Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
Dear George,
The problems that I have
with Bruno's thesis is Digital substitution and
that it does not address the problem of epiphenomenona found in both Idealism
and Materialism. Digital substitution seems to assume that consciousness
and awareness and related notions can be completely explained in terms of how
one number relates to another.
I think that your would agree that Bruno's
thesis is a very sophisticated form of Idealism. It is widely recognized that
"matter" and physicality in general is an epiphenomenona within any Ideal
theory. This in turn makes the notion of a physical substrate suspect as it does
not exist apart from its properties as encoded in numbers, e.g. our
consciousness is merely information thus what that information is "encoded" in
is irrelevant.
What I am trying to do is to make the
point that it is not sufficient to just take as an article of faith or
postulation the idea that digital substitution is actually possible, especially
when the epiphenomenona problem is not even addressed! OTOH, if it can be shown
that digital substitution is possible in practice then Bruno's thesis will go
along way to explaining many things. But there is more to my difficulties than
this! Copying, to me, implies that something is doing the copying. What is that
which does the copying? Physical states are mere epiphenomenona...
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
George Levy
To: Everything List
Sent: Tuesday, June 15, 2004 4:25
PM
Subject: Re: duplicatability or copying
is problematic
Hi StephenLet me add my grain of salt to Bruno's post.
The No Cloning Theorem applies to the physical duplication but not necessarily
to the duplication of information that is carried by a physical substrate. For
example, you could very well make a copy of a DVD that reproduces exactly the
information stored in the DVD without reproducing exactly the atomic
arrangement of the DVD. The crucial question is whether our
consciousness is aware of its physical substrate at the atomic (Planck) level
or only at a much higher biological, neurological or psychological level.
Would we agree ("Yes Doctor") to an organ substitution at the high level or
would we hold out for a a substitution at the Planck level? If we allow
copying at the high level, then Bruno's thesis survives.How much
resolution should the copier have? I don't know the answer to this question. I
don't even know if copying (increasing measure) has any ethical significance
or any other value or drawbacks. GeorgeStephen Paul King
wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Does your thesis survive without the
notion of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed
out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand how
duplication can be carried out in classical physics.
If we merely consider the Platonia of
mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number. If
we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one number
for each and every physical object. Where does duplication obtain in
Platonia? If duplicatability is an impossible notion, does your thesis
survive?
Stephen
Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
Hi Stephen
Let me add my grain of salt to Bruno's post. The No Cloning Theorem
applies to the physical duplication but not necessarily to the
duplication of information that is carried by a physical substrate. For
example, you could very well make a copy of a DVD that reproduces
exactly the information stored in the DVD without reproducing exactly
the atomic arrangement of the DVD.
The crucial question is whether our consciousness is aware of its
physical substrate at the atomic (Planck) level or only at a much
higher biological, neurological or psychological level. Would we agree
("Yes Doctor") to an organ substitution at the high level or would we
hold out for a a substitution at the Planck level? If we allow copying
at the high level, then Bruno's thesis survives.
How much resolution should the copier have? I don't know the answer to
this question. I don't even know if copying (increasing measure) has
any ethical significance or any other value or drawbacks.
George
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Does your thesis survive without the notion
of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed
out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand
how duplication can be carried out in classical physics.
If we merely consider the Platonia of
mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number. If
we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one
number for each and every physical object. Where does duplication
obtain in Platonia? If duplicatability is an impossible notion, does
your thesis survive?
Stephen
Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
At 01:25 PM 6/14/2004, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Does your thesis survive without the notion of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand how duplication can be carried out in classical physics. If computationalism is true, it's possible in principle to implement a CA on our boring (i.e. non-quantum, classical) computers that contains conscious beings. Since we would have access to every single bit of information in this CA universe, we could make exact, bit-level copies of these conscious beings. This alone is enough to open the door to all of the philosophical issues we discuss on this list. We can make one copy of the CA and send it to a computer in Moscow, while we leave one copy running here in Washington... and so on. Presumably, these CA beings would be hard pressed to make copies of themselves while working within the constraints of their own physics; similarly, we may never figure out how to construct matter transmitters and matter copiers within our own physics. But that doesn't change that fact that, in principle, an exact copy of me could be made - say, by a "being" outside of this universe who has total access to this universe's state information and the ability to change it. (Of course, this is a very single-world way of looking at things - imagining that our universe is like a single-history deterministic or indeterministic CA that can be viewed and changed by some outside computer programmer. In actual fact, I take a more complex multi-worlds view, but that view only makes sense after you work out the consequences of "copying". The easiest way to work that out is to concentrate on simple single-world scenarios, like CA worlds that we have perfect information about.) If we merely consider the Platonia of mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number. If we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one number for each and every physical object. Where does duplication obtain in Platonia? The suggestion that there is only "a single example" of each number in Platonia is so ontologically wispy that I don't even know how to label it true or false. Presumably every real number - that is, every possible infinite string of 0s and 1s - "exists" in Platonia. Even if we insist that each real number exists "only once", it follows that any given integer - that is, any given finite string of 1s and 0s - will appear an infinite number of times within the digits of these real numbers. So in fact, we can just as easily say that each integer exists "an infinite number of times" in Platonia. This is not an idle example. Every possible history of every possible CA exists in Platonia, and even if we insist that each of these unique histories exists "only once", it still follows that some particular *finite* pattern of bits which represents a conscious being will appear innumerable times within these CAs. Within some of these universes there will be beings who create large "computers" in their worlds, and run CAs on them which contain other beings, and they will be able to make perfect copies of these beings. All of the philosophical questions about copying and identity and 1st person vs. 3rd person views apply here. -- Kory
Re: First Person Frame of Reference
At 22:25 11/06/04 -0700, George Levy wrote: We agree on most things except on the terms relative and absolute. How strange that we should disagree precisely on those terms! This is the proof that the meaning of these terms is relative to our mental states and that our frame of reference must be different! OK let's agree at least that our terminology should be consistent with Einstein's. For example when Einstein says that length is a relative quantity he means that two observers occupying inertial frames of reference in motion relative to each other perceive the length of an object differently. On the other hand, such observers perceive a charge as an absolute quantity because in spite of their motion, the charge of an object appears identical to both observers. A third person in yet another frame of reference would perceive the charge exactly the same as those first two obsevers. Hence length is relative and dependent on the observer's frame of reference, and charge is absolute and independent on the observer's frame of reference. In the context of relativity, first person = subjective = relative and third person = objective = absolute. I agree. I mean I see your point. It means I should better avoid the use of the term "relative" and "absolute". Perhaps there is some duality hidden here. I cannot a priori decide to be consistent with Einstein, giving that he does not really tackle the subjectivity, but at least I see why you don't want to classify the subjective as absolute. I did it, (but will no more do that), due to the (generally accepted) incorrigibility of the knower. I should have use "incorrigible" instead of absolute. Now let's move on to a Q-suicide experiment that parallels Einstein's scenario: two observers occupy different frames of reference because their continuing existence is differently contingent on a particular event (such as winning a lottery ticket). They perceive this particular event differently. As length in Einstein's relativity, this event is relative to the observers: its value or occurence depends on the observers' frame of reference. On the other hand, another event such as the movement of the moon, that has no effect or an equal effect on the life of these observers, is perceived to be absolute: like charge in relativity, the value of this event is the same for both observers or for a hypothetical third person. Are you ready for some definition? (We can abandon for a while the "absolute"/"relative" opposite view giving that we agree on the 1/3 distinction and on the subjective/objective opposition, and that's what counts in the interview of the Universal Machine (and its Godelian "Guardian Angel"). I still wish to resolve our disagreement of the terms relative and absolute because it may indicates some roadblocks in narrowing the gap. I don't think there are roadblock; at least to see how does "my theory" (the platonist UTM's theory) work. Remember, you begin with an absolute formulation Yes. In your sense. (Don't hesitate to recall me I must swap the definition!). but end up with a relative one Not really. The whole things belongs to the third person discourse. Unless you mean I end up to the doctor and say "yes" for an artificial digital brain. and I argued that you had no justification for starting with the third person (absolute?) formulation. My goal was to (help you?) achieve the ultimate relativization. At first I thought that an "ultimate" relativization should be somehow absolute, but then I rememeber your relativity-theory inspired definition of "absolute", ok then. And thanks for the help. You make me realize that the words "relative" and "absolute" are again words used in opposite sense by logicians and physicists. We should one day write a logic/physics dictionnary: Where logicians say: physicists say: model theory theory model absolute relative relative absolute ... However, yes I am ready for some definitions. :-) Asap. I need to make drawings with my MAC at home, and then put it in my web page with my PC in my office. More easy to say than to do ;-) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic
Dear Stephen, At 13:25 14/06/04 -0400, You (Stephen Paul King) wrote: Dear Bruno, Does your thesis survive without the notion of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand how duplication can be carried out in classical physics. Remember the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA, see link in my url). It shows that the stability of any piece of matter is due to a continuum of (infinite) computational histories. A priori this is not Turing-emulable. So, for the same reason there is a notion of comp-immortality, there is a quasi obvious "non cloning" theorem for the comp-observable piece of information. It remains to be seen if this can be explained by the machine-itself (cf the logic G) or its guardian angel (cf G*). But that, only the future will say. Big first evidences have appeared, though, in the sense that the general shape of quantum logic appears for the comp-observable. If we merely consider the Platonia of mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number. If we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one number for each and every physical object. Where does duplication obtain in Platonia? If duplicatability is an impossible notion, does your thesis survive? It is known that "classical information" is duplicable. This is actually illustrated by the fact that this current mail will be multiplied without loss of information (same number of bits) to the readers of the everything and FOR list. I mean: at some right level with respect to the content of this post. (Assuming no bugs, no moderation, etc.) OK. I could give you another answer. I could say that duplication is not only allowed in QM, but is very easy to do. Just look at a cat in the superposition state dead (d) and alive (a). If you (y) look at it: this happens: y(a+d) = y_a a + y_d d, where y_i = y (you) with the 1-memory of a dead (resp alive) cat. Of course you can object that if you don't look at the cat the situation is really described by y a + y b, and if you look at the cat this becomes y_a a + y_d d, so that no duplication has occurred: just a differentiation. Right, but recall that this *is* the way I have explained why, just with classical comp, we are obliged to consider in fine that with comp too we have only differentiation. Do you remember the "Y = | |" drawing? That is: if you duplicate yourself into an exemplary at Sidney, and one at Pekin, from an original at Amsterdam, your "probability weight" at Amsterdam is bigger. A future duplication add weight in the present. That's why I agree with David that in QM it is preferable to consider the Schroedinger (or Heisenberg) Equation as describing differentiation instead of duplication. But the same is true for classical comp, by the way the UDA forces the probability weights. Last answer (I agree the matter is subtle, and it is better to have more than one explanation). Remember simply I do not assume QM at the start. If comp would entails the duplicabilty of matter, then, as far as we can correctly believe in QM, comp would be refuted. But as I said, comp predicts the non-duplicability of matter. The thought experiment used in the UDA does NOT presuppose the duplicability of matter, only the duplicability, at some level, of the 3- *person*. (Not of the 1-person which is never duplicated: as Everett puts it: the observer cannot feel the split, and the 1-person is the observer/feeler, etc.). You can sum up things with the following slogan: Duplicability of the soul (the 1-person, say) => the non-duplicability of whatever remains stable in its observations. (3-person or 1-person plural). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
