Re: Self without context???
Dear Bruno and Stephen: Since I think I have just about finished explaining my model to myself perhaps I can now do a better job of explaining it to others. So here goes. 1) The first thing I consider in need of basis is: There is a dynamic within the system [The machine(s) change state]. I start my basis for this with my own concepts for factuals and counterfactuals. A factual in my model is a piece of information. An example would be: All numbers exist. A counterfactual in my model is a piece of information that is the "not" or negation of part or all of a factual. An example would be: All numbers do not exist. A factual that is completely negated by a collection of counterfactuals is itself a counterfactual. Together these counterfactuals form a set. The first level of the model is the ensemble of all counterfactuals. It contains no information. Call that the Everything. Now we may have forged a problem. To say: The Everything exists is a factual. This by itself is not in keeping with the objective of working with a zero information system. Does it have a counterfactual. Yes: The Nothing defined as the absence of factuals of any sort. So we allow that the Nothing also exists. Now note that since both the Everything and the Nothing are counterfactuals they are both in the Everything. The Everything is a member of itself - over and over. This association is thus infinitely nested as is the boundary between the Everything and the Nothing. Now switch to the idea of selection. The Everything can contain no selection since any selection would constitute a factual that is absent a counterfactual which is not allowed. Thus the Everything/Nothing boundary must not have a selected configuration or a selected evolution - it must randomly shift. The shifting boundary exposes some of the counterfactuals in the Everything to the Nothing. During this exposure such counterfactuals approach an incomplete negation - their negation becomes fuzzy. What we consider our reality [our universe] is one of an infinite number of similar realities that are emergent as isomorphisms to this randomly shifting fuzz [a seething foamy fractal]. 2) The next thing I see in need of discussion is whether any members of this ensemble of universes are in some way subject to input from the underlying random dynamic. This input would be as input from a random external oracle - true noise. The primary tool I use is the need to avoid a selection. The conclusion is that either none of them are subject to this input or they all are. To have some subject to this input is not allowed if selection is to be avoided. Is there any reason that a universe might be subject to this noise? A universe in this model that has an evolutionary history must have found a series of successive isomorphic matches to the random dynamic of the Everything/Nothing boundary. While noise free universes might have short histories, those with long histories would tend to be those subject to noise. It would be a bit like natural selection for such a trait but is really an initial feature. I take this to be sufficient basis given the need to avoid selection to hold in the model that all evolving universes are subject to true noise. 3) The next thing to explore is the nature of the rules in each universe that guide its range of next possible isomorphisms [states]. Each current state has its own such range. More later. Hal
Re: relevant probability distribution
On 15 Jun 2002, at 14:27, Russell Standish wrote: > > No the issue concerns any conscious "program", rather than any > particular one. The fact that there are vastly more amoeba than homo > sapiens tends to argue against amoebae being consious. > This remind me of Jack Vance novels "Alastor". One of the characters is the king that rules over a vast area of the galaxy. He likes to travel incognito among his subjects, and he often ask himself the question: "There is billions of men and only one king. How is it possible that it happens that I am the king ?" Do your position about this is that subjects are not conscious, only kings? >From a third-person point of view (the reader of the novel), the question is simple. There is billions of subjects, and they can all ask themselves "Why I am me and not someone else ?". The problem is we have only a first-person point of view on our universe (or on the "everything"). We must use our imagination, to do thought experiments, to get a third-person point of view. Matthieu. -- http://matthieu.walraet.free.fr
Re: self-sampling assumption is incorrect
After writing the following response, I realized that my argument against
the self sampling assumption doesn't really depend on E1 and E2 being
experiences. They can be any kind of events. Suppose they're prizes that
the copies can win for the original. E1 is a TV and E2 is a stereo. You'd
prefer a TV over a stereo but would rather have one TV and one stereo
instead of two TVs. Then my argument still works.
The issue of whether substitution effects can apply to experiences of
copies is of independent interest, so my original response still has a
point.
On Fri, Jun 14, 2002 at 07:42:27PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
> What about this variant on the experiment (the full experiment is below).
> Instead of B1 and B2 both getting E1, let B1 get E1 and B2 get E1'.
> E1' is another experience than E1 that is just about as good.
> U(E1) > U(E2) and U(E1') > U(E2). The idea is that this eliminates
> possible issues regarding whether two people (B1 & B2) who get exactly
> the same experience should count twice.
I think in that case it's still possible for U({E1,E1'}) < U({E1,E2}), if
for example E1 and E1' are very similar.
> It does seem that the SSA pretty much implies that if U(E1') > U(E2) then
> U({E1,E1'}) > U({E1,E2}). Is it really rational for this to be otherwise?
Yes, I believe it can be. If you believe otherwise you have to convince me
why it's impossible to value diversity of experience in your copies, or
why having that value would lead to absurd consequences.
We all know the law of diminishing marginal utility, which says that the
marginal utility of a good decreases as more of that good is consumed, and
the existence of substitution effects, where the marginal utility of one
good decreases when another similar good is consumed. I suggest there is
no reason to assume that the value of experiences of one's copies cannot
exhibit similar cross-dependencies. Actually I think the reason that
we have diminishing marginal utility and substitution effects, namely that
they provide an evolutionary advantage, also applies to the value of
experiences of copies.
> We know that rationality puts some constraints on the utility function.
> We can't have cyclicity in the utility preference graph, for example.
Our normative theories of rationality (i.e. decision theories) do put
constraints on preferences, but the history of decision theory has been
one of recognizing and removing unnecessary constraints, so that it can be
used by wider classes of people. The earliest decision theories for
example where stated in terms of maximizing expected money payoffs rather
than expected utility, which implicitly assumes that utility is a linear
function of money. Today, of course we recognize that utility can be any
function of money, even a decreasing one. Another example is the move from
objective probabilities to subjective probabilities.
> But in the case above, where U({X,Y}) means the utility of having two
> different independent experiences X and Y, maybe it does follow that
> U({X,Y}) and U({X,Z}) must compare the same as U(Y) and U(Z). You don't
> have any choice but to accept the equivalence. As Lewis Carroll wrote,
> "Then Logic would take you by the throat, and FORCE you to do it!"
> (http://www.mathacademy.com/pr/prime/articles/carroll/index.asp)
But remember that we choose the axioms. Logic doesn't tell use which
axioms to use.
