Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
Hi, --- En date de : Ven 8.7.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm a écrit : > Bob Richard wrote: > > It turns that real live voters (including real live > politicians) care a lot about the later-no-harm criterion, > even if they don't know what it's called. > > > > If true, that is unfortunate. Perhaps we would have to pick > a better criterion that is also easy to understand, > something like the (weak) Favorite Betrayal Criterion. But > if we have to do that, then a lot of otherwise good methods > go out the window. Well, you can modify MinMax to satisfy FBC. But, you have to figure out what to do when it returns more than one unbeaten candidate. First- preference count is the most obvious general fix. Probably violates Plurality. "Total support" would be better but brings in an additional concept... Yes, I think that if FPP didn't have such strong nomination disincentive, voters would be more concerned about the principle of not having to lie about who their favorite is. As things are, who other than a "third-party extremist" would ever need to worry about it? It's too bad there is no conclusive, persuasive way to measure LNHarm or FBC performance. There's certainly better and worse among methods that fail. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
On Jul 8, 2011, at 10:43 AM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 8.7.2011, at 17.16, Andy Jennings wrote: Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it. For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too: instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required information at once and then act as if there were runoffs. That fails to account for the dynamics between the rounds, but that's a subtle detail and might easily be missed. I, too, must admit that IRV has a natural feeling to it. I had a friend who described to me a system he thought of "on his own" and he ended up describing IRV. And MANY of us asking for Condorcet probably see it as fitting the above description - for the voter. It is when we notice that IRV counting can stray FAR from awarding to the CW, that our attention can turn to Condorcet which: . Has counting that awards to deserving candidates. . Can easily handle equal ranking. . Can learn to award to write-ins (when they are deserving). Dave Ketchum I agree with that (as one reason). It is a bit like natural selection, or a like fight of strong men where the weakest ones must leave the arena first. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
On 8.7.2011, at 17.16, Andy Jennings wrote: > Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it. > For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too: > instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required > information at once and then act as if there were runoffs. That fails to > account for the dynamics between the rounds, but that's a subtle detail and > might easily be missed. > > I, too, must admit that IRV has a natural feeling to it. I had a friend who > described to me a system he thought of "on his own" and he ended up > describing IRV. I agree with that (as one reason). It is a bit like natural selection, or a like fight of strong men where the weakest ones must leave the arena first. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
2011/7/8 Andy Jennings > Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it. >> For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too: >> instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required >> information at once and then act as if there were runoffs. That fails to >> account for the dynamics between the rounds, but that's a subtle detail and >> might easily be missed. >> > > I, too, must admit that IRV has a natural feeling to it. I had a friend > who described to me a system he thought of "on his own" and he ended up > describing IRV. > If "most likely to be independently reinvented" is the criterion, Borda wins by a country mile. Bucklin is also compelling that way. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
> > Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it. > For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too: > instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required > information at once and then act as if there were runoffs. That fails to > account for the dynamics between the rounds, but that's a subtle detail and > might easily be missed. > I, too, must admit that IRV has a natural feeling to it. I had a friend who described to me a system he thought of "on his own" and he ended up describing IRV. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
Bob Richard wrote: It turns that real live voters (including real live politicians) care a lot about the later-no-harm criterion, even if they don't know what it's called. If true, that is unfortunate. Perhaps we would have to pick a better criterion that is also easy to understand, something like the (weak) Favorite Betrayal Criterion. But if we have to do that, then a lot of otherwise good methods go out the window. On the other hand, both Nanson and Bucklin has been used in the US, and neither of these pass LNHarm. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
Jameson Quinn wrote: Russ's message about simplicity is well-taken. But the most successful voting reform is IRV - which is far from being the simplest reform. Why has IRV been successful? I want to leave this as an open question for others before I try to answer it myself. The one answer which wouldn't be useful would be "Because CVD (now FairVote) was looking for a single-winner version of STV". There's a bit of truth there, but it's a long way from the whole truth, and we want to find lessons we can learn from moving forward, not useless historical accidents. I think there's that -- and the general confusion between ranked balloting in general and IRV in particular. FV has kept the two linked together, in effect giving a depiction of the sort: "Hey, don't you just loathe spoilers? Wouldn't it be better if you could rank the candidates so that there are no spoilers? Well, with IRV, you can!". This seemed sensible enough at first glance, so IRV was accepted. It was a dangerous move: it could get IRV into elections more quickly, but if the voters found out that IRV provided bad results, they could turn against ranked ballots in general. Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it. For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too: instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required information at once and then act as if there were runoffs. That fails to account for the dynamics between the rounds, but that's a subtle detail and might easily be missed. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
On Jul 7, 2011, at 7:40 PM, Bob Richard wrote: It turns that real live voters (including real live politicians) care a lot about the later-no-harm criterion, even if they don't know what it's called. They need to learn that Condorcet offers less painful response than what IRV is offering. Dave Ketchum --Bob Richard On 7/7/2011 3:43 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the argument was that (in two-party countries) IRV is not as risky risky from the two leading parties' point of view as methods that are more "compromise candidate oriented" (instead of being "first preference oriented"). I think that is one reason, but it is hard to estimate how important. Juho On 7.7.2011, at 23.56, Jameson Quinn wrote: Russ's message about simplicity is well-taken. But the most successful voting reform is IRV - which is far from being the simplest reform. Why has IRV been successful? I want to leave this as an open question for others before I try to answer it myself. The one answer which wouldn't be useful would be "Because CVD (now FairVote) was looking for a single-winner version of STV". There's a bit of truth there, but it's a long way from the whole truth, and we want to find lessons we can learn from moving forward, not useless historical accidents. JQ -- Bob Richard Executive Vice President Californians for Electoral Reform PO Box 235 Kentfield, CA 94914-0235 415-256-9393 http://www.cfer.org Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
It turns that real live voters (including real live politicians) care a lot about the later-no-harm criterion, even if they don't know what it's called. --Bob Richard On 7/7/2011 3:43 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the argument was that (in two-party countries) IRV is not as risky risky from the two leading parties' point of view as methods that are more "compromise candidate oriented" (instead of being "first preference oriented"). I think that is one reason, but it is hard to estimate how important. Juho On 7.7.2011, at 23.56, Jameson Quinn wrote: Russ's message about simplicity is well-taken. But the most successful voting reform is IRV - which is far from being the simplest reform. Why has IRV been successful? I want to leave this as an open question for others before I try to answer it myself. The one answer which wouldn't be useful would be "Because CVD (now FairVote) was looking for a single-winner version of STV". There's a bit of truth there, but it's a long way from the whole truth, and we want to find lessons we can learn from moving forward, not useless historical accidents. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- Bob Richard Executive Vice President Californians for Electoral Reform PO Box 235 Kentfield, CA 94914-0235 415-256-9393 http://www.cfer.org Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the argument was that (in two-party countries) IRV is not as risky risky from the two leading parties' point of view as methods that are more "compromise candidate oriented" (instead of being "first preference oriented"). I think that is one reason, but it is hard to estimate how important. Juho On 7.7.2011, at 23.56, Jameson Quinn wrote: > Russ's message about simplicity is well-taken. But the most successful voting > reform is IRV - which is far from being the simplest reform. Why has IRV been > successful? > > I want to leave this as an open question for others before I try to answer it > myself. The one answer which wouldn't be useful would be "Because CVD (now > FairVote) was looking for a single-winner version of STV". There's a bit of > truth there, but it's a long way from the whole truth, and we want to find > lessons we can learn from moving forward, not useless historical accidents. > > JQ > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Learning from IRV's success
On Jul 7, 2011, at 4:56 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: Russ's message about simplicity is well-taken. But the most successful voting reform is IRV - which is far from being the simplest reform. Why has IRV been successful? how can one answer a question when one does not accept the premise of it? my take is that IRV is only successful when it elects the Condorcet winner. I want to leave this as an open question for others before I try to answer it myself. The one answer which wouldn't be useful would be "Because CVD (now FairVote) was looking for a single-winner version of STV". There's a bit of truth there, but it's a long way from the whole truth, and we want to find lessons we can learn from moving forward, not useless historical accidents. are you defining "successful" in that it may have a foothold usage in governmental elections whereas Condorcet has not been used in such? -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
