probability in ensemble theories

2004-10-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

[I am starting a new thread on this question because I feel I may have 
confused matters with increasingly elaborate thought experiments in my posts 
to Eric Cavalcanti's thread on observation selection effects.]

The occurence of events which at first glance seem to be very unlikely 
should not necessarily surprise us. For example, the probability that a 
particular person wins first prize in a lottery may be one in a million, but 
the probability that SOMEONE wins first prize is usually greater than 50% 
for most lotteries. We can avoid confusion by being clear on what the 
desired outcome is before the event takes place: Pr(someone wins)=1/2, 
Pr(John Smith wins)=1/1,000,000.

Consider the situation in a generic ensemble theory in which every possible 
outcome occurs. Clearly, Pr(some version of John Smith wins)=1. The outcome 
(some version of John Smith wins) is analogous to the outcome (someone wins) 
in the above example.

Now, if some version of John Smith wins, it may be argued that this is 
surprising, because there is only a 1/1,000,000 probability that that 
PARTICULAR version wins. But for this to be surprising, we would have to 
specify the desired outcome before the event takes place: just as in the 
single world example above we have to specify that a particular individual 
will be the winner, in the ensemble theory we would have to further specify 
that a particular version of that individual will be the winner.

The difficulty is that it is impossible to specify a particular version of a 
particular individual in an ensemble theory. The different worlds do not 
come labelled in any way, and it is not possible in general to pick out any 
attribute which will single out a particular world or individual, because 
the only necessary difference is the outcome of interest. In other words, 
the only way to specify which version of John Smith will win is to specify 
the outcome (that version of John Smith who will win, will win), which is 
obviously not going to lead to any surprises.

Stathis Papaioannou
_
Smart Saving with ING Direct – earn 5.25% p.a. variable rate:  
http://ad.au.doubleclick.net/clk;7249209;8842331;n?http://www.ingdirect.com.au/burst6offer.asp?id=8



Ambjørn et al.

2004-10-12 Thread Pete Carlton
Of possible general interest -
J. Ambjørn J. Jurkiewicz and R. Loll
(also a writeup in Nature news, at 
http://www.nature.com/news/2004/041004/full/041004-17.html)

Emergence of a 4D World from Causal Quantum Gravity
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103%2FPhysRevLett.93.131301



Re: S, B, and a puzzle by Boolos, Smullyan, McCarthy

2004-10-12 Thread Jesse Mazer
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You made a relevant decomposition of the problem,
and you are on the right track. Actually I'm not sure the ja da
McCarthy's amelioration adds anything deep to the problem.
It will be enough to take into account that a double negation
gives an affirmation.
I've thought about McCarthy's version for a while and I can't figure it out, 
even if I make the simplifying assumption of two truth-tellers and one 
random-answerer. It seems like the 3 bits of information you get from their 
answers just shouldn't be enough to tell the meaning of Ja vs. Da *and* tell 
you the identity of all three gods. 3 bits of information should only allow 
you to choose from 8 possibilities, but there seem to 12 possibilities here:

(Ja=yes, god #1=knight, god#2=knave)
(Ja=yes, god#1=knight, god#2=knife)
(Ja=yes, god#1=knave, god#2=knight)
(Ja=yes, god#1=knave, god#2=knife)
(Ja=yes, god#1=knife, god#2=knight)
(Ja=yes, god#1=knife, god#2=knave)
(Da=yes, god #1=knight, god#2=knave)
(Da=yes, god#1=knight, god#2=knife)
(Da=yes, god#1=knave, god#2=knight)
(Da=yes, god#1=knave, god#2=knife)
(Da=yes, god#1=knife, god#2=knight)
(Da=yes, god#1=knife, god#2=knave)
Then I thought there might be a clever solution where you can figure out the 
identity of the gods without ever knowing the meaning of Ja and Da. But 
if you don't figure out the meaning of Ja and Da, it seems to me you're 
really only getting 2 bits of information from their answers, since it 
doesn't actually matter what the first answer is, only whether the second 
and third answer are the same as or different from the first--you can't 
distinguish between the answers Ja-Da-Ja and Da-Ja-Da, for example. 2 bits 
should only be enough to choose from 4 possibilities, but there are 6 
possibilities you need to choose from to find the identity of all three 
gods:

(god #1=knight, god#2=knave)
(god#1=knight, god#2=knife)
(god#1=knave, god#2=knight)
(god#1=knave, god#2=knife)
(god#1=knife, god#2=knight)
(god#1=knife, god#2=knave)
So either way I'm stumped...can you give me the solution? If you want to let 
other people keep trying to figure it out you can just email it to me.

Jesse



Re: Ambjørn et al.

2004-10-12 Thread Saibal Mitra
Download the article free of charge here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0404156


- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: Pete Carlton [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: Tuesday, October 12, 2004 07:09 PM
Onderwerp: Ambjørn et al.


 Of possible general interest -

 J. Ambjørn J. Jurkiewicz and R. Loll
 (also a writeup in Nature news, at
 http://www.nature.com/news/2004/041004/full/041004-17.html)

 Emergence of a 4D World from Causal Quantum Gravity
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1103%2FPhysRevLett.93.131301





Re: S, B, and a puzzle by Boolos, Smullyan, McCarthy

2004-10-12 Thread Eric Cavalcanti
On Mon, 2004-10-11 at 22:51, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 As a Price, I give you the (known?) Smullyan McCarthy

As a Price, or a Prize? :)

 puzzle. You are in front of three Gods: the God of Knights, the
 God of Knaves, and the God of Knives. The God of Knight always
 tells the truth. The God of Knaves always lies, and the God of Knives
 always answers by yes or no randomly.
 You must find which is which, through some questions.
 You can ask no more than three yes-no (answerable) questions.
 (Each question must be asked to one God, but you can ask
 more than one question to a God; only then there will be a
 God you can no more ask a question).
 And (added McCarthy) I let you know that all the Gods, although
 they understand English, will  answer the yes-know question by
 either JA or DA, and you are not supposed to know which
 means yes and which means no.

Wow, that was a hard one!
I have been thinking about it all day, but I think
I got to the solution. Let's see...

I developed a whole method for solving this kind of
problem. :)

Labelling the Knights' God as T, the Knaves' God as F,
and the Knives' God as R, we have 6 possible 'states'
we want to distinguish, which are all the permutations
of them. I'll make 3 questions, which can have two
possible outcomes each, JA(J) or DA(D). This means
that in the end my experiment has 8 possible outcomes.

From this initial analysis it is clear that I cannot aim
to ask questions which would give me information about
the statements JA=YES or JA=NO, because for that I
would need to distinguish between 12 states. 
But since I have 2 outcomes more than states, it is
possible that I might in some cases get this last answer,
but only as a bonus.

So I make a table where I try to fit a set of 3
questions whose outcomes are going to distinguish these
states. One possible table is the following:

State   1st J  DJJ  JD  DJ  DD  Final
---
TRF J   J   J   JJJ 
TFR D  JJ   DJJ
FRT J   D   J   JDJ
FTR D  DJ   DDJ
RTF J/D J  DD   D   JJD/DDD
RFT J/D D  JD   D   JDD/DJD
---

The blank spaces mean that we don't care what would
be the answer in those cases, because they have been
already ruled out. It's important to leave blank
spaces in at least two lines which correspond to
'R's in the same column, because we can always make
the question to the the God in that column so that
we can arrange the random answers to fall in those
places. The columns 'J', 'JJ' and so on indicate the
outcomes that I wish the next question to have given
outcome 'J', 'JJ' and so on for the previous questions.

Some more thought shows that you can always come up
with *some* question that fits whatever choice of
outcomes you want, given the constraints above. So
we have a lot of freedom to choose the outcomes in
the above table, the only problem will be to think
of the corresponding verbal questions.

So the first problem is to come up with some question
which would be answered as in the '1st' column.
This question could be, using the idea of Jesse Mazer,
but with an extra trick:
If I asked you Is the 2nd God the 'R', would
you say 'JA'?
The interesting thing is that this question does not
tell us if JA is YES or NO, but a minute of thought
shows that the outcomes are the same whatever JA means.

After some thought, the other questions can be:
Column'J': 3rd god, if I asked you 'Are you the 'F'',
would you say 'JA'?;
Column'D': 2nd god, if I asked you 'Are you the 'F'',
would you say 'JA'?;
Columns 'JJ' and 'JD': 3rd god, if I asked you 
'Is the 2nd god 'R'', would you say 'JA'?;
Columns 'DJ' and 'DD': 2nd god, if I asked you 
'Is the 3rd god 'R'', would you say 'JA'?.

So I think these would solve the problem. It was a
lot of fun! Let me see what you guys think. 

As an extra challenge, can you think of a way to
find out if JA=YES in some of the outcomes? It
would involve different questions, but I think it
should be possible in principle.

Eric.



Re: S, B, and a puzzle by Boolos, Smullyan, McCarthy

2004-10-12 Thread Jesse Mazer
Nice work, Eric! Your solution looks right to me. I now realize my mistake, 
I was thinking that if the gods are in a particular order (say, TRF) and Ja 
has a particular meaning (say, Ja=yes) and you get a particular series of 
answers (say, JJJ) then if you reverse the meaning of Ja and ask the same 
questions, that means you'll also get the reverse answers (in this case 
DDD). But if the question is of the form If I asked X, would you say 'Ja'? 
this isn't actually the case. The key seems to be that if you ask a question 
of the form If I asked X, would you say 'Ja'? then if X is true, both the 
knight and the knave will answer Ja regardless of whether Ja means yes 
or no, and if X is false then both the knight and the knave will answer 
Da regardless of the meaning of Ja. So with that trick in mind, the 
solution to this problem will be exactly like the solution to the problem 
where the gods actually say yes and no...for example, I could take my 
previous solution to that problem:

your first question should be to ask the first God If I asked you 'is the 
second God the God of Knives', would you say 'yes'? If the first God 
answers yes, you know the God of Knives is either the first or the second 
God, so you can ask the third God, If I asked you 'are you the God of 
Knights', would you say 'yes'? and after that you can ask the third God 
If I asked you 'is the first God the God of Knives', would you say 'yes'? 
and this will be enough to tell you the identity of all three Gods. On the 
other hand, if the answer to your first question was no, then you know 
the God of Knives is either the first or the third God, so you would ask 
the *second* God the same two subsequent questions as above.
...and simply replace every yes with Ja and every no with Da:
your first question should be to ask the first God If I asked you 'is the 
second God the God of Knives', would you say 'Ja'? If the first God 
answers Ja, you know the God of Knives is either the first or the second 
God, so you can ask the third God, If I asked you 'are you the God of 
Knights', would you say 'Ja'? and after that you can ask the third God If 
I asked you 'is the first God the God of Knives', would you say 'Ja'? and 
this will be enough to tell you the identity of all three Gods. On the 
other hand, if the answer to your first question was Da, then you know 
the God of Knives is either the first or the third God, so you would ask 
the *second* God the same two subsequent questions as above.
...keeping in mind, again, that if you ask a god If I asked you X, would 
you say 'Ja'?, then if he says Ja that means X must be true if the god 
was a knight or a knave, and if he says Da X must be false if the god was 
a knight or a knave.

Jesse