Re: Quantum Theory from Quantum Gravity

2004-12-03 Thread Doriano Brogioli
As many other theories about quantum mechanics, also this one is based
on Nelson's idea of quantum mechanical effects in classical mechanics.
Unfortunately, Nelson's idea cannot explain all the quantum mechanical
effects observed in nature. In order to apply Nelson's approach, we need
that the velocity field is v=dS(x,t)/dx. This condition means that all
the interference effects cannot be explained by Nelson's idea. By the
way, it's worth noting that all the non-local effects of quantum
mechanics are basically interference phenomena, so Nelson's idea
reproduces only a lesser quantum mechanics, that is local.
The same problem holds for this new paper.
A polemic consideration. If one understood the so called many worlds
interpretation, that is the Everett interpretation of quantum
mechanics, he should be able to understand that the lesser quantum
mechanics describes only a single world. The two ideas, or
interpretations, cannot hold together!
Finally, it's time to note that many explanation of quantum mechanics in
terms of statistical dynamics have been proposed, but none of them have
been able to explain any experiment about quantum mechanics. Many people
(including G. Parisi, for example) proposed a similarity between quantum
field theory and classical statistical mechanics, but there's alwais a
factor i that is wrong. There's a huge difference between diffusion
equation and Schroedinger equation, though they differ only by a factor
i. I'm a supporter of many worlds theories, and I think that there are
many experimental evidences of the real existence of different wave
packets in interference experiments. This is in contrast with the
lesser quantum mechanics, where interference is not possible.
Best regards,
Doriano Brogioli

Saibal Mitra wrote:
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0311059
 
 
*Authors:* Fotini Markopoulou 
http://arxiv.org/find/gr-qc/1/au:+Markopoulou_F/0/1/0/all/0/1, Lee 
Smolin http://arxiv.org/find/gr-qc/1/au:+Smolin_L/0/1/0/all/0/1

We provide a mechanism by which, from a background independent model
with no quantum mechanics, quantum theory arises in the same limit
in which spatial properties appear. Starting with an arbitrary
abstract graph as the microscopic model of spacetime, our ansatz is
that the microscopic dynamics can be chosen so that 1) the model has
a low low energy limit which reproduces the non-relativistic
classical dynamics of a system of N particles in flat spacetime, 2)
there is a minimum length, and 3) some of the particles are in a
thermal bath or otherwise evolve stochastically. We then construct
simple functions of the degrees of freedom of the theory and show
that their probability distributions evolve according to the
Schroedinger equation. The non-local hidden variables required to
satisfy the conditions of Bell's theorem are the links in the
fundamental graph that connect nodes adjacent in the graph but
distant in the approximate metric of the low energy limit. In the
presence of these links, distant stochastic fluctuations are
transferred into universal quantum fluctuations. 

 
 
--
Defeat Spammers by launching DDOS attacks on Spam-Websites: 
http://makelovenotspam.com/intl




Fw: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-03 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Bruno,
   How is the trueness of members of this theory (of all true
arithmetical sentences) given? By fiat?
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, December 03, 2004 8:03 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


At 15:49 01/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
the All is internally inconsistent since it is complete.
I have a counter-example: take the following theory: All
true arithmetical sentences. This is complete and yet consistent.
Gödel's theorem applies only on axiomatizable (or mechanically
generable) theory.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-03 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno:
I assume your theory is intended to give the range of descriptions of worlds.
The All in my model contains - well - ALL so it includes systems to which 
Godel's theorem applies.

Your theory has problems for me.
What is truth?
What is a sentence?
What is arithmetical?
As Stephen Paul King asked: How is truth resolved for a given sentence?
Why the down select re descriptions vs the All.
How is the set of such sentences known to be consistent?
To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into 
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - and where 
did all that info come from and why allow any in a base level system for 
worlds?

Yours
Hal
At 08:03 AM 12/3/2004, you wrote:
At 15:49 01/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
the All is internally inconsistent since it is complete.
I have a counter-example: take the following theory: All
true arithmetical sentences. This is complete and yet consistent.
Gödel's theorem applies only on axiomatizable (or mechanically
generable) theory.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/