Re: [EM] Oops! Squeeze-effect.

2013-01-21 Thread Raph Frank
On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff
email9648...@gmail.com wrote:
 Elimination would start at the extremes. Transfers would be sent
 inward, until the candidates adjacent to the CW would have collected
 all of those inward-transferred votes, enough to eliminate the CW.

It seems more realistic that the CW is the centrist and one of the 2
large parties wins.

 So it's safe to say that IRV isn't at all good at electing CWs or fair
 compromises.

Right, that is the problem.

IRV supports the 2 party system.  It is not clear if the effect is
weaker than with plurality.

It might be weaker, but it is still sufficient.

See Australia, they have IRV and a 2 party system.

The 2 party system forces 1 dimension to politics.  You can't selected
policy direction and low corruption (or even 2 have 2 dimensions for
policy).

 In that squeeze-effect scenario, of course the voters preferring
 candidates to one side, plus those preferring the CW, must add up to a
 majority. So there are two majorities, and the one that prevails will
 be the one on the side that the CW's voters prefer and transfer their
 votes to, when the CW is eliminated.

45) L  C  R
10) C  L  R
45) R  C  L

The center candidate loses.

The mutual majority is (C, L), but the C candidate is the CW.

 IRV is a special purpose method that should
 only be supported by befeficiaries of a mutural majority.

It benefits the 2 parties, since they will be the last 2 parties to be
eliminated.

Spoiler effects mean that voters can't pick the best candidate.  In
the L/C mutual majority that can just pick L/C as a bloc.

Anyway, better systems would not be an advantage for the current
parties, better to have a 50% chance of winning the election, than a
centre party wins most of the time.

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Re: [EM] Oops! Squeeze-effect.

2013-01-21 Thread Michael Ossipoff
On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 4:14 PM, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff
 email9648...@gmail.com wrote:
 Elimination would start at the extremes. Transfers would be sent
 inward, until the candidates adjacent to the CW would have collected
 all of those inward-transferred votes, enough to eliminate the CW.

 It seems more realistic that the CW is the centrist

Certainly the CW is the centrist, in the strongest meaning of the word.

In the U.S., however, centrist is used deceptively by the media. The
media seem to think that Centrist means someone who is between the
Democrats and the Republicans. Their implication is that that's where
the public's genuine center is.  ...the voter median, if the media
ever worded it in that way.

Well, the media are wrong. The public median, in terms of actual
wishes and preferences, is somewhere among the progressive parties,
maybe the Greens. As I always point out, only a schoolground
drug-dealer is regarded as being as despicable, contemptible and
disgusting as a Republocrat politician. Polls consistently show that
the voters are considerably more progressive than their Republocrat
representatives.

No, the media's center, between the Democrats and Republicans isn't
where the voter-median is.

I'm just mentioning the double-meaning for centrist in this country.




and one of the 2
 large parties wins.

I believe that we have a progressive majority, if people would just
read the platforms and vote for what they actually want.

As I was saying, I believe that the voter-median is in the progressive
region, maybe where the Greens are.

Approval (or Score) will quickly home in on the voter median and then
stay there. That means it will soon give us governments by progressive
parties such as the Greens, and keep on doing so.

ICT or Symmetrical ICT would get us there a little quicker, but is
less enactable, and more difficult to handcount.

IRV? Well, if the progressive majority is cohesive, a mutual majority,
then IRV will work great for progressives, and the Republocrats will
never win again. But, as I was saying earlier, we don't know if that
majority is mutual, cohesive. That's something that we'll find out
later.

Without a mutual majority, we wouldn't want IRV.

If the progressives aren't cohesive, then the mutual majority might
include the Democrats, and IRV could elect them, even if the
progressives are a (not cohesive) majority.

So yes, under the right bad conditions, even if everyone knew the
progressives were a majority, IRV could elect Republocrats.

And certainly I agree that we don't want IRV now, under the existing
conditions, with our current electorate. Yes, under these conditions,
IRV would keep on electing Republicans and Democrats, as Plurality
does.



 So it's safe to say that IRV isn't at all good at electing CWs or fair
 compromises.

 Right, that is the problem.

 IRV supports the 2 party system.  It is not clear if the effect is
 weaker than with plurality.

Yes, IRV would preserve the 2-party system we have now.

IRV wouldn't be as bad as Plurality, but iRV definitely wouldn't be
good enough. It wouldn't be adequate at all, for out electorate now.


 In that squeeze-effect scenario, of course the voters preferring
 candidates to one side, plus those preferring the CW, must add up to a
 majority. So there are two majorities, and the one that prevails will
 be the one on the side that the CW's voters prefer and transfer their
 votes to, when the CW is eliminated.

 45) L  C  R
 10) C  L  R
 45) R  C  L

 The center candidate loses.

 The mutual majority is (C, L), but the C candidate is the CW.

Yes, the C-L majority would be out of luck.

In a Condorcet method, especially ICT or Symmetrical ICT, C would win.
With Approval or Score (optimally-voted), C would win.  The voters who
like C best would rather have Condorcet, Approval or Score, instead of
IRV.So would the L voters.

The R voters would be quite happy with IRV.

But, what if we vote in a Green government, and everyone knows then
that the progressives are a majority, and that they're a mutual
majority? Then, if that Green government holds a referendum on what
the voting system should be, wouldn't it be to the best advantage of
the progressives to support IRV under those new favorable conditions?

Suppose the progressives are a majority, and all of the members of
that progressive majority would rank all of the progressive candidates
over all the other candidates? With IRV, the progressives would have
an automatic win every time.

Would it be self-serving for the progressives to vote for IRV in that
hypothetical green government voting systems referendum? Of course.
Would there be anything wrong with that self-servingness, or anything
dishonest about it? No. People should support the voting system that
is in their best interest. In the hypothetical (optimistic) situation
I supposed above, the mutual majority (progressives) should support
IRV.