RE: Belief Statements
Stathis Papaioannou writes: > 1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program. I'm not sure that this is the best definition of a "possible" world. I'm concerned that we are hiding a lot of assumptions in this word. It relates to my earlier comment about ambiguity in which constitutes the multiverse. > 4. A computer need not be a box that runs Windows or Linux. Conceivably, a > computer could consist of the idle passage of time, or the set of natural > numbers, operated on by some hugely complex look-up table. In Greg Egan's > 1994 novel "Permutation City", it is pointed out that a simulated being's > experiences are the same if the computation is run backwards, forwards, > chopped up into individual pieces and randomly dispersed throughout the > world-wide network; the computation somehow assembles itself out of "dust" - > out of omnipresent, apparently randomly distributed ones and zeroes. I had a problem with the demonstration in Permutation City. They claimed to chop up a simulated consciousness timewise, and then to run the pieces backwards: first the 10th second, then the 9th second, then the 8th, and so on. And of course the consciousness being simulated was not aware of the chopping. The problem is that you can't calculate the 10th second without calculating the 9th second first. That's a fundamental property of our laws of physics and I suspect of consciousness as we know it. This means that what they actually did was to initially calculate seconds 1, 2, 3... in order, then to re-run them in the order 10, 9, 8 And of course the consciousness wasn't aware of the re-runs. But it's not clear that from this you can draw Egan's strong conclusions about "dust". It's possible that the initial, sequential run was necessary for the consciousness to exist. > As for the "failure of induction" if all possible worlds exist, I prefer to > simply bypass the problem. I predict that in the next few moments the world > will most likely continue to behave as it always has in the past... Here I > am a few moments later, and I am completely, horribly wrong. A zillion > versions of me in other worlds are dying or losing consciousness as they > watch fire-breathing dragons materialise out of nothing. So what? Those > versions are not continuing to type to the end of this paragraph, while this > one-in-a-zillion version manifestly is, and will continue to live life > holding the delusional belief that the laws of physics will remain constant. This works OK to reject worlds where you die, but presumably there are also more worlds where you survive but see surprising failures of natural law than worlds where natural law exists. If you truly believe this, it should affect your actions, and you should not proceed under the assumption that everything will be normal. Most universes where you survive would probably be so lawless that you would just barely survive, so perhaps this would point to abandoning moral behavior and striving for brute survival at all costs. I.e. go out and steal from people, rob banks, commit murder without thought of the consequences, because it's far more likely that the street will turn to molten metal than that you'll be apprehended and sent to jail. Hal Finney
RE: Belief Statements
On 9 January 2005 Alastair Malcolm wrote: This is a fascinating discussion list, full of stimulating ideas and theories, but I would be interested to know what people *actually* believe on the subject of many/all worlds - what one would bet one's house or life on, given that one were forced to choose some such bet. I believe it is logically necessary that all possible worlds exist, based on a number of ideas that have been discussed many times on this list: 1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program. 2. It is not, in general, possible to distinguish between a simulated world and a "real" world. 2a. If there is no empirical or logical way to distinguish with certainty between a real and a simulated world, one may as well say there is no essential difference between them [interesting, but not really necessary for the rest of this argument]. 3. Consider a computer running a simulation complete with conscious beings. This particular computer was designed by a now extinct civilization, and although the hardware still appears to be working, the compiler, instruction manual and computer language documentation have all been lost. 3a. The result of (3) is that the simulated world continues to run on the computer, even though there can be no communication between it and us in the "real" world where the computer exists physically. (Idea for a story: maybe that's why the gods used to talk to us in ancient times but no longer do!) 4. A computer need not be a box that runs Windows or Linux. Conceivably, a computer could consist of the idle passage of time, or the set of natural numbers, operated on by some hugely complex look-up table. In Greg Egan's 1994 novel "Permutation City", it is pointed out that a simulated being's experiences are the same if the computation is run backwards, forwards, chopped up into individual pieces and randomly dispersed throughout the world-wide network; the computation somehow assembles itself out of "dust" - out of omnipresent, apparently randomly distributed ones and zeroes. 4a. In other words, no hardware, whether physical or simulated (if these are different things) is necessary for the implementation of a computation. Every possible computation is implemented out there in the realm of pure mathematics, so every possible world necessarily exists. Now, the above argument is sometimes taken as being self-evidently absurd. Hilary Putnam and John Searle have actually used it in this way to attack strong A.I. theories. The objection is that the effort and information needed to construct the look-up table in (4) is at least as great as that which would be needed to construct and program a computer in the conventional way. An analogy can be made with a block of marble: in a sense, it does contain every possible statue, but this is not any help to the sculptor. But all this means is that we cannot, in this world, communicate with or make any use of the type of computer described in (3) or (4). The other worlds may exist, but we can never know this directly. As for the "failure of induction" if all possible worlds exist, I prefer to simply bypass the problem. I predict that in the next few moments the world will most likely continue to behave as it always has in the past... Here I am a few moments later, and I am completely, horribly wrong. A zillion versions of me in other worlds are dying or losing consciousness as they watch fire-breathing dragons materialise out of nothing. So what? Those versions are not continuing to type to the end of this paragraph, while this one-in-a-zillion version manifestly is, and will continue to live life holding the delusional belief that the laws of physics will remain constant. --Stathis Papaiaonnou _ Searching for that dream home? Try http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au for all your property needs.
Re: Belief Statements
Dear Russell, you wrote:
>"This sounds like a terminological difference. To me, "data" refers to
>mere differences. Information has meaning. Observation attaches
>meaning to data, creating informations from that data."
WHAT do you "observe" if you have to create the meaning? I find it a reverse
route, to learn the quantities (data) and then enrich them with meaning to
make it 'information'. Don't forget that there is ample information
(meanings galore) - unquantizable, where the 'bits' don't even come into the
picture. All those are "its" (in my nomenclature).
I wonder if I am alone with this terminology?
Far we are not: in my terminology to 'absorb' (acknowledge, imbibe) a
difference implies the meaning part as well, so the datum gets it when it
becomes information. Of course data can be non-quantitative.
*
Then you wrote:
> "Again this is terminology. By "timelike" I was referring to the
> process of bringing two entities together for comparison. Nothing
> more, not less. Perhaps "pre-timelike" is a more accurate term, but I
> like to egg the pudding!
You probably missed my example anticipating such reply:
>>"... observation can compare e.g. overlapping pictures,
>> atemporarily, in one "<<
when WE do not "bring together" comparables one after the other.
I don't deny the time factor, just want to leave open the possibility of an
atemporal worldview (which is still a big problem for me, too).
*
Then again I have a reply to your:
> Not sure how remark to point 4 relates to this one. Does it mean you
> don't believe in QM? Or that QM is not universal within the >plenitude?
(I'd agree with you there) Or that QM is an accidental >feature of our
world? (I'm inclined to disagree with you here)<
First I find it an 'out-of-bounds' argumentative twist to change my term
"human representational way of OUR world model" into your
"accidental feature of our world".
The linear THEORY of QM about the - originally- (nonlinear?) world of
microscopic physics is not a 'feature' of the world. I answered this
differentiation after #4 (cf: Comp-Turing), that's why I referred to it
after #5 (QM) as similarly a limited model based anthropologism. Sorry if a
critical remark on QM hit mores sensitive chords.
*
Small potato: (on the religious discussion-example)
> No ideas can be proven. Surely you know that from Popper. <
Right you are, let's change it to 'justified'/'explained'. That can be
logical, even if Sir Karl did not exclude it from existence. What I meant
is: first the believers should explain what their belief is based on, then I
can argue against it. Not in reverse (time!).
I don't start to argue against something the existence of which I don't see
justified or explained, just because the other side would like to put me
into a more vulnerable position in the argumentation.
*
To your final par:
> Comp & QM aren't part of the belief system here. They are interesting
> afterthoughts. The belief system relates to ideas about what
> information means - I don't really see you disputing this, although I
> do see some misunderstandings; the existence of a plenitude of
> data (which I don't see you disputing either); and the Anthropic
> Principle, which you may well dispute, as its a decidedly dodgy
proposition.>
Information I coined more than 10 years ago (maybe a review is actual, one
reason why I entered this discussion: to get new input ideas) was:
Absorbed (acknowledged) difference. By any contraption capable of doing so
('meaning' implied). Any difference, from an electrical charge to an
economical controversy in S-W Asia. Now I see 'observation' as very close to
this. And: to 'experience' as well.
My plenitude is a feature in my NARRATIVE (not even a hypo-thesis)
needed for a story of Big Bangs (unlimited) to start the multiverse in a way
acceptable for human logic (- without the controversies in the physical
cosmological BB fable.) It lacks data, serves ONE purpose, I refuse to
discuss details of it, it is unobservable and unexplained.
Sorry, I did not read your paper on the AP, maybe you made some sense to it.
So far I see in it only "us, god's real children as the most important
feature in the world".
Merry Xmas! (oops: it is past).
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2005 8:19 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
> On Tue, Jan 11, 2005 at 06:12:28PM -0500, John M wrote:
SNIP, Quotes for reply see above in the text.
Re: Belief Statements
At 18:12 11/01/05 -0500, John M quotes Russell Standish writing: (if I am correct in the quotes). 4) For those who believe in Computationalism, the Turing model of computation implicitly requires this Time postulate. Here I disagree a lot. Actually most models of computation does no require any Time Postulate. They need only Peano axioms of arithmetic. Time-steps of computations are build from the successor function : n -> n+1 Reasoning on computations needs no more than the induction axioms (See Podnieks page for the first order arithmetic axioms). Even quantum computation does not (really) need time, but that is a less obvious statement about which we can discuss later. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Belief Statements
At 09:45 12/01/05 +, Alastair Malcolm wrote: It sounds like we may be using 'logics' for two different purposes. For me, basic logic is intended here (that of syllogisms and 'if it is true that p, then it cannot be the case that p is false'); This is a little ambiguous. But I will take it as your acceptation of (at least) intuitionist basic logical system. any ambiguities between logics in directly describing a (physical-type) world would tend to be due to their particular application areas (for example temporal logic would not be geared to worlds with certain alternatives to time); And this will depend on some non-logical axiom you will postulate togeteher with the background logic. others tend not to have this use at all (for example modal logic is more about consistency/proveability/necessity, or worlds in general). Again, in the same vein as my reply to Hal F, if a logic / formal system cannot describe an entity, it is either due to an inherent restriction (compared to other logics / formal systems), or else the entity is totally beyond our comprehension (in a formal sense). OK. Is it still the case that the best english version of the relevant ideas are from your earlier posts to this list, as identified in your URL? I shall try to look at them at some stage. Perhaps better is my SANE paper, you can download it from http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html I show that IF we are Turing-emulable THEN physics is, in a testable way, the geometry of the border of our ignorance. Where by "our" I refer to "us" the Loebian Machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Belief Statements
- Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Alastair Malcolm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: 11 January 2005 14:47 Subject: Re: Belief Statements > I certainly agree. Now the problem is that there are many logics, and so > there are many notion or "logical possibility". It sounds like we may be using 'logics' for two different purposes. For me, basic logic is intended here (that of syllogisms and 'if it is true that p, then it cannot be the case that p is false'); any ambiguities between logics in directly describing a (physical-type) world would tend to be due to their particular application areas (for example temporal logic would not be geared to worlds with certain alternatives to time); others tend not to have this use at all (for example modal logic is more about consistency/proveability/necessity, or worlds in general). Again, in the same vein as my reply to Hal F, if a logic / formal system cannot describe an entity, it is either due to an inherent restriction (compared to other logics / formal systems), or else the entity is totally beyond our comprehension (in a formal sense). > The choice of the logic (or logicS) will depend on some basic assumptions. . . . >If you read the papers I am referring too, don't hesitate to ask questions. Is it still the case that the best english version of the relevant ideas are from your earlier posts to this list, as identified in your URL? I shall try to look at them at some stage. Alastair
