Re: Are we in a simulation

2003-06-10 Thread Eric Hawthorne
My corollaries to: 
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from
magic.

1. Any sufficiently detailed and correct reality simulation is indistinguishable from reality.

2. Any artificial consciousness which communicates in all 
circumstances within the range of communication behaviours of 
conscious humans, is indistinguishable from a human consciousness.

Further to 1.
-
Because reality may be a set of programs selected
from the plenitude of all possible state changes, a 
programmed simulation of it, if it was really any good,
would essentially be reality. In fact, there is perhaps
a law that any completely precise simulation of reality
is identical to reality, by definition.

Further to 2.
-
The qualia of consciousness (i.e. the feeling or
experience of consciousness and how sense data seem
to us) are only explainable to other conscious beings
through communication and observable behaviour.
The only but compelling reason to assume that others
experience essentially the same kind of qualia that
you do (their red is like your red) etc. is that the
simplest theory would say that since our brains are similar,
and, since communication assures us that the behaviours
of our minds (yours and mine) are similar, then the 
qualia are also similar. A theory that postulated
substantial differences in qualia-experience for different
people would be hard pressed to explain why it is different.
You don't have to explain why qualia-experience is similar
from person to person. That's just the simplest (and thus the 
default) theory.

Since all qualia of consciousness, and all other results
of consciousness, are only explainable to or able to be
made evident to other conscious beings via communication
and other behaviours (i.e. through patterns in I/O), we might
be forced to say that it is impossible in principle to prove
the existence of anything in human consciousness that is different
than the consciousness of an artificial mind that communicated
and behaved indistinguishably from a conscious human (in
all kinds of circumstances, contexts.)
Consciousness's only manifestation outside itself is via
I/O. If the I/O patterns are indistinguishable, it is simplest
to say that the consciousness processes themselves are
essentially equivalent.
8-Count
---
I fall twisted.
I lie at a strange angle.
I stand corrected.
The punchline came out of nowhere.
 
Eric

--
   We are all in the gutter,
but some of us are looking at the stars.
 - Oscar Wilde



















Re: are we in a simulation?

2003-06-10 Thread George Levy




Sorry about the graphics... There were'nt any except some italics I think.
I'll send this one in plain text.. tell me how it goes.

Hal Finney wrote:

  George Levy writes:
  
  
!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
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head

  
  
Oh, sorry, I'm supposed to ignore that, aren't I?  I guess you had
some neat graphics in your message 

  
  
Discreteness may be important in our world for the development of 
consciousness, but it is certainly not necessary across worlds. I 
believe therefore that the differences between the simulations is 
infinitesimal - not discrete - and therefore that the number of 
simulations is infinite like the continuum.

  
  
The last part doesn't follow.  It could be that the number of simulations
is infinite like the rational numbers, which would still allow for the
differences between simulations to be infinitesimal.  In that case the
number of simulations is countably infinite rather than uncountable.

Personally I am uncomfortable with the infinity of the continuum, it
seems to be a much more troublesome concept than is generally recognized.
I would not want to invoke it unless absolutely necessary.

I think the rest of your argument works just as well with a countable
infinity as an uncountable one.


I only invoked the uncountable infinite because I think there is NO ANTHROPIC
REASON for using the countable infinite. Again, it's the same philosophical
argument that justifies the plenitude: if an existing instance is arbitrary
(not justified), then all instances are necessary. 

This principle applied here goes as follows: If there was an anthropic reason
requiring discretness between worlds, then those other worlds would have
to be causally linked with ours. This would then be one arbitrary instance
of a cluster of linked worlds, which we would imply that many other clusters
would also exist. Hence we are led to the uncountable infinite.

We're faced with the strange possibility that the
consciousness spans an  infinite number of simulations distributed over widely
different levels.  Each individual simulation implementation becomes infinitesimal
and  unimportant in comparison with the the whole infinite set of  implementations
that the consciousness covers. A particular simulation  that stops operating
(for example because the plug is pulled) will hardly  affect or be missed
by the consciousness as a whole. In fact I rather  think of the "simulations"
as static states in the plenitude, and  consciousness as a locus in the plenitude
linking these states in a  causally and logically significant manner. We
live in the plenitude, not  in any particular simulation. Each point in
the conscious locus perceives  the world that gives it meaning. 
 

Richard Miller wrote

Of all the attempts to link consciousness with physics, this paradigm  makes
the most sense to me. Additionally, it offers the only model of  consciousness
that can be described mathematically (well,  topologically)---and it even
makes sense if you happen to be a  neodissociationist psychologist. I'd
like to know if George can supply  some references for this model or if he
came up with it on his own. 

 
I came up with this model myself some time ago as I tried to write a book
which has been sitting on my shelf for years, but I think others in this
list share this same point of view or may have invented this model independently.
We have been talking about this topic for years. 

Neodissociationist psychologist... phieww, I had trouble typing this one.
A really scary term :-)


George

 
 
 
 
 
 
 




Re: are we in a simulation?

2003-06-10 Thread Stephen Paul King



Dear Friends,

 Does 
computational complexity (such as NP-Completeness, etc.) andcomputational 
"power" requirements factor into the idea of simulated worlds?

Kindest regards,

Stephen