Re: fin insanity

2001-09-08 Thread Saibal Mitra


Charles Goodwin wrote:


  -Original Message-
  From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 
  As I have written before, a person is just a computation being
implemented
  somewhere. Suppose that the person has discovered that he suffers from a
  terminal ilness and he dies (the computation ends). Now in principle the
  person in question could have lived on if he wasn't diagnosed with this
  terminal ilness. Somewhere in the multiverse this person exists. Some
time
  ago I wrote (I think on the FoR list) that the transformation from the
old
  dying person to the new person is a continuous one. The process of death
  must involve the destruction of the brain. At some time the information
  that the person is dying will be lost to the person. The person might
even
  think he is 20 years old while in reality he is 92. Anyway, the point is
  that his brain had stored so much information that adding new
information
  would lead to an inconsistency. By dumping some of the information, the
  information left  will be identical to the information in a similar
brain
  somewhere else of a younger person, free from disease.

 Hmm.and this is a simpler theory, with more explanatory power, than
that people are just material objects which eventually wear
 out?

People are material objects, but the materials out of which people are made
don't matter.

If your neurons were replaced by artifiicial ones that would function in the
same way, would you not be the same person?

You would answer any question in the same way as the original version of you
would. I conclude that it is the computation that is performed by your brain
that generates you. The materials don't matter. I could just as well
generate you by a primitive analog computer. What matters is the computer
program that is running on the machine, not the machine itself.

If you believe that all possible universes exist (universes that can be
generated by a computer program), then you ``always´´ exist in some
universe, because, by definition, you are a computer program.

So, I would say that you will always find yourself alive somewhere. But it
is interesting to consider only our universe and ignore quantum effects.
Even then you will always find yourself alive somewhere, but you won't find
yourself becoming infinitely old (see above). Because this is a classical
continuation of you, it is much more likely than any quantum continuation
that allows you to survive an atomic bomb exploding above your head.

Saibal




Re: FIN too

2001-09-08 Thread Marchal

Fred Chen wrote:

Hal, Charles, I think this is an unavoidable part of the QTI or FIN debate.
It seems that with QTI, you could only be entering white rabbit
(magical-type) universes, not continue in probable ones.

But in general I have a more fundamental objection (to quantum
 immortality).
In QM, not all quantum states are possible for a given situation. For
example, an electron orbiting a proton can only occupy certain energy
states, not arbitrary ones. The energy states in between are forbidden; an
electron cannot be measured and found to be in one of these forbidden
states. So I do not see why immortality is allowed by QM from our universe
if physical mechanisms generally ban it. Survival seems to me (and I guess
most people) a forbidden state in the situations where death is certain.


But all the QTI problem (or the COMP I problem) is there. QM shows 
that even by taking account the forbidden states, from the point of view
of the observer there are enough histories making hard to define a 
situation where death is certain. It is plausible that comp immortality
makes that death entails a deviation from normality, but you always find
yourself in the most near possible world such that you survive. 
Not really a happy thought *a priori*, but how to escape it?
Now comp is rich enough for allowing the consistency of jump between
type of normal world, amnesia bactracking, etc. The mortality question
is harder with comp than with QM, and with QM the solution would be 
provided the SE applied to the agonising: just intractable.
All the problem comes from the fact that although it is easy to
imagine situation where 3-death is very probable, it is not easy
at all to define a situation where 1-death is certain. Comp entails
big ignorance here.

Bruno




RE: Conditional probability continuity of consciousness (was:

2001-09-08 Thread Marchal

Jesse Mazer wrote:

I don't really think there's some other metaphysical realm where we get 
dropped from, but I do think that, as an analogy, the spotlight one is not 
actually so bad. After all, if you think that you just *are* your current 
observer-moment, how can you possibly become any other one? The 
observer-moment itself doesn't transform--it's just sitting there timelessly 
in Platonia among all other possible observer-moments. So, it's better to 
think of continuity of consciousness as a spotlight moving between 
different observer-moments, with the probability of going from one to 
another defined by the conditional probability distribution.


I think each observer moment as the quality of believing it has just 
been
light-spotted and expect very similar moment in its immediate 
neigborhoods.

No need for external time nor external spotlight imo. Perhaps I am taking
your analogy too seriously.


If we abandon the idea of an 
absolute probability distribution, we have no hope of explaining why I am 
this particular type of observer-moment experiencing this particular type of 
universe, and we can only explain why my future experience will have a 
certain amount in common with my current experience (assuming that's what 
the conditional probability distribution actually predicts).


But that is what each observer-moment can ask an explanation for. The
duplication WM experience illustrates that such question are senseless.
It is like why am I in W or Why am I in M. With comp we can predict
that those questions will be asked, but there are no answers. We get
sort of necessary contingent propositions. No?


Bruno