Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Just to make myself clear here, to a voter a "utility" is something like the electric company, or the municipal water supplier. "Utilities" is a category of stocks traded on various exchanges. They have nothing to do with how we vote. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 04:01 PM 8/22/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>To be clear, I thought you were claiming that any method (not just a
>Condorcet method) that allows such votes could simply be called a mix
>of Condorcet and Approval. That's why I brought up ER-IRV.
Oh. That is so blatantly false that it did not even occur to me that
what I wrote could be read that way, though, of course, it is a
possible reading, even a literal one. No, what I intended to write was:
Any *Condorcet* method which allows equal ranking and truncation is
Condorcet/Approval, *not* referring to a specific method by that
name, and not specifying exactly how the votes are counted and the
winner determined, beyond it being a Condorcet method.
In fact, however, I also had in mind IRV, and IRV / Approval is pretty simple.
> > There are lots of Condorcet methods, of course. But allowing equal
> > ranking and truncation causes most of them to take on aspects of
> > Approval, and, of course, voters could elect to cast what are
> > essentially approval ballots. If all of them did, I would assume that
> > the Approval winner would win
>
>If the method strictly satisfies Condorcet, then yes, the candidate with
>the most votes would have to win.
Right.
>However, MinMax (pairwise opposition), which does still determine its
>winner strictly from the strengths of pairwise contests, would not
>necessarily elect the approval winner on such votes. On the other hand,
>it satisfies FBC and LNHarm.
No claim is made that such a method is optimal. I do claim that
allowing equal ranking and truncation generally improve methods.
("The Approval winner" is indistinguishable from a Condorcet winner
in the context described, a Condorcet method that allows equal
ranking and truncation. At least that is how it looks to me, superficially.)
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Hi, --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > At 09:04 AM 8/22/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: > >I wouldn't choose it either. This comment of mine is a response to you > >seeming to claim that if a method allows equal-ranking and truncation, > >this is a sufficient condition for it to be called "Condorcet/Approval." > > > >If that's not what you were saying than I wonder what you meant in your > >first mail that used the term "Condorcet/Approval"? > > I was not aware when I wrote that of a method called, specifically > "Condorcet/Approval." I now see a wiki page on it, specifically on > Improved Condorcet/Approval. I was not claiming that any Condorcet > method allowing equal ranking and truncation was *this* particular > method. In particular, I did not state that approval would be used to > resolve cycles. To be clear, I thought you were claiming that any method (not just a Condorcet method) that allows such votes could simply be called a mix of Condorcet and Approval. That's why I brought up ER-IRV. > There are lots of Condorcet methods, of course. But allowing equal > ranking and truncation causes most of them to take on aspects of > Approval, and, of course, voters could elect to cast what are > essentially approval ballots. If all of them did, I would assume that > the Approval winner would win If the method strictly satisfies Condorcet, then yes, the candidate with the most votes would have to win. However, MinMax (pairwise opposition), which does still determine its winner strictly from the strengths of pairwise contests, would not necessarily elect the approval winner on such votes. On the other hand, it satisfies FBC and LNHarm. Kevin Venzke _ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 10:42 PM 8/21/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote: >On Tue, 21 Aug 2007 21:59:49 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: >>At 10:48 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: >> >>>That's still pretty strange... What about IRV with equal rankings allowed? >WHAT do the vote counters do that maybe can claim equal strength for >such rankings, when others are not doing such? > Joe ranks A and B at top - give same count to each as the one > Joe would otherwise select and they get an advantage. IRV with equal ranking is really almost identical in procedure. IRV is a single-candidate elimination process. If equal ranking is allowed, each stage becomes an Approval-loser election instead of a Plurality-loser election. Were the argument of unfairness true, it would also apply to simple Approval. It does not. There is no advantage, unless you consider some restoration of fairness and advantage. IRV with equal ranking could ameliorate the center squeeze effect. But, of course, if voters don't use the option, it would have no effect. In any case, it costs nothing. Mr. Ketchum has been around for some time, I'd expect him to understand this. (Others have made the same error in the past, though.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 01:32 AM 8/21/2007, Paul Kislanko wrote: >Just to make myself clear here, to a voter a "utility" is something like the >electric company, or the municipal water supplier. "Utilities" is a category >of stocks traded on various exchanges. > >They have nothing to do with how we vote. Ah, this is really offensive. Look it up, Paul! >6 utility > (economics) a measure that is to be maximized in any situation > involving choice Were we proposing that the world "utility" appear on ballots, the objection that it could be confusing would be cogent. But we are not. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 01:23 AM 8/21/2007, Paul Kislanko wrote: >There is no such thing as "utility" to a voter. That is an abstraction used >by analysts for which I have seen no definition that is useful to me, a >voter, despite having pleaded for one on this list for at least three years >now. The term is widely used, and it has generally accepted meanings, though often lacking precision. There are certain assumptions underlying the concept. And there are equivalent terms. Expected Satisfaction is one. If Candidate A wins this election, how satisfied would you be? 0 Very Dissatisfied 1 Moderately Dissatisfied 2 Slightly Dissatisfied 3 Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 4 Slightly Pleased 5 Moderately Pleased 6 Very Pleased. This could be a Range 6 ballot. It is usually a bad idea to claim that something that many find a useful concept does not exist. It does, at least in some way Utility is used in game theory to find optimum actions. Each possible choice is assigned a utility, some value. In some cases, this can be done accurately; if, for example, various outcomes have economic value, they might be valued in dollars. There are voting schemes where one essentially bids with taxes. (I find this idea interesting, and not necessarily plutocratic, if what is being decided with the "votes" is how taxes will be spent. But it is not my purpose here to examine this kind of proposal, it is merely an example where "utility" has a very specific meaning for a given voter. It would be, in this case, how much you were willing to bid to get the outcome you want.) The utilities in Range Voting are really the same as utilities in game theory. In simulations, it is assumed that people have some kind of internal process for assigning value to candidates. While, in fact, there may be no such valuation, rather people consider candidates pairwise and rank through a series of pairwise comparisons, people also have a sense of preference strength, and, through pairwise comparisons and preference strengths, one can estimate a scale. Can there be a Condorcet Cycle? Not in the simulations, but, in reality, it might be possible, for when we compare two candidates, we may compare them based on a particular set of characteristics that are salient for that pair; with another pair, another set may be used, and thus it becomes possible to have a cycle. The simulations that I'm aware of use "issue space." If I am correct, it is presumed that there are a series of issues, with a linear scale associated with each. Voters and candidates are assigned positions on each of these scales, according to some distribution considered realistic (it would not realistically be a linear distribution; rather the opinions of people cluster). The distance between the voter's position and the candidate's position is "regret" if that candidate is elected, on that scale. I don't know, actually, if only one issue scale is used, or if there are a series in vector space. In any case, resulting from this is an assignment of numerical values to each candidate. In the simulations, this is the utility. That, then, is translated into a Range vote using various strategies. Range votes are, however, just votes. They are not "utilities." But *if* there are commensurable utilities, and voters vote Range Votes proportional to them, Range optimizes utility summed over all voters. If the utilities are "relative expected satisfaction," somewhat like what I listed above, Range, then, optimizes overall voter satisfaction with the result, minimizing dissatisfaction. Obviously, there is a series of assumptions being made. However, they are reasonable ones. We are quite capable of ranking candidates, and, in addition, of estimating preference strengths. This, then, means that we are capable of *rating* candidates. Rating is just ranking with varying spread between the ranks. Rating is utility is expected voter satisfaction; however, in the end, all of this is theory and perhaps rationalization, the reality is that the voter is casting votes which have effects on the outcome. It just happens that Range apparently *does* optimize overall satisfaction, not perfectly, but better than other methods on the table. Even if voters vote "strategically," i.e., choose the votes which game theory would indicate are optimal. It's really rather silly, the objection about strategic voting in Range. We want people to express what they want, and how strongly they want it. If they think they gain advantage by voting strongly, *they have strong preferences,* at least if they are sane. (There are hysterics who make everything a matter of strong preference. But Range Voting is not turning society over to hysterics. There are probably hysterics on all sides of the issues, and they average out. The presence of "hysterical voters" -- who would vote quite as people claim strategic voters would vote -- merely shifts the election toward Approval, which
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
On Tue, 21 Aug 2007 21:59:49 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > At 10:48 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: > >>That's still pretty strange... What about IRV with equal rankings allowed? > WHAT do the vote counters do that maybe can claim equal strength for such rankings, when others are not doing such? Joe ranks A and B at top - give same count to each as the one Joe would otherwise select and they get an advantage. > > Well, I suggested it long ago as a simple improvement. Voters can > essentially vote it as Approval if they want. > > In an Approval election, if all the candidates you approve are not > going to win, your vote has been wasted. (Unless, of course, it is > Asset Voting or some PR scheme). Having a fallback vote makes sense. > > However, I wouldn't personally choose IRV as the ranked method to > use. Why in the world not use a Condorcet method, if you want ranked? Now you get away from IRV's failures. Condorcet can and does give equal power to equal ranking (only thing special is that A=B means they are equal - they get fully normal relationship to higher and lower ranks). > > The trick that I've proposed to make Range methods MC compliant could > also be used with IRV. Let the IRV election play out, then reanalyze > the ballots fully and see if anyone beats the IRV winner pairwise. > Since you need only compare the pairs including the IRV winner, the > counting is simplified. This would detect the Condorcet winner > (though it might detect more than one candidate beating the IRV > winner -- but that should be rare, since IRV does usually pick the > Condorcet winner unless there are a lot of candidates.) > > You could either award the victory to the one who beats the pairwise > winner -- in some fashion -- or hold a runoff. A real runoff is the > ultimate challenge, the proof that the winner is acceptable to a > majority, at least comparatively. (A true test would be a pure Yes/No > ratification.) -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff (small correction)
Chris Benham wrote: 31: A>>B 32: B>>C 37: C>>A Leaving aside the approval cutoffs, methods that don't elect C here must fail mono-raise. With these rankings and also C being the most approved candidate, for me a method needs a good excuse for not electing C. DMC and also "Approval-Weighted Pairwise" both elect C. The last line is wrong. I meant to write DMC and also "Approval-Weighted Pairwise" both fail to elect C. They both elect B. Sorry if I caused any confusion. Chris Benham Peter Barath wrote: And what about the method (I don't know the name) in which the least approved candidate is eliminated until there is a Condorcet-winner? That is called "Definite Majority Choice". It has some alternative algorithms. http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choice Does it also fail FBC? Yes. All methods that meet the Condorcet criterion fail FBC. Condorcet is incompatible with FBC. Kevin's "adjustment" of Condorcet//Approval to meet FBC causes it to no longer strictly meet the Condorcet criterion. Did somebody analyse the strategy incentives then? Yes, it has been discussed a lot at EM. It used to be my favourite. 31: A>>B 32: B>>C 37: C>>A Leaving aside the approval cutoffs, methods that don't elect C here must fail mono-raise. With these rankings and also C being the most approved candidate, for me a method needs a good excuse for not electing C. DMC and also "Approval-Weighted Pairwise" both elect C. http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Cardinal_pairwise I like "Approval-Sorted Margins". http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins I also like using that method to find the lowest-ordered candidate, eliminate that candidate, and then repeat the process until one remains, each time interpreting ballots that make no approval distinction among remaining candidates as approving all except those they rank (among the remaining candidates) bottom or equal-bottom. (I think that is also good for plain ranked ballots that allow truncation but not an explicit approval cutoff.) An algorithm that is equivalent or nearly equivalent to ASM is to use one of Beatpath, River or Ranked Pairs measuring the 'defeat strength' by the difference between the two candidates' approval scores. I proposed this a while ago as "Approval Margins". Chris Benham By the way, electing from the Condorcet top tier using approval would be called Smith//Approval or Schwartz//Approval depending on which top tier is used. I don't typically consider these methods because they are more complicated than Condorcet//Approval and can't be adjusted to satisfy FBC. And what about the method (I don't know the name) in which the least approved candidate is eliminated until there is a Condorcet-winner? Does it also fail FBC? Did somebody analyse the strategy incentives then? (And here I don't think of a method in which all ranked candidates are considered as approved, but a whole preference order with a cutoff mark somewhere between.) Peter Barath Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól. Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 10:48 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: >That's still pretty strange... What about IRV with equal rankings allowed? Well, I suggested it long ago as a simple improvement. Voters can essentially vote it as Approval if they want. In an Approval election, if all the candidates you approve are not going to win, your vote has been wasted. (Unless, of course, it is Asset Voting or some PR scheme). Having a fallback vote makes sense. However, I wouldn't personally choose IRV as the ranked method to use. Why in the world not use a Condorcet method, if you want ranked? The trick that I've proposed to make Range methods MC compliant could also be used with IRV. Let the IRV election play out, then reanalyze the ballots fully and see if anyone beats the IRV winner pairwise. Since you need only compare the pairs including the IRV winner, the counting is simplified. This would detect the Condorcet winner (though it might detect more than one candidate beating the IRV winner -- but that should be rare, since IRV does usually pick the Condorcet winner unless there are a lot of candidates.) You could either award the victory to the one who beats the pairwise winner -- in some fashion -- or hold a runoff. A real runoff is the ultimate challenge, the proof that the winner is acceptable to a majority, at least comparatively. (A true test would be a pure Yes/No ratification.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote in reply Peter Barath: >I guess this is an unjust blame because this thing >affect all voting methods. No. It *particularly* affects ranked methods, because ranked methods obscure preference strength. While there may be methods which promote the expression of absolute utilities in the votes (one possibility is mentioned below by Mr. Barath), if we set these aside, even Range methods may fail to accurately aggregate utilities because of normalization, resolution, or, yes, issues of strategy. to which I reply: There is no such thing as "utility" to a voter. That is an abstraction used by analysts for which I have seen no definition that is useful to me, a voter, despite having pleaded for one on this list for at least three years now. If you can't define "utility", don't use that in any argument. If you can, please do so. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 04:58 PM 8/20/2007, Peter Barath wrote: > >Sure. That's been proposed many times. However, > >it's not a very good method. First of all, it is > >blatantly obvious, if you care to look, that the > >Condorcet winner is sometimes *not* the best > >winner, by far. > >I guess this is an unjust blame because this thing >affect all voting methods. No. It *particularly* affects ranked methods, because ranked methods obscure preference strength. While there may be methods which promote the expression of absolute utilities in the votes (one possibility is mentioned below by Mr. Barath), if we set these aside, even Range methods may fail to accurately aggregate utilities because of normalization, resolution, or, yes, issues of strategy. Assuming that the Condorcet winner in an election is, unconditionally, the best winner, is blatantly an error, because it is easy to construct scenarios where reasonable people will agree that a different winner is better, and deliberative process would be almost certain to choose that winner. Election methods are shortcuts, which reduce what may be considered impossibly tedious or complex deliberative process to a matter of counting and analyzing ballots, but it is practically inherent that the shortcut introduces flaws; this does indeed affect Range as well as ranked methods. But not as badly, not *nearly* as badly. Most analysts here comment that, with "sincere voters," Range is the best method; they then, often, go on to claim that, however, because of the issue of strategic voting, Range is impractical or dangerous or whatever. Yet I have never seen a scenario which actually shows this, and, at the same time, shows votes that make any sense, that real voters would be at all likely to cast. The basis of the claim is often that voters will essentially disable themselves by voting weak votes against smart strategic voters who vote strong votes. However, if I vote a weak vote, it means that my preference is weak, and I have little ground to complain if, therefore, someone who expresses strong preference prevails. I allowed that by my vote. And, I claim, we should take the votes as writ. In any case, I find the question interesting, "What is the ideal method with sincere voters?" It is obvious that Condorcet methods *fail* rather badly with sincere voters, when they trip over the matter of preference strength. In a ranked method, where A>B>C is expressed, no information at all is provided about preference strength. If we assume that A>>B>>C is impossible, an assumption that Range generally makes (you only have one vote to express, so you cannot express full vote strength in the AB pair and at the same time full vote strength in the BC pair), we can look at the three rough possibilities: A>>B>C, A>B>C, A>B>>C, plus a ranked method that does not allow equal ranking may also have, as actual preferences of the voter, A=B>>C, and A>>B=C. (I'm neglecting the weak A=B>C and A>B=C; in the language of Range, I'm normalizing.) Those votes are really quite different in meaning and value. I may be able to discern a preference and therefore express it in a ranked method, but this preference may be insignificant compared to the preference I have for both these candidates as compared to all the others. Yet any ranked method will treat this maximally weak preference -- it may actually be no preference if the method forces ranking and does not allow equal ranking -- as quite the same as a life-or-death, full vote preference. Blatantly, this causes, under some conditions, poor results. The Condorcet Criterion sounds good, it would seem obvious that a proper election winner, if the election allows full ranking, should not lose the pairwise contest with any other candidate, i.e., if the election were immediately held, at the outset, only between these two, vote for one, we would think that the ideal winner would not lose. But that is only true if we neglect preference strength. In real elections, the effect I'm talking about is more rare than we might expect because if, in fact, voters have a weak preference, they might not even bother to vote, depending on who the frontrunners are. > Even in a two-candidate >contest where every considerable method becomes >Plurality, it's possible that the minority has >stronger preference, so the winner is not the >social optimum. In public elections under present conditions, absolutely, no method will choose the true SU winner unless somehow absolute utilities are expressed. It does happen, sometimes, and sometimes we forget that election methods are general and public elections are not the only application. Further, in some public elections, the context is *not* the highly competitive, polarized situation we commonly think of with regard to elections. Normalization with two candidates only obscures the preference strength, causing all preferences to become equal. However, it is a serious erro
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > At 01:22 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: > > > And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is > > > "Condorcet/Approval." > > > >By "And" did you mean "Any"? > > Lucky guess! > > >I don't think either equal ranking or truncation are necessary rules for > >Condorcet//Approval. The method could require a strict ranking but > >feature an explicitly placed cutoff. > > I did not make the condition described a necessary one, merely a > sufficient one. That's still pretty strange... What about IRV with equal rankings allowed? Condorcet//Approval with the two slashes has a pretty specific meaning. Kevin Venzke _ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 12:30 PM 8/20/2007, Chris Benham wrote: >And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is "Condorcet/Approval." > >Abd, >Is "And.." suppose to read 'Any...', or is there some missing >word? As written, to the extent that it makes >sense it is false. Yes. Any. >>The term "Approval" is somewhat misleading for the method, because >>a vote does not necessarily represent any absolute "Approval" of >>the candidates, and some people have a reaction to the method based >>on an idea that it does. >That is purely a secondary marketing issue. Perhaps you would like >to unilaterally change Approval's name? We already have. Approval is now being marketed as "Count All the Votes." You may think it secondary if you are only concerned about the theoretical properties of methods, but some of us are only interested in election methods from the point of view of improving politics and the process of government, as well as other practical uses of election methods. Much argument about Approval hinges on some expectation that voters will "approve" of those they "approve." And not those that they do not. But a supporter of a third party candidate, here, with no hope of his favorite winning, may well choose to vote for the preferred major candidate in addition to his favorite. Does this mean that this voter "approves" of this candidate? You could argue that it does, but only by assuming, quite simply, that "approval" is an action, in this case, of choosing, which is not really the ordinary meaning. And,, since the ordinary meaning of approval, i.e., to hold a favorable opinion of, to consider that the actions of the one "approved" are beneficial, could mean that the voter does *not* approve of this candidate in any absolute sense, but only in comparison with the other frontrunner, and this preference might be relatively small. Do I prefer a quick poison or a slow one? If I make a choice, does this mean that I "approve" of it? Absolutely, I have seen Approval as a voting method used in the real world where the vote meant to "accept." But this was not a competitive context, it was one where a group had a number of possible choices and needed to choose one only. An Approval polls was taken, the question was "which of these are acceptable to you?" And, indeed, the first preference of the majority (probably a 2/3 majority}, was passed over. But not by the poll. The poll was not binding, it was not the act of decision. When it was apparent from the poll that there was a choice that all but one "accepted," the motion was made to make that nearly universal choice. And that motion passed unanimously. Apparently the single holdout in the Approval poll either abstained or changed her mind. (This was a poll made in person, by show of hands. Under that situation, sequence matters. Everyone knows how everyone voted for the prior choices. It is entirely possible that the holdout revised her opinion based on a subsequent vote It is an error to suppose that people have some kind of fixed internal preference, our actual preferences do shift in response to the preferences of others. We are social animals.) >>It's a vote, pure and simple. "Approval" is a method which allows >>overvoting, or equal rating. >It is, but is that supposed to be its definition? Maybe you are on >your way to changing Approval's definition. The method is the method; that is, properly, an election method should not depend on what it is called, or the precise manner in which the process is described. You can describe Approval as it was originally described, that is, with a ballot instruction. However, ballot instructions which include something like "Vote for those you approve," are not neutral, they could shift the election results, and then we get all this stuff about how "strategic voters" are taking advantage of the poor "sincere voters." But that only occurs if the "sincere voters" are simply following instructions regarding "Approval." If they understand that they are simply voting, that they are marking a ballot such that a vote is added to the total of a candidate, and that the candidate with the most votes wins, and that they may do what the ballot itself would allow them to do, which is to vote for more than one (I do not recall seeing a ballot instruction that informs voters that their vote will be discarded if they vote for more than one, and my suspicion is that some level of overvoting is from voters who think that the votes will be counted, even though what I *do* see on ballots is "Vote for One.") The word "Approve" should not appear on the ballot unless some very specific purpose justifies it. Simply Approval does not have an "Approval cutoff." If the ballot is a ranked or range ballot, and approval cutoff has a meaning with the method, then I'd think it acceptable. With ordinary Count All the Votes, standard, basic Approval, the term is misleading, there is no Approval c
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Peter Barath wrote: And what about the method (I don't know the name) in which the least approved candidate is eliminated until there is a Condorcet-winner? That is called "Definite Majority Choice". It has some alternative algorithms. http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choice Does it also fail FBC? Yes. All methods that meet the Condorcet criterion fail FBC. Condorcet is incompatible with FBC. Kevin's "adjustment" of Condorcet//Approval to meet FBC causes it to no longer strictly meet the Condorcet criterion. Did somebody analyse the strategy incentives then? Yes, it has been discussed a lot at EM. It used to be my favourite. 31: A>>B 32: B>>C 37: C>>A Leaving aside the approval cutoffs, methods that don't elect C here must fail mono-raise. With these rankings and also C being the most approved candidate, for me a method needs a good excuse for not electing C. DMC and also "Approval-Weighted Pairwise" both elect C. http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Cardinal_pairwise I like "Approval-Sorted Margins". http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins I also like using that method to find the lowest-ordered candidate, eliminate that candidate, and then repeat the process until one remains, each time interpreting ballots that make no approval distinction among remaining candidates as approving all except those they rank (among the remaining candidates) bottom or equal-bottom. (I think that is also good for plain ranked ballots that allow truncation but not an explicit approval cutoff.) An algorithm that is equivalent or nearly equivalent to ASM is to use one of Beatpath, River or Ranked Pairs measuring the 'defeat strength' by the difference between the two candidates' approval scores. I proposed this a while ago as "Approval Margins". Chris Benham By the way, electing from the Condorcet top tier using approval would be called Smith//Approval or Schwartz//Approval depending on which top tier is used. I don't typically consider these methods because they are more complicated than Condorcet//Approval and can't be adjusted to satisfy FBC. And what about the method (I don't know the name) in which the least approved candidate is eliminated until there is a Condorcet-winner? Does it also fail FBC? Did somebody analyse the strategy incentives then? (And here I don't think of a method in which all ranked candidates are considered as approved, but a whole preference order with a cutoff mark somewhere between.) Peter Barath Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól. Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
>>1. If there is a Condorcet-winner she/he/it wins. If there is >>not, the Approval winner wins. >Sure. That's been proposed many times. However, >it's not a very good method. First of all, it is >blatantly obvious, if you care to look, that the >Condorcet winner is sometimes *not* the best >winner, by far. I guess this is an unjust blame because this thing affect all voting methods. Even in a two-candidate contest where every considerable method becomes Plurality, it's possible that the minority has stronger preference, so the winner is not the social optimum. (The only defense against this is the money voting, the Clarke-tax, which is - I think - treated also a little unjustly. At least the theoretical honor should be given for showing the possibility of strategy-freeness. And who knows, one day it can be proven even practical in some circumstances.) Peter Barath Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól. Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
>By the way, electing from the Condorcet top tier using approval >would be called Smith//Approval or Schwartz//Approval depending on >which top tier is used. I don't typically consider these methods >because they are more complicated than Condorcet//Approval and >can't be adjusted to satisfy FBC. And what about the method (I don't know the name) in which the least approved candidate is eliminated until there is a Condorcet-winner? Does it also fail FBC? Did somebody analyse the strategy incentives then? (And here I don't think of a method in which all ranked candidates are considered as approved, but a whole preference order with a cutoff mark somewhere between.) Peter Barath Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól. Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 09:44 PM 8/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: I would guess that if you searched the EM archives you would find literally dozens of proposed methods that combine approval with a pairwise measure. And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is "Condorcet/Approval." Abd, Is "And.." suppose to read 'Any...', or is there some missing word? As written, to the extent that it makes sense it is false. The term "Approval" is somewhat misleading for the method, because a vote does not necessarily represent any absolute "Approval" of the candidates, and some people have a reaction to the method based on an idea that it does. That is purely a secondary marketing issue. Perhaps you would like to unilaterally change Approval's name? It's a vote, pure and simple. "Approval" is a method which allows overvoting, or equal rating. It is, but is that supposed to be its definition? Maybe you are on your way to changing Approval's definition. Chris Benham At 09:44 PM 8/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: I would guess that if you searched the EM archives you would find literally dozens of proposed methods that combine approval with a pairwise measure. And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is "Condorcet/Approval." The term "Approval" is somewhat misleading for the method, because a vote does not necessarily represent any absolute "Approval" of the candidates, and some people have a reaction to the method based on an idea that it does. It's a vote, pure and simple. "Approval" is a method which allows overvoting, or equal rating. Basic Approval is just Plurality with that tweak. (Which is actually removing an old errooneous assumption, the idea that an overvote is necessarily an error on the part of an error. Why is it an error? Because the rules will discard the ballot. Why will they discard the ballot? Because it is an error. Oops! A very old Catch-22.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 09:44 PM 8/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: >I would guess that if you searched the EM archives you would find >literally dozens of proposed methods that combine approval with a pairwise >measure. And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is "Condorcet/Approval." The term "Approval" is somewhat misleading for the method, because a vote does not necessarily represent any absolute "Approval" of the candidates, and some people have a reaction to the method based on an idea that it does. It's a vote, pure and simple. "Approval" is a method which allows overvoting, or equal rating. Basic Approval is just Plurality with that tweak. (Which is actually removing an old errooneous assumption, the idea that an overvote is necessarily an error on the part of an error. Why is it an error? Because the rules will discard the ballot. Why will they discard the ballot? Because it is an error. Oops! A very old Catch-22.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff, Lomax
Hi, --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >> At 01:29 PM 8/16/2007, Diego Renato wrote: >> We should resist TACTICAL bullet voting for the same reason that many >> other methods than plurality. Increase the overall satisfaction of the >> voters. > > It's an error. The one most harmed by "tactical" bullet-voting is the > voter who votes that way. Some analysts are confused by the fact that > it can look like tactical voting is advantageous. > If a so-called "tactical voter" supposedly approves of two > candidates, but only votes for one, we must look at why. Let me > suggest why: the voter has a preference, and the preference is strong > enough to motivate the voter to bullet-vote. There is a contradiction > in the assumptions: weak preference is assumed if we think the voter > approves of two, and strong preference in the action of voting. > > The voter has a reason for voting that way! He wants his favorite to win! > > And there is *nothing* wrong with this. Diego Renato's point is not that the voter is doing something wrong, it's that it is undesirable that the voter should perceive that he can gain an advantage by withholding information. It would be better if (in this particular situation) the voter could approve both candidates without any loss of advantage. That's why Diego Renato went on to suggest a method where arguably a bullet vote is not likely to be optimal. Kevin Venzke _ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 07:01 PM 8/19/2007, Peter Barath wrote: >Which means that the concept of "two candidates with the best chances" >depends not solely on the candidates themselves but theoretically >possibly on the voting method too! Yes. Of course. But I don't think that voting method results in a different estimation of who is in the top two or three, which is all that is relevant in nearly all real-world situations. Let's leave out the California gubernatorial recall >In your example with 47 percent firm Bush supporters the voters >were very wrong in supposing that he is a harmless candidate. >In reality, in this case the strategic votes would be identical >to the honest ones. > >However, I think your example did point to a widely ignored fact: >that the ugly dilemma of the Plurality vote: "how will other >voters vote?" does exist in Approval, even if it's smaller It's not widely ignored. The question of how to vote in Approval is certainly not as simple as "Which candidates do you approve of?" However, it is quite a reasonable way to vote in Approval to, quite simply, answer the question sincerely, for yourself, and vote for those candidates. It is not necessarily strategically optimal. But what is the penalty for failure? One suboptimal vote is not much to worry about! >So it's plausible to mix Approval. Absolutely, this does not follow from what was stated. For one thing, "Approval" is absolutely the simplest, cheapest reform on the table. Simply Count all the Votes. Few among us consider Approval the best method, though there are, in fact, some experts who do. It's a respectable position. However, there is no doubt but that Count All the Votes -- the name "Approval" greatly confuses the issue -- is a vast improvement for no cost. Sure, when you have a third party candidate who approaches parity with the big two, i.e., there are more than two frontrunners, strategic issues arise again. However, they do not bite as badly. And they bite even less in Range. The choice becomes more difficult in Approval merely because the method is so black and white, so ... binary. > My favourite (at this moment) >is a preference ranking with an approval cutoff. For me it's >interesting enough that it can be used in two ways: Well, I've been suggesting the reverse: Approval with preference indication. >1. If there is a Condorcet-winner she/he/it wins. If there is >not, the Approval winner wins. Sure. That's been proposed many times. However, it's not a very good method. First of all, it is blatantly obvious, if you care to look, that the Condorcet winner is sometimes *not* the best winner, by far. Secondly, if you *do* think that the Condorcet winner is the best, if one exists, one would think that, if there is a cycle, that the winner should come from a candidate who is a member of the cycle, and not be an Approval winner, who would have been beaten by any member of the cycle. So if you really want to go this way, you use approval level to determine which member of the cycle wins. And I don't know what this is called, but it is certainly a known method. However, consider the reverse, and, while we are at it, we might as well use a Range ballot. Range ballots need be no more complicated than ranked ballots, but they provide more information. You can do preference analysis on Range ballots, but not range analysis on Ranked ballots. It is already established practice in many places, when there is no majority preference shown in the election, to hold a runoff. What is generally done is that the runoff is between the top two. And, of course, this is just like IRV, except better. And more of a nuisance, hence the idea of combining the runoff with the first election But my point, really, is that certain conditions trigger a runoff. Now, Range is the only method on the table that considers true preference strength. Some Condorcet methods use a presumed measure of preference strength, but there is no reliability to it at all. In any case, in simulations, Range outperforms nearly all other methods in optimizing overall voter satisfaction with the result; it essentially does this by using *expressed* expected satisfaction! Some claim that this makes it vulnerable to "strategic voting," but the term is actually misapplied to Range, in part because there is no fixed algorithm for converting sincere preferences and internal absolute utilities to specific Range votes. Essentially, what I've come to, is a Range vote is a *vote*, i.e., an action, not a sentiment. And the simulations show that even if voters "strategize" to their heart's content, Range still outperforms other methods. *On average*. You can always come up with specific scenarios that will make it appear otherwise, but what I find fascinating is that, so far, all such scenarios I have seen depend on contradictory assumptions. A voter has a weak preference, i.e., does not care much which of
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Hi, --- Peter Barath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > My favourite (at this moment) > is a preference ranking with an approval cutoff. For me it's > interesting enough that it can be used in two ways: > > 1. If there is a Condorcet-winner she/he/it wins. If there is >not, the Approval winner wins. I think that Condorcet//Approval is an ok method. I made a revision to it that preserves Approval's feature that you never need to use favorite betrayal: http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Improved_Condorcet_Approval > 2. Calculate the two candidates with the most Approval points >and the pairwise winner of them wins. However, this procedure is easily undermined when every serious candidate simply has a "running mate" nominated with him. I would guess that if you searched the EM archives you would find literally dozens of proposed methods that combine approval with a pairwise measure. Kevin Venzke _ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
>47: Bush >> Gore > Nader >27: Gore > Nader >> Bush (honest); Gore >> Nader > Bush (strategic) >26: Nader > Gore >> Buch (honest); Nader >> Gore > Bush (strategic) >Bush wins the first rount, but loses for Gore in a runoff (IAR). >With strategic voting, the spoiler effect is possible under simple >approval. But this example was made possible only by the fact that many voters made bad estimates. It's a well accepted fact that in the most cases (no, not in all cases, as Warren D. Smith has low probability counter-examples for that) a strategic Approval vote is made by: - making a honest preference order - putting a cutoff mark between the two candidates with the best chances - if the better one seems to have more chance, put the cutoff immediately under her/him/it - if the worse one seems to have more chance, put the cutoff immediately above her/him/it But rarely is the question asked: what do we mean by the "two candidates with the best chances"? I think we are best to measure this only by the fact of how we expect all other voters to vote. Which means that the concept of "two candidates with the best chances" depends not solely on the candidates themselves but theoretically possibly on the voting method too! In your example with 47 percent firm Bush supporters the voters were very wrong in supposing that he is a harmless candidate. In reality, in this case the strategic votes would be identical to the honest ones. However, I think your example did point to a widely ignored fact: that the ugly dilemma of the Plurality vote: "how will other voters vote?" does exist in Approval, even if it's smaller. So it's plausible to mix Approval. My favourite (at this moment) is a preference ranking with an approval cutoff. For me it's interesting enough that it can be used in two ways: 1. If there is a Condorcet-winner she/he/it wins. If there is not, the Approval winner wins. 2. Calculate the two candidates with the most Approval points and the pairwise winner of them wins. Peter Barath Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól. Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Diego Renato wrote: 2007/8/18, Gervase Lam: > [With a reweight of 0 a] concern [is] that if you approve your compromise > candidate, who ends up being the most approved, you can weaken your votes > for your favorite candidate and cause him to fail to qualify for the > second round. The ideal way to sort out this concern would be have the reweighting be 1 instead of 0. However, having a reweighting of 1 means that a faction could get a turkey candidate into the second round, as Chris has pointed out. The compromise between a reweighting of 0 and 1 is 1/2! Personally, I agree with dropping rule #2 but would keep the reweighting at 1/2. I devised an example where a reweighting of 0 results CW fail to run second round (>> is approval cutoff): 33: Right >> Center > Left 8: R > C >> L 7: C > R >> L 8: C >> R > L 8: C >> L > R 8: C > L >> R 7: L > C >> R 21: L >> C > R First count: R: 48; C: 46; L: 36 Second count: C: 38,5; L: 36 (IAR), C: 31; L: 36 (Chris' proposal) Under IAR, candidates from right and center compete in the second round, and centrist wins. Under Crhis' method, the competitors are from right and left, and rightist wins. Diego, I don't think your example works. My approval scores are C53, R48, L36. (Note there are 107 ballots. FP scores are R41, C38, L28) Both methods have C as the first qualifier and R as the second. C easily pairwise beats both R and L so C wins. For your method the scores in the second count are R40.5, L28.5. In my suggested method the second count scores are R33, L21. It obviously isn't possible for any version of top-2 approval runoff to guarantee the election of a sincere CW when there are more than two candidates, so if your example did work I can't see what it would prove. Chris Benham Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
2007/8/18, Gervase Lam: > > > [With a reweight of 0 a] concern [is] that if you approve your > compromise > > candidate, who ends up being the most approved, you can weaken your > votes > > for your favorite candidate and cause him to fail to qualify for the > > second round. > > The ideal way to sort out this concern would be have the reweighting be > 1 instead of 0. However, having a reweighting of 1 means that a faction > could get a turkey candidate into the second round, as Chris has pointed > out. The compromise between a reweighting of 0 and 1 is 1/2! > Personally, I agree with dropping rule #2 but would keep the reweighting > at 1/2. I devised an example where a reweighting of 0 results CW fail to run second round (>> is approval cutoff): 33: Right >> Center > Left 8: R > C >> L 7: C > R >> L 8: C >> R > L 8: C >> L > R 8: C > L >> R 7: L > C >> R 21: L >> C > R First count: R: 48; C: 46; L: 36 Second count: C: 38,5; L: 36 (IAR), C: 31; L: 36 (Chris' proposal) Under IAR, candidates from right and center compete in the second round, and centrist wins. Under Crhis' method, the competitors are from right and left, and rightist wins. I agree that dropping rule #2 is better. However, as Dave said, runoffs are expensive. In parliamentary systems, 50%+ support is sufficient to maintain a head of government, because this i thought a winner in same conditions is not a bad outcome. Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
> Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2007 20:23:19 +0200 (CEST) > From: Kevin Venzke > Subject: [Election-Methods] RE : Improved Approval Runoff > --- Diego Renato <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a ?crit?: > > 3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other candidate - > > the > > most approved after a new count which the votes for the first one are > > reweighted to 1/2. > The difference is that Chris' suggestion doesn't have rule #2, and in > rule #3 the reweight is to 0. > [With a reweight of 0 a] concern [is] that if you approve your compromise > candidate, who ends up being the most approved, you can weaken your votes > for your favorite candidate and cause him to fail to qualify for the > second round. The ideal way to sort out this concern would be have the reweighting be 1 instead of 0. However, having a reweighting of 1 means that a faction could get a turkey candidate into the second round, as Chris has pointed out. The compromise between a reweighting of 0 and 1 is 1/2! Personally, I agree with dropping rule #2 but would keep the reweighting at 1/2. Thanks, Gervase. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 01:29 PM 8/16/2007, Diego Renato wrote: We should resist TACTICAL bullet voting for the same reason that many other methods than plurality. Increase the overall satisfaction of the voters. It's an error. The one most harmed by "tactical" bullet-voting is the voter who votes that way. Some analysts are confused by the fact that it can look like tactical voting is advantageous. However, what it boils down to is like this: You are the last voter. By some process, you know how everyone else voted. There is a tie between two candidates. You approve of both of them. How should you vote? Well, you have a choice. You can vote for both, and thus let, usually, chance determine between them, or you can vote for your favorite. The choice is yours. And, indeed, this is the situation with voting, properly: the choice is yours, as a voter. If a so-called "tactical voter" supposedly approves of two candidates, but only votes for one, we must look at why. Let me suggest why: the voter has a preference, and the preference is strong enough to motivate the voter to bullet-vote. There is a contradiction in the assumptions: weak preference is assumed if we think the voter approves of two, and strong preference in the action of voting. The voter has a reason for voting that way! He wants his favorite to win! And there is *nothing* wrong with this. We suggest that the proper way for each voter to vote is to increase his or her own satisfaction. And then we try to use methods that take this information, and use it to find the winner who will satisfy the most. If the voter conceals relevant satisfaction information, then the method will not know how to satisfy this voter! And it may err, with regard to this one, and thus to the overall satisfaction. We must note, that if this "strategic voter" prevails, and the candidate wins, that candidate must have been also approved by others. We may argue that if the voter had also voted for another candidate, that the winner might have changed, and this might have resulted in more people being satisfied. But it is just as likely, unless the voter has the kind of knowledge described above, that the voter who bullet votes ends up with a candidate that the voter is not satisfied with. When I studied the specific outcomes in a Range 2 election (ratings of 0, 1, 2), what I saw with bullet voting as distinct from so-called sincere voting was the same expected outcome, *but* greater variability. That is, sometimes bullet-voting caused the favorite to win, a desirable outcome for the voter, but sometimes it caused the least-favored to win, because the voter did not also approve of the middle candidate. As I recall, there was one scenario (the study looks at all possible pre-vote scenarios where the voter's vote can affect the outcome) out of 27 where a sincere vote resulted in a worse outcome than bullet voting, and one where it resulted in a better outcome. Looking at approval style votes, in particular bullet voting, there were two scenarios where the voter gained by bullet voting, and two where the voter lost. This was a zero-knowledge election. What has happened is that far too many analysists have not taken a close enough look at the actual scenarios, at what actually happens in voting, but instead they rely on superficial analyses and specific examples that make it look like the strategic voter gains something unjust. But the strategy used only makes sense in certain contexts, and the risks of that strategy, in that context, are not considered by the analyst. From what I've seen, the regret of the strategic voter whose strategy fails is deeper than the regret of the sincere voter who loses some value because of voting sincerely. If you give a candidate some support, but not enough, because you had a favorite you wanted to reserve the full vote for, you may regret it, but you know that you were, at least, sincere, and the result turned out differently simply because others did not agree with you. But if you fail to vote at all for someone you really would prefer to the one who wins, you may kick yourself for a long time. why didn't I just express what I felt? But if the voter really did express how he felt, if he really *didn't* want to vote for that candidate, then his vote was sincere, it was not a strategic vote. We set up a contradiction when, in Range and Approval, we assume weak preference in a context where the voter indicates a strong one. Suppose you are out with friends, and you are choosing a pizza. (Oh, no, here comes the pizza election again!) Your friends say they prefer Pepperoni, but Mushroom is okay with them. You are the last voter. Suppose you are Jewish, keeping kosher, you can't eat Pepperoni. (I think some Jews will have other problems as well, with food not prepared in a kosher kitchen, but lots of Jews aren't that strict, but they won't eat pork.) You will say so, presumably, you will i
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
> Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2007 17:00:59 -0300
> From: "Diego Renato"
> Subject: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
> 1) On the first round, the voter can vote for as many or as few candidates
> as desired.
> 2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, the most approved is
> elected.
> 3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other candidate - the
> most approved after a new count which the votes for the first one are
> reweighted to 1/2.
> 4) The winner is the candidate who receives a majority of votes on the
> second round.
I did think of this idea awhile back, but it excluded step 2. That is,
there will always be a second round (just to make sure?...)
Rightly or wrongly, I dismissed the idea because it was really just a
variation of Sequential PAV ('Proportional' Approval Voting). That is,
the ballots who voted for the winner in the first round is halved.
Thanks,
Gervase.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff]
I do not see where I expressed a bias I do not feel: For many elections most voters would be happy with Plurality. We NEED to have a method that will both satisfy their needs AND provide for satisfying voter desires when they are ready for something more complex. Could be that Brazil is more ready to discard Plurality, though we do have multiparty races in the US - and thus reason to move on to better methods. I LIKE Condorcet for, with reasonable simplicity, it lets voters express order of desirability of candidates as they see such. I dislike runoffs as expensive for all concerned. I dislike your variation of Approval as complicated to understand, yet less desirable than Condorcet. DWK On Thu, 16 Aug 2007 13:06:38 -0300 Diego Renato wrote: > > > 2007/8/15, Dave Ketchum: > > On most elections many, if not most, voters? preference will be a > single > candidate. Why is this something to fight? > One candidate can overshadow the competition. > Voters can be loyal to their party. > > For occasional exception elections there will be more interest in voting > for multiple candidates, and it is DESIRABLE to support this voting for > whichever elections may inspire voter interest in such. > > Fighting complications that make the rules for deciding on winners > hard to > understand make such complications undesirable unless they provide major > benefits. > > DWK > > > Your viewpoint is biased to two-party system. In multi-party > democracies, like Brazil, your assumption is likely wrong. No one-round > voting system is able to differentiate them. I?ll try to illustrate it. > Suppose an election which three candidates (Bush, Gore, Nader) runs. > These are the real preferences of the voters: > ... > > Diego Santos > Aluno de Ciência da Computação > Integrante do projeto Wireless(Petrobras/DEE-UFCG) -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Diego Renato wrote: All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality voting. For instance, suppose that some voter has A as his/her first preference. S/he can vote like this: Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected ... Range (0 - 100 scale): A: 100; B: 0; C: 0; D: 0 ... Preferential (IRV, Condorcet, etc): A>B=C=D=... A voter never gets a better result for hirself in IRV by bullet voting, because lower rankings do nothing until the voter's higher-ranked candidates have been eliminated. IRV meets "Later-no-Harm". Also as has been pointed out, in all the methods you mention it only takes a small proportion of voters to max. score or rank more than one candidate to give a different result from plurality voting. I regard Approval as vastly vastly better than Plurality (FPP) even if in practice nearly all voters bullet vote and the result is always the same as if they all had. Additionally, there are several instances which only binary input voting systems are reasonable. Complex systems are hard to adopt in low-educated underdeveloped countries. Yes, interesting problem. This system, called Improved Approval Runoff (IAR), has the goal to resist bullet voting through simple ballots. Description: 1) On the first round, the voter can vote for as many or as few candidates as desired. 2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, the most approved is elected. 3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other candidate - the most approved after a new count which the votes for the first one are reweighted to 1/2. 4) The winner is the candidate who receives a majority of votes on the second round. On computer simulations, the top-two approval runoff method selected more times the Condorcet winner than any Condorcet method. I think that IAR is slightly fairer than top-two approval runoff under real voters. Any comments? I think this is not bad for a simple method and a big improvement on "top-two approval runoff", which I long ago rejected as a strategy farce. Parties with a chance of winning a normal approval election will run pairs of clones and ask their supporters to approve both of them. Normal plurality top-2 runoff is more vulnerable than IRV to the Pushover strategy, but approval top-2 runoff is much much more vulnerable again. Voters who are confidant that their favourite or one of their favourites (with their approval) can qualify will have incentive to also approve all the candidates they are sure that their favourite/s can beat in the runoff. If a faction succeeds with this strategy then the final round will be between their favourite and a candidate with much less sincere support. If more than one faction attempts it then it is just possible that both qualifiers will be "turkeys" with very little sincere support. *push-over* The strategy of ranking a weak alternative higher than one's preferred alternative, which may be useful in a method that violates monotonicity <#monotonicity>. 2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, the most approved is elected. This is understandable, but if more than one candidate has more than 50% approval then I would still like to see a runoff. Maybe I'd like to see a runoff in some circumstances even when only one candidate has 50+% approval. This special rule of yours creates extra Compromise incentive and also means that the result can be changed by adding or removing ballots that ignore all the viable candidates (just by changing the absolute size of the 50% threshold). 3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other candidate - the most approved after a new count which the votes for the first one are reweighted to 1/2. This prevents the final from being between a pair of clones from the same party. It makes the Pushover strategy a bit less effective because voters can't have their first-round votes count at full strength for both their sincere favourite and the turkey. How did you decide on the reweighting figure of 1/2? Why not "reweight" those ballots that supported the first qualifier to zero? That would mean that Pushover strategists would have to take some extra risk by not approving their sincere favourite in the first round (as in normal plurality top-2 runoff). Chris Benham All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality voting. For instance, suppose that some voter has A as his/her first preference. S/he can vote like this: Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected ... Range (0 - 100 scale): A: 100; B: 0; C: 0; D: 0 ... Preferential (IRV, Condorcet, etc): A>B=C=D=... Additionally, there are several instances which only binary input voting systems are reasonable. Complex systems are hard to adopt in low-edu
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Correction: > 2nd count (1st round): > 22,5 Bush clone > 27 Gore <- selected for runoff. > 26 Nader > > Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
2007/8/16, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax: > At 04:00 PM 8/15/2007, Diego Renato wrote: > >All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are > >vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality > voting. > > "Vulnerable" implies that there is something wrong with this. It is > not correct to claim that this gives "the same results" as plurality > voting. That's only true if *all* voters bullet vote. And if that is > what they want to do, who are we to say that they should not? > Read my previous message. If the majority of voters really intend to vote for one candidate, they still are able to do it under IAR. > For instance, suppose that some voter has A as his/her first > > preference. S/he can vote like this: > > > >Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected ... > >Range (0 - 100 scale): A: 100; B: 0; C: 0; D: 0 ... > >Preferential (IRV, Condorcet, etc): A>B=C=D=... > > Yes. What's the problem? In a good method, if truncation results in > no majority winner, that is, majority consent to the win is not > apparent from the ballots, there should be a runoff. > > >Additionally, there are several instances which only binary input > >voting systems are reasonable. Complex systems are hard to adopt in > >low-educated underdeveloped countries. > > > >This system, called Improved Approval Runoff (IAR), has the goal to > >resist bullet voting through simple ballots. > > I'm mystified as to why we should "resist" bullet-voting. We should resist TACTICAL bullet voting for the same reason that many other methods than plurality. Increase the overall satisfaction of the voters. >Description: > > > >1) On the first round, the voter can vote for as many or as few > >candidates as desired. > >2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, the most > >approved is elected. > >3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other > >candidate - the most approved after a new count which the votes for > >the first one are reweighted to 1/2. > >4) The winner is the candidate who receives a majority of votes on > >the second round. > > It seems with the reweighting that it is assumed that the voter only > votes for two, otherwise why that particular reweighting? > > I'm not sure I understand the "second round." The expression was a > bit garbled, I suspect. I assume that the "second round" is not an > actual runoff, but a recounting. As written, it would seem manifestly > unfair to the first candidate, the plurality winner of the approval > election. It is a runoff. The weight of 1/2 fo the second round of count after first election is based on Sequential Proportional Approval Voting. The contenders of second runoff are the same winners of an hypotetical two-winner election under SPAV. This approach increases chances of a consensus candidate be selected to compete in runoff. An example with four candidates: Bush, Bush clone, Gore and Nader. Bush clone is a candidate strategically nominated: 2: Bush >> Bush clone > Gore > Nader 45: Bush = Bush clone >> Gore > Nader 27: Gore > Nader >> Bush = Bush clone (honest); Gore >> Nader > Bush = Bush clone (strategic) 26: Nader > Gore >> Bush = Bush clone (honest); Nader >> Gore > Bush = Bush clone (strategic) If under top-two approval, Bush and Bush clone will run the runoff election. Under IAR, Bush and Gore will run. 1st count (1st round): 47 Bush <- selected for runoff 45 Bush clone 27 Gore 26 Nader 2nd count (1st round): 22,5 Bush clone 27 Gore 26 Nader<- selected for runoff. Final result (runoff) 47 Bush 53 Gore (winner) There is no way to guarantee that a candidate gets "the majority of > votes" except by redefining votes to mean something other than "the > majority of voters approve this outcome of the election." (Top two > runoff does it by a trick: the voters only have two choices, and any > ballot which does not select one of them is discarded. This is > actually a failure of democracy, election results, when possible, > should always be ratified by a majority. That's what happens in small > societies using full democratic process, this step is only skipped in > large elections, supposedly for efficiency. > > However, Asset Voting methods could make real runoffs and > ratifications quite efficient. > > >On computer simulations, the top-two approval runoff method selected > >more times the Condorcet winner than any Condorcet method. I think > >that IAR is slightly fairer than top-two approval runoff under real > voters. > > Again, I don't think that's true. Approval is *not* guaranteed to > pick the Condorcet winner, no matter how you slice it, and any > Condorcet method, by definition, will. That is, a Condorcet method > *always* finds the Condorcet winner if voters vote sincerely, and > there are few reasons to treat the matter as if they will not. > > however, the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the best winner; > Approval may, indeed, select a better winner, as shown by social > utility simulations. Approv
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
2007/8/15, Dave Ketchum: > > On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single > candidate. Why is this something to fight? > One candidate can overshadow the competition. > Voters can be loyal to their party. For occasional exception elections there will be more interest in voting > for multiple candidates, and it is DESIRABLE to support this voting for > whichever elections may inspire voter interest in such. > > Fighting complications that make the rules for deciding on winners hard to > > understand make such complications undesirable unless they provide major > benefits. > > DWK > > Your viewpoint is biased to two-party system. In multi-party democracies, like Brazil, your assumption is likely wrong. No one-round voting system is able to differentiate them. I'll try to illustrate it. Suppose an election which three candidates (Bush, Gore, Nader) runs. These are the real preferences of the voters: 47: Bush >> Gore > Nader 33: Gore >> Nader > Bush 10: Gore > Nader >> Bush 10: Nader > Gore >> Bush Under honest approval voting, Gore receives 53 approvals, Bush 43 and Nader 20. Gore wins. It looks fair to me. However, note that Nader voters voted honestly because they were sure that Nader is not likely to win. Instead of, if is not known the winner of a pairwise comparison between Gore and Nader, there is incentive for bullet voting. This is the reason of Bucklin is no longer used in US. 47: Bush >> Gore > Nader 27: Gore > Nader >> Bush (honest); Gore >> Nader > Bush (strategic) 26: Nader > Gore >> Buch (honest); Nader >> Gore > Bush (strategic) Bush wins the first rount, but loses for Gore in a runoff (IAR). With strategic voting, the spoiler effect is possible under simple approval. Diego Santos Aluno de Ciência da Computação Integrante do projeto Wireless(Petrobras/DEE-UFCG) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
At 04:00 PM 8/15/2007, Diego Renato wrote:
>All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are
>vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality voting.
"Vulnerable" implies that there is something wrong with this. It is
not correct to claim that this gives "the same results" as plurality
voting. That's only true if *all* voters bullet vote. And if that is
what they want to do, who are we to say that they should not?
> For instance, suppose that some voter has A as his/her first
> preference. S/he can vote like this:
>
>Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected ...
>Range (0 - 100 scale): A: 100; B: 0; C: 0; D: 0 ...
>Preferential (IRV, Condorcet, etc): A>B=C=D=...
Yes. What's the problem? In a good method, if truncation results in
no majority winner, that is, majority consent to the win is not
apparent from the ballots, there should be a runoff.
>Additionally, there are several instances which only binary input
>voting systems are reasonable. Complex systems are hard to adopt in
>low-educated underdeveloped countries.
>
>This system, called Improved Approval Runoff (IAR), has the goal to
>resist bullet voting through simple ballots.
I'm mystified as to why we should "resist" bullet-voting.
>Description:
>
>1) On the first round, the voter can vote for as many or as few
>candidates as desired.
>2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, the most
>approved is elected.
>3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other
>candidate - the most approved after a new count which the votes for
>the first one are reweighted to 1/2.
>4) The winner is the candidate who receives a majority of votes on
>the second round.
It seems with the reweighting that it is assumed that the voter only
votes for two, otherwise why that particular reweighting?
I'm not sure I understand the "second round." The expression was a
bit garbled, I suspect. I assume that the "second round" is not an
actual runoff, but a recounting. As written, it would seem manifestly
unfair to the first candidate, the plurality winner of the approval election.
There is no way to guarantee that a candidate gets "the majority of
votes" except by redefining votes to mean something other than "the
majority of voters approve this outcome of the election." (Top two
runoff does it by a trick: the voters only have two choices, and any
ballot which does not select one of them is discarded. This is
actually a failure of democracy, election results, when possible,
should always be ratified by a majority. That's what happens in small
societies using full democratic process, this step is only skipped in
large elections, supposedly for efficiency.
However, Asset Voting methods could make real runoffs and
ratifications quite efficient.
>On computer simulations, the top-two approval runoff method selected
>more times the Condorcet winner than any Condorcet method. I think
>that IAR is slightly fairer than top-two approval runoff under real voters.
Again, I don't think that's true. Approval is *not* guaranteed to
pick the Condorcet winner, no matter how you slice it, and any
Condorcet method, by definition, will. That is, a Condorcet method
*always* finds the Condorcet winner if voters vote sincerely, and
there are few reasons to treat the matter as if they will not.
however, the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the best winner;
Approval may, indeed, select a better winner, as shown by social
utility simulations. Approval begins the progression of Range
methods, which match the very method of measuring what it means to
have a good result. ("Condorcet Criterion" can be shown to manifestly
make a poor choice under certain conditions, it really is not
controversial. That is, a small society would *never* choose what the
Condorcet Criterion would indicate should win, given sufficient
knowledge, under certain conditions, basically those of a majority
with a sufficiently weak preference and a minority with a
sufficiently strong one. Who decides, properly, when such a condition
should result in the violation fo the Majority Criterion?
The majority, but it is crucial that the decision be explicit.
What I have suggested is that Approval have a preference marker
added. I called this A+; that is, Approval with a "Plus" indicator
that shows preference. This marker could be used for more than one,
but the general intention is that it would be used to show the
Favorite. The ballot then indicates the set of approved candidates --
these are considered acceptable under the present conditions by the
voter -- and the favorite -- or favorites -- as well.
However, initially the ballots are counted without regard to the Plus
marker. It's an Approval election, initially. Now, with basic A+,
that's it. The Plus marker is used for analysis of election results,
allocation of campaign funding, and other informational purposes.
But having this preference inf
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
On Thu, 16 Aug 2007 01:04:21 +0100 James Gilmour wrote: > Dave Ketchum> Sent: 15 August 2007 22:57 > >>On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single >>candidate. > > > On what basis do you say that? Surely it is, to a very great extent, a > function of the voting system. If the voting > system says (directly or indirectly) "pick one winner", then the voter's > preference will be one candidate. It will also > apply when there are only two candidates contesting the seat. > First, I am writing from and for the US, where we have MANY elective offices. While some offices have the potential for attracting more candidates if supported by a good election method, many will not often attract more than a couple of serious candidates. When there is no good reason for more than a couple candidates, Plurality would be good enough - though I propose installing better voting methods to give their flexibility whenever it would be useful. > > >> Why is this something to fight? > > > This is not something to "fight", but it seems reasonable to offer the voters > a more sensitive voting system so that > those voters who wish can express their preferences more fully, if we can > devise such a voting system. > As I say above, the voting method should support voters selecting multiple candidates. The problem to fight is twisting voters' arms to encourage them to select more candidates than their desires support. > >> One candidate can overshadow the competition. > > > True, but not always the case. > > >> Voters can be loyal to their party. > > > True, but not always the case. > > > >>For occasional exception elections there will be more interest in voting >>for multiple candidates, and it is DESIRABLE to support this voting for >>whichever elections may inspire voter interest in such. > > > Why would such elections be "exceptional"? Surely at every election, if the > voter knows there is a chance her/his most > preferred candidate may not win, that voter would welcome the opportunity to > express one or more additional preferences > among the other candidates that might influence the outcome? > To get into this game there must be a suitable election method (assumed for this discussion), and a suitable collection of candidates to interest this voter in backing more than one of them. Write-ins can, if they choose, become extra candidates - but this becomes practical only if they choose to be serious about it. > > >>Fighting complications that make the rules for deciding on winners hard to >>understand make such complications undesirable unless they provide major >>benefits. > > > Avoidable complication is always to be avoided. If the rules for your "new" > voting system are too hard to understand > the electors will not support your proposed reform. You seem to echo my thought. > > James Gilmour See also my related post: [Election-Methods] Plurality + Approval + Condorcet. Sat, 04 Aug 2007 18:10:05 -0400 -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
Dave Ketchum> Sent: 15 August 2007 22:57 > On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single > candidate. On what basis do you say that? Surely it is, to a very great extent, a function of the voting system. If the voting system says (directly or indirectly) "pick one winner", then the voter's preference will be one candidate. It will also apply when there are only two candidates contesting the seat. > Why is this something to fight? This is not something to "fight", but it seems reasonable to offer the voters a more sensitive voting system so that those voters who wish can express their preferences more fully, if we can devise such a voting system. > One candidate can overshadow the competition. True, but not always the case. > Voters can be loyal to their party. True, but not always the case. > For occasional exception elections there will be more interest in voting > for multiple candidates, and it is DESIRABLE to support this voting for > whichever elections may inspire voter interest in such. Why would such elections be "exceptional"? Surely at every election, if the voter knows there is a chance her/his most preferred candidate may not win, that voter would welcome the opportunity to express one or more additional preferences among the other candidates that might influence the outcome? > Fighting complications that make the rules for deciding on winners hard to > understand make such complications undesirable unless they provide major > benefits. Avoidable complication is always to be avoided. If the rules for your "new" voting system are too hard to understand the electors will not support your proposed reform. James Gilmour Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single candidate. Why is this something to fight? One candidate can overshadow the competition. Voters can be loyal to their party. For occasional exception elections there will be more interest in voting for multiple candidates, and it is DESIRABLE to support this voting for whichever elections may inspire voter interest in such. Fighting complications that make the rules for deciding on winners hard to understand make such complications undesirable unless they provide major benefits. DWK On Wed, 15 Aug 2007 17:00:59 -0300 Diego Renato wrote: > All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are > vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality > voting. For instance, suppose that some voter has A as his/her first > preference. S/he can vote like this: > > Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected ... > Range (0 - 100 scale): A: 100; B: 0; C: 0; D: 0 ... > Preferential (IRV, Condorcet, etc): A>B=C=D=... > > Additionally, there are several instances which only binary input voting > systems are reasonable. Complex systems are hard to adopt in > low-educated underdeveloped countries. > > This system, called Improved Approval Runoff (IAR), has the goal to > resist bullet voting through simple ballots. > > Description: > > 1) On the first round, the voter can vote for as many or as few > candidates as desired. > 2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, the most approved > is elected. > 3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other candidate - > the most approved after a new count which the votes for the first one > are reweighted to 1/2. > 4) The winner is the candidate who receives a majority of votes on the > second round. > > On computer simulations, the top-two approval runoff method selected > more times the Condorcet winner than any Condorcet method. I think that > IAR is slightly fairer than top-two approval runoff under real voters. > > Any comments? > > > Diego Santos -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality voting. For instance, suppose that some voter has A as his/her first preference. S/he can vote like this: Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected ... Range (0 - 100 scale): A: 100; B: 0; C: 0; D: 0 ... Preferential (IRV, Condorcet, etc): A>B=C=D=... Additionally, there are several instances which only binary input voting systems are reasonable. Complex systems are hard to adopt in low-educated underdeveloped countries. This system, called Improved Approval Runoff (IAR), has the goal to resist bullet voting through simple ballots. Description: 1) On the first round, the voter can vote for as many or as few candidates as desired. 2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, the most approved is elected. 3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other candidate - the most approved after a new count which the votes for the first one are reweighted to 1/2. 4) The winner is the candidate who receives a majority of votes on the second round. On computer simulations, the top-two approval runoff method selected more times the Condorcet winner than any Condorcet method. I think that IAR is slightly fairer than top-two approval runoff under real voters. Any comments? Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
