[Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between strategy
vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.

Is this controversial?  For instance, could a two candidate election
be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?  Assuming at least
some honest voters, this approach might be able to improve the
"maximum net tangible utility" ("tangible" meaning we are only
counting the happiness with the results themselves, and ignoring such
less-measurable utility such as "feeling of fairness" or "elimination
of resentment" or "long term satisfaction with the election process
itself").

 My own opinion has always been that the (perceived?) fairness of
"everyone's vote counts the same" outweighs any desire for "maximum
net tangible utility."  I'd even go so far as to say that this would
be true even if we knew all votes were honest (say we put everyone on
a perfectly accurate lie detector).

So, I am quite happy with plain old majority vote for a two candidate
election.  But I am encountering those who seem to disagree with this,
and who don't seem to have the same concept of "fairness" as I do.
I'm curious if people here see this as a legitimately controversial
issue.

 Thanks,
 -rob


various voting related stuff at karmatics.com:
 http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/bargraphs.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/bars-demo.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/rank.html

 http://karmatics.com/docs/collective-self-interest-fallacy.html
 http://karmatics.com/docs/evolution-and-wisdom-of-crowds.html

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Ian Fellows]

I'm not aware of much in the way of serious opposition to the two-party
majority vote. in fact any reasonable methodology should reduce to the
majority vote when there are two candidates. The only method (to my
knowledge) that doesn't do this is range voting. www.rangevoting.org. Range
voting reduces to something similar to what you are saying. The problem lies
in giving numerical value to something as intangible as "satisfaction." How
do I measure my satisfaction relative to yours? Also, regardless of strongly
I feel (perhaps I only have a weak preference for one candidate),
strategically, I should give the maximum rating to the candidate I like to
maximize my happiness. And could this even be called strategic voting,
because there is no universal yardstick of happiness? Perhaps my weak
preference is comparable to your strong preference.

Ian Fellows
Statistician
University of California, San Diego
http://thefell.googlepages.com

p.s. The arguments on rangevoting.org are pretty fast and loose


-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of rob
brown
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 10:59 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election


My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between strategy
vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.

Is this controversial?  For instance, could a two candidate election
be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?  Assuming at least
some honest voters, this approach might be able to improve the
"maximum net tangible utility" ("tangible" meaning we are only
counting the happiness with the results themselves, and ignoring such
less-measurable utility such as "feeling of fairness" or "elimination
of resentment" or "long term satisfaction with the election process
itself").

 My own opinion has always been that the (perceived?) fairness of
"everyone's vote counts the same" outweighs any desire for "maximum
net tangible utility."  I'd even go so far as to say that this would
be true even if we knew all votes were honest (say we put everyone on
a perfectly accurate lie detector).

So, I am quite happy with plain old majority vote for a two candidate
election.  But I am encountering those who seem to disagree with this,
and who don't seem to have the same concept of "fairness" as I do.
I'm curious if people here see this as a legitimately controversial
issue.

 Thanks,
 -rob


various voting related stuff at karmatics.com:
 http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/bargraphs.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/bars-demo.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/rank.html

 http://karmatics.com/docs/collective-self-interest-fallacy.html
 http://karmatics.com/docs/evolution-and-wisdom-of-crowds.html

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Ian Fellows]

Sorry, I meant to post to the list

I'm not aware of much in the way of serious opposition to the two-party
majority vote. in fact any reasonable methodology should reduce to the
majority vote when there are two candidates. The only method (to my
knowledge) that doesn't do this is range voting. www.rangevoting.org. Range
voting reduces to something similar to what you are saying. The problem lies
in giving numerical value to something as intangible as "satisfaction." How
do I measure my satisfaction relative to yours? Also, regardless of strongly
I feel (perhaps I only have a weak preference for one candidate),
strategically, I should give the maximum rating to the candidate I like to
maximize my happiness. And could this even be called strategic voting,
because there is no universal yardstick of happiness? Perhaps my weak
preference is comparable to your strong preference.

Ian Fellows
Statistician
University of California, San Diego
http://thefell.googlepages.com

p.s. The arguments on rangevoting.org are pretty fast and loose

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of rob brown
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 2:00 PM
To: Ian Fellows
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election


I was going to post a reply to the list but noticed your reply was
just to me.  (bummer, I was kinda hoping you'd go on record with that
opinion)

Yes I am no fan of range voting, and it is a range voting fan (clay
shentrup) who inspired my post.  What is particularly disturbing is
now there is a new book coming out (gaming the vote) that, while
otherwise excellent, endorses range voting.

Interestingly, I did get Clay to admit that in range voting, it is
expected that even honest voters will "scale" their vote so that at
least one candidate gets a zero, and one gets a 100 (or whatever is
max).  In which case it would "reduce to the majority vote when there
are two candidates."  However, the rest of his arguments would not
make sense if it is assumed that a two candidate election works fine
with majority vote.

> p.s. The arguments on rangevoting.org are pretty fast and loose

Ha.  A lot of people seem impressed with Warren's math, and while I
haven't scrutinized it, I sure have seen their logic, which strikes me
as cree. :)

-rob



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Rob!

As you may expect, I am not at all of the opinion that majority rule is 
perfect, no matter how few options there are. The reason is simple: no 
majoritarian method can ever be democratic because it allows 51% of the 
electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the electorate from 
having any power at all, whereas a democratic method required everybody 
to have the same amount of power. In this sense, majority vote is far 
from being "fair".

The simplest democratic method in the two-options case, as with more 
options, is random ballot. In those unfortunate situations in which it 
cannot be guaranteed that both options are constitutional, random ballot 
should perhaps be modied in a way which ensures that only an option with 
at least, say, 5% support may win. (With more than two options, random 
ballot is of course not optimal since it does not encourage voter 
cooperation to elect good compromise options but rather elects polar 
options. D2MAC solves this problem while still being democratic.)

Yours, Jobst

rob brown schrieb:
> My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
> there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
> issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
> disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
> really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between strategy
> vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
> simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.
>
> Is this controversial?  For instance, could a two candidate election
> be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
> voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?  Assuming at least
> some honest voters, this approach might be able to improve the
> "maximum net tangible utility" ("tangible" meaning we are only
> counting the happiness with the results themselves, and ignoring such
> less-measurable utility such as "feeling of fairness" or "elimination
> of resentment" or "long term satisfaction with the election process
> itself").
>
>  My own opinion has always been that the (perceived?) fairness of
> "everyone's vote counts the same" outweighs any desire for "maximum
> net tangible utility."  I'd even go so far as to say that this would
> be true even if we knew all votes were honest (say we put everyone on
> a perfectly accurate lie detector).
>
> So, I am quite happy with plain old majority vote for a two candidate
> election.  But I am encountering those who seem to disagree with this,
> and who don't seem to have the same concept of "fairness" as I do.
> I'm curious if people here see this as a legitimately controversial
> issue.
>
>  Thanks,
>  -rob
>
> 
> various voting related stuff at karmatics.com:
>  http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html
>  http://karmatics.com/voting/bargraphs.html
>  http://karmatics.com/voting/bars-demo.html
>  http://karmatics.com/voting/rank.html
>
>  http://karmatics.com/docs/collective-self-interest-fallacy.html
>  http://karmatics.com/docs/evolution-and-wisdom-of-crowds.html
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>   



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Ian Fellows]

"The reason is simple: no majoritarian method can ever be democratic because
it allows 51% of the  electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the
electorate from having any power at all"

Perhaps you have a different definition of democracy than I do.

"The simplest democratic method in the two-options case, as with more
options, is random ballot."

err... Then either 51% or 49% of the population would have no power based on
which ballot was picked. If you have a binary choice someone will not get
what they want, and those people should be in the minority, period.



-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Jobst
Heitzig
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 12:38 PM
To: rob brown
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election


Dear Rob!

As you may expect, I am not at all of the opinion that majority rule is
perfect, no matter how few options there are. The reason is simple: no
majoritarian method can ever be democratic because it allows 51% of the
electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the electorate from
having any power at all, whereas a democratic method required everybody
to have the same amount of power. In this sense, majority vote is far
from being "fair".

The simplest democratic method in the two-options case, as with more
options, is random ballot. In those unfortunate situations in which it
cannot be guaranteed that both options are constitutional, random ballot
should perhaps be modied in a way which ensures that only an option with
at least, say, 5% support may win. (With more than two options, random
ballot is of course not optimal since it does not encourage voter
cooperation to elect good compromise options but rather elects polar
options. D2MAC solves this problem while still being democratic.)

Yours, Jobst

rob brown schrieb:
> My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
> there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
> issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
> disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
> really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between strategy
> vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
> simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.
>
> Is this controversial?  For instance, could a two candidate election
> be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
> voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?  Assuming at least
> some honest voters, this approach might be able to improve the
> "maximum net tangible utility" ("tangible" meaning we are only
> counting the happiness with the results themselves, and ignoring such
> less-measurable utility such as "feeling of fairness" or "elimination
> of resentment" or "long term satisfaction with the election process
> itself").
>
>  My own opinion has always been that the (perceived?) fairness of
> "everyone's vote counts the same" outweighs any desire for "maximum
> net tangible utility."  I'd even go so far as to say that this would
> be true even if we knew all votes were honest (say we put everyone on
> a perfectly accurate lie detector).
>
> So, I am quite happy with plain old majority vote for a two candidate
> election.  But I am encountering those who seem to disagree with this,
> and who don't seem to have the same concept of "fairness" as I do.
> I'm curious if people here see this as a legitimately controversial
> issue.
>
>  Thanks,
>  -rob
>
> 
> various voting related stuff at karmatics.com:
>  http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html
>  http://karmatics.com/voting/bargraphs.html
>  http://karmatics.com/voting/bars-demo.html
>  http://karmatics.com/voting/rank.html
>
>  http://karmatics.com/docs/collective-self-interest-fallacy.html
>  http://karmatics.com/docs/evolution-and-wisdom-of-crowds.html
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info



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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 20, 2007 3:41 PM, Ian Fellows <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> "The reason is simple: no majoritarian method can ever be democratic because
>> it allows 51% of the  electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the
>> electorate from having any power at all"
>
> Perhaps you have a different definition of democracy than I do.

I have become keenly aware that there are radically different
definitions of democracy floating around.  Ian, you and I seem to
agree on ours, but I thoroughly and completely disagree with the
definition implied by Jobst, as well as by various range voting
advocates that I have had the frustrating experience of trying to
communicate with.

Let me throw this one out there.  Let's say it is a vote for a number,
for instance we have a club, and we want to have vote on how much our
monthly dues will be.  We decide to have everyone write down their
preferred number, and then select the median value.  (you could do the
interpolated median or smoothed median [
http://karmatics.com/voting/median2.gif ] if you wish to reduce the
"aliasing" artifacts of conventional median)

Would that be "democratic"?  To me it is as close to perfectly fair
and democratic as you are going to get, since each person's vote
changes the result by the same amount as everyone else's vote (for all
reasonable intents and purposes).  Again, there is no conflict between
strategy and sincerity, and knowing how others will vote will not give
a voter an advantage.

However, again -- I know that others do not see it this way, but that
is because they seem to define democracy/fairness differently than you
(Ian) and I do.  Jobst, I'm curious how you feel about this one.

-rob

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Paul Kislanko]

>>Let me throw this one out there.  Let's say it is a vote for a number,
for instance we have a club, and we want to have vote on how much our
monthly dues will be.  We decide to have everyone write down their
preferred number, and then select the median value.  (you could do the
interpolated median or smoothed median [
http://karmatics.com/voting/median2.gif ] if you wish to reduce the
"aliasing" artifacts of conventional median)

Would that be "democratic"?  To me it is as close to perfectly fair
and democratic as you are going to get, since each person's vote
changes the result by the same amount as everyone else's vote (for all
reasonable intents and purposes).  Again, there is no conflict between
strategy and sincerity, and knowing how others will vote will not give
a voter an advantage. <<

How do you handle the more important question "how should dues be spent?"
There's a large faction in the club who believe that dues should go to feed
the hungry, and another large faction who believe the club should repave the
parking lot, and a different faction who believe land should be purchased
for a new clubhouse.

How do you decide "democratically" how to disperse the funds you've
collected from that simplistic method of defining the amount of dues?




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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 20, 2007 7:34 PM, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> How do you handle the more important question "how should dues be spent?"

Whether that is a more important question or not is beside the point.
It is a different question.  Maybe you could have more votes, deciding
the relative percentages spent on various things, or you can just
elect people to make those decisions.  I don't know.

However, I think it is quite reasonable that in certain situations, it
may be useful to vote on a numerical value, independent of other
issues.  Maybe there could be a vote on what the legal drinking age
is, or what the maximum speed limit is, or how much to pay the
sheriff, or how many cats are allowed to live in a single apartment,
or how much to charge for a fishing license.

I suppose you could bring in all kinds of things to complicate things,
but that seems rather counterproductive unless your intention was to
miss the point I was getting at.

-rob

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Paul Kislanko]

Well, what point were you getting at other than if there's only one issue
you can use median to decide the one issue?

My point is that the example isn't useful. In real elections there are more
alternatives than "set the value for this one item" examples can solve.

Yes, I got your point, but you didn't answer my question. You may think it
is useful to vote a numerical value, but construct an election where the
club members decide how to spend their collective dues along your lines.
With more than one alternative, how do you reduce the election to a single
rating? 

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of rob
brown
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 10:17 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

On Dec 20, 2007 7:34 PM, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> How do you handle the more important question "how should dues be spent?"

Whether that is a more important question or not is beside the point.
It is a different question.  Maybe you could have more votes, deciding
the relative percentages spent on various things, or you can just
elect people to make those decisions.  I don't know.

However, I think it is quite reasonable that in certain situations, it
may be useful to vote on a numerical value, independent of other
issues.  Maybe there could be a vote on what the legal drinking age
is, or what the maximum speed limit is, or how much to pay the
sheriff, or how many cats are allowed to live in a single apartment,
or how much to charge for a fishing license.

I suppose you could bring in all kinds of things to complicate things,
but that seems rather counterproductive unless your intention was to
miss the point I was getting at.

-rob

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

I think there is no single definition of democracy in the sense that  
it would determine which voting method is the best (for all  
elections). Majority, Condorcet and random ballot are good answers  
but maybe for different questions (in some special cases even Range  
could be a correct answer).


One basic example is electing a (giant) pizza for a group that often  
eats out together. The correct answer might be to use random ballot  
and eat 49% of the times pizza A and 51% of the times pizza B. But  
when electing a political leader (with a strong mandate) to a country  
random ballot may not be the correct answer. If the support is e.g.  
45% Bush, 45% Clinton, 10% Hitler it may be better to just use a  
method where one elects randomly either Bush or Clinton (instead of  
electing Hitler with 10% probability). Even when we have 55% Bush,  
45% Hitler it may be better to just pick the majority favourite.


There are also other possible criteria. In some elections we may want  
to elect the alternative that people like a lot. In other elections  
we may want to elect the alternative that people dislike as little as  
possible. In the leader example above I obviously wanted (roughly) to  
elect a compromise that is ok to most of the citizens and that is a  
compromise rather than an extremist.


Sometimes there is no method that would meet the (possibly very well  
defined) needs e.g. due to problems with strategic voting and one has  
to pick a method that is closest to what one wants.


In short, different methods for different needs. Some methods are  
good for many types of elections but not necessarily for all.


Juho



On Dec 20, 2007, at 22:37 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:


Dear Rob!

As you may expect, I am not at all of the opinion that majority  
rule is

perfect, no matter how few options there are. The reason is simple: no
majoritarian method can ever be democratic because it allows 51% of  
the

electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the electorate from
having any power at all, whereas a democratic method required  
everybody

to have the same amount of power. In this sense, majority vote is far
from being "fair".

The simplest democratic method in the two-options case, as with more
options, is random ballot. In those unfortunate situations in which it
cannot be guaranteed that both options are constitutional, random  
ballot
should perhaps be modied in a way which ensures that only an option  
with

at least, say, 5% support may win. (With more than two options, random
ballot is of course not optimal since it does not encourage voter
cooperation to elect good compromise options but rather elects polar
options. D2MAC solves this problem while still being democratic.)

Yours, Jobst

rob brown schrieb:

My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between  
strategy

vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.

Is this controversial?  For instance, could a two candidate election
be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?  Assuming at  
least

some honest voters, this approach might be able to improve the
"maximum net tangible utility" ("tangible" meaning we are only
counting the happiness with the results themselves, and ignoring such
less-measurable utility such as "feeling of fairness" or "elimination
of resentment" or "long term satisfaction with the election process
itself").

 My own opinion has always been that the (perceived?) fairness of
"everyone's vote counts the same" outweighs any desire for "maximum
net tangible utility."  I'd even go so far as to say that this would
be true even if we knew all votes were honest (say we put everyone on
a perfectly accurate lie detector).

So, I am quite happy with plain old majority vote for a two candidate
election.  But I am encountering those who seem to disagree with  
this,

and who don't seem to have the same concept of "fairness" as I do.
I'm curious if people here see this as a legitimately controversial
issue.

 Thanks,
 -rob


various voting related stuff at karmatics.com:
 http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/bargraphs.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/bars-demo.html
 http://karmatics.com/voting/rank.html

 http://karmatics.com/docs/collective-self-interest-fallacy.html
 http://karmatics.com/docs/evolution-and-wisdom-of-crowds.html

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
list info








Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
list info

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

On Dec 21, 2007, at 3:24 , rob brown wrote:

> Let's say it is a vote for a number,
> for instance we have a club, and we want to have vote on how much our
> monthly dues will be.  We decide to have everyone write down their
> preferred number, and then select the median value.  (you could do the
> interpolated median or smoothed median [
> http://karmatics.com/voting/median2.gif ] if you wish to reduce the
> "aliasing" artifacts of conventional median)

Median is often a nice way to pick the best best value, but as  
discussed in other mails it is not always possible to set a numeric  
value to solve a question. Here's one example where numeric values  
may bring some additional value to an election that is a choice  
between two exclusive alternatives.

There is an election between two alternatives, A and B. Alternative A  
is given value 0 and candidate B is 100. Voters may pick any value in  
range 0..100. Vote 0 means "I prefer A and don't like B at all". Vote  
51 means "I prefer B but A is almost as good".

If we now count the median we will get the winner and in addition we  
will get the strength and distribution of the opinions. Note that the  
"conventional median" avoids the problem of not electing the majority  
winner (49 votes "0", 51 votes "51"). If the median is 50, the median  
of the non-50 votes can be used to solve the tie.

Let's say that alternative A is supported by 60% of the voters. The  
median could be anything between 0 and 49 (or 50). One could use it  
as an informative value or even to automatically determine some  
further questions after the election.

In principle one could develop this method further by using multiple  
numeric values in the case of multiple (discrete, not linearly  
related) alternatives. It is also possible to use methods where  
candidates would put themselves somewhere in a map of various  
numerical "coordinates" (we might find quite many centrists though ;-).

Juho




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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 20, 2007 10:58 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Dec 21, 2007, at 3:24 , rob brown wrote:

> Median is often a nice way to pick the best best value, but as
> discussed in other mails it is not always possible to set a numeric
> value to solve a question.

Of course it isn't.  Who said it was?

My question was IF we are voting a number (and I gave an example that
I thought was simple), then would the median method be considered
"ideal"?  I fully understand that if we are voting for non-numbers
(such as candidates), a method for voting for numbers isn't going to
be effective.

> Here's one example where numeric values
> may bring some additional value to an election that is a choice
> between two exclusive alternatives.

You have moved it back to talking about electing discrete candidates,
which I never suggested that median was good for...or at least isn't
"perfect" for.  In fact, I'll go out on a limb and say it is most
certainly not.

-rob

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 20, 2007 8:32 PM, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Well, what point were you getting at other than if there's only one issue
> you can use median to decide the one issue?
>
> My point is that the example isn't useful. In real elections there are more
> alternatives than "set the value for this one item" examples can solve.

Yes.  I see simplified examples on this list used to explain
theoretical concepts all the time.  I thought that was ok, and often
necessary.  I was trying to help resolve a theoretical point.

(however I would argue that an election in a club where they decide
what their dues are is every bit as "useful" and "real" an election as
one where we vote for president.  Does it have to be government to be
"real"?  For that matter,  I see no reason why a government couldn't
allow the citizens to vote for its budget.  But all of this is
irrelevant to the theoretical concept I was trying to explore.)

> Yes, I got your point, but you didn't answer my question.

Well, ok, but I was trying to get an answer on what I saw as a fairly
simple straightforward question, rather than go the "free association"
route off onto another subject.

I'll back up and explain.

What  I was trying to do is establish a baseline for evaluating
election methods (including ones that would be used for "real"
elections with multiple discrete candidates).  So I wanted to start by
discussing a type of election that does not have potential for cycles
and all those complexities that Arrow stressed out about.

I suggested that a "theoretically perfect" election can be held in the
case where we are looking for a simple numerical value (of course, I
am making the assumption that the closer the result is to a voters
ideal, the happier the voter will be).  My understanding is that Arrow
would have no problems with such an election.

If, however, this is not agreed on (and I have reason to think it
isn't, by the Range voting people specifically), it seems pointless to
talk about condorcet vs. range vs. approval.  Since we can't even
agree on what makes makes a theoretically "ideal"  election in simpler
cases where we have no possibility of cycles and all that ugly stuff.

That's why I was asking the question.  To help establish a baseline
for evaluating election methods.  Not to solve a real world problem
with numerical voting.

> You may think it
> is useful to vote a numerical value, but construct an election where the
> club members decide how to spend their collective dues along your lines.
> With more than one alternative, how do you reduce the election to a single
> rating?

Yeah, I don't know.  Not trying to be a jerk about it, but I'm not
going to answer it, because it has nothing to do with what I was
getting at.  Maybe someone else will.

-rob

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 20, 2007 10:07 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think there is no single definition of democracy in the sense that
> it would determine which voting method is the best (for all
> elections).

Yeah, not looking for that.  There is a reason I restricted it to one
simple type of election.  (well, I later added another type, numerical
elections)

Arrow's theorem has been reworded "There is no consistent method by
which a democratic society can make a choice (when voting) that is
always fair when that choice must be made from among 3 or more
alternatives."

And all I wanted to know was, can we agree that we can be "always
fair" in a case where there are only two candidates?

My understanding is that  Arrow believed that a two candidate election
was trivially solvable, by a simple majority vote.

Meanwhile, I believe the general opinion of those who advocate Range
Voting is that it is NOT solvable, because Range Voting people are
after a different sort of fairness than what Arrow was after.

That's where I was trying to go with this.  I'm trying, really hard,
to understand where Range Voting fans are coming from.

Sorry if it just confused people.

-rob

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Ian!

Well, "period" ist not a very good argument in a scientific discussion...

I didn't mean to define "democracy" since that would certainly require more 
than just saying what a democratic *single-winner decision method* is. But on 
the latter I agree we do seem to have different opinions.

Also, when I said "equal power" I did not imply that "power" should be 
interpreted as "getting what I want". Such an interpretation would not be 
helpful, as you rightfully pointet out. In my opinion, the only meaningful way 
to define "power" in the context of a single-winner decision is how much 
influence on the outcome one has. One straightforward way to measure this 
influence is to look at how the winning probabilities change when the voter's 
behaviour changed. 

A member of a minority has no influence at all under majority rule since she 
cannot change the winning probabilities. Under random ballot, she has exactly 
the same influence on the winning probabilities as any other voter. 

So, when you favour majority vote over random ballot, then maybe you do so 
because it seems more "efficient" in electing a "good" option -- but that is a 
different aspect than the question of whether it is democratic. Sadly, 
efficiency and democracy are not the same goals.

Yours, Jobst


> -Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
> Von: "Ian Fellows" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Gesendet: 21.12.07 00:41:13
> An:  "rob brown" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Betreff: RE: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election


> 
> "The reason is simple: no majoritarian method can ever be democratic because
> it allows 51% of the  electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the
> electorate from having any power at all"
> 
> Perhaps you have a different definition of democracy than I do.
> 
> "The simplest democratic method in the two-options case, as with more
> options, is random ballot."
> 
> err... Then either 51% or 49% of the population would have no power based on
> which ballot was picked. If you have a binary choice someone will not get
> what they want, and those people should be in the minority, period.
> 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Jobst
> Heitzig
> Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 12:38 PM
> To: rob brown
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
> 
> 
> Dear Rob!
> 
> As you may expect, I am not at all of the opinion that majority rule is
> perfect, no matter how few options there are. The reason is simple: no
> majoritarian method can ever be democratic because it allows 51% of the
> electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the electorate from
> having any power at all, whereas a democratic method required everybody
> to have the same amount of power. In this sense, majority vote is far
> from being "fair".
> 
> The simplest democratic method in the two-options case, as with more
> options, is random ballot. In those unfortunate situations in which it
> cannot be guaranteed that both options are constitutional, random ballot
> should perhaps be modied in a way which ensures that only an option with
> at least, say, 5% support may win. (With more than two options, random
> ballot is of course not optimal since it does not encourage voter
> cooperation to elect good compromise options but rather elects polar
> options. D2MAC solves this problem while still being democratic.)
> 
> Yours, Jobst
> 
> rob brown schrieb:
> > My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
> > there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
> > issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
> > disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
> > really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between strategy
> > vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
> > simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.
> >
> > Is this controversial?  For instance, could a two candidate election
> > be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
> > voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?  Assuming at least
> > some honest voters, this approach might be able to improve the
> > "maximum net tangible utility" ("tangible" meaning we are only
> > counting the happiness with the results themselves, and ignoring such
> > less-measurable utility such as "feeling of fairness" or "elimination
> > of resentment" or &qu

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Dec 20, 2007, at 11:59 PM, rob brown wrote:

> And all I wanted to know was, can we agree that we can be "always
> fair" in a case where there are only two candidates?
>
> My understanding is that  Arrow believed that a two candidate election
> was trivially solvable, by a simple majority vote.
>
> Meanwhile, I believe the general opinion of those who advocate Range
> Voting is that it is NOT solvable, because Range Voting people are
> after a different sort of fairness than what Arrow was after.

Arrow doesn't talk about 'fairness' per se, but rather a collection of  
explicit criteria.

The problem with two-candidate elections is 'agenda manipulation': How  
did there get to be only two candidates? The US presidential election  
is a fine example of agenda manipulation, in which many factors  
(attractiveness to donors, party machinery, restrictive ballot access  
laws) other than voter preference goes into deciding, say, that of all  
eligible candidates, only John Kerry and George W Bush will  
(effectively) be on the ballot.

So in that sense, you're certainly right to question the guarantee of  
fairness, regardless of how many candidates there are.


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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Jan Kok]

Hi Rob,

I congratulate you for focusing on some questions that underlie the
endless debates about which is the "best", "fairest", etc. voting
method.

To restate the questions my own way: What do we _mean_ by "best",
"fairest", "most democratic", etc. Is there some standard (criterion,
figure of merit) that we can all agree upon for evaluating and
comparing voting methods?

It appears that, so far, there is no widely agreed-upon definition for
"best", fairest", "most democratic", etc. that can be used for
comparing voting methods. Nor is there some "gold standard" that we
can all agree upon for comparing methods. I had thought there were
only a couple commonly held standards, but I see from this thread that
there are perhaps four or more:

The Majority Criterion: roughly speaking, the majority of voters get their way.

Social Utility: pick the winner that maximally benefits society, or
gives maximal overall voter satisfaction, etc.

Equal voting power: all voters have equal influence over the election.

Minimize or eliminate the need or temptation for voters to vote strategically.

Some people (anarchists) reject the idea of voting entirely!

Many thousands of words have been written to try to define those
standards or criteria more precisely. I won't add to that verbiage
here. I think it's not very productive to haggle over detailed
definitions when we don't agree about which of those broad criteria is
"best".

Instead, I'll say a few words to promote my view that Social Utility /
Overall Voter Satisfaction / "Maximum Net Tangible Utility" (I like it
:-) is the "best" standard.

Preface: I don't think there is a way to "prove" that any of these
standards are "correct" or "best", using mathematical or philosophical
arguments. It seems to me that this is a discussion about personal
values - do you value social utility more, or do you value equal
voting power more? It seems almost axiomatic to me that Social Utility
is the "obvious" "best" standard. But I recognize that others may feel
the same way about the other standards. How can we move beyond such an
impasse? My approach to persuasion is to present voting scenarios
where I hope it will make sense to most readers that preference
strength should trump majority rule, equal voting power, etc. I am
also striving for some degree of realism, in the sense that people can
see how similar situations could occur in real elections. At the same
time I don't want the scenarios to be so realistic that some readers
will identify strongly with the majority and therefore conclude that
majority rule is best! (I'm explaining my strategy here because I want
to invite people to contribute more scenarios, in support of Social
Utility, or in support of the other criteria.)

Preface: Except for my initial infatuation with IRV, I have always
chosen my criteria first, and then chosen to support voting methods
that best satisfy those criteria. I have NOT chosen voting methods
first, then chosen criteria that justified my choice of voting method.

Ok, here are a couple of scenarios:

(Inspired by Clay Shentrup.) Consider an election where the choices are:
A. Spend $10 billion to find a cure for the common cold.
B. Spend $10 billion to find a cure for multiple sclerosis.
(Assume equal high probability of success for either choice.)
Presumably a lot more people suffer from colds than from MS, but MS is
devastating, while colds are generally just a nuisance. So, if voters
are selfish and shortsighted (and "honest" about expressing their
preferences), option A might win with a simple majority vote. But,
let's assume that option B gives better social utility. Wouldn't that
be the better outcome? A method such as fine-grained Range Voting,
which allows voters to express preference strength, would have a
better chance of making the "right" choice, if voters who are not
afflicted with MS and not worried about getting MS vote "honestly"
their weak preference for option A. On the other hand, if the A voters
strategically exaggerate their preference for A, then A would win.
That's no worse than the majority rule result.

Here's another, similar scenario. The choices are:
A. All people pay income tax in proportion to their income.
B. People whose last names begin with A through F pay twice as much as
they would in option A, and the rest pay $1 less than they would in
option A.
Assume the extra taxes collected in B are just wasted. So option B has
lower social utility, but the majority of voters - those whose last
names begin with G through Z - would slightly prefer option B. I
think/hope that most readers would agree that A is the "better" and
"fairer" choice. A simple majority vote would choose B. Range Voting
with honest voters is more likely to choose A. But if the G-Z voters
strategically exaggerate their preference for B, then the result is
the same as majority vote - no worse.

Would voters vote "honestly" with intermediate values, thus
voluntarily "weakening" their vote under Range Vot

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Dec 21, 2007, at 7:41 AM, Jan Kok wrote:

> I personally have voted on bylaws or platform issues at political
> conventions, where I wanted to cast a weak vote rather than a strong
> yes or no vote. The reason was that I had only a weak opinion, and
> would have preferred to let those with strong opinions have their way
> - but if nearly everyone had only weak opinions, then I might as well
> register my opinion and participate in the decision.


Then there's Yeats's counter-argument.

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.


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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 21, 2007 7:41 AM, Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Hi Rob,
>
> I congratulate you for focusing on some questions that underlie the
> endless debates about which is the "best", "fairest", etc. voting
> method.
>

Cool.  glad to see someone gets where I'm coming from. :)


> To restate the questions my own way: What do we _mean_ by "best",
> "fairest", "most democratic", etc. Is there some standard (criterion,
> figure of merit) that we can all agree upon for evaluating and
> comparing voting methods?
>
> It appears that, so far, there is no widely agreed-upon definition for
> "best", fairest", "most democratic", etc. that can be used for
> comparing voting methods. Nor is there some "gold standard" that we
> can all agree upon for comparing methods. I had thought there were
> only a couple commonly held standards, but I see from this thread that
> there are perhaps four or more:


Agree.


> The Majority Criterion: roughly speaking, the majority of voters get their
> way.
>

Personal opinion: I don't find this one at all compelling. (note that I find
majority works fine in a two person election, but I don't think that
generalizes to elections with more than two candidates. In fact I think it
is next to meaningless in some cases an example being my "vote for a
number" scenario, where there are essentially an infinite number of
candidates)


> Social Utility: pick the winner that maximally benefits society, or
> gives maximal overall voter satisfaction, etc.
>

Let's make sure we are in agreement that this is "short term satisfaction
with the results alone", and doesn't bring into it all the other (intangible
and possibly long term) factors that can satisfy people, such as feeling of
fairness, lack of conflict between feeling like you are "cheating" or being
a "sucker", etc.

My discussions with Clay got ridiculous because he would include these
intangible things under social utility so that he could say "it is a fact
that social utility is the 'correct' thing to judge a voting method on", and
then he would not include them when he did his "proofs".  In other words, he
changed the definition (dramatically) to suit him.

In any case, I think social utility -- in the restricted first meaning -- is
one of many criteria, but not the only one and probably not the most
important one.  But that's my opinion.


> Equal voting power: all voters have equal influence over the election.
>

This is, to me, a fundamental concept of democracy and one of the top
criteria.  It directly contrasts with "social utility", since it by nature
has to ignore strength of preference.

Minimize or eliminate the need or temptation for voters to vote
> strategically.


This is an extremely important one to me as well.  It overlaps a bit with
the "equal voting power" one (if strategic voting provides benefit, that
means non-strategic voters have less influence over the outcome than
strategic ones).  But they are ultimately separate issues.

I think there are other important criteria as well.  My biggest problem with
plurality is its tendency to cause parties to form.  I think this
polarization, which is of course a long term effect, is one of the most
destructive things in society.

I think a system that tends to elect centrist candidates is better than ones
that elect candidates that bring out strong feelings of a particular
faction.  All the moreso in places (Iraq comes to mind) that are civil war
prone.  I would argue that the differences between north and south in the US
could have been resolved peacefully, but for the polarization caused by
plurality (in fact the election of Lincoln, who was hated in the south, was
the specific reason the south seceded...but it went way beyond that)

Again, this overlaps with the strategic one, but they are not one and the
same.

Instead, I'll say a few words to promote my view that Social Utility /
> Overall Voter Satisfaction / "Maximum Net Tangible Utility" (I like it
> :-) is the "best" standard.
>
> Preface: I don't think there is a way to "prove" that any of these
> standards are "correct" or "best", using mathematical or philosophical
> arguments.


That's good to hear.  I agree.  Clay does not agree, and demands they are
proven, which drives me insane when trying to discuss these things with
him.  I have had the same experience with Warren and Abd.


> I have NOT chosen voting methods
> first, then chosen criteria that justified my choice of voting method.
>

I think that is a good policy.


> Ok, here are a couple of scenarios:
>
> (Inspired by Clay Shentrup.) Consider an election where the choices are:
> A. Spend $10 billion to find a cure for the common cold.
> B. Spend $10 billion to find a cure for multiple sclerosis.
> (Assume equal high probability of success for either choice.)
> Presumably a lot more people suffer from colds than from MS, but MS is
> devastating, while colds are generally just a nuisance. So, if voters
> are selfish and shortsighted (and "honest" about

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho Laatu]

Ok, no intention to say that our mails would be somehow incompatible.  
Median is perfect for many uses.

Juho

On Dec 21, 2007, at 9:08 , rob brown wrote:

> On Dec 20, 2007 10:58 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On Dec 21, 2007, at 3:24 , rob brown wrote:
>
>> Median is often a nice way to pick the best best value, but as
>> discussed in other mails it is not always possible to set a numeric
>> value to solve a question.
>
> Of course it isn't.  Who said it was?
>
> My question was IF we are voting a number (and I gave an example that
> I thought was simple), then would the median method be considered
> "ideal"?  I fully understand that if we are voting for non-numbers
> (such as candidates), a method for voting for numbers isn't going to
> be effective.
>
>> Here's one example where numeric values
>> may bring some additional value to an election that is a choice
>> between two exclusive alternatives.
>
> You have moved it back to talking about electing discrete candidates,
> which I never suggested that median was good for...or at least isn't
> "perfect" for.  In fact, I'll go out on a limb and say it is most
> certainly not.
>
> -rob
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
> list info


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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

On Dec 21, 2007, at 9:59 , rob brown wrote:

> I'm trying, really hard,
> to understand where Range Voting fans are coming from.

Maybe idealism. Maybe just defending something they find positive.  
I'm not one so I can't really tell. Or in some sense I am. Range is  
cool, but I don't claim it would be very suitable for typical  
contentious elections.

> Sorry if it just confused people.

No confusion (no more than what is normal in email discussions).

Juho




___ 
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your Internet provider. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 01:59 PM 12/20/2007, rob brown wrote:
>My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
>there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
>issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
>disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
>really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between strategy
>vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
>simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.

Yes. If there are really only two candidates, and a majority of 
voters prefer to elect one of them than to have the election fail. 
Basically, the two candidates, properly, are Yes and No to a motion.

If the two candidates are Ralph and Susan, we start to run into 
problems. because there is generally a third choice, if we care 
about majority rule: none of the above. In majority elections, with 
proper rules -- such as Robert's Rules, standard, if a voter casts a 
blank ballot, it counts in the denominator of the majority fraction. 
It's a valid vote in that sense. (Robert's Rules of Order Newly 
Revised, p.402, "illegal votes.")

>Is this controversial?

Yes, actually. It's quite easy to construct scenarios for small group 
decisions where it it blatantly obvious that the majority preference 
is the wrong choice, and, in fact, all voters will agree.

There is a confusion between the majority criterion and majority 
rule. The majority may decide, by majority vote -- which in its 
purest form must be on a Yes/No motion -- to choose other than the 
first preference of the majority, and small groups *often* do this. 
They do it, in particular, where there is a strong preference of a 
minority vs a weak preference of a majority.

I call my standard example the "pizza election." Three friends want 
to choose a pizza. They are voting methods enthusiasts, and they have 
noticed that a Range ballot can be used as input for Condorcet 
methods and for Range voting. (The Condorcet method must allow equal 
ranking, which causes no problems).

The candidates are, in this order, Pepperoni, Mushroom, Anchovy.

The votes are:
100, 90, 0
100, 90, 0
0, 100, 50

The Condorcet winner is Pepperoni, and this is the first choice of a 
2/3 majority. However, Mushroom is the Range winner. Critics of Range 
assert this -- without giving a concrete example -- as a flaw in Range.

However, let me put it this way. If this group chooses Pepperoni, it 
is quite probably going to have one less member.

In the implementation of Range that I prefer (and it's the same with 
Approval, but there it requires some first preference marker), I 
would analyze ballots for a Condorcet winner, and if there is 
conflict between the Condorcet winner and the Range winner, I'd hold 
an actual runoff. This makes the method Condorcet compliant, yet such 
runoffs would, in actual practice, be quite rare. My opinion is that 
the Range winner would usually win the runoff, if the votes were 
accurate in the first election, due to preferential turnout. If, 
however, there was a lot of exaggerated voting, it's possible that 
the votes concealed the true preference strengths and that the 
Condorcet winner would prevail.

Small possible cost, but it totally answers the alleged majority 
criterion violation of Approval and Range.

>   For instance, could a two candidate election
>be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
>voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?

Yes, absolutely, and it happens routinely in deliberative bodies. 
This is why the procedure is not Motion, Second, Vote! Part of the 
discussion reveals preference strengths, and members change their 
votes in accordance with that.

>   Assuming at least
>some honest voters, this approach might be able to improve the
>"maximum net tangible utility" ("tangible" meaning we are only
>counting the happiness with the results themselves, and ignoring such
>less-measurable utility such as "feeling of fairness" or "elimination
>of resentment" or "long term satisfaction with the election process
>itself").

Yes, it can. And it does. However, the situation where the majority 
preference is not also a Range winner is unusual. It's just that when 
it happens, it can bite some people deeply.

If, when the discrepancy arises, the majority has the option of 
refusing to accept loss of its first preference, it can do so. There 
is no fairness problem.

It is arguable, though, that there is nothing unfair about simply 
awarding the choice to the Range or Approval winner. In the case of 
Approval, the majority has given an explicit consent to this! But I 
prefer that the consent be to the actual result.

Sometimes an assumption is made that "extreme" votes must be 
insincere or fanatical. While that is possible, Range and Approval 
never reward *truly* insincere votes; my contention is that if 
someone votes the extremes, they have a reason for it. Critics of 
Range will posit a "sin

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 21, 2007 8:10 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> At 01:59 PM 12/20/2007, rob brown wrote:
> >My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
> >there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
> >issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
> >disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
> >really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between strategy
> >vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
> >simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.
>
> Yes. If there are really only two candidates, and a majority of
> voters prefer to elect one of them than to have the election fail.
> Basically, the two candidates, properly, are Yes and No to a motion.
>
> If the two candidates are Ralph and Susan, we start to run into
> problems. because there is generally a third choice, if we care
> about majority rule: none of the above. In majority elections, with
> proper rules -- such as Robert's Rules, standard, if a voter casts a
> blank ballot, it counts in the denominator of the majority fraction.
> It's a valid vote in that sense. (Robert's Rules of Order Newly
> Revised, p.402, "illegal votes.")
>
> >Is this controversial?
>
> Yes, actually. It's quite easy to construct scenarios for small group
> decisions where it it blatantly obvious that the majority preference
> is the wrong choice, and, in fact, all voters will agree.
>

Your example is for more than two candidates.  I am not questioning that
when there are more than two candidates, it is a different situation.  But
there are plenty of possibilities for there to be an election where there
really are only two candidates, and that is what my question was about.
While I appreciate that most electionsat least political
electionsmay have more than two potential candidates, I was trying to
restrict it to a simpler case.

Say your pizza voters are going to watch a DVD, and the only choices are the
two movies from Netflix that are in the mailbox.  It's really just two
candidates sometimes.


> There is a confusion between the majority criterion and majority
> rule. The majority may decide, by majority vote -- which in its
> purest form must be on a Yes/No motion -- to choose other than the
> first preference of the majority, and small groups *often* do this.
> They do it, in particular, where there is a strong preference of a
> minority vs a weak preference of a majority.
>
> I call my standard example the "pizza election." Three friends want
> to choose a pizza. They are voting methods enthusiasts, and they have
> noticed that a Range ballot can be used as input for Condorcet
> methods and for Range voting. (The Condorcet method must allow equal
> ranking, which causes no problems).
>
> The candidates are, in this order, Pepperoni, Mushroom, Anchovy.
>
> The votes are:
> 100, 90, 0
> 100, 90, 0
> 0, 100, 50
>
> The Condorcet winner is Pepperoni, and this is the first choice of a
> 2/3 majority. However, Mushroom is the Range winner. Critics of Range
> assert this -- without giving a concrete example -- as a flaw in Range.
>
> However, let me put it this way. If this group chooses Pepperoni, it
> is quite probably going to have one less member.


Of course in a small group there are much different dynamics.  Reciprocity
comes into play. People tend to be a lot more altrusitic towards their
friends or people they are close to.  I think these issues are quite a bit
different in larger elections.

In the implementation of Range that I prefer (and it's the same with
> Approval, but there it requires some first preference marker), I
> would analyze ballots for a Condorcet winner, and if there is
> conflict between the Condorcet winner and the Range winner, I'd hold
> an actual runoff. This makes the method Condorcet compliant, yet such
> runoffs would, in actual practice, be quite rare. My opinion is that
> the Range winner would usually win the runoff, if the votes were
> accurate in the first election, due to preferential turnout. If,
> however, there was a lot of exaggerated voting, it's possible that
> the votes concealed the true preference strengths and that the
> Condorcet winner would prevail.
>
> Small possible cost, but it totally answers the alleged majority
> criterion violation of Approval and Range.
>
> >   For instance, could a two candidate election
> >be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
> >voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?
>
> Yes, absolutely, and it happens routinely in deliberative bodies.
> This is why the procedure is not Motion, Second, Vote! Part of the
> discussion reveals preference strengths, and members change their
> votes in accordance with that.
>

Hmm, ok, well, is that really an election or more of a "lets all talk about
this and agree to something"?  It seems like all these situations are much
more social, non-contentious places which 

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

Just a quick followup to Abd, since I think my message may have gotten lost
in a long post of interspersed replies.

I still want to ask a very, very simple question, and I don't think you
answered it.  But this time I will go to some extra effort to make sure it
is interpreted for the simple question it was intended to be.  Everyone
seems to want to turn it into something more complex than it is. Maybe I'm
wrong, but all appearances are that some people are trying to avoid the
question or obscure the issue.

Say you've got an election for two candidates.  They may be people running
for office, or it may be an issue that is being voted for (for instance,
maybe citizens of a territory are voting on whether they would like to be
annexed as a state).  But the point is, there are only two options, and
there is no possibility of there being more options.  There were never
primaries to narrow down candidates, or anything of the type.  If you are
tempted to come up with some scenario where there might be more options or
have been more options, or to otherwise bring other complexities into the
picture, please resist it.  It is a two candidate election.

Let's further assume that there are a large enough number of voters that we
can assume that most don't know one another.  This isn't a pizza party or a
local club, but a large scale vote.  Also assume that while some people are
somewhat on the fence, a lot of others have very strong feelings about it on
one side or the other.  And assume anyone is welcome to abstain from voting.

So once again, the question is this:

In this case, do you consider a majority vote optimum?

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Jan Kok]

On Dec 21, 2007 1:02 PM, rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Dec 21, 2007 7:41 AM, Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> > Here's another, similar scenario. The choices are:
> > A. All people pay income tax in proportion to their income.
> > B. People whose last names begin with A through F pay twice as much as
> > they would in option A, and the rest pay $1 less than they would in
> > option A.
>
> > A simple majority vote would choose B.
>
> Well, again, I think representative democracy is the way we address such
> things, not direct voting on individual issues, which simply breaks down on
> things like that, Range voting or not.  If a candidate put such a thing on
> his platform, every single A - F voter would show up at the polls, and vote
> his ass out. And then they'd probably stop by his house on the way home and
> burn it to the ground.

:-) A good illustration of people having a "strong preference", eh? :-)

> G - [Z] voters wouldn't care as much, and would tend to concentrate on other
> issues on the candidates' platforms.

... vs. having a weak preference...

>
> Also, remember in such calculations of utility, the "tangible utility" is
> not the only factor.  For the winners, it might be.  For the losers, in
> addition to the financial hit of having to pay more taxes, they have the
> resentment of being treated unfairly. And this would not be matched by an
> equal positive utility on the part of the people who profited by this
> scheme.  Humans have a deep seated sense of fairness, that simplistic
> "tangible utility" calculations tend to ignore.
>
> (incidentally, even monkeys have this sense of fairness which goes beyond
> tangible utility: http://www.primates.com/monkeys/fairness.html )
>
> > Range Voting
> > with honest voters is more likely to choose A. But if the G-Z voters
> > strategically exaggerate their preference for B, then the result is
> > the same as majority vote - no worse.
>
> I have a hard time thinking that people who would vote for something that
> unfair, would then "de-weight" their preferences just to be nice (really,
> think about that).
>
> More likely, they'd think "plan B's f*cked up" (recognizing that it would
> cause a huge amount of anger and societal strife that doesn't make their $1
> savings worthwhile) and vote for A.
>
>  I understand what you are getting at, but whether you use your extreme
> example or a more realistic one, you have the same problem:
> you are assuming that people will be selfish in which they vote for, while
> at the same time altruistically de-weighting that vote.  That doesn't
> compute for me.

> Abd wrote:
>>The candidates are, in this order, Pepperoni, Mushroom, Anchovy.
>>
>>The votes are:
>>100, 90, 0
>>100, 90, 0
>>0, 100, 50
>>
>>The Condorcet winner is Pepperoni, and this is the first choice of a
>>2/3 majority. However, Mushroom is the Range winner. Critics of Range
>>assert this -- without giving a concrete example -- as a flaw in Range.
>>
>>However, let me put it this way. If this group chooses Pepperoni, it
>>is quite probably going to have one less member.
>
> Of course in a small group there are much different dynamics.
> Reciprocity comes into play. People tend to be a lot more
> altrusitic towards their friends or people they are close to.
> I think these issues are quite a bit different in larger elections.

I think it's not exactly a matter of large vs. small elections.

I think it's a matter of how much empathy the voters have for the
minority. And certainly voters fall into a broad spectrum, from
extreme selfishness and shortsightedness (not recognizing that they
could be in the minority some other time) through great empathy and
generosity. (The cynical libertarian in me demands that I add "with
other taxpayers' money" to the previous sentence. :-)

Anyway... it seems we can tune these examples to appeal to more  or
less selfish voters. For example, what if I substituted "cancer" for
MS in my earlier MS-vs.-cold cure example? Then I think most people
would prefer to cure cancer. What if it was "breast cancer"? Then
maybe some misogynist men would prefer to cure colds.

And given that voters would be distributed on a spectrum from strongly
supporting one option to being undecided or not caring either way, to
strongly supporting the other option, I think it quite plausible that
some voters could choose to vote a weak preference, or not vote at all
(which happens all the time, of course).

> > Would voters vote "honestly" with intermediate values, thus
> > voluntarily "weakening" their vote under Range Voting?
> >
> > Warren D. Smith's 2004 exit poll study showed that a surprisingly high
> > fraction of the respondents (about 75% if I recall) voted with other
> > than max and min values.
>
> Sure, they might well do so in the first few elections.  Until their
> candidate loses, and they realize that some on the other side had more
> "voting power" because they voted with ma

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 01:32 AM 12/22/2007, rob brown wrote:
>Your example is for more than two candidates.

Well, it might seem that way. But there are really only two choices 
that make any sense. The third pizza type was in there simply to make 
the normalization scores make sense. If it's not there, there is a 
problem, and we will get to that.

>   I am not questioning that when there are more than two 
> candidates, it is a different situation.  But there are plenty of 
> possibilities for there to be an election where there really are 
> only two candidates, and that is what my question was about.

Actually, that situation is rare in true democratic process. When it 
happens, it is artificial, and typically represents a loss of 
democracy, a compromise, which has been made in the name of efficiency.

>   While I appreciate that most electionsat least political 
> electionsmay have more than two potential candidates, I was 
> trying to restrict it to a simpler case.

But there is always a third potential option, which is None of the 
above. In true democratic process, at face-to-face meetings, unless 
special rules have been implemented (which Robert's Rules advises 
rather strongly against), there is *never* a two-candidate election 
where there is no third option, which is *no* result. The exception: 
the two "candidates" are Yes or No. And even there a majority can 
create any number of other options.

>Say your pizza voters are going to watch a DVD, and the only choices 
>are the two movies from Netflix that are in the mailbox.  It's 
>really just two candidates sometimes.

But couldn't they decide not to watch a DVD at all? Maybe talk. But, 
sure, if there are only two possibilities you then have a *real* 
problem with what is called "normalization error" in the theory of 
Range Voting.

>Of course in a small group there are much different 
>dynamics.  Reciprocity comes into play. People tend to be a lot more 
>altrusitic towards their friends or people they are close to.  I 
>think these issues are quite a bit different in larger elections.

Rob is coming to a major point: the difference between elections in a 
small group and in a large group. However, remember, above, he wants 
to simplify the question. Now, it seems, there may be some desire to 
complicate it. Yes, it gets more complicated in large groups. My own 
work, in fact, is to treat this disease, the isolation and separation 
of people that is the cause of this lack of "altruism." I don't, 
myself, call it altruism: we all benefit from living in a society 
where people care about each other.

However, if we are studying election methods, I would think that the 
study would start with methods that work when people vote sincerely, 
with concern for the public welfare. If a method does not work well 
with people being honest and open and caring, how would we expect it 
to work when under *difficult* conditions?

Obviously, the conditions are not the same, and thus, when applied in 
difficult environments, special considerations may be needed. But, 
remember the basic question here: simple two-candidate election. What 
is the "best" outcome? Can the best outcome be found with a simple 
majority vote on two candidates only?

It's quite clear that the *general* answer is no. Many examples can 
be shown where the majority first preference, if we assume this is 
how the majority votes in this case, is not the best outcome. But 
this, then can raise the question Rob raised, of "fairness." I gave 
the pizza example because fairness, in fact, *requires* that we set 
aside the majority preference. It is not claimed that this would 
*always* be true, but merely that the situations exist and are even 
reasonably common where this is the case. Generally, most people will 
agree to give up a small benefit in favor of a large benefit to 
others. And life can get pretty ugly, pretty fast, when people don't.

I have the right of way, driving down a street, with some level of 
traffic. I see a car coming out of a driveway, seeking to enter the 
street. I could drive on, assuming that *someone* later would let 
this car in, or maybe I don't care at all. Or I could stop and let 
the car in. Small loss to me (and small loss to those behind me, 
maybe -- maybe not, depends -- larger gain to the car needing to enter.

Now, democratic process is necessarily deliberative. Otherwise we 
get, in fact, the "tyranny of the majority," without the majority 
ever realizing what it is doing. If it's three people and that pizza, 
they will surely talk about it, and they won't even vote, they will 
find consensus informally. But what if it is three thousand people, 
with one thousand people feeling just like each of the original 
three? Does the best outcome change?

Whether or not there is a practical way to find that outcome is 
another story. Range Voting is not an ultimate solution, full-on 
consensus process is it. That, allegedly, suffers from serious 
efficiency problems

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 22, 2007 8:04 PM, Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> And then they'd probably stop by his house on the way home and
> > burn it to the ground.
>
> :-) A good illustration of people having a "strong preference", eh? :-)
>
> > G - [Z] voters wouldn't care as much, and would tend to concentrate on
> other
> > issues on the candidates' platforms.
>
> ... vs. having a weak preference...
>

Yes.  Strong and weak preferences (for issues) are definitely expressed in
representative democracy (well, not so much in the "burning his house down"
sense, but still).  Not very efficiently, but it does work overall.


> Anyway... it seems we can tune these examples to appeal to more  or
> less selfish voters. For example, what if I substituted "cancer" for
> MS in my earlier MS-vs.-cold cure example? Then I think most people
> would prefer to cure cancer. What if it was "breast cancer"? Then
> maybe some misogynist men would prefer to cure colds.


Yes,  I wasn't trying to miss your point there, I just thought you could use
a better example.  I think if someone actually found a complete cure for the
common cold, that person would be celebrated more than someone who cured MS.

But I know what you are getting atsomething that would affect a lot of
people a little, vs. something that would affect a few people a lot.

I think voting directly on such things just doesn't work right under any
sort of democracy (at least as long as each issue is voted on separately).
And I think that the idea that range voting would magically fix that problem
is a nice fantasy, but nothing more.

> Sure, they might well do so in the first few elections.  Until their
> > candidate loses, and they realize that some on the other side had more
> > "voting power" because they voted with max values.  They would feel
> > suckered.  Then they'll say "screw this being nice crap" and from then
> on be
> > strategic voters.
>
> Yes, some people might vote weak preferences in their first Range
> Voting election, then "learn their lesson" when their preference lost
> and they would vote strongly thereafter. But I sort of wonder about
> the intelligence of people who would cast a *weak* vote for some
> choice X, and then get upset when X lost. What were they thinking when
> they voted?!?


Well, I once again mention the 2000 election. Someone who likes Nader best,
Gore second best, and Bush the least would probably say "Oh cool!  Before, I
couldn't say that I liked Nader best because it would take my vote away from
Gore who really needs it.  Now with this newfangled Range voting system I
can express that.  I'll give 100 to Nader, 80 to Gore, and 0 to Bush.  Woo
hoo!"

And then Gore loses, just like he did with Plurality.

What exactly have you guys solved again?

The thing is, even more so that plurality, Range ASKS people to vote
"honestly".  I didn't feel dishonest at all when I voted for Gore (even
though I liked Nader better.  I just felt like I was giving a vote to the
candidate that could best use it.  (some, of course, people feel otherwise,
and interpret a plurality to mean "I like this candidate best")

Range, however, has a strong implication that you are SUPPOSED to express
more "rich" preferences than, say, approval.  After all, why else would they
go to the expense of offering the more complex ballot?

I know that's an opinion, and is psychological speculationbut I *am * a
UI designer, and psychological speculation is what I do. :)

By the way, I'm not about to go on a crusade to implement Range Voting
> for two-choice elections. I don't think the benefit of perhaps
> slightly better outcomes would be worth the effort and cost. I'm just
> responding to Rob's question: Yes, I think there could be _some_
> benefit, sometimes, to using RV in binary-choice elections.
>

Well, if range is implemented, I'd assume it would apply to two candidate
elections as well, wouldn't it?

My point, however, is that on two candidate elections, where you don't have
the potential for cycles and all these other problems you have with
multicandidate elections, it makes more clear the absurdity  (in my opinion)
of asking people to weaken their vote.

People already have the ability to not vote.  I skip candidates and
propositions I don't know much about or care much about.  Here in san
francisco, I even get to rank candidates, and will rank candidates equally
if that's how I feel.  But if I actually have a preference, I will express
it as strongly as I can.

I think people already feel like their vote doesn't count for much.
Expecting them to reduce it further is nuts, in my opinion.

With 3-or-more choice elections, I think the benefits of Range Voting
> would be HUGE.
>

Understood.  Disagree.

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

On Dec 23, 2007, at 3:39 , rob brown wrote:

> Say you've got an election for two candidates.

> Let's further assume that there are a large enough number of voters  
> that we can assume that most don't know one another.  This isn't a  
> pizza party or a local club, but a large scale vote.  Also assume  
> that while some people are somewhat on the fence, a lot of others  
> have very strong feelings about it on one side or the other.  And  
> assume anyone is welcome to abstain from voting.
>
> So once again, the question is this:
>
> In this case, do you consider a majority vote optimum?

The election seems to be a typical competitive election where people  
want to win or defend what they think is best for them or for some  
others or for all.

Under these typical circumstances majority based methods may well be  
the recommended systems to use. I wouldn't say that majority vote is  
"the optimum". It may well be that the minority favourite (that may  
have e.g. better average utility) would be the ideal alternative to  
elect.

Sometimes it may also be optimal (from one point of view) to elect  
the majority favourite instead of the the one with best utility -  
just to respect the majority opinion and to avoid further fighting  
that could occur if the best utility alternative would be chosen.

Majority vote is a good and well working tool (works in competitive  
and strategic environments too) if one wants to give one equal vote  
to everyone (a rather good democratic principle).

Now bak to the question. Majority vote may often not yield the  
optimum outcome (from some chosen high level theoretical viewpoint)  
but majority vote may well be considered to be the best practical  
method for competitive two candidate elections.

Juho


P.S. There are also circumstances where methods like Range work well,  
but that is not typical e.g. in the competitive political  
environment. One could try to give also an opportunity to the  
alternative with best average utility to win. One could e.g. first  
arrange a Range vote and after that a majority vote between the  
majority winner of the first election and the utility winner (if they  
differ). At the second round the majority would thus be offered an  
opportunity to donate the victory to the best (Range style) utility  
alternative (now they know how popular that alternative is). In many  
circumstances also the informative Range votes could however be  
strategic (many voters would feel no need to weaken the position of  
their favourite and thereby invite others to pick the (Range style)  
utility winner at the second round).



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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Dave Ketchum]

On Sat, 22 Dec 2007 22:46:17 -0800 rob brown wrote:

 > On Dec 22, 2007 8:04 PM, Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 > > wrote:
 >
...
 >
 > Yes, some people might vote weak preferences in their first Range
 > Voting election, then "learn their lesson" when their preference lost
 > and they would vote strongly thereafter. But I sort of wonder about
 > the intelligence of people who would cast a *weak* vote for some
 > choice X, and then get upset when X lost. What were they thinking when
 > they voted?!?
 >
 >
 > Well, I once again mention the 2000 election. Someone who likes Nader
 > best, Gore second best, and Bush the least would probably say "Oh cool!
 > Before, I couldn?t say that I liked Nader best because it would take my
 > vote away from Gore who really needs it.  Now with this newfangled Range
 > voting system I can express that.  I?ll give 100 to Nader, 80 to Gore,
 > and 0 to Bush.  Woo hoo!"
 >
 > And then Gore loses, just like he did with Plurality.

But what other voters do also matters.
 >
 > What exactly have you guys solved again?
 >
 > The thing is, even more so that plurality, Range ASKS people to vote
 > "honestly".  I didn?t feel dishonest at all when I voted for Gore (even
 > though I liked Nader better.  I just felt like I was giving a vote to
 > the candidate that could best use it.  (some, of course, people feel
 > otherwise, and interpret a plurality to mean "I like this candidate best")
 >
 > Range, however, has a strong implication that you are SUPPOSED to
 > express more "rich" preferences than, say, approval.  After all, why
 > else would they go to the expense of offering the more complex ballot?
 >
 > I know that?s an opinion, and is psychological speculationbut I *am
 > * a UI designer, and psychological speculation is what I do. :)
 >
 > By the way, I?m not about to go on a crusade to implement Range Voting
 > for two-choice elections. I don?t think the benefit of perhaps
 > slightly better outcomes would be worth the effort and cost. I?m just
 > responding to Rob?s question: Yes, I think there could be _some_
 > benefit, sometimes, to using RV in binary-choice elections.
 >
 >
 > Well, if range is implemented, I?d assume it would apply to two
 > candidate elections as well, wouldn?t it?

Sure - we start with two candidates and Plurality.

Then we get into trouble when there are, sometimes, more than two candidates.

So we look for a method suitable for two, or more, candidates, such as:
  Approval - cannot rank 3 candidates as best, worst, and soso 
(matters when voter wants to indicate best is better than soso AND soso is 
better than worst).
  Condorcet - allows any number of ranks plus equal ranking such as 
Approval offers.
  IRV - like Condorcet, excluding equal ranking and occasionally 
awarding disappointing choices as to winner.
  Range - like Condorcet but uses ratings instead of ranks.  Ratings 
give finer control than ranks, but demand that voters learn to assign them 
effectively.
 >
 > My point, however, is that on two candidate elections, where you don?t
 > have the potential for cycles and all these other problems you have with
 > multicandidate elections, it makes more clear the absurdity  (in my
 > opinion) of asking people to weaken their vote.

The ability of the methods above to handle more than two candidates does 
not demand any weakening of votes when there are only two candidates.
 >
 > People already have the ability to not vote.  I skip candidates and
 > propositions I don?t know much about or care much about.  Here in san
 > francisco, I even get to rank candidates, and will rank candidates
 > equally if that?s how I feel.  But if I actually have a preference, I
 > will express it as strongly as I can.

This puzzles.  I understand that San Francisco has ranking via IRV -
but assume that it does not permit equal ranking, which IRV has
trouble implementing.
 >
 > I think people already feel like their vote doesn?t count for much.
 > Expecting them to reduce it further is nuts, in my opinion.
 >
 > With 3-or-more choice elections, I think the benefits of Range Voting
 > would be HUGE.
 >
 >
 > Understood.  Disagree.

Range and Condorcet give benefits whenever there are more than two 
seriously contending candidates.

-- 
   [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
 Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
   If you want peace, work for justice.





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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 23, 2007 11:43 AM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>  > And then Gore loses, just like he did with Plurality.
>
> But what other voters do also matters.
>

Surely you understood that I had considered that others might do the same
thing.

The point is, the issue of vote splitting with plurality is there with range
as well.

 > People already have the ability to not vote.  I skip candidates and
>  > propositions I don?t know much about or care much about.  Here in san
>  > francisco, I even get to rank candidates, and will rank candidates
>  > equally if that?s how I feel.  But if I actually have a preference, I
>  > will express it as strongly as I can.
>
> This puzzles.  I understand that San Francisco has ranking via IRV -
> but assume that it does not permit equal ranking, which IRV has
> trouble implementing.


I allows you to express a first choice but treat second and third as equal.


If I had my way, it would be condorcet, and would allow equal rankings at
any position.

I will, however, say I much prefer IRV to plurality, and think it is a step
in the right direction.  First we had runoff elections (which people seemed
to understand), then we have an automated version of the same that involves
ranking candidates, and hopefully in the future we will have a better way of
tabulating it that also uses ranked candidates.  As much as I understand the
imperfections of IRV, it still thrills me to get to rank candidates.



>   > With 3-or-more choice elections, I think the benefits of Range
> Voting
>  > would be HUGE.
>  > >
>  > Understood.  Disagree.
>
>  > I think people already feel like their vote doesn?t count for much.
>  >
> Range and Condorcet give benefits whenever there are more than two
> seriously contending candidates.
>

I am well aware that with 3 candidates there are problems that are not there
in two candidate elections.  (
http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.htmlsums up my view on this) To
be clear, I think Condorcet (and related things
like DSV) addresses them (if imperfectly), while Range doesn't come close.
Approval is somewhere in the middle.

My point in talking about two candidate elections is that the main
differentiating effect Range has (allowing people to voluntarily express
their opinion with less than maximum weight) could equally apply to two
candidate elections as well.  By looking at it where the complexities of
3-candidate elections are absent, its absurdity might be more apparent.

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 23, 2007 10:49 AM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Now bak to the question. Majority vote may often not yield the
> optimum outcome (from some chosen high level theoretical viewpoint)
> but majority vote may well be considered to be the best practical
> method for competitive two candidate elections.
>

Yeah, well that is pretty much my opinion.  With the exception that the
"high level theoretical viewpoint" that supports Range (whether in 2
candidate elections or ones with 3 or more), by ignoring the competitive
nature of elections, makes it a pretty non-useful theory for elections held
among human beings, who have a history of being rather competitive by nature
( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War ).

It works pretty good for predicting how non-competive eusocial animals such
as bees might want to hold elections, however.  (
http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html ,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eusociality )

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

On Dec 23, 2007, at 22:52 , rob brown wrote:


On Dec 23, 2007 10:49 AM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Now bak to the question. Majority vote may often not yield the
optimum outcome (from some chosen high level theoretical viewpoint)
but majority vote may well be considered to be the best practical
method for competitive two candidate elections.

Yeah, well that is pretty much my opinion.  With the exception that  
the "high level theoretical viewpoint" that supports Range (whether  
in 2 candidate elections or ones with 3 or more), by ignoring the  
competitive nature of elections, makes it a pretty non-useful  
theory for elections held among human beings, who have a history of  
being rather competitive by nature ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
War ).


It works pretty good for predicting how non-competive eusocial  
animals such as bees might want to hold elections, however.   
( http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html , http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eusociality )


Works with humans too. Three friends living in different places might  
agree to meet at a place that has equal distance to all three homes.  
Or they might select a place that minimizes the sum of the distances  
(maybe they will share the travelling costs). Parents could agree to  
watch a Disney movie with their child although they might like a war  
movie more themselves. In that case they are maybe seeking a solution  
that maximizes the worst of the three personal utilities. There are  
many functions that can be used in determining the optimum outcome.


But in politics / competitive situations rules of course tend to be  
different. And the election methods should be chosen accordingly.


Juho


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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 23, 2007 2:00 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Works with humans too. Three friends living in different places might
> agree to meet at a place that has equal distance to all three homes. Or they
> might select a place that minimizes the sum of the distances (maybe they
> will share the travelling costs).
>

What you are describing is very different from what happens with eusocial
animals.

A situation where a small number of people can work things out, and where
reciprocity plays into it (i.e. "you got your way last time", etc) is
completely, totally different from the type of situation where voting is
needed, such as a large scale election where most of the voters don't know
one another.

What you describe isn't eusociality, which is the complete lack of self
interest found in animals that don't reproduce directly.  A 100% rational,
self-interested person may wish to allow someone else to get their way when
preference strengths differ, with the expectation that it will be
reciprocated when the preference strengths are reversed.  But a large
election has no mechanism for reciprocity.

I could imagine a voting system that might address this issue for larger
groups, but it isn't Range.


> Parents could agree to watch a Disney movie with their child although they
> might like a war movie more themselves.
>

Parents and children are, from a Darwinian perspective pretty much the  same
as eusocial animals, motivation-wise.  The children's interests are almost
completely aligned with the interests of the parents, since the children are
the vector for the parents getting their genes into future generations. In
my view, all motivation can be traced back to the attempt to get genes into
future generations.

But in politics / competitive situations rules of course tend to be
> different. And the election methods should be chosen accordingly.
>

I'm with you there.

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

On Dec 24, 2007, at 1:16 , rob brown wrote:


On Dec 23, 2007 2:00 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Works with humans too. Three friends living in different places  
might agree to meet at a place that has equal distance to all three  
homes. Or they might select a place that minimizes the sum of the  
distances (maybe they will share the travelling costs).


What you are describing is very different from what happens with  
eusocial animals.


A situation where a small number of people can work things out, and  
where reciprocity plays into it (i.e . "you got your way last  
time", etc) is completely, totally different from the type of  
situation where voting is needed, such as a large scale election  
where most of the voters don't know one another.


I don't think be hives and human families are that different. Human  
families are smaller. Humans have "hives" of 50'000 individuals,  
called cities, and in such environment humans tend to become less co- 
operative and altruistic than bees, but that is only a difference in  
size. Bee hives have members that are not reproductive, which gives  
them more incentive to wok for the common interest. I didn't include  
the time component ("you got your way last time") in my examples.  
That component (proportionality in time) is obviously very weak among  
the bees.


Humans can also make "voting scale" decisions in bee/utility/rating  
style. For example http://www.imdb.com/ uses user ratings and they  
work ok. The key of course is to use such methods in areas that are  
not competitive. Polls are one type of (often) non-competitive  
elections.


I think the basic rules are the same but the scale and style are  
different.


What you describe isn't eusociality, which is the complete lack of  
self interest found in animals that don't reproduce directly.  A  
100% rational, self-interested person may wish to allow someone  
else to get their way when preference strengths differ, with the  
expectation that it will be reciprocated when the preference  
strengths are reversed.  But a large election has no mechanism for  
reciprocity.


Ok, also reciprocity is a concept that bees probably don't use much  
(due to limited conceptual thinking capabilities).


The non-reproducing worker bees are probably not completely non- 
selfish. I'm sure they push the next worker bee aside when they want  
to perform some important task within the hive. We could also say  
that humans are non-selfish and their only task is to work for their  
genes and to pass them on to the next generations (pushing other  
human beings aside when doing so can be said to be just for the  
benefit of the genes). My examples are quite wide spread, but the  
idea is just to demonstrate that although bees have some special  
characteristics, that need not put them into some totally different  
behavioural category.


I could imagine a voting system that might address this issue for  
larger groups, but it isn't Range.


One could have elections that take into account e.g. proportionality  
in time (that could be called one kind of reciprocity) (favour a  
republican after a democrat, favour other pizzas after pepperoni).  
Range is useful in some cases too, e.g. in "poll like" elections.


Parents could agree to watch a Disney movie with their child  
although they might like a war movie more themselves.


Parents and children are, from a Darwinian perspective pretty much  
the  same as eusocial animals, motivation-wise.  The children's  
interests are almost completely aligned with the interests of the  
parents, since the children are the vector for the parents getting  
their genes into future generations. In my view, all motivation can  
be traced back to the attempt to get genes into future generations.


I wrote above "in favour of the genes", but I would say only that  
genes are one way to explain motivations and the way the world works,  
not necessarily the only correct one (maybe you didn't say so either).


Juho

But in politics / competitive situations rules of course tend to be  
different. And the election methods should be chosen accordingly.


I'm with you there.

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 24, 2007 12:34 AM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

The non-reproducing worker bees are probably not completely non-selfish. I'm
> sure they push the next worker bee aside when they want to perform some
> important task within the hive
>

Well, apologies if I am straying too far into evolutionary biology, but if
you think that bees might be somewhat selfish among themselves, and that a
bee colony is somehow the same as a city but smaller, you probably don't
understand eusociality.  It's easy to apply your intuition about human
behavior to other animals, but if you apply it to non-reproducing bees, you
are making a big mistake.  It just doesn't apply.

Ok, also reciprocity is a concept that bees probably don't use much (due to
> limited conceptual thinking capabilities).
>

This has absolutely nothing to do with conceptual ability.  Look at the
design of a bee's stinger -- which is morphology, not behavior.  When a bee
stings, it kills the bee.  Do you know of anything like that in an animal
that reproduces directly?  It would be what might be referred to as "a
really stupid design".  Natural selection would have weeded that out within
a few generations.  (note that some bees don't live in colonies, and DO
reproduce directly, and guess what?  No stinger at all on them...)

In a eusocial animal, a stinger that kills the bee is fine, since a worker
beefrom a Darwinian perspectivehas no more tendency for preservation
of self over other bees in the colony than does a cell in your body over
other cells in your body.

There is a fundamental difference between eusocial animals and non-eusocial
animals.  The math on such things isn't hard to do.  Altruism in humans can
be explained by reciprocity and similar things, but (with the exception of
parent-child) kin selection hardly plays into it.  Kin selection is
EVERYTHING in worker bees.

I wrote above "in favour of the genes", but I would say only that genes are
> one way to explain motivations and the way the world works, not necessarily
> the only correct one (maybe you didn't say so either).
>

I'd like to hear another.  The main competing theory for motivations I've
heard is that God made us in his own image and put selfishness in us so he
had something to punish us for.  Another theory is that all living things
simply have an intrinsic motivation to survive and be happy, which is one of
the core assumptions behind Lamarkian (pre-Darwinian) evolution theory.
While that assumption seems rather obvious from an intuitive perspective, it
has no basis in anything else, once you think it through.

(for what it's worth, I'm actually working on an article on this stuff,
independent from voting theory.  Bees, and understanding the difference
between their motivations and more typical animal motivations, is what
inspired my interest in evolution, game theory and related fields as a kid,
so it is core to my thinking on all this)

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[James Gilmour]

rob brown > Sent: 24 December 2007 15:35
> (for what it's worth, I'm actually working on an article on 
> this stuff, independent from voting theory.  Bees, and 
> understanding the difference between their motivations and 
> more typical animal motivations, is what inspired my interest 
> in evolution, game theory and related fields as a kid, so it 
> is core to my thinking on all this) 

So you MIGHT be interested to see this article: 
  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/science/article3086949.ece

As for voting behaviour, and making predictions based on that, I think it might 
be more productive to look at the increasing body of
research on the real behaviour of real voters in real public elections.   Of 
course, you have take the social and political context
into account as well as the political structures and the voting systems the 
sample voters are used to  -  voter behaviour in
different countries is likely to be quite different.

James Gilmour

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

On Dec 24, 2007, at 17:34 , rob brown wrote:

It's easy to apply your intuition about human behavior to other  
animals, but if you apply it to non-reproducing bees, you are  
making a big mistake.  It just doesn't apply.


I try to map human concepts to bees and bee concepts to humans and  
generic scientific concepts to both. I don't like the idea of trying  
to see animals as if they would have human like intentions etc. Also  
talking about the (human like) intention of genes to do something  
(e.g. selfish genes trying to multiply) is an interesting but  
theoretically not the best possible style to explain their role in life.


When a bee stings, it kills the bee.  Do you know of anything like  
that in an animal that reproduces directly?


Yes, unfortunately at the very moment many soldiers at their best  
reproducing age give their lives for their country. Worker bees are  
likely to die when they sting a soft skinned large animal. Humans are  
not that radical - in most war situations individual soldiers have a  
reasonable probability to stay alive. But often sacrificing one's own  
life in order to protect others is praised and thereby encouraged,  
and happens in real life.


Note also that worker bees can produce drones if needed (not totally  
different animals from that point of view). They can also be said to  
be in the state of rage when they attack (driven to attack by a  
smell). Rage with its possibly fatal consequences is also a known  
phenomenon among (typically male, maybe less important from  
reproduction point of view) humans.


There is a fundamental difference between eusocial animals and non- 
eusocial animals.


I still tend to rather see the differences to be in scale and style.  
Surely colonies where majority of the members are (usually) non- 
reproductive has somewhat different rules and outcome than humans.  
Maybe my basic approach is simply "some characteristics of a group of  
animals tends to keep that population alive". No big difference if  
some behaviour pattern leads to high mortality rate ("unpremeditated/ 
unplanned suicides") (among a subset of the population) or not.


Altruism in humans can be explained by reciprocity and similar  
things, but (with the exception of parent-child) kin selection  
hardly plays into it.  Kin selection is EVERYTHING in worker bees.


Humans form also extended families, clans, tribes and nations,  
concepts that are to some extent based on genetic similarity.


I wrote above "in favour of the genes", but I would say only that  
genes are one way to explain motivations and the way the world  
works, not necessarily the only correct one (maybe you didn't say  
so either).


I'd like to hear another.


Survival of one's children is the more traditional alternative to  
genes. A bit more different path is cultural evolution. Nations also  
fight for survival, why not ideologies too. Referring to my earlier  
definition above, it is interesting to study any property that either  
stays or disappears in time (no need to always explain them with  
attributes like selfishness and biological survival instincts).


(for what it's worth, I'm actually working on an article on this  
stuff, independent from voting theory.  Bees, and understanding the  
difference between their motivations and more typical animal  
motivations, is what inspired my interest in evolution, game theory  
and related fields as a kid, so it is core to my thinking on all this)


Go for it. Don't listen too much to the current popular trends, and  
avoid humanization of the story (well, humanization sells better ;-).


Juho


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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 24, 2007 10:31 AM, James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> rob brown > Sent: 24 December 2007 15:35
> > (for what it's worth, I'm actually working on an article on
> > this stuff, independent from voting theory.  Bees, and
> > understanding the difference between their motivations and
> > more typical animal motivations, is what inspired my interest
> > in evolution, game theory and related fields as a kid, so it
> > is core to my thinking on all this)
>
> So you MIGHT be interested to see this article:
>  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/science/article3086949.ece
>

So some old guy I've never heard of discredited Dawkins?  H.  Ok.  I'll
take Dawkins, thanks.

Or, I'll just read a newspaper.  Because humans appear rather selfish.  Ever
noticed war?



> As for voting behaviour, and making predictions based on that, I think it
> might be more productive to look at the increasing body of
> research on the real behaviour of real voters in real public elections.


I think I do.  It aligns quite well with the idea that humans are self
interested.  In my opinion most problems in the world are because we
underestimate people's self interest, not because we overestimate it.

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[rob brown]

On Dec 24, 2007 1:22 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> On Dec 24, 2007, at 17:34 , rob brown wrote:
>
> When a bee stings, it kills the bee.  Do you know of anything like that in
> an animal that reproduces directly?
>
> Yes, unfortunately at the very moment many soldiers at their best
> reproducing age give their lives for their country. Worker bees are likely
> to die when they sting a soft skinned large animal. Humans are not that
> radical - in most war situations individual soldiers have a reasonable
> probability to stay alive. But often sacrificing one's own life in order to
> protect others is praised and thereby encouraged, and happens in real life.
>

Well, we hear about it when it happens...that's part of it being praised and
encouraged.  I doubt it happens all that likely unless they really didn't
have the option of surviving.

In the case of the stinger, I was asking if you knew of any morphological
(not behavioral) feature of a non-eusocial animal that kills the animal when
used.  The only ones I can think of are part of the reproductive process (
i.e. male spider dies when it mates, etc).

Behaviorallysure, there are anecdotal outliers to everything.  But the
behavior I see 1000 times as powerful in humans is one of self
preservation.  Eusocial animals only have a self preservation instinct as
far as it preserves the colony.  Period.

So what percentage of humans do you think voluntarily give their lives for
someone else that isn't direct offspring?  1 in 10 million?

I know it's all touchy feely and warms the heart to think the best of
humans, but my observation of human behaviour aligns quite well with what I
would expect based on how they reproduce.  Altruism obviously existswhen
there is a chance of reciprocation or where convincing others that being
altruistic has value in itself.  In a secret ballot situation, I'm just not
seeing it.

Regardless, it just strikes me as an incredible, irresponsible cop-out for
voting reform advocates to suggest a method that expects voters to just
play nice.  It is to me the equivalent of a computer security professional
suggesting that studies of psychology show that people generally don't want
to hack computers.  What problem are you solving again?

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[James Gilmour]

rob brown > Sent: 24 December 2007 22:01
> So some old guy I've never heard of discredited Dawkins?

I suggest you take a look at:  
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E._O._Wilson   
and some of the other 63,000 webpage references for "Edward O Wilson".



James Gilmour wrote:
> > As for voting behaviour, and making predictions based on 
> > that, I think it might be more productive to look at the increasing body of
> > research on the real behaviour of real voters in real public elections.   


> I think I do.

Then I just hope your investigation of that body of academic research is better 
than your investigation of the academic research on
socio-biology and unit and target selection.

Just for the record, I am not a specialist in voter behaviour, socio-biology or 
selection and have no axe to grind on any of these
topics.  
James Gilmour

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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

On Dec 25, 2007, at 0:28 , rob brown wrote:

> In the case of the stinger, I was asking if you knew of any  
> morphological (not behavioral) feature of a non-eusocial animal  
> that kills the animal when used.  The only ones I can think of are  
> part of the reproductive process ( i.e. male spider dies when it  
> mates, etc).

I don't have any very good additional examples. Salmons also  
reproduce first and then die. Humans are driven by behavioural, not  
by morphological drivers. That maybe makes them even a more extreme  
example. They even know that they may or will die but still they  
continue.

One potentially interesting example is insects that taste bad. A  
young bird might eat (or harm) one of them but then learns its lesson  
and saves the rest. One insect in a way took the risk when it did not  
hide and saved many others.

> the behavior I see 1000 times as powerful in humans is one of self  
> preservation.  Eusocial animals only have a self preservation  
> instinct as far as it preserves the colony.  Period.

Saving the individual makes sense also in situations where the  
individual does not reproduce and is part of a colony. Saving the  
individual itself correlates with saving the colony.

Self preservation is instinctive to humans and can be claimed to be  
stronger than its altruistic features, but also altruistic behaviour  
exists in many ways. We could also say that humans have the self  
preservation instinct just to preserve its "colony" (the individuals  
themselves will die anyway sooner or later while the "colony"  
continues to live).

This line of discussion plays with the art of humanizing the natural  
phenomena. Not very good. It would be better to just say that certain  
features tend to maintain certain characteristics in the chain of  
events in nature.

A mother defends her genes when defending her child. A worker bee  
defends her genes when defending her mother. For humans it doesn't  
make sense to the mother to die easily since human children need long  
time parental support, but taking risks may be worth it.

> So what percentage of humans do you think voluntarily give their  
> lives for someone else that isn't direct offspring?  1 in 10 million?

Humans are complex creatures and it is not easy to give absolute  
rules on their behaviour. I'll use the soldier example again. In many  
countries large part of the male population says they would be ready  
to fight for their country if need arises.

I can't estimate what percentage of bees dies as a result of their  
suicidal attacks against mammals. To some extent they are playing a  
mutual destruction threat game (known to humans too) where the big  
threat they can present turns many mammals away without a fight (and  
without losses on the bee side). Even during the last century quite a  
number of humans has died in war like conflicts (defending the  
society as a whole) (maybe more than in individual level conflicts).

> I know it's all touchy feely and warms the heart to think the best  
> of humans, but my observation of human behaviour aligns quite well  
> with what I would expect based on how they reproduce.  Altruism  
> obviously existswhen there is a chance of reciprocation or  
> where convincing others that being altruistic has value in itself.   
> In a secret ballot situation, I'm just not seeing it.

Yes, humans have even developed theories on how competition between  
individuals is for the best of the society as a whole.

> Regardless, it just strikes me as an incredible, irresponsible cop- 
> out for voting reform advocates to suggest a method that expects  
> voters to just  play nice.  It is to me the equivalent of a  
> computer security professional suggesting that studies of  
> psychology show that people generally don't want to hack computers.

Yes. Of course this should not stop people promoting better behaviour  
in their societies. In smaller circles like families behaviour is  
often based on trust that all members work for the benefit of all the  
members and will take also their viewpoint into account as needed.  
Having lots of trust among different players may also be a  
competitive advantage at national level. But of course there is no  
point in using voting methods that don't work (for the purpose and  
environment in question).

Juho





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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 01:46 AM 12/23/2007, rob brown wrote:
>Well, I once again mention the 2000 election. Someone who likes 
>Nader best, Gore second best, and Bush the least would probably say 
>"Oh cool!  Before, I couldn't say that I liked Nader best because it 
>would take my vote away from Gore who really needs it.  Now with 
>this newfangled Range voting system I can express that.  I'll give 
>100 to Nader, 80 to Gore, and 0 to Bush.  Woo hoo!"
>
>And then Gore loses, just like he did with Plurality.

Actually, that is a 4/5 vote for Gore. If Nader supporters had voted 
that way, Gore would have won. What are you thinking?


>What exactly have you guys solved again?

"You guys," as if we all think alike. Fact is, the general consensus 
in the Range Voting community is to support Approval Voting. Range is 
*theoretically* ideal, though there are also good arguments to be 
made for Approval. Bottom line, though, it is a no-cost reform, 
better than Plurality, it should be a no-brainer. Just Count All the 
Votes. All it takes is deleting a couple of sentences in the election 
code, generally.

>The thing is, even more so that plurality, Range ASKS people to vote 
>"honestly".

Nope. It *allows* people to vote fractional votes. Whether or not it 
asks anything depends on the ballot instructions. I'd certainly 
oppose ballot instructions that made out a Range vote to be anything 
other than a fractional vote, an application of voting power. The 
example above would not be harmful. If a Nader supporter is willing 
to lessen the support for Gore to 80%, that's fine with me. *It is 
the voter's choice.*

>   I didn't feel dishonest at all when I voted for Gore (even though 
> I liked Nader better.  I just felt like I was giving a vote to the 
> candidate that could best use it.  (some, of course, people feel 
> otherwise, and interpret a plurality to mean "I like this candidate best")

Of course, that's an error. It's an action. It's tossing a pebble into a scale.

>Range, however, has a strong implication that you are SUPPOSED to 
>express more "rich" preferences than, say, approval.  After all, why 
>else would they go to the expense of offering the more complex ballot?

Once again, we are not generally proposing Range at this time for 
public elections. However, Range 3 would be fine. The MSNBC polls I 
saw that were Range 3 were far more informative than simple plurality 
(vote for your favorite) or approval (vote for all you would support) 
polls. With full reporting of the results, these polls (-1, 0, +1) 
showed not only net support, but that some candidates had strong 
positives and strong negatives, others showed different patterns, 
with modest support but less opposition, greater net positive. These 
were the polls that showed Ron Paul way ahead of all other 
Republicans. I think they were accurate! On the Dem side, the polls 
showed Obama and Edwards leading. Clinton had positive numbers as 
strong, but lots of negatives, for a net zilch, approximately. Again, 
that reflects my understanding of what the situation was at the time.

Approval is simple, and don't you like the slogan, which I'll repeat, 
just in case.

JUST COUNT ALL THE VOTES.

Geez, you'd think we'd already be doing that!

(There is a knee-jerk reaction that Approval is a violation of 
one-person, one-vote; but, in fact, multiple votes are alternative 
votes, for only one of them is not moot, in the end. That is, either 
only one of them counts, or none do. (If the voter votes for both 
frontrunners, the net result is an abstention from that pairwise 
contest. But how often would voters want to vote for both frontrunners?)

>I know that's an opinion, and is psychological speculationbut I 
>*am * a UI designer, and psychological speculation is what I do. :)

Voters voting sincerely in Range do no harm. Certainly, however, some 
may want to vote standard Range "personal optimization" strategy: 
vote 100% for the favorite frontrunner and 0% for the least-favored 
frontrunner, then vote sincerely for all others *given those votes as 
benchmarks*. I.e., prefer some candidate to the preferred 
frontrunner, also vote 100% for this one, detest some candidate more 
than the least preferred frontrunner, vote 0% for that one. As to 
those in the middle, it matters little where you put them; and I'd 
suggest asking yourself the question: How would you feel if your vote 
caused this candidate to win? If you'd like it, rate the candidate at 
50% to 100%. If not, rate the candidate at 0% - 50%.

But Approval is quite a bit simpler. Arguments over Range are really premature.


>By the way, I'm not about to go on a crusade to implement Range Voting
>for two-choice elections. I don't think the benefit of perhaps
>slightly better outcomes would be worth the effort and cost. I'm just
>responding to Rob's question: Yes, I think there could be _some_
>benefit, sometimes, to using RV in binary-choice elections.
>
>
>Well, if range is implemented, I'd assume it would a

Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Juho!

You wrote:

> I could imagine a voting system that might address this issue for larger 
> groups, but it isn't Range. 
> 
> One could have elections that take into account e.g. proportionality in time 
> (that could be called one kind of reciprocity) (favour a republican after a 
> democrat, favour other pizzas after pepperoni).

Try D2MAC! It does precisely that in the long run :-)

Yours, Jobst
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Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

[Juho]

On Dec 25, 2007, at 17:55 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:

> Dear Juho!
>
> You wrote:
>
>> I could imagine a voting system that might address this issue for  
>> larger groups, but it isn't Range.
>>
>> One could have elections that take into account e.g.  
>> proportionality in time (that could be called one kind of  
>> reciprocity) (favour a republican after a democrat, favour other  
>> pizzas after pepperoni).
>
> Try D2MAC! It does precisely that in the long run :-)
>
> Yours, Jobst

Yes, random methods typically aim at the same target. Maybe the  
target can be said to be proportionality here. All single winner  
methods of course need not aim at proportionality.

I was thinking mainly about methods where all unused quota would be  
inherited to the next election. Proportionality is more deterministic  
than with random methods. Inheritance also causes problems when  
compared to randomness (e.g. changes in party structure, clear  
changes in opinions).

Juho



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