Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Kathy Dopp]

Abd ul,

I agree with virtually everything you say here. However, I would also
consider that an excellent system for electing one winner would be
"approval, every voter votes for up to two candidates, followed by a
runoff of the top two vote getters".  It solves some of the problems
of a simple runoff election, avoids the spoiler effect I think, and is
very fair.  Although it does seem to always require a runoff election.

Kathy

> Date: Wed, 26 May 2010 20:09:50 -0400
> From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax 
> To: robert bristow-johnson ,  Jameson Quinn
>        
> Cc: EM Methods , clay shentrup
>        
> Subject: Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential
>        Voting (new name        for an MCA-like system)
> Message-ID: <20100527002856.a051b8db0...@zapata.dreamhost.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>
> At 02:30 PM 5/26/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
>>On May 25, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>>>What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
>>>
>>>-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy
>>>from a large minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.
>>
>>except some unnamed folks here (whose posts i don't see anymore) think
>>that it's better than IRV.
>
> I am *so* relieved that Mr. B-J doesn't have to suffer through my
> posts any more. He should have done this long ago.
>
> Is Plurality better than IRV? Under some conditions.
>
> You are a small town. You hold nonpartisan elections, with a small
> number of candidates. Plurality is better than IRV. Why? I'll just
> start with a few:
>
> 1. IRV under the general conditions of nonpartisan elections almost
> never changes the result from Plurality. People don't realize this
> because they tend to think of "spoiler effect," which usually depends
> on partisan elections and a small party or independent candidate
> pulling off a few votes that flips the election. IRV can fix that,
> but at huge cost, and, notice, it is turning a victory for one
> almost-winner into that for the other almost-winner. Many imagine
> that IRV would have rescued the nation from George Bush, but it is
> far from obvious. It might have made a difficult canvass into a
> totally insane impossible one. The fact is that in nonpartisan
> elections, that phenomenon seems to almost never influence the
> outcome. IRV doesn't flip results in nonpartisan elections.
>
> 2. When the method is plurality, people know that if they vote for
> their favorite, if their favorite is not going to win, they are
> wasting their vote. IRV can create that impression, but it is a false
> one under center squeeze conditions. By voting for their favorite and
> thus concealing their preference for the candidate who would be the
> majority winner, underneath their favorite who runs second in
> first-preference votes, and who maintains that until the last round,
> they have wasted their vote, they might as well have stayed home.
> Just like Plurality. But they know it, so they can make an intelligent choice.
>
> 3. Plurality is much easier to canvass. It's also, in a small town,
> easier to vote. Just vote for your favorite, hang the "strategy."
> People do accept plurality results as fair, and in small town
> government, when Plurality is the method, not very many offices have
> three candidates, so it's moot. The problem in small towns is more,
> sometimes, in getting *anyone* to run!
>
> But I personally believe that finding a majority is important,
> because it is more unifying. IRV, quite simply, doesn't do this, the
> majority it manufactures is, too often, faux. Since top two runoff
> has some of the same problems as IRV -- but it functions better in
> terms of results than IRV -- I suggest using a better advanced method
> for the primary, one that is actually designed to seek true
> majorities, unlike IRV, and that certainly does it better than IRV.
> And that's Bucklin, and it is easy to vote and canvass, and there are
> no reports in the historical record otherwise. It was tried in
> approximately ninety towns in the U.S., in roughly 1910-1920 (a far
> wider application than FairVote has managed, without the central
> organization pushing it), and it was used for party primary
> elections, apparently, for much longer. It's alleged "failures"
> disappear if it is used in its best application, as a way of finding
> majorities without a runoff. It does it, often. And when it fails to
> do so, instead of using it to elect by plurality, just hold the
> runoff! Compared to plurality, you have not lost anything, and y

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 09:33 PM 5/26/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:

Abd ul,

I agree with virtually everything you say here.


Thanks.


 However, I would also
consider that an excellent system for electing one winner would be
"approval, every voter votes for up to two candidates, followed by a
runoff of the top two vote getters".  It solves some of the problems
of a simple runoff election, avoids the spoiler effect I think, and is
very fair.  Although it does seem to always require a runoff election.



Would you agree that if only one candidate gets a majority in this 
approval election, and it is a form of approval, a runoff is 
unnecessary? A runoff might only be needed if (1) there is no 
majority, or (2) there are two majorities, which is more iffy.


There is already an excellent system that is not terribly different 
from this, and the only difference between how it was used is that it 
wasn't coupled with a runoff for majority failure. And I'm suggesting 
a couple of tweaks. I'd be thrilled just to see original Bucklin 
restored, it worked, and it's a much better system than the 
propaganda has claimed.


Perfect, almost, for a primary election in a runoff system, because 
it's much better at finding *real* majorities than IRV.



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Kathy Dopp]

Yes. I agree with your scenario of not needing a runoff Abd ul.

On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 9:47 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
 wrote:
> At 09:33 PM 5/26/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>
>> Abd ul,
>>
>> I agree with virtually everything you say here.
>
> Thanks.
>
>>  However, I would also
>> consider that an excellent system for electing one winner would be
>> "approval, every voter votes for up to two candidates, followed by a
>> runoff of the top two vote getters".  It solves some of the problems
>> of a simple runoff election, avoids the spoiler effect I think, and is
>> very fair.  Although it does seem to always require a runoff election.
>
>
> Would you agree that if only one candidate gets a majority in this approval
> election, and it is a form of approval, a runoff is unnecessary? A runoff
> might only be needed if (1) there is no majority, or (2) there are two
> majorities, which is more iffy.
>
> There is already an excellent system that is not terribly different from
> this, and the only difference between how it was used is that it wasn't
> coupled with a runoff for majority failure. And I'm suggesting a couple of
> tweaks. I'd be thrilled just to see original Bucklin restored, it worked,
> and it's a much better system than the propaganda has claimed.
>
> Perfect, almost, for a primary election in a runoff system, because it's
> much better at finding *real* majorities than IRV.
>
>



-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

View my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 10:39 PM 5/26/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:

Yes. I agree with your scenario of not needing a runoff Abd ul.


You get the basic system you suggested simply by changing the line in 
the election code that prohibits counting more votes for an office 
than there are office-holders to be elected. One vote per voter per 
candidate (maximum!) is Approval. And so then you simply use Approval 
voting in a top-two runoff election. It does no harm and sometimes it 
will find a majority. Costs nothing extra to count except for the 
actual extra votes, which won't be a lot, usually. Enough to fix a 
spoiler effect, sometimes. A bit of a push towards a majority.


Bucklin is better because it allows people to express a first 
preference and gives that first preference a chance to win before 
additional approvals are brought in.


I believe that the fact is has an honorable history in the U.S. may 
help get implementations. It's precinct summable, no problem. You 
just count it as if it were three elections, same candidates. First 
choice election, second choice election, third choice election. And 
it's just sum of votes that you need in each rank. So three-rank 
Bucklin sums three ranks for each candidate. Theoretically, you 
wouldn't have to count the lower ranks until you know you need them, 
but I think it's rude to ask people to vote and then not count all their votes!


But the ballots themselves can also be used for Condorcet analysis, 
and even more so if a higher-resolution Range ballot is used. (For 
the Bucklin part, same idea as Bucklin, you add in the votes in each 
rating, starting at the top, until you have found a majority, or you 
have counted all the votes.)


Original Bucklin allowed, most implementations, the voter to rank as 
many candidates as desired in the third rank, but only one in first 
and second rank. Most voters wouldn't use it, but I can see no good 
reason to prohibit overvotes in those first two ranks. The only 
problematic kind of overvoting in Bucklin is where the voter votes 
for one candidate in more than one rank: those extra votes must be 
eliminated or the voter would have cast two votes for a candidate!


Original Bucklin counted them, I think, in the highest expressed 
rank. There is another option I think is slightly better, it actually 
improves the method a little, allowing more flexibility of 
expression. But I gotta go



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Jameson Quinn]

2010/5/26 Kathy Dopp 

> Abd ul,
>
> I agree with virtually everything you say here. However, I would also
> consider that an excellent system for electing one winner would be
> "approval, every voter votes for up to two candidates, followed by a
> runoff of the top two vote getters".  It solves some of the problems
> of a simple runoff election, avoids the spoiler effect I think, and is
> very fair.  Although it does seem to always require a runoff election.
>
> Kathy
>
>
As Abd already said, you can avoid the runoff if only one candidate has a
majority. Abd's Bucklin proposal tricks many voters into extending more
approvals to decrease the chances of a runoff. My proposal, the one that
started this thread, is simpler to describe and count than Abd's, and it
makes extending second-rank approval (and thus typically avoiding a runoff)
rational for voters. I think that that will be more effective than tricks**.

My proposal again:

Voters rank each candidate as preferred, approved, or unapproved. If any
candidates have a majority ranking them at-least-approved, then the one of
those which is most preferred wins outright. If not, then the two candidates
which are most preferred against all others (ie, the two Condorcet winners
based on these simple ballots, or the two most-preferred in case of a
Condorcet tie) proceed to a runoff

To further explain how to figure who makes it into the runoff, if there is
one:
Calculate preferred+approval "base score" for each candidate. Now for every
candidate pair X vs Y, compare
X's base score - ballots which prefer X and approve Y
vs
Y's base score - ballots which prefer Y and approve X
If one candidate W beats all the rest, W is in the runoff. If V beats all
but W, V is the other one in the runoff. If not in either case, take the
candidate with the most preferences instead.
(This is just a simplified way of finding the Condorcet matrix).

This method is precinct-summable. One-round results can be done easily on
any equipment that exists, and/or by hand easily. The process for finding
who is in the runoff described above could also be done on even the most
antiquated equipment by running the ballots through once per viable
candidate (that is, those who's base score plus preferences is over the top
base score). Typically, this would not be more than three candidates.

JQ

**Insofar as voters agree with the statement "I trust society to get the
right answer, even if it's not the one I agree with", it's not a trick. Most
people don't seem to believe that, though.

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Jameson Quinn]

> This method is precinct-summable. One-round results can be done easily on
> any equipment that exists, and/or by hand easily. The process for finding
> who is in the runoff described above could also be done on even the most
> antiquated equipment by running the ballots through once per viable
> candidate (that is, those who's base score plus preferences is over the top
> base score). Typically, this would not be more than three candidates.
>
> Oops, I meant "those who's base score plus preferences is over the
second-highest base score"; and nevertheless, it would frequently be only
two candidates, removing the need for any fancy counting at all.

JQ

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Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Kathy Dopp]

All three methods sound OK to me.

On Thu, May 27, 2010 at 12:35 AM, Jameson Quinn  wrote:
>
>> This method is precinct-summable. One-round results can be done easily on
>> any equipment that exists, and/or by hand easily. The process for finding
>> who is in the runoff described above could also be done on even the most
>> antiquated equipment by running the ballots through once per viable
>> candidate (that is, those who's base score plus preferences is over the top
>> base score). Typically, this would not be more than three candidates.
>>
> Oops, I meant "those who's base score plus preferences is over the
> second-highest base score"; and nevertheless, it would frequently be only
> two candidates, removing the need for any fancy counting at all.
>
> JQ
>
>



-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

View my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 12:31 AM 5/27/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
As Abd already said, you can avoid the runoff if only one candidate 
has a majority. Abd's Bucklin proposal tricks many voters into 
extending more approvals to decrease the chances of a runoff.


Tricks? I don't know if the runoff will cause voters to add more 
approvals or to reduce them. This is what I think: it sets an 
absolute preference based on the perceived utility of completing the 
election, which is relatively small compared to the value of the 
office being filled by the right candidate. It's enough to 
*encourage* a few approvals, but the existence of the runoff may, 
contrariwise, discourage them.


What's wrong with encouraging voters to add more approvals? They 
tried, in Okalahoma to *force* voters to add more approvals. They 
*require* voters in Australia to add lower preferences (in most 
jurisdictions). I don't support that, either one of those. But 
*allowing* it? With, simply, natural consequences either way?


 My proposal, the one that started this thread, is simpler to 
describe and count than Abd's, and it makes extending second-rank 
approval (and thus typically avoiding a runoff) rational for 
voters. I think that that will be more effective than tricks**.


Bucklin, very similar to what I'm proposing, was widely used for a 
time. We know that some voters don't like being restricted to three 
ranks in RCV. Additional expression, *if voluntary*, is, in my book, 
a good thing. With three ranks, Bucklin starts to get much closer to 
using a Range ballot, and it allows four candidates to be ranked.




My proposal again:

Voters rank each candidate as preferred, approved, or unapproved.


So you have an explicit disapproved rank? How is this treated 
compared to a blank?


 If any candidates have a majority ranking them at-least-approved, 
then the one of those which is most preferred wins outright.


Right. With quite possibly bizarre outcomes. Now, I can see a value 
to it, and that's why, in fact, I want to make sure that there is a 
runoff if the approval winner is beaten by another (by ranking). Why 
I'd want to use first preferences for this determination, only, I 
don't know and don't understand, except that first preference *tends* 
to be stronger preference.


This method is somewhat ameliorated by being ER in all ranks. But 
having three approved ranks instead of two allows far better 
expression of preference strength. It doubles the expressivity. On 
the other hand, as designed, the ballot is balanced. Mr. Quinn, from 
this point of view, incorrectly, perhaps, assigned values to the 
ranks, instead of his 1, 0.75, and 0, it should be 1, 0.5, 0. But 
that isn't used in this present statement of the method. It's simply 
Range analysis.


 If not, then the two candidates which are most preferred against 
all others (ie, the two Condorcet winners based on these simple 
ballots, or the two most-preferred in case of a Condorcet tie) 
proceed to a runoff


Utility theory would not suggest his pair. Utility theory suggests 
the sum of scores candidates. I only suggest including a Condorcet 
winner because of conflict between utility theory and democratic 
majority theory. If a result is to be based on "greater summed good," 
the majority should accept it.

[...]
I didn't see this note until the end, here:

**Insofar as voters agree with the statement "I trust society to get 
the right answer, even if it's not the one I agree with", it's not a 
trick. Most people don't seem to believe that, though.


It's not a trick in any case. It's quite open and clear. Do you want 
to see a decision made now, or do you prefer it to be deferred? This 
is the choice faced by voters in repeated ballot, it's perfectly 
ordinary. Do they want to complete the election, or do they want to 
keep voting until the cows come home? It creates a certain natural 
force toward compromise, not enough to cause people to abandon what 
is important to them, but to relax their standards *a little.* 
Bucklin naturally does this within a single ballot, so rerunning a 
Bucklin election extends it a bit more, with an opportunity for the 
voter to revise the voting robot instructions that a Bucklin ballot represents.


Basic concept: A Bucklin ballot is a Range ballot where the voter 
places candidates into utility classes; in original Bucklin there 
were three classes all approved, plus a disapproved class. Voter 
placement of candidates in these classes was relatively 
unconstrained, compared to most methods. That is, equal ranking was 
allowed in third rank, and empty ranks were allowed (which is 
significant only for truncation and an empty second rank.) The method 
then simulates three approval elections with declining approval 
cutoff, seeking a majority. I see no reason to prohibit equal ranking 
in first and second rank: we should remember that when we 
unnecessarily prohibit possibly meaningful voter behavior, we cause 
ballots to be spoiled. Equal ranking has an

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Jameson Quinn]

2010/5/27 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax 

> At 12:31 AM 5/27/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> As Abd already said, you can avoid the runoff if only one candidate has a
>> majority. Abd's Bucklin proposal tricks many voters into extending more
>> approvals to decrease the chances of a runoff.
>>
>
I should have been more precise. I believe that with Bucklin/Runoff, people
will honestly rank more candidates than are approved with approval/runoff.
This will help avoid some unnecessary runoffs, which is a good thing. It
will also possibly improve the utility of the result for society. However,
it is a strategic mistake on their part. Thus, I call it a "trick"; if they
fully understood the situation, they probably would just vote strategically.
Being a trick doesn't make it evil; on the contrary, if anything, it helps
the social utility. But it does make it unstable; people might see through
it, and it would stop working. (If they have a rational degree of doubt in
their own judgement of which option is best, and are voting altruistically,
and believe that a majority of voters are voting altruistically or have no
negative-sum interests at stake, then it's not a mistake, but the first part
at least clearly doesn't describe most.)

In APV, adding additional preferences (beyond the approval ballot) is not a
strategic mistake, which I think makes it more robust. It also still has the
same justifications in human psychology.

Correct strategy in APV when the two frontrunners are ideologically distinct
is to disapprove one and everybody worse, prefer the other and everybody
better, and approve everybody in between. If they're near-clones
ideologically (ie, near to same value for most people who aren't strong
supporters of one of them), then do the same using the third frontrunner and
the most-distinct of the first two; that automatically means at least one
approval, for the other clonelike frontrunner. Both of these strategies, if
widely followed and if the "frontrunner" determination is common knowledge,
never lead to a runoff.

> Bucklin, very similar to what I'm proposing, was widely used for a time. We
> know that some voters don't like being restricted to three ranks in RCV.
> Additional expression, *if voluntary*, is, in my book, a good thing.
>

If voluntary and honest. But one dishonest strategic expression can "poison"
a number of honest expressions. Moreover, even semi-honest strategy creates
two classes of voting power - strategic and nonstrategic - which hurts
legitimacy.

That's why adding levers and knobs to your voting system is dangerous if
they can be used strategically with impunity. I believe that the best
solution to expressiveness is not a "kitchen sink" system such as some of
Abd's proposals, but a drastically simple system with an official,
nonbinding, Range/Condorcet/Bucklin poll attached.


>> Voters rank each candidate as preferred, approved, or unapproved.
>>
>
> So you have an explicit disapproved rank? How is this treated compared to a
> blank?


Same as blank. Exists only to prevent accidentally approving when trying to
vote "against". Tallied together but break-out percentages reported for
anyone who cares.


>
>
>   If any candidates have a majority ranking them at-least-approved, then
>> the one of those which is most preferred wins outright.
>>
>
> Right. With quite possibly bizarre outcomes.


No more bizarre than closed primaries, at the very worst. That is, a solid
majority coalition might elect its more radical member, not the centrist.
"Solid majority" means that the median voter is a member of that coalition,
supporting the "radical" on that side over all other candidates. Unlike
closed primaries, if there's a majority but it's not solid, the centrist
from that side is probably elected.

Personally, I don't see that as necessarily bad - think of it as a small
taste of time-series proportional representation. In other words, a bit of
diversity, instead of centrists winning always, could be healthy.


> ... instead of his 1, 0.75, and 0, it should be 1, 0.5, 0. But that isn't
> used in this present statement of the method. It's simply Range analysis.
>

This is only for the nonbinding poll. People can set these numbers
explicitly, those were just defaults. Actually, the right default value for
the "approved" rank is the average of the value people explicitly write in
for that rank. I do suspect that people would be more likely to write in
values above 0.5 than below it, so I suspect that number will be closer to
0.75 than to 0.5.


>
>
>   If not, then the two candidates which are most preferred against all
>> others (ie, the two Condorcet winners based on these simple ballots, or the
>> two most-preferred in case of a Condorcet tie) proceed to a runoff
>>
>
> Utility theory would not suggest his pair. Utility theory suggests the sum
> of scores candidates. I only suggest including a Condorcet winner because of
> conflict between utility theory and democratic majority theory. If a result
> 

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 03:14 AM 5/27/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:

2010/5/27 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax 
<a...@lomaxdesign.com>

At 12:31 AM 5/27/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
As Abd already said, you can avoid the runoff if only one candidate 
has a majority. Abd's Bucklin proposal tricks many voters into 
extending more approvals to decrease the chances of a runoff.


I should have been more precise. I believe that with Bucklin/Runoff, 
people will honestly rank more candidates than are approved with 
approval/runoff.


Yes, and there are two reasons. The most common immediate objection 
to Approval is that it does not allow the expression of preference 
within the approved class. That can be very important to me as a 
voter. If I'm a Nader supporter in 2000, I want to, at the same time, 
make it clear that I prefer Nader, while allowing my vote to count 
against Bush, i.e., to support Gore. (If I believe Nader's argument 
about Tweedle-Dum and Tweedle-Dee, I may not care.) While Approval 
gives me a better option than Plurality, where it is all-or-nothing, 
it's still unsatisfactory. In addition, there is a minor problem with 
multiple majorities due to over-eager additional approvals, which 
then creates pressure to, next election, bullet vote. It seems fairly 
clear that approval compared to Plurality will not harm results, 
long-term, but will improve them to a degree, and Approval is a 
basically no-cost reform, it would normally require only the removal 
of a line from the election code that requires discarding and not 
considering overvotes.


This applies to approval/runoff as well. If there is no multiple 
majority, it's moot, though some may be upset if they would have 
preferred a runoff to the election of their second favorite, whom 
they additionally approved. They made that approval, presumably, 
because they wanted to make sure that a different candidate was not elected.


So, Bucklin. Bucklin is *similar* to Approval, in practice, but the 
phased approval it sets up allows the expression of that preference, 
and it is even possible, with original Duluth Bucklin, to show 
strong, weak, or  preference. I.e., if it happens to be three 
candidates plus write-in,


This will help avoid some unnecessary runoffs, which is a good 
thing. It will also possibly improve the utility of the result for 
society. However, it is a strategic mistake on their part.


Sure that depends on their preferences and preference strengths. It 
seems that Mr. Quinn is making some possibly unwarranted assumptions here.


Thus, I call it a "trick"; if they fully understood the situation, 
they probably would just vote strategically.


With this, I vigorously disagree. While it is possible that some 
voters will "misunderstand" the situation, with good ballot 
instructinons and general education, few are likely to truly 
misunderstand. It is a fact that with high knowledge (hindsight is 
high knowledge!) and with nearly any voting system, a voter may see a 
strategic vote to cast that will improve the outcome for the voter. 
Far more likely, though, is that the voter will see that their vote 
was moot, that they could have stayed home with no change in outcome.


Bucklin is very similar to Approval, and what a "strategic vote" is 
in Bucklin, as in Approval, depends on who the frontrunners are and 
what the preference strengths of the voters are. In Bucklin/runoff, 
there is an additional factor, the possible desire to avoid a runoff 
election. Or, to the contrary, the desire to postpone an approval 
until the runoff. Mr. Quinn seems to assume that if the voter 
understands the situation, the voter will therefore prefer a runoff 
to making an additional approval. But I'd want to see voter education 
on this be very clear: if you would prefer a runoff to the election 
of a candidate, don't approve the candidate!


If you hate runoffs -- some have expressed that opinion here -- then, 
TANSTAAFL, you rationally will take a chance on making a significant 
approval. If you prefer runoffs, you will only add additional 
approvals if you have relatively low preference strength, or, 
alternatively, prefer a no-hope candidate, and you want to help get 
your favored frontrunner into the runoff. With some variations I've 
proposed, you can do both: avoid electing your preferred frontrunner 
in the primary, but help get that candidate into the runoff (by using 
an elevated unapproved class assignment, indicating both preference 
for condorcet analysis, and higher utility.)


The basic instructions to the voters are quite simple, as I've 
outlined them, and runoff complicates Bucklin strategy only a little. 
Runoff/Bucklin will almost certainly depress approvals to some 
degree, but what it will depress is holding-my-nose-and-voting for 
the preferred frontrunner. It will not depress genuine additional 
approvals with low preference strength between that candidate and the favorite.


Straight Bucklin without runoff will force voters w

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>> Correct strategy in APV when the two frontrunners are ideologically
>> distinct is to disapprove one and everybody worse, prefer the other and
>> everybody better, and approve everybody in between.
>>
>
> Eh? That forces favorite betrayal, doesn't it?


No.


> "Correct strategy" presumes that a particular goal is "correct." What is
> it, in this case? Presumed here is an assumption that ideology is the issue.
>


I give a more precise and general definition below for the shorthand
"ideology", which makes your objections moot. Perhaps you should finish a
paragraph before writing several in response to the first sentence.


>> If voluntary and honest. But one dishonest strategic expression can
>> "poison" a number of honest expressions. Moreover, even semi-honest strategy
>> creates two classes of voting power - strategic and nonstrategic - which
>> hurts legitimacy.
>>
>
> I would encourage all voters to vote strategically and honestly. In a
> Bucklin system there is no advantage to dishonesty that is worth the risk.
> I.e., from a game theory point of view, net zero or negative expected gain.
>

I happen to agree. But some voters might overestimate their capacity to
predict behavior, and the fact that they're wrong doesn't stop the harm they
do. In my system, where there is never more and almost always significantly
less payoff from dishonest strategy, this is less of a danger.

Anyway, you didn't respond to my critique of semi-honest strategy. In APV,
naive human nature strategy is closer to being the same as optimal strategy,
so the difference in voting power is less. This means more legitimacy.

This is important: the math hasn't been done, but my intuition here is that
> the rational strategic Bucklin ballot is a Range ballot with these
> restrictions: the candidates are divided into two sets, approved and
> non-approved, and range ratings are best as sincere ratings *within these
> sets*.


I vigorously disagree. The rational strategic Bucklin ballot is, to first
approximation, an approval ballot. In some cases (which I don't quite have a
handle on) it might be rational to move a single candidate down from maximal
to minimal approval, or to add a minimal approval to a single candidate who
would not have made the cut under approval. Intermediate approved rankings
are never rational if all voters are purely rational, though if there are
some honest voters, it may become rational to use intermediate approvals
occasionally. Unapproved rankings besides the bottom are used for
turkey-raising if at all.

>
>  That's why adding levers and knobs to your voting system is dangerous if
>> they can be used strategically with impunity.
>>
>
> I've seen no cogent example of this. In evaluating strategy, I'd encourage
> Mr. Quinn and anyone else to *start* with utilities.


I do.

Voters will bullet vote, commonly. It is a rational and sensible and
> *sincere* strategy, properly understood.


Absolutely true in many, but not all, cases. I'd guess that mostly it's
rational and sincere; sometimes it's rational and insincere; and rarely it's
irrational and sincere.

Mr. Quinn's proposal is indeed simpler,


Simpler; and better at harmonizing naive, individually optimal, and socially
optimal strategies. Both are important advantages.


>> No more bizarre than closed primaries, at the very worst.
>>
>
> One is getting desperate when one justifies a system as being no worse than
> a bizarre system.


A lower bound which is acceptable to most is not desperate. It is not the
average performance.

>
>
>   That is, a solid majority coalition might elect its more radical member,
>> not the centrist. "Solid majority" means that the median voter is a member
>> of that coalition, supporting the "radical" on that side over all other
>> candidates. Unlike closed primaries, if there's a majority but it's not
>> solid, the centrist from that side is probably elected.
>>
>
> In the example shown, there was a drastic difference between the winner and
> loser.


And it was an artificially-constructed example, one which both the naive and
the correct strategy (which are the same in this case) would tend to
discourage from ever happening.


> The loser was massively approved, the winner only barely. Bare approval in
> a situation like that is quite likely to be an anomaly. But without having a
> set of utilities to start with, we cannot judge a scenario outcome, not
> well, anyway. If the approvals represented sincere approval, the approval
> winner would *certainly* have been the best. Mr. Quinn is arguing that
> preferring the most-preferred candidate will, then encourage additional
> approvals. But then he discards those approvals in this scenario, making
> them useless. Tell me again, exactly why do we want to encourage people with
> a strong preference for first preference to add additional approvals? Beyond
> the natural encouragement of avoiding a runoff -- when "strong preference"
> means they'd rather have a runoff?


If the

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 05:28 PM 5/27/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:


Correct strategy in APV when the two frontrunners are ideologically 
distinct is to disapprove one and everybody worse, prefer the other 
and everybody better, and approve everybody in between.



Eh? That forces favorite betrayal, doesn't it?


No.


Okay, by "approve," you must mean "approve or prefer." This is also 
"correct strategy," i.e., maximizes expected outcome, with any 
Bucklin method I've seen. The more a third candidate approaches 
parity with the others, the less obvious it becomes. With a runoff as 
a possibility when there is majority failure, it is possible to defer 
making the decision to approve a frontrunner, such that one will only 
do it if the preference strength for more-preferred candidates is 
low. With three major candidates, the probability that voters have a 
good understanding of all three goes down. Most voters will still 
have a first choice. I can say that when I come to a race on a ballot 
where there are only unknown candidates, I skip it, unless I know of 
a good write-in.


And I recommend that behavior. If one is not willing to defer the 
judgment to the rest of the electorate, one can write in "Someone 
Else, 27 West 57th Place, Nowhere, MA." (Local rules ask for an 
address for write-ins and the clerks tend to disregard write-ins 
without an address. But they are still reported as "write-in," and 
still for part of the basis for a majority, and are therefore a vote 
against all other candidates.)


Wo what this strategy does is to, by default, seek a majority for one 
of the frontrunners. It's likely to do so unless there are more than 
two frontrunners. The supporters of minor candidates normally know 
that they are minor, so they are the most likely to add additional approvals.


"Correct strategy" presumes that a particular goal is "correct." 
What is it, in this case? Presumed here is an assumption that 
ideology is the issue.



I give a more precise and general definition below for the shorthand 
"ideology", which makes your objections moot. Perhaps you should 
finish a paragraph before writing several in response to the first sentence.


Your "should" presumes a behavioral model here which is inaccurate. I 
use the comments of others as grist for generating my own comments. I 
frequently respond as I read. I risk sticking my foot in my mouth. 
You get to see my reactions from *before* you have completed your 
argument. Some of them will be "moot," in which case you can thank me 
for effectively agreeing with you. I.e., for making an objection, 
say, that you would see as needing argument, which you supplied. My 
goal is discursive, not generally polemic. When I move into polemic 
mode, you will see my responses become far shorter. These are, for 
me, discussions, explorations, not finished argument in a debate. As 
this proceeds, though, for me, the issues become clearer, and the 
background generated becomes part of the foundation of my continuing 
positions (or shifts those positions).


This isn't for everyone. It is for me, and for you and others if you 
care to participate or read. If you don't, no obligation. There is no 
presumption, with mailing lists, that anyone has read anything, 
unless they respond.




If voluntary and honest. But one dishonest strategic expression can 
"poison" a number of honest expressions. Moreover, even semi-honest 
strategy creates two classes of voting power - strategic and 
nonstrategic - which hurts legitimacy.



I would encourage all voters to vote strategically and honestly. In 
a Bucklin system there is no advantage to dishonesty that is worth 
the risk. I.e., from a game theory point of view, net zero or 
negative expected gain.



I happen to agree. But some voters might overestimate their capacity 
to predict behavior, and the fact that they're wrong doesn't stop 
the harm they do. In my system, where there is never more and almost 
always significantly less payoff from dishonest strategy, this is 
less of a danger.


The harm they do is mostly to themselves, not to others. The supposed 
rational strategy for these voters, if based on overestimation of the 
accuracy of their knowledge, results in their exclusion from the 
decisive electorate. In other words, the method will maximize the 
utility of everyone else. Alternatively, if they cast a 
"turkey-raising" vote, we do have the possibility that a majority 
raise that turkey, and it becomes the national flag. When a majority 
makes a mistake, it's done until the next opportunity. It is 
impossible to prevent the majority from making mistakes through 
voting systems! If a majority want to vote with a stupid strategy, 
and turkey-raising with runoff methods is, at least, very dangerous, 
they can do it.


I find it practically inconceivable that a normal electorate would do 
this in large numbers. So such a strategy can only afflict small 
groups, and affect close elections. In Lizard v Wizard, did some of 
the voter

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[Dave Ketchum]

On May 25, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:


What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?


Runoffs need avoiding, due to their expense.
 Plurality needs them when lacking a majority, for we know they  
could not completely express their wants - and still have trouble.

 For others, need thought as to when they are worth the pain.

Primaries are another Plurality need - need thought as to when they  
are worth their expense elsewhere - and how to do them well.


Write-ins - needed, though need should be avoided at Runoff time.


-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy  
from a large minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.


Does not let me express my desires - unless bullet voting was always  
good enough for all.


-IRV: Voting can hurt you (nonmonotonicity). That means that small  
third parties can survive, but once they threaten to pass 25%,  
you're back to the problems of plurality. A great learning tool to  
understand this is http://zesty.ca/voting/voteline/ , which lets you  
play with one-dimensional scenarios and see how common  
nonmonotonicity is.


Ballot is good, but counting too often ignores what is important.


-Condorcet: complexity. While the basic idea of one-on-one matches  
is simple, the details of tiebreakers are enough to make most  
voters' eyes glaze over. Moreover, the need to individually rank  
numerous candidates is more work than many are ready for, and the  
inevitable shortcuts they'll take could harm results.


Ballot is good - rank only the candidates you like best, with best at  
top and equal ranking permitted.  Bullet voting is fine when that is  
your liking.


Some talk of voting for frontrunners - above sentence gives all the  
encouragement worth offering.


Its ballot is like IRV's - it is the counting that is more complete  
and smarter.


The counting, reportable as an N*N matrix comparing each pair of  
candidates, is valuable both to indicate progress and to help in  
deciding how to do better.


Tiebreaking is only a problem if you feel you need, but cannot get,  
adequate understanding.  It is simply a cycle of those most voted for,  
thus including the winner, separated from the less-liked rejects.


-Approval: divisiveness. By forcing all votes into an all-or-nothing  
mold, it does not allow partial alliances between candidates.  
Consider the probable results in the recent Hawaii election, where  
the majority democrats split their votes between two candidates,  
leading to a Republican win. Lets assume for a second that, because  
the two democrats were distinguished mainly by individual not  
ideological factors, cross-party approvals are insignificant; and  
that Democrats are pretty evenly split between the two choices.  
Then, there are two possible results: either the less-cooperative  
Democratic faction wins, or, if the "uncooperative arms race" gets  
out-of-hand, the condorcet-loser Republican wins. In other words,  
the system has incentives not to cooperate between two frontrunners  
running approximately even in the polls, no matter how close they  
are, and these incentives are unhealthy whether or not they get out- 
of-hand.


This sits between Plurality, which supports only bullet voting, and  
Condorcet that provides for needed ranking of multiple candidates.


-Range: Strategy is too powerful. If one faction is more inclined to  
honestly rank, seeing themselves as neutral judges, while another  
faction has selfish reasons to strategically vote approval-style,  
the strategic faction will dominate, even if they are a minority.  
Range is very robust under strategy, if it's not factionally biased;  
but too vulnerable to factionally biased strategy. You can  
rationalize until you're blue in the face about how minority Range  
winners reflect a true societal preference; but imagine how you'd  
feel if Bush/Gore/Nader had been decided for your least-favorite  
against the will of the majority, due partly to a certain complicity  
of some people who should should SHOULD have been on your side, and  
partly to the obvious and dishonest machinations of the winning  
side, and you'll see that this is still a real problem. (OK, I know  
that doesn't take a lot of imagination for some people.)


The rating is a great ability, but trying to do it well is a major pain.


-Bucklin: Bucklin (with equal rankings, of course) doesn't really  
have a single biggest weakness. It is still technically just as  
vulnerable to divisiveness as approval; but the trappings tend to  
hide this fact, and so it shouldn't be as much of a problem in  
practice. Still, it doesn't have any really strong points either.  
It's not the best honest system like Range; it doesn't give a  
Condorcet guarantee; and it's more complex than Approval, without  
really fixing Approval's greatest flaw.


In a way, more complex than Condorcet, with Bucklin's complications  
not worth the pain.


So, allow me to re

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 01:20 PM 5/25/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:

What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?

-Bucklin: Bucklin (with equal rankings, of course) doesn't really 
have a single biggest weakness. It is still technically just as 
vulnerable to divisiveness as approval; but the trappings tend to 
hide this fact, and so it shouldn't be as much of a problem in 
practice. Still, it doesn't have any really strong points either. 
It's not the best honest system like Range; it doesn't give a 
Condorcet guarantee; and it's more complex than Approval, without 
really fixing Approval's greatest flaw.


Bucklin can be tweaked to provide better Condorcet performance. Some 
of the tweaks allow "failure" of the majority criterion and the 
condorcet criterion, when there are multiple majorities in the first 
round. In particular, equal ranking being allowed can be interpreted 
as allowing majority criterion failure, because it is possible that a 
majority prefer a candidate but suppress this preference, even though 
in, say, three-round Bucklin there is very little strategic incentive 
to do so. Bucklin is designed to allow safe expression of first 
preference! Allowing equal ranking without providing high strategic 
incentive for it -- the circumstances where a voter might 
legitimately want to equal rank in first preference when there is 
practically no constraint on simply ranking the favorite top and the 
second favorite (and others, perhaps) in second or lower rank, yet 
the voter has *significant* preference, are rare to impossible.


Which brings up a point. Some technical readings of the majority 
criterion and the condorcet criterion consider that *any* preference 
is sufficient to trigger criterion failure, since the criteria do not 
consider preference strength. Further, generally, criterion failure 
is considered to exist no matter how preposterous or remote is the 
possibility of an actual failure. Absent some objective consideration 
of the significance of criteria failure, the purpose of voting 
systems criteria, to be able to objectively compare voting systems, 
is largely defeated, and the debate becomes which criteria failures 
are more important. It seems odd that, if a preference is not 
*significant*, it nevertheless causes a criterion failure where the 
voter *voluntarily* suppresses the preference. And no voting system 
can divine unexpressed preferences. Taken to its absurd conclusion, 
then, every voting system fails to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, 
for example, since the voters could simply vote for someone else, for 
whatever reason. And no system would satisfy the majority criterion, 
either. The common opinion that plurality satisfies the majority 
criterion assumes that voters vote sincerely for their favorite, but, 
in fact, with plurality, they may *easily* have motives to vote for 
someone else, basically an ignorance, on the part of each voter with 
the necessary preference, that they are, in fact, in the majority and 
that the majority will vote sincerely with them.


The judgment of voting systems is afflicted with this reliance on 
possibly unreliable criteria, in general. Most criteria are generally 
desirable, but even that fails. The condorcet criterion and even the 
majority criterion can be faced with situations where there is a 
better indicated winner, given sufficient information from the voters 
*and the voters will confirm this in a runoff.* This is *especially* 
true with the condorcet criterion, which can indicate a plurality 
winner; implying that the electorate has not settled on a conclusion.



So, allow me to restate my favored single-winner system, which, I 
think, avoids all of the major pitfalls above. I call it Approval 
Preferential Voting (the acronym, APV, is I believe only taken by 
American Preferential Voting, an old name for Bucklin; and since 
this system could be considered a Bucklin variant, I think that's just fine.)


It is certainly a Bucklin variant. A less thorough one than what I've 
been proposing, though.


Voters rank each candidate as preferred, approved, or unapproved. If 
any candidates have a majority ranking them at-least-approved, then 
the one of those which is most preferred wins outright. If not, then 
the two candidates which are most preferred against all others (ie, 
the two Condorcet winners based on these simple ballots, or the two 
most-preferred in case of a Condorcet tie) proceed to a runoff.


I see no reason for the reduction of ranks to three from the 
traditional four for Bucklin. For even better performance, I'd 
suggest as many ranks as there are candidates, at least, thus 
allowing full ranking if the voter wishes. In reality, these ranks 
are ratings, if we use Bucklin-ER; that is, they can be voted that 
way, indicating preference strength by the placement of the candidate 
into a rank, relative to the set of rankings. Traditional Bucklin did 
allow this, with the vote of A>.>B being allowed and meaningful. 
(D

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>  This method is very simple. I think that the description above, without
>> the parentheses, is simple and intuitive; it uses only concrete terms. It is
>> also very easy for a voter to sort candidates into three rankings; I'd argue
>> that this is the easiest possible ballot task, easier in general than either
>> two or four ranking categories. (Two means too many compromises, and four
>> means too many fine distinctions.)
>>
>
> The voters can easily not use them. Many didn't. This is overprotecting
> voters, taking facility away from them in the name of  what?
>
> In the name of reducing turkey-raising strategy to an absolute minimum.

First, I'd love to take full range data on the first election, defaulting to
100/75/0 for preferred/approved/unapproved, to be analyzed by Range,
Condorcet, and Bucklin standards and published before the runoff. And the
runoff should allow approval-style write-ins, in case that analysis shows
that my method got it wrong somehow. So it's not about reducing
expressivity.

But let's look at the *overall strategy for APV*:

First off, if nobody ever uses the middle rank, it's just approval with a
runoff if there's no majority. That's a good system. It would, for instance,
have handled Clinton/Bush/Perot or Bush/Gore/Nader with nary a hiccup. But
in the recent Hawaii election, with two 30% clones who hate each other
against a 40% other, it would have gone into a runoff.

The basic strategies in approval/runoff are standard approval strategy (vote
for one of the two frontrunners and anybody better than them), plus
turkey-raising. I'll look at turkey-raising later, but let's assume for the
moment that it's not a big factor. So, we have standard approval strategy
for the top rank. That means that if there's a clear CW and a clear
Condorcet 2nd place, then the CW will have the only majority. If that
happens, great; you're done.

Of course, that condition held in HI and there was no majority. That's
because if the two frontrunners are clones, supporters of other candidates
will see no reason to waste voting power choosing between two equal-utility
options, and so will consider them as effectively being just one of the
frontrunners. So that's the other possibility: a HI-like majority failure.
Call the clones A and B, and the third candidate opposing both C. (In HI, C
was Djou, who won.)

At that point, standard approval with no runoffs just falls down and gives
the election to the true third-place winner. One big yuck. Approval with
runoffs needs a runoff to decide, and the true Condorcet winner might not
actually be in the runoff, so the election might go to the true second-place
winner. Two small yucks.

How do you encourage voters to include additional rankings so as to avoid a
runoff in this situation? *Standard Bucklin certainly does not do the trick*;
the same
damned-if-I'll-cancel-out-my-own-vote-by-also-voting-for-the-second-frontrunner
logic applies exactly as much in the second ranking as it did in the first!
My later-minimum harm takes away this strong reason for A and B voters not
to extend their approval. But they still have no particular positive reason
to do so.

What carrot can you offer two allied subfactions to get them to cooperate? A
better chance to defeat their common enemy, of course. Presumably, they both
want to be the bigger subfaction, but they also both agree that whichever
one is bigger, is the best one to face C in the runoff. This is exactly the
promise that my system gives: if two factions mutually extend approval to
each other, they're helping each other climb the condorcet matrix against
all other candidates to get into the runoff. But if it comes down to just
one of them making it into the runoff - as it very likely will - the one
with the strongest "competitive advantage" (first preferences, plus second
preferences from third-candidate voters) will be the one. That's something
that benefits both sides.

Should they be afraid of overshooting and giving the other faction a
majority? No, because if one side overshoots, the other side probably will
too, so both will have a majority. And then the winner is... the one with
the strongest first preferences, probably** the very same as the one who
would have made it into the runoff.  So extending approval hasn't hurt them
at all, it's just let them avoid the work of voting again, exactly as
designed.

There is of course a middle case, where they "overshoot" the cooperation by
enough to both make it into the runoff, but not by enough to both have a
majority. Voters for the candidate with the stronger first preferences -
say, A - if they are being selfishly rational, probably want to avoid this.
So, if A is clearly beating B, A voters might not approve B. But it would
make no sense for B voters to retaliate; they were approving A as having a
better chance against C, and that still holds.

If the two are not clones with respect to C, but one is actually closer,
that logic for the "middle case" is diff

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[robert bristow-johnson]

On May 25, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:


What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?

-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy  
from a large minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.


except some unnamed folks here (whose posts i don't see anymore) think  
that it's better than IRV.


-IRV: Voting can hurt you (nonmonotonicity). That means that small  
third parties can survive, but once they threaten to pass 25%,  
you're back to the problems of plurality. A great learning tool to  
understand this is http://zesty.ca/voting/voteline/ , which lets you  
play with one-dimensional scenarios and see how common  
nonmonotonicity is.


not only nonmonotonicity, your sincere first choice can help elect  
your worst choice as what has happened in the case study in Burlington  
VT in 2009.  savvy voters that realize that happened to them will  
consider voting strategy (compromising) in the next election to avoid  
electing their worst choice.  this was *precisely* what IRV (or any  
preferential voting system) was meant to avoid.



-Condorcet: complexity.


i don't see it.  Condorcet is simple and defaults most directly to the  
"simple majority" rule of two-candidate elections.


While the basic idea of one-on-one matches is simple, the details of  
tiebreakers are enough to make most voters' eyes glaze over.


by "tiebreakers", do you mean methods to resolve a Condorcet cycle or  
paradox.  i would agree that Schulze (which i have nothing against, in  
fact i think it's the fairest way to do it) would make most voters'  
eyes glaze over.  but i don't think that is the case for Ranked Pairs  
which is almost as good as Schulze and will elect the same candidate  
virtually every time, and i would be happy to accept a suboptimal, but  
simpler, Condorcet (like elect the candidate with the most 1st choices  
in case of a cycle) just to *get* Condorcet adopted.  small price to  
pay, because i really am not convinced that cycles will happen very  
often at all.


Moreover, the need to individually rank numerous candidates is more  
work than many are ready for, and the inevitable shortcuts they'll  
take could harm results.


there should always be ballot access laws.  there should never be more  
than 4 or 5 candidates on the ballot (along with Write-In).  if there  
are, the ballot access laws need to be more strict (more signatures  
required).  having 20 candidates on the ballot for a single seat is  
ridiculous.




-Approval: divisiveness.

...

-Range: Strategy is too powerful.


i couldn't get the guys at ESF to even acknowledge the obvious  
strategic considerations a voter would face with Approval or Range.   
they just say that "it's mathematically proven" to be better than  
anything else.  Clay Shentrup needs to get on this list and start  
defending his position rather than expecting me to do the same on his  
list.


Clay, i'll take you on here on EM, but not on ESF.  it takes too much  
time and is a far less objective context.


--

r b-j  r...@audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."





Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Jameson,

I can't easily quote this message so I'll put my comments between symbols.


--- En date de : Mar 25.5.10, Jameson Quinn  a écrit :
What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?

-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy from a large 
minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.

^
I think there happens to be a nice thing about Plurality in that it
is so primitive that everybody knows they have to have their act together
before the election.

There seems to be a feeling that this (pre-election consolidation) is 
completely bad, but I don't think it is. I mainly would like to have a
third choice.
^


-IRV: Voting can hurt you (nonmonotonicity). That means that small third 
parties can survive, but once they threaten to pass 25%, you're back to the 
problems of plurality. A great learning tool to understand this 
is http://zesty.ca/voting/voteline/ , which lets you play with one-dimensional 
scenarios and see how common nonmonotonicity is.

^
I don't call this problem nonmonotonicity... Even monotone methods can
have the situation that a third party candidate that is stronger than
expected can ruin the result and be unable to "fall back" to their
second preference that they didn't intend to have defeated.

Unless nonmonotonicity is politically unacceptable, or exploitable, I
don't think it's a problem.

The problem with IRV is that it eliminates candidates who have a good
chance of being good, in elections based in issue space.
^


-Condorcet: complexity. While the basic idea of one-on-one matches is simple, 
the details of tiebreakers are enough to make most voters' eyes glaze over. 
Moreover, the need to individually rank numerous candidates is more work than 
many are ready for, and the inevitable shortcuts they'll take could harm 
results.

^
I think complexity is one issue; another issue is the varying dangers
of strategy. I say issue rather than problem. The problem is if the issues
make it politically unacceptable.
^


-Approval: divisiveness. By forcing all votes into an all-or-nothing mold, it 
does not allow partial alliances between candidates. Consider the probable 
results in the recent Hawaii election, where the majority democrats split their 
votes between two candidates, leading to a Republican win. Lets assume for a 
second that, because the two democrats were distinguished mainly by individual 
not ideological factors, cross-party approvals are insignificant; and that 
Democrats are pretty evenly split between the two choices. Then, there are two 
possible results: either the less-cooperative Democratic faction wins, or, if 
the "uncooperative arms race" gets out-of-hand, the condorcet-loser Republican 
wins. In other words, the system has incentives not to cooperate between two 
frontrunners running approximately even in the polls, no matter how close they 
are, and these incentives are unhealthy whether or not they get out-of-hand.

^
Well, you don't have this problem only in Approval. I think the biggest
concern with Approval is that you can get a senseless result if the
voters have bad information.

It also doesn't easily admit three frontrunners. If you simulate polls
with left/right/center candidates, either left or right eventually
gives up (in my sims anyway) and votes for center, making two 
frontrunners, with center much more likely to win. Not a bad outcome
but it's still just two possible outcomes.

Sometimes with polls things never settle down, such as in the presence
of a cycle. In that case I find it hard to explain what the result was
really based on. The method here appears to be a game or tool like FPP
rather than a metric in itself, of who is a good candidate.
^

-Range: Strategy is too powerful. If one faction is more inclined to honestly 
rank, seeing themselves as neutral judges, while another faction has selfish 
reasons to strategically vote approval-style, the strategic faction will 
dominate, even if they are a minority. Range is very robust under strategy, if 
it's not factionally biased; but too vulnerable to factionally biased strategy. 
You can rationalize until you're blue in the face about how minority Range 
winners reflect a true societal preference; but imagine how you'd feel if 
Bush/Gore/Nader had been decided for your least-favorite against the will of 
the majority, due partly to a certain complicity of some people who should 
should SHOULD have been on your side, and partly to the obvious and dishonest 
machinations of the winning side, and you'll see that this is still a real 
problem. (OK, I know that doesn't take a lot of imagination for some people.)

^
For Range I would just say complexity, much in the same vein as your
criticism of Bucklin. They are basically Approval with ballots that offer
you unusual decisions.
^


-Bucklin: Bucklin (with equal rankings, of course) doesn't really have a single 
biggest weakness. It is still technically just as vulnerable to divisiveness as 
approval; but 

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:30 PM 5/26/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:


On May 25, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:


What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?

-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy
from a large minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.


except some unnamed folks here (whose posts i don't see anymore) think
that it's better than IRV.


I am *so* relieved that Mr. B-J doesn't have to suffer through my 
posts any more. He should have done this long ago.


Is Plurality better than IRV? Under some conditions.

You are a small town. You hold nonpartisan elections, with a small 
number of candidates. Plurality is better than IRV. Why? I'll just 
start with a few:


1. IRV under the general conditions of nonpartisan elections almost 
never changes the result from Plurality. People don't realize this 
because they tend to think of "spoiler effect," which usually depends 
on partisan elections and a small party or independent candidate 
pulling off a few votes that flips the election. IRV can fix that, 
but at huge cost, and, notice, it is turning a victory for one 
almost-winner into that for the other almost-winner. Many imagine 
that IRV would have rescued the nation from George Bush, but it is 
far from obvious. It might have made a difficult canvass into a 
totally insane impossible one. The fact is that in nonpartisan 
elections, that phenomenon seems to almost never influence the 
outcome. IRV doesn't flip results in nonpartisan elections.


2. When the method is plurality, people know that if they vote for 
their favorite, if their favorite is not going to win, they are 
wasting their vote. IRV can create that impression, but it is a false 
one under center squeeze conditions. By voting for their favorite and 
thus concealing their preference for the candidate who would be the 
majority winner, underneath their favorite who runs second in 
first-preference votes, and who maintains that until the last round, 
they have wasted their vote, they might as well have stayed home. 
Just like Plurality. But they know it, so they can make an intelligent choice.


3. Plurality is much easier to canvass. It's also, in a small town, 
easier to vote. Just vote for your favorite, hang the "strategy." 
People do accept plurality results as fair, and in small town 
government, when Plurality is the method, not very many offices have 
three candidates, so it's moot. The problem in small towns is more, 
sometimes, in getting *anyone* to run!


But I personally believe that finding a majority is important, 
because it is more unifying. IRV, quite simply, doesn't do this, the 
majority it manufactures is, too often, faux. Since top two runoff 
has some of the same problems as IRV -- but it functions better in 
terms of results than IRV -- I suggest using a better advanced method 
for the primary, one that is actually designed to seek true 
majorities, unlike IRV, and that certainly does it better than IRV. 
And that's Bucklin, and it is easy to vote and canvass, and there are 
no reports in the historical record otherwise. It was tried in 
approximately ninety towns in the U.S., in roughly 1910-1920 (a far 
wider application than FairVote has managed, without the central 
organization pushing it), and it was used for party primary 
elections, apparently, for much longer. It's alleged "failures" 
disappear if it is used in its best application, as a way of finding 
majorities without a runoff. It does it, often. And when it fails to 
do so, instead of using it to elect by plurality, just hold the 
runoff! Compared to plurality, you have not lost anything, and you 
have gained a great deal.


In particular, Bucklin does very well at allowing sincere first 
preference expression. That is very important to voters! It is very 
flexible for voters in how to add additional approvals, and this 
becomes much less of a worry in a runoff system. Voters can make 
their decision on adding second preferences, or third preferences, 
with a simple question: which do you prefer, to add lower preferences 
or to have this election go into a runoff? If you don't mind a 
runoff, you are completely free to truncate, if that makes sense to 
you. Most people, historically, in major Bucklin elections, did add 
additional preferences. But we don't have a lot of data. There is a 
project for an enterprising student!



-Approval: divisiveness.

...

-Range: Strategy is too powerful.


i couldn't get the guys at ESF to even acknowledge the obvious
strategic considerations a voter would face with Approval or Range.
they just say that "it's mathematically proven" to be better than
anything else.  Clay Shentrup needs to get on this list and start
defending his position rather than expecting me to do the same on his
list.

Clay, i'll take you on here on EM, but not on ESF.  it takes too much
time and is a far less objective context.


The arguments are the same regardless of the list. On the ESF lis

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:30 PM 5/26/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

Clay Shentrup needs to get on this list and start
defending his position rather than expecting me to do the same on his
list.


Clay, by the way, needs nothing of the kind. He has better stuff to 
do, and he's doing it. He's now in this for the long term.


Nobody "expects" B-J to do anything on the Election Science list.

Does Rob Richie "need" to get on this list and defend his position? 
You know and I know what would happen. So?


It would show courage, for sure. But he's not really a voting systems 
expert, and I think he'd not see good results for his purposes. Terry 
Bouricius does participate here, and knows more, generally, (though 
Richie does have some knowledge of certain particulars, I've 
certainly worked with him on Wikipedia. We have to be careful.)



Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 01:45 PM 5/26/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:


This method is very simple. I think that the description above, 
without the parentheses, is simple and intuitive; it uses only 
concrete terms. It is also very easy for a voter to sort candidates 
into three rankings; I'd argue that this is the easiest possible 
ballot task, easier in general than either two or four ranking 
categories. (Two means too many compromises, and four means too many 
fine distinctions.)



The voters can easily not use them. Many didn't. This is 
overprotecting voters, taking facility away from them in the name of  what?


In the name of reducing turkey-raising strategy to an absolute minimum.


Turkey raising is pretty stupid in a Range or Approval-like system, 
so one is cutting off good voting facility in favor of eliminating a 
foolish and almost certainly ineffective strategy. Again, in the name 
of  what?




First, I'd love to take full range data on the first election, 
defaulting to 100/75/0 for preferred/approved/unapproved, to be 
analyzed by Range, Condorcet, and Bucklin standards and published 
before the runoff. And the runoff should allow approval-style 
write-ins, in case that analysis shows that my method got it wrong 
somehow. So it's not about reducing expressivity.


Hey, pretty close to my suggestion. Those range defaults are, in 
fact, what I suggested, but I'd add the 50% slot as (bare minimum) 
approval, corresponding to original Bucklin, which worked, and could 
handle lots of candidates, and, to allow neutral and unbiased range 
and condorcet analysis, 25% as an additional disapproved slot. But 
maybe it would be better to have balanced approved and disapproved 
slots. With Range 5, that would be:


Favorite
Preferred
Approved
Almost approved
better than worst
The worst (default, blank)

Or instead of the loaded 'worst," perhaps simply "Maximally unacceptable."

Or Range 3,

Favorite
Preferred
Not quite approved
Unacceptable.

But this doesn't allow much preference strength expression in the two 
approved classes.



But let's look at the overall strategy for APV:

First off, if nobody ever uses the middle rank, it's just approval 
with a runoff if there's no majority. That's a good system. It 
would, for instance, have handled Clinton/Bush/Perot or 
Bush/Gore/Nader with nary a hiccup. But in the recent Hawaii 
election, with two 30% clones who hate each other against a 40% 
other, it would have gone into a runoff.


Two clones who hate each other is an anomaly, by the way. Something 
is wrong with the picture, they are not actually clones, or they are 
both unsuited for public office.


This is a situation where the middle rank (third approved rank) might 
find a majority. 40% for one is pretty high. That candidate only 
needs to get 10% from other voters, the supporters of the 60%. 
Remember that voters are not necessarily partisans. Two outcomes are 
possible here:


The supporters of the 30% clones hate each other as much as their 
candidates pretend to hate each other, so they lose, because 16% 
second choice voting rate among that group, for the 40% candidate, is 
not terribly high.


The supporters fo the 30% clones preferentially second rank each 
other's preference, even more likely in third rank in original 
Bucklin, because it gives them more chance for the favorite to win, 
expressing stronger preference. But still approving of both. If these 
really are clones, as described, that voting pattern would be 
expected. So one of them would win, and it might even be one of the 
rare multiple majorities. Or, they would pull into the lead, and both 
of them would go into the runoff. The danger of the runoff has to do 
with real preference strength and turnout. There is a risk that the 
40% candidate might win the runoff. From the stated preferences it 
might not appear so, which is, quite precisely, why I suggest that 
voting examples give preference strength (i.e., sincere Range) data. 
Ideally, it would actually be non-normalized absolute range, because 
the difference in absolute utility to the voter is what drives 
turnout. When that's high, high turnout, when it is low, low turnout.


The basic strategies in approval/runoff are standard approval 
strategy (vote for one of the two frontrunners and anybody better 
than them), plus turkey-raising. I'll look at turkey-raising later, 
but let's assume for the moment that it's not a big factor. So, we 
have standard approval strategy for the top rank. That means that if 
there's a clear CW and a clear Condorcet 2nd place, then the CW will 
have the only majority. If that happens, great; you're done.


Of course, that condition held in HI and there was no majority.


It wasn't approval, and, even more, it wasn't ranked approval, which 
allows clear preference expressing while still approving to avoid a runoff.


 That's because if the two frontrunners are clones, supporters of 
other candidates will see no reason to waste voting power choosing 
b

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[Jameson Quinn]

2010/5/26 Kevin Venzke 

> --- En date de : Mar 25.5.10, Jameson Quinn  a
> écrit :
> What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
> ...
>
> -IRV: Voting can hurt you (nonmonotonicity). ...
> http://zesty.ca/voting/voteline/ ...
>
> ^
> I don't call this problem nonmonotonicity...
> ^
>
> Whatever you call it, it's obvious when you play with that app I linked to.


>
>
> -Approval: divisiveness. ...
>
> ^... The method here appears to be a game or tool like FPP
> rather than a metric in itself, of who is a good candidate.
> ^
>

You've expressed better than I could why I think Approval lacks legitimacy.


>
> Voters rank each candidate as preferred, approved, or unapproved. If any
> candidates have a majority ranking them at-least-approved, then the one of
> those which is most preferred wins outright.
>
> ^
> This part here has been thought of before: I/we called it MAFP. But
> when no one had a majority then simply the approval winner would win.
> ^
>

Majority Approval First Preference???

>
> If not, then the two candidates which are most preferred against all others
> (ie, the two Condorcet winners based on these simple ballots, or the two
> most-preferred in case of a Condorcet tie) proceed to a runoff.
>
> ^
> This seems not clearly defined to me...? Are you saying the "two most
> preferred candidates" and implying that this is the same as being the
> two Condorcet winners?
> ^
>

No, I mean an actual pairwise analysis, using just the data from these
ballots. The easiest way to do it would be to calculate the "base total" of
preferences plus approvals for each candidate, and then to compare A and B,
you'd subtract from A's base total the number of approvals she got from
B-preferrers, and vice versa, then compare results.


>
>
> I'm having trouble understanding how monotonicity is guaranteed. Suppose
> that there is a runoff between X and Y and X wins. Isn't it possible
> that when X takes some preferences from Y, then instead the runoff is
> between X and Z? Just like a normal runoff. Or is this move not
> considered because it's a three-slot ballot?
>

It's not zero-sum. If some Y-preferrers move X up (either to approval, or to
preferred-along-with-Y), that makes no difference in the question of Y vs.
Z. In other words, the main difference from a normal runoff is that
equalities are allowed. This makes it monotonic.


> Those are the only comments I have at the moment.
> ^
>

Thanks.

Jameson

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[robert bristow-johnson]

i think it was Dave Ketchum who said:

-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy  
from a large minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.


to which i answered:

On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 11:30, robert bristow-johnson > wrote:

except some unnamed folks here
(whose posts i don't see anymore) think that it's better than IRV.



On Jun 5, 2010, at 3:00 PM, clay shentrup wrote:


Robert,

I'm not necessarily saying that IRV is worse than plurality in terms  
of direct election outcome performance.


Clay, you weren't that particular unnamed folk.  before i ventured  
over to the ESF forum, i had a little slugfest with Kathy Dopp (i  
think you know who she is).  even though she was not a direct  
participant, she *did* insert herself into a referendum we had here in  
Burlington Vermont about IRV (so did Warren, BTW, but Warren actually  
has a pretty good idea about the facts where Kathy was most just  
repeating partisan tripe).  the specific referendum was to replace IRV  
with the method that existed before, which is plurality if above 40%  
and top-two runoff (in 3 weeks) if no one gets 40%.  even though i  
have been clearly critical of IRV, particularly how well it performed  
(even regarding the very goals we had in adopting IRV in 2005) in  
2009, i voted against the recall.  but Kathy was clearly in favor of  
plurality over IRV.



If you look at Bayesian Regret figures, IRV certainly is better. But  
I have two major reasons for believing that, on the whole, it may be  
worse than Plurality.
	• If enough IRV voters are strategic, then that improvement may be  
too small to outweigh the side effects of IRV, such as
		• Greater risk of near-tie election recount nightmares (http://scorevoting.net/TieRisk.html 
)


not if the ballot scanners are working.  if your ballot scanning  
technology is faulty, it's bad for any system.  there would be a lot  
more work in hand counting (and recounting after transferred votes) an  
IRV election.



• Greater ballot spoilage rate 
(http://scorevoting.net/SPRates.html)


about 1/100 % in Burlington in 2009.  machine errors rejected 4 of  
7980 ballots, but upon examination 3 of those were okay.  only 1  
ballot in the entire city was a bad ballot in 2009.  i don't think the  
argument washes.


		• Need for central tabulation (http://scorevoting.net/ 
IrvNonAdd.html)


to which i agree.  not so bad for a smaller venue, but not good for a  
state-wide or nationwide election.



• Increased likelihood of adopting electronic voting machines


you mean touch-screen?  because we already have optical scan (of paper  
ballots) and i am convinced that is the best method.  nonetheless, it  
is an independent issue regarding which of plurality, IRV, Condorcet,  
Approval, or Range.


	• Even if IRV is still an improvement over plurality after tactical  
voting and these side effects have been taken into account, the  
adoption of IRV is a loss when you factor in the opportunity cost of  
adopting IRV instead of Score or Approval Voting (or maybe even  
Condorcet methods). Reform energy and manpower is extremely limited.  
If you use limited resources to make 100 dollars when the same  
resources could have been used to make 1000 dollars, you didn't gain  
100 dollars, you lost 900 dollars. That's basic economics that most  
voting reformers seem blissfully ignorant of.


Now consider IRV's tendency to "backslide" (e.g. in Burlington and  
Pierce County WA), which presumably leaves voters reluctant to try  
another alternative voting method, leaving us stuck with Plurality  
Voting -- and then getting IRV was an even bigger loss.


i've been saying that since March 2009.  the mistake of both  
proponents and detractors of IRV was the insistence that Preferential  
Voting (the ranked-order ballot) is synonymous with the IRV (or STV)  
method of tabulation.  FairVote did the Ranked Ballot a disservice by  
*only* associating it with IRV when they introduced and promoted the  
reform to political jurisdictions.


So I am not trying to sound like an idiot making some simplistic  
statement like "IRV is worse than Plurality Voting". It's a lot more  
complex than that. But the above explanation doesn't make a great  
soundbite.


-Condorcet: complexity.

i don't see it.  Condorcet is simple and defaults most directly to  
the "simple majority" rule of two-candidate elections.


Well, it depends which Condorcet method you use of course.


Ranked Pairs is pretty simple.  even for Yahoo's that complain about  
IRV being "too complex".  and meaningful.  and, in the case of a CW or  
a Smith Set of 3, will always elect the same person as would Schulze,  
which seems to be the generally agreed "best method" with Condorcet.   
Schulze is, in my opinion, too complex to explain to and be acceptable  
to the Yahoos.



But think about the logistics of tabulation with Condorcet.


you need a computer, just like you would fo