The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
> 
> A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
> 
> THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
> 

approval, would work if voters approval cutoff is below 80, as would
honest range.

> The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...

dang! I would suggest using one of the above methods and removing any
knowledge from the voter of how any of the other voters will vote.

No Media coverage.
No predictions by political analysts.
No talking with your family/friends/co-workers about who you will vote for.

This would limit the voters ability to vote strategically. i.e. if the
group of 55 voters don't know they have a majority they would probably
vote honest in order to get the best result.

> 
> Good luck & have fun :-)
> 
> Jobst
> _
> In 5 Schritten zur eigenen Homepage. Jetzt Domain sichern und gestalten! 
> Nur 3,99 EUR/Monat! http://www.maildomain.web.de/?mc=021114
> 
> 
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Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Diego Renato]

2007/8/22, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
>
> The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
>
> The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
>
> A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
>
> THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
>
> The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
>
> Good luck & have fun :-)
>
>
Since A has a majority, no method is guaranteed to elect C. If both A and B
voters are not sure which faction is larger, it is possible vote for their
preferred candidate and C under approval voting, or put C highly rated under
range voting, and C be elected.


Diego Santos

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[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Jobst Heitzig]

A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.

The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.

The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.

A concrete example: true ratings are
   55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
   45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0

THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!

The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...

Good luck & have fun :-)

Jobst
_
In 5 Schritten zur eigenen Homepage. Jetzt Domain sichern und gestalten! 
Nur 3,99 EUR/Monat! http://www.maildomain.web.de/?mc=021114


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