Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-07 Thread Olav Seyfarth
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: RIPEMD160

Hi Philip,

> Does the recent news about vulnerability of usb devices to attacks such as 
> described in 'badusb' [http://srlabs.de/badusb/] mean that the usb reader 
> into which the gnupg smart card is inserted is also vulnerable to
> exploits?

Yes. ANY USB device. Personally, I don't use a USB based smart card reader ;-)

> If not, what is the essential difference that would make a usb memory
> stick compromisable but not the usb smart card reader ?

No. The principle difference remains, even for USB based SmartCard readers: even
if you hack the (USB based) SmartCard reader, you still are not able to get hold
of the secret stored within your private key since this key is even generated in
the card, it literally only exists within that card and is only accessible (in
terms of being used to compute something) through the card OS commands.

Olav
- -- 
The Enigmail Project - OpenPGP Email Security For Mozilla Applications
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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-07 Thread Robert J. Hansen

Does the recent news about vulnerability of usb devices to attacks such as
described in 'badusb' [*] mean that the usb reader into which the gnupg smart
card is inserted is also vulnerable to exploits ?


Sure.  But the *kind* of exploits are different.


If not, what is the essential difference that would make a usb memory stick
compromisable but not the usb smart card reader ?


Not only did I already answer this, but you included it in your email 
(as a quote).


"Smart cards work by storing the key in a method where it cannot be read
by the host computer.  Once a key is moved to the smart card, it ceases
to exist as anything other than a black box.  Data can be sent to the
smart card to be decrypted or signed, but the host computer has
literally no access to the cryptographic key stored on the smart card.

In a USB model, an attacker who can compromise your box can easily
acquire your private key: wait for you to plug in the USB dongle and
make a covert copy of your keyring.  In a smartcard model, an attacker
can't easily acquire your private key."

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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-07 Thread Philip Jackson
On 06/08/14 16:24, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> 
>> I do not get your point here. My proposal is to operate the keyring
>> from a USB stick. What is the difference with operating it from a
>> smart card?
> 
> Exactly what I said.  USB is completely broken as far as security goes.
>  A USB device cannot be made secure.  Thumb drives are malware vectors
> par excellence, and with some of the recent attacks which work by
> exploiting the firmware things get even nastier and harder to defend
> against.  If you're concerned about a remote attacker exploiting your
> system from afar, you should also be concerned about a remote attacker
> rooting your box and exploiting the hell out of your USB stack.
> 
> Smart cards work by storing the key in a method where it cannot be read
> by the host computer.  Once a key is moved to the smart card, it ceases
> to exist as anything other than a black box.  Data can be sent to the
> smart card to be decrypted or signed, but the host computer has
> literally no access to the cryptographic key stored on the smart card.
> 
> In a USB model, an attacker who can compromise your box can easily
> acquire your private key: wait for you to plug in the USB dongle and
> make a covert copy of your keyring.  In a smartcard model, an attacker
> can't easily acquire your private key.

Does the recent news about vulnerability of usb devices to attacks such as
described in 'badusb' [*] mean that the usb reader into which the gnupg smart
card is inserted is also vulnerable to exploits ?

If not, what is the essential difference that would make a usb memory stick
compromisable but not the usb smart card reader ?

[*] /srlabs.de/badusb/


0x23543A63.asc
Description: application/pgp-keys


signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Phil Stracchino
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On 08/06/14 10:24, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Exactly what I said.  USB is completely broken as far as security
> goes. A USB device cannot be made secure.  Thumb drives are malware
> vectors par excellence, and with some of the recent attacks which
> work by exploiting the firmware things get even nastier and harder
> to defend against.  If you're concerned about a remote attacker
> exploiting your system from afar, you should also be concerned
> about a remote attacker rooting your box and exploiting the hell
> out of your USB stack.

It should also be pointed out that if your system is secure, then
storing your keyring on your computer is safe anyway; but if your
computer has already been compromised, then storing your keyring on a
USB stick, which must be mounted on your already-compromised computer
to use it, is AT BEST no more secure than storing the keyring on the
computer in the first place was.  And it may be *worse*, because the
compromised computer may use the USB stick as a vector to compromise
other computers you have that were previously secure.



- -- 
  Phil Stracchino
  Babylon Communications
  ph...@caerllewys.net
  p...@co.ordinate.org
  Landline: 603.293.8485
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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Robert J. Hansen

Clear explanation. Can we go the smartcard route already with
GPG/Enigmail?


Enigmail works well with smartcards.

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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Roland Siemons

  
  

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- 
Hash: SHA1 
 
Thanks Olav,

Clear explanation. Can we go the smartcard route already with
GPG/Enigmail?

Thx

Roland

On 06/08/2014 16:12, Olav Seyfarth wrote:
> Hi Roland,
  >
  > you no doubt have a need for email encryption. But remember:
  the chain is only
  > as strong as its weakest link.
  >
  > Robert stated that USB is not going to solve the issue since
  you cannot trust
  > it: https://srlabs.de/badusb/
  >
  > > What is the difference with operating it from a smart
  card?
  >
  > The difference between a keyring stored on a USB device and a
  SmartCard is that
  > the SmartCard computes crucial operations itself and thus
  cannot easily be
  > tampered with.
  >
  > The main question ist whether you trust the computer where
  you plug in the USB
  > storage device and why this is more secure than storing it on
  the (encrypted?!)
  > harddrive.
  >
  > > If a smart card gets lost, it can be used by the finder
  if she knows the
  > > pincodes.
  >
  > Yes. If you employ a simple 4 digit PIN, that'll be a
  problem. However, OpenPGP
  > SmartCard PIN should be named Password or Passphrase since it
  accepts 6-32 char:
  > http://g10code.com/p-card.html
  >
  > The main difference is that you KNOW if your SmartCard is
  missing while you
  > would not know if a trojan copied it (and now brute forces
  your passphrase).
  >
  > Olav
  >
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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Roland Siemons

  
  

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- 
Hash: SHA1 
 
Got it.
Can we go the smartcard route already?

Thx

Roland


On 06/08/2014 16:24, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> patients and with
  colleagues, we are legal advisers, we are ..., we
  >> are who we are and we have secrets, and there are those
  who want to
  >> know those secrets.
  >
  > Yes.  And we're also just normal people sharing barbecue
  recipes with
  > our friends.  If you're in Texas, then I suppose a barbecue
  recipe is
  > considered a national security secret and worth killing to
  keep private.
  > In the rest of the country that's just seen as overkill.
  >
  > It's definitely true that certain industries and people are
  at high risk
  > for intrusions and looting.  It's also definitely true that
  certain
  > industries and people are at low risk.  Let's not go about
  saying that
  > *everyone* is at high risk, because not everyone is.
  >
  >> I do not get your point here. My proposal is to operate
  the keyring
  >> from a USB stick. What is the difference with operating
  it from a
  >> smart card?
  >
  > Exactly what I said.  USB is completely broken as far as
  security goes.
  >  A USB device cannot be made secure.  Thumb drives are
  malware vectors
  > par excellence, and with some of the recent attacks which
  work by
  > exploiting the firmware things get even nastier and harder to
  defend
  > against.  If you're concerned about a remote attacker
  exploiting your
  > system from afar, you should also be concerned about a remote
  attacker
  > rooting your box and exploiting the hell out of your USB
  stack.
  >
  > Smart cards work by storing the key in a method where it
  cannot be read
  > by the host computer.  Once a key is moved to the smart card,
  it ceases
  > to exist as anything other than a black box.  Data can be
  sent to the
  > smart card to be decrypted or signed, but the host computer
  has
  > literally no access to the cryptographic key stored on the
  smart card.
  >
  > In a USB model, an attacker who can compromise your box can
  easily
  > acquire your private key: wait for you to plug in the USB
  dongle and
  > make a covert copy of your keyring.  In a smartcard model, an
  attacker
  > can't easily acquire your private key.
  >
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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Robert J. Hansen

patients and with colleagues, we are legal advisers, we are ..., we
are who we are and we have secrets, and there are those who want to
know those secrets.


Yes.  And we're also just normal people sharing barbecue recipes with
our friends.  If you're in Texas, then I suppose a barbecue recipe is
considered a national security secret and worth killing to keep private.
In the rest of the country that's just seen as overkill.

It's definitely true that certain industries and people are at high risk
for intrusions and looting.  It's also definitely true that certain
industries and people are at low risk.  Let's not go about saying that
*everyone* is at high risk, because not everyone is.


I do not get your point here. My proposal is to operate the keyring
from a USB stick. What is the difference with operating it from a
smart card?


Exactly what I said.  USB is completely broken as far as security goes.
 A USB device cannot be made secure.  Thumb drives are malware vectors
par excellence, and with some of the recent attacks which work by
exploiting the firmware things get even nastier and harder to defend
against.  If you're concerned about a remote attacker exploiting your
system from afar, you should also be concerned about a remote attacker
rooting your box and exploiting the hell out of your USB stack.

Smart cards work by storing the key in a method where it cannot be read
by the host computer.  Once a key is moved to the smart card, it ceases
to exist as anything other than a black box.  Data can be sent to the
smart card to be decrypted or signed, but the host computer has
literally no access to the cryptographic key stored on the smart card.

In a USB model, an attacker who can compromise your box can easily
acquire your private key: wait for you to plug in the USB dongle and
make a covert copy of your keyring.  In a smartcard model, an attacker
can't easily acquire your private key.

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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Olav Seyfarth
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: RIPEMD160

Hi Roland,

you no doubt have a need for email encryption. But remember: the chain is only
as strong as its weakest link.

Robert stated that USB is not going to solve the issue since you cannot trust
it: https://srlabs.de/badusb/

> What is the difference with operating it from a smart card?

The difference between a keyring stored on a USB device and a SmartCard is that
the SmartCard computes crucial operations itself and thus cannot easily be
tampered with.

The main question ist whether you trust the computer where you plug in the USB
storage device and why this is more secure than storing it on the (encrypted?!)
harddrive.

> If a smart card gets lost, it can be used by the finder if she knows the 
> pincodes.

Yes. If you employ a simple 4 digit PIN, that'll be a problem. However, OpenPGP
SmartCard PIN should be named Password or Passphrase since it accepts 6-32 char:
http://g10code.com/p-card.html

The main difference is that you KNOW if your SmartCard is missing while you
would not know if a trojan copied it (and now brute forces your passphrase).

Olav
- -- 
The Enigmail Project - OpenPGP Email Security For Mozilla Applications

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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Roland Siemons

  
  

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- 
Hash: SHA1 
 
Dear Robert,

>> Since we know that our
  computers are being hacked so often by
  >> persons and organisations that are curious about our
  >> communications...
  
  > Do we? That seems like rather a leap to me. ... If you're
  doing something high-risk then yes, 
  > ...   

Yes we do. Encryption is not only for those who are doing something
highly risky, but for all who have to protect secrecy for their own
good or for their profession. We are technology developers who
communicate with patent attorneys, we are patent attorneys who
communicate with patent bureaus, we are medical practitioners who
communicate with patients and with colleagues, we are legal
advisers, we are ..., we are who we are and we have secrets, and
there are those who want to know those secrets.

>> Is it a good idea to store
  our private keys on a USB stick instead of
  >> having it permanently operational inside Enigmail or
  GPGWin etc.?
  
  > No.  USB is inherently broken as far as security goes.  If
  you want to
  > go this route, use a smartcard.

I do not get your point here. My proposal is to operate the keyring
from a USB stick. What is the difference with operating it from a
smart card? If a smart card gets lost, it can be used by the finder
if she knows the pincodes. Doesn't the same apply to a USB stick?

Best regards,

Roland




On 06/08/2014 13:52, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 8/6/2014 6:44 AM, Roland
  Siemons wrote:
  >> Since we know that our computers are being hacked so
  often by
  >> persons and organisations that are curious about our
  >> communications...
  >
  > Do we?  That seems like rather a leap to me.  There are a
  couple of
  > *billion* home computers on the internet right now: even if
  you assume
  > tens of thousands of high-end attackers who want to
  compromise your
  > communications, it seems unlikely that they would be able to
  target a
  > significant fraction of those couple of billion.
  >
  > If you're doing something high-risk then yes, you should
  definitely be
  > extremely concerned about someone compromising your system in
  order to
  > read your email traffic.  But otherwise, the people
  compromising your
  > system are generally more interested in sending spam than
  reading your
  > email.
  >
  > By all means, use OpenPGP to secure your email traffic.  I
  think it's a
  > good idea.  But let's try and keep our paranoia connected to
  reality,
  > okay?  :)
  >
  >> a good idea to store our private keys on a USB stick
  instead of
  >> having it permanently operational inside Enigmail or
  GPGWin etc.?
  >
  > No.  USB is inherently broken as far as security goes.  If
  you want to
  > go this route, use a smartcard.
  >
  >
  >
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Re: [Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 8/6/2014 6:44 AM, Roland Siemons wrote:
> Since we know that our computers are being hacked so often by
> persons and organisations that are curious about our
> communications...

Do we?  That seems like rather a leap to me.  There are a couple of
*billion* home computers on the internet right now: even if you assume
tens of thousands of high-end attackers who want to compromise your
communications, it seems unlikely that they would be able to target a
significant fraction of those couple of billion.

If you're doing something high-risk then yes, you should definitely be
extremely concerned about someone compromising your system in order to
read your email traffic.  But otherwise, the people compromising your
system are generally more interested in sending spam than reading your
email.

By all means, use OpenPGP to secure your email traffic.  I think it's a
good idea.  But let's try and keep our paranoia connected to reality,
okay?  :)

> a good idea to store our private keys on a USB stick instead of
> having it permanently operational inside Enigmail or GPGWin etc.?

No.  USB is inherently broken as far as security goes.  If you want to
go this route, use a smartcard.



smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
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[Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Roland Siemons
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Resent, due to signature problem

Dear Forum,

Since we know that our computers are being hacked so often by persons
and organisations that are curious about our communications, would it be
a good idea to store our private keys on a USB stick instead of having
it permanently operational inside Enigmail or GPGWin etc.? And implement
those programmes as necessarily requiring the external USB sticked
keyring (otherwise no decryption)?

Is it already possible to implement the said software in such manner?

Best regards,

Roland

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Version: GnuPG v2.0.21 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/

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[Enigmail] Key management by users, and key use by Enigmail/GPGWin/etc.

2014-08-06 Thread Roland Siemons

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
 
Dear Forum,

Since we know that our computers are being hacked so often by persons
and organisations that are curious about our communications, would it be
a good idea to store our private keys on a USB stick instead of having
it permanently operational inside Enigmail or GPGWin etc.? And implement
those programmes as necessarily requiring the external USB sticked
keyring (otherwise no decryption)?

Is it already possible to implement the said software in such manner?

Best regards,

Roland

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2.0.21 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/
 
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