RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>-Original Message- >From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 7:58 AM >To: Brent Meeker >Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality > > > >Le 14-avr.-05, à 13:53, Brent Meeker a écrit : > >> Before drawing drastic conclusions, like QTI, from the multiple-worlds >> (or >> better, the relative state) interpretation of QM, it would be good to >> remember >> that it is just one of several intepretations. Bohm's interpretation >> will >> leave you as dead as classical physics. So will Penrose's and other >> modified >> theories with real collapse of the wave-function. My personal >> favorite is >> decoherence (Zurek, Joos, Zeh, et al) with a lower bound on non-zero >> probabilities as outlined by Omnes. > >Omnes is just everett + a new axiom asserting the uniqueness of the >universe. >Bohm is everett + a new axiom based on a (non covariant) potential >guiding some >prefered observable result (particle's positions). >Decoherence $is$ everett (as people can understand by reading his long >text. > >Bruno That's essentially my understanding; except that now decoherence and einselection are understood to be responsible for the emergence of classical behavoir - which I think Everett did not consider. Brent Meeker
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>>Jonathan Colvin writes: >> >>>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I >think it is by >>>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does >>>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes >>>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life >dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >>>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with >>>"everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds where we >>>live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a >pink rabbit >>>suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there >is no world >>>in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the >>>multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life >dressed in a pink rabbit suit. >>> >>>Jonathan Colvin >>> >>I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a >>world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone >>shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where >>everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does >>equal 5), but how is it logically impossible that you live your whole >>life in a pink rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such >worlds as at >>least on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly >more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. >> >>--Stathis Papaioannou > >Brent: But what does "logically possible" mean? Logic is just some >rules to prevent us from contradicting ourselves. Is it >logically possible that, "Quadruplicity preens cantatas."? Is >it logically possible that the same object be both red and >green? Once you get beyond direct contradiction (e.g. >"Quadruplicity does >*not* preen cantatas") you have to invoke semantics and some >kind of "nomologically possible". Then, so far as anyone >knows, we're back to "physically possible" and even that is >ill defined. The whole concept of "possible", beyond narrowly >defined circumstances, is so ambiguous as to be worthless. I think we're assuming Tegmark's UI here, so "physically possible" and "logically possible" means the same thing. Jonathan Colvin
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I agree with Hal. The measure is doubled after copying. So, this is sort of the reverse of a suicide experiment in which the measure decreases. If you consider a doubling in which one of the copies doesn't survive then the measure stays the same, while in suicide experiment it decreases. Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that the notion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can be defined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely when considering copying or suicide. Saibal - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/ - Oorspronkelijk bericht - Van: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Aan: Verzonden: Saturday, April 16, 2005 12:27 AM Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Jesse Mazer writes: > > Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe > > that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the > > thought-experiment I suggested in my post at > > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html -- > > Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a > single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind > will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a > significant practical and philosophical difference. > > Practically, copying a mind leaves it with half as many resources per > new-mind, while splitting it leaves it with the same number of resources > per mind. This means that you might take very different practical > actions if you knew that your mind was going to be copied than if you > were about to split a coin. > > Philosophically, the measure of the observer-moments associated with a > copied mind are twice as great as the measure of the observer-moments > associated with a split one. Obviously 2 is not equal to 1. This puts > the burden of proof on those who would claim that this difference is > philosophically irrelevant in considering issues of consciousness. > > Hal Finney >
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>-Original Message- >From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 7:02 AM >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com >Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality > > >Jonathan Colvin writes: > >>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no >>means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there >>will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for >>ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with "everything >>we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds where we live forever or >>become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be >>*logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse >>where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever >>or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. >> >>Jonathan Colvin >> >I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a world >where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone shares the >delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where everyone shares the >delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5), but how is it >logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit suit? If >anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on a par with the ones where >pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. > >--Stathis Papaioannou But what does "logically possible" mean? Logic is just some rules to prevent us from contradicting ourselves. Is it logically possible that, "Quadruplicity preens cantatas."? Is it logically possible that the same object be both red and green? Once you get beyond direct contradiction (e.g. "Quadruplicity does *not* preen cantatas") you have to invoke semantics and some kind of "nomologically possible". Then, so far as anyone knows, we're back to "physically possible" and even that is ill defined. The whole concept of "possible", beyond narrowly defined circumstances, is so ambiguous as to be worthless. Brent Meeker "The life of the law has not been logic, but experience". --- Oliver Wendell Holmes
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Jonathan Colvin wrote: > >> >>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think >> >it is by >> >>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does >> >>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes >> >>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life >> >dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >> >>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with >> >>"everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds >> >where we live >> >>forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink >> >rabbit suit >> >>may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is >no world in >> >>the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the >multiverse >> >>where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a >> >pink rabbit suit. >> >> >> >>Jonathan Colvin >> >> >> >Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that >> >there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of >worlds where >> >everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds >> >where everyone shares the delusion that >> >2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5) >> >>Isn't that a contradictory statement? "It is not logically possible >>that there is a world where 2+2=5" AND "there are lots of >worlds where >> in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5". > >Yes, it is contradictory as written. What I should have said >was that 2+2= (whatever it actually is) independently of time >and space, but while it is not logically possible for this sum >to amount to anything else in any world, it is possible that >one or more sentient beings in some world are systematically >deluded about the value of the sum. > >>, but how is it >> >logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit >> >suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on >a par with >> >the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones >> >where Hell freezes over. >> >>I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to >>exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically >>impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does not mean >>that it is logically possible. >> >>Here's a (limited) analogy. If I show you are particular >mid-game chess >>position, with a certain arrangement of pieces on the board, it is >>generally not possible to tell whether the position is a logically >>possible chess game (ie. corresponds to a legal chess >position) without >>knowing the entire history of the game up to that point. There are >>certainly particular arrangements of pieces that it is impossible to >>reach given the axiomatic starting positions and the rules of chess. >> >>It is equally possible, I would suggest, that there *might* >be certain >>arrangements of matter that will not be reachable in *any* formal >>system; universally undecidable propositions, to use a Godelian term. >>My pink buny suit universe might be one such. >> >>Jonathan Colvin > >OK, I agree with this in principle. However, I can't think of >any such logically impossible worlds. With quantum tunneling, >matter popping into existence from the vacuum, and so on, it >really does look like everything conceivable is possible. At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a problem? If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal systems (as in Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie. worlds that are never instantiated). This seems in direct contradiction to the actual existence of everything conveivable, does it not? Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Jonathan Colvin writes: >> I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to >> exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically >> impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does >not mean >> that it is logically possible. > >Hal wrote: It's important to understand that logical possibility is not a >constraint on worlds as such; it is a constraint on our >understanding of worlds. > >It's not like we could go to God and say, "God, please >implement this world"; and God takes a look at the spec, and >answers, in a deep, sorrowful voice, "No, I'm sorry, I can't >implement this world, it's not logically possible. Go back >and try again." And we say, "Okay, sorry, God, we'll try >harder next time." > >If we think of computer programs as implementing worlds, all >programs exist and are instantiated. It's not that some >programs may be logically impossible and the universal TM >refuses to run them. Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible (inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have property X and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent for there to exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I consist of a single elctron. Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). Such a world may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all instantiated programs. >Where logical possibility arises is in our understanding of worlds. >The mere concept of a world where 2+2=5, for example, >represents an error of understanding. What 2+2 equals is not >a property of a world! >It is incoherent to speak of a world where 2+2 equals anything >specific, whether 4 or 5. > >We don't live in a world where 2+2=4. That mathematical fact >has no bearing whatsoever on the existence of our world. As a Platonist, I would disagree. In *all* possible worlds, 2+2=4. So we do live in a world where 2+2=4. > We >live in a world with certain laws of physics: conservation of >energy, quantum theory, Einsteinian gravitation. We may use >mathematics to help us understand these laws, but the truths >of mathematics are not contingent on anything about our world >or any world. Sure; it is the other way round: our world is contingent on the truths of mathematics. > >If a world is logically impossible, the problem is always in >our description and understanding of the world. Worlds >themselves exist (given the AUH) independently of our >understanding of them. Logical and mathematical consistency >are not properties of worlds, they are properties of our descriptions. Yes; but this is begging the question as to how we decide whether any description we come up with corresponds to a logically possible world. Or are you saying that any description necessarily corresponds with a possible world? Is there a world where A AND ~A? Jonathan Colvin
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes: > Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe > that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the > thought-experiment I suggested in my post at > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html -- Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a significant practical and philosophical difference. Practically, copying a mind leaves it with half as many resources per new-mind, while splitting it leaves it with the same number of resources per mind. This means that you might take very different practical actions if you knew that your mind was going to be copied than if you were about to split a coin. Philosophically, the measure of the observer-moments associated with a copied mind are twice as great as the measure of the observer-moments associated with a split one. Obviously 2 is not equal to 1. This puts the burden of proof on those who would claim that this difference is philosophically irrelevant in considering issues of consciousness. Hal Finney
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Saibal Mitra wrote: I more or less agree with Jesse. But I would say that the measure of similarity should also be an absolute measure that multiplied with the absolute measure defines a new effective absolute measure for a given observer. Given the absolute measure you can define effective conditional probabilities, except in cases where branches lead to death. In these cases, the ''conditional probability'' of there being a next experience at all would be less than 1. Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the thought-experiment I suggested in my post at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html -- But you should no more expect to end up in a branch where you died than in a branch where you were never born in the first place. Consider, instead of a branching multiverse, a Star-Trek-style transporter/duplicator in a single universe, which can deconstruct you and reconstruct exact copies atom-by-atom in distant locations (assuming the error introduced by the uncertainty principle is too small to make a difference--if you don't want to grant that, you could also assume this is all happening within a deterministic computer simulation and that you are really an A.I.). To use Bruno Marchal's example, suppose this duplicator recreates two identical copies of you, one in Washington and one in Moscow. As you step into the chamber, if you believe continuity of consciousness is "real" in some sense and that it's meaningful to talk about the probabilities of different possible next experiences, it would probably make sense to predict from a first-person-point of view that you have about a 50% chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 50% chance of finding yourself in Washington. On the other hand, suppose only a single reconstruction will be performed in Washington--then by the same logic, you would probably predict the probability of finding yourself in Washington is close to 100%, barring a freak accident. OK, so now go back to the scenario where you're supposed to be recreated in both Washington and Moscow, except assume that at the last moment there's a power failure in Moscow and the recreator machine fails to activate. Surely this is no different from the scenario where you were only supposed to be recreated in Washington--the fact that they *intended* to duplicate you in Moscow shouldn't make any difference, all that matters is that they didn't. But now look at another variation on the scenario, where the Moscow machine malfunctions and recreates your body missing the head. I don't think it makes sense to say you have a 50% chance of being "killed" in this scenario--your brain is where your consciousness comes from, and since it wasn't duplicated this is really no different from the scenario where the Moscow machine failed to activate entirely. In fact, any malfunction in the Moscow machine which leads to a duplicate that permanently lacks consciousness should be treated the same way as a scenario where I was only supposed to be recreated in Washington, in terms of the subjective probabilities. Extending this to the idea of natural duplication due to different branches of a splitting multiverse, the probability should always be 100% that my next experience is one of a universe where I have not been killed. So if the machine accidentally creates a copy of me missing a head, do you agree that doesn't lessen the probability that I will continue to have conscious experiences, that in this case I could be confident I'd end up as the other copy that was created with head intact? If so, is this any different from a situation where someone is shooting at me, and there is a branch of the multiverse where my head gets blown off and another where the bullet misses? Jesse
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes: > I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I > said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just > because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically > possible. It's important to understand that logical possibility is not a constraint on worlds as such; it is a constraint on our understanding of worlds. It's not like we could go to God and say, "God, please implement this world"; and God takes a look at the spec, and answers, in a deep, sorrowful voice, "No, I'm sorry, I can't implement this world, it's not logically possible. Go back and try again." And we say, "Okay, sorry, God, we'll try harder next time." If we think of computer programs as implementing worlds, all programs exist and are instantiated. It's not that some programs may be logically impossible and the universal TM refuses to run them. Where logical possibility arises is in our understanding of worlds. The mere concept of a world where 2+2=5, for example, represents an error of understanding. What 2+2 equals is not a property of a world! It is incoherent to speak of a world where 2+2 equals anything specific, whether 4 or 5. We don't live in a world where 2+2=4. That mathematical fact has no bearing whatsoever on the existence of our world. We live in a world with certain laws of physics: conservation of energy, quantum theory, Einsteinian gravitation. We may use mathematics to help us understand these laws, but the truths of mathematics are not contingent on anything about our world or any world. If a world is logically impossible, the problem is always in our description and understanding of the world. Worlds themselves exist (given the AUH) independently of our understanding of them. Logical and mathematical consistency are not properties of worlds, they are properties of our descriptions. Hal
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote: >>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think >it is by >>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does >>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes >>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life >dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with >>"everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds >where we live >>forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink >rabbit suit >>may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in >>the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse >>where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a >pink rabbit suit. >> >>Jonathan Colvin >> >Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that >there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of >worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for >that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that >2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5) Isn't that a contradictory statement? "It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5" AND "there are lots of worlds where in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5". Yes, it is contradictory as written. What I should have said was that 2+2= (whatever it actually is) independently of time and space, but while it is not logically possible for this sum to amount to anything else in any world, it is possible that one or more sentient beings in some world are systematically deluded about the value of the sum. , but how is it >logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink >rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least >on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more >common than the ones where Hell freezes over. I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically possible. Here's a (limited) analogy. If I show you are particular mid-game chess position, with a certain arrangement of pieces on the board, it is generally not possible to tell whether the position is a logically possible chess game (ie. corresponds to a legal chess position) without knowing the entire history of the game up to that point. There are certainly particular arrangements of pieces that it is impossible to reach given the axiomatic starting positions and the rules of chess. It is equally possible, I would suggest, that there *might* be certain arrangements of matter that will not be reachable in *any* formal system; universally undecidable propositions, to use a Godelian term. My pink buny suit universe might be one such. Jonathan Colvin OK, I agree with this in principle. However, I can't think of any such logically impossible worlds. With quantum tunneling, matter popping into existence from the vacuum, and so on, it really does look like everything conceivable is possible. --Stathis Papaioannou _ $60,000 prize pool to be won. Three winners. Apply now! http://www.healthe.com.au/competition.do
J.B.S. Haldane
I have no doubt that in reality the future will be vastly more surprising than anything I can imagine. Now my own suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose. - J.B.S. Haldane Humanity has reached a period of evolutionary and technological adolescence. The transitions brought about by modern science and technology tempered with wisdom and caution can lead us to deeper, unexplored paths of wisdom and experience. Let us not jump to short-sighted or hasty conclusions in assuming the extent of Nature itself, for our knowledge is finite. Nature need not confine itself to the limitations of our perception. Upon close enough examination, even the most fundamentally held tenets of objective reality break down. What are the implications of these discoveries? The discordant nature of current interpretations of physical reality suggests that our theoretical models are incomplete. It is premature to suppose that we have reached the last steps of our journey in understanding the universe. To the contrary, we have yet to even leave the womb of our home planet. Scientific dogma is just as perilous a trap as religious dogma. The only logically valid position is to remain open to the introduction of new foundations. Any deterministic theory will always be an approximation - a philosophical interpretation of the boundaries of our empirical knowledge. With the advent of quantum mechanics, we have refined our understanding of reality at the price of reaching only disjointed explanations. But we must always continue to progress in the face of our limitations, for this is what makes us human. The most important component of knowledge is the imagination. __ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com
Re: "Free Will Theorem"
Dear Stathis,
isn't this getting out of control?
I am not talking about your ingenious octopus question (ask the octopus!)
I am talking of the simplistic anthropomodelled and today-level-related way
of thinking: something (anything) is black or white, in other words:
it is either this (one) way we can think about now, or it is THE other ONE
way we can think of now, as an alternative.
This list produced more advanced ways of thinking over the 5-6 years (?) I
have the pleasure of reading in.
Just as 'random' is not free, once it is the consequence of (any) generator
system (deterministic outcome, even if it includes 'many') and as the poorly
identified 'deterministic' is not "the one and only" (especially not the
teleological end-point identifying aberration) origination-way in a world of
more interlaced efects (in the complexity of the wholeness) than we. or any
(semi?)closed system can presently (and practically) compute, the question
of "Now, which one of the two do I feel?" is questionable to put it nicely.
You are right on when you wrote:
> "neither random nor determined", then I am misusing the word or deluding
myself, because everything has to be some combination of random or
determined. However, I didn't intend to enter such a debate when I used that
word!<
you just missed your own distinction of random as 'some combination'.
Based on the emotional brainwashing (religious AND scientific) in our young
years (schools?), we all are prone to such 'deluding' if we are not careful.
It is so interesting when members with free insight and unrestricted mind's
freedom fall back into the 'oneplane restricted' classical mathematical ways
and negate the (still) unknown. "If it is not Q-science it is not true".
Comp my way or the highway. 101 physix class. (Not even religion!)
It is so amazing how an unusual and emotion-based (superstition?) topic can
distort the advanced thinking in the minds! My God! (??)
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 6:27 AM
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >Le 14-avr.-05, à 14:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> >
> >>A decision I make is "free" when I feel that I could have decided
> >>otherwise.
> >
> >OK I can take that definition of free-will, although I would bet that
> >free-will will always be in company of any genuine act of will.
> >
> >Bruno
> >
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
>
> It is exactly the quibbling over precise definitions etc. that I was
trying
> to avoid. When I say my decision was "free", I mean that it *felt* free,
as
> opposed to a decision I might have made with a gun held to my head. I have
> to use some word to describe it, so that you can understand what I'm
talking
> about, which is only possible if you have similar experiences.
Philosophers
> then take this word "free", look at various possible meanings, and decide
> whether my use of the word is appropriate. For example, if "free" means
> "neither random nor determined", then I am misusing the word or deluding
> myself, because everything has to be some combination of random or
> determined. However, I didn't intend to enter such a debate when I used
that
> word!
>
> Suppose an octopus, in addition to the regular human-type free will ("will
I
> have dinner now or later?"), has a special 8-free will when it has to
decide
> which tentacle it will use. This 8-free will feels completely different to
> the other sort, in that the octopus mentally spins a roulette wheel, which
> feels completely random, but at the moment it moves the thus-chosen
> tentacle, a strange retrospective causality event takes place, such that
the
> octopus knows with every fibre of its being that the chosen tentacle was
the
> "correct" one all along.
>
> OK, here is the question. Given our knowledge of physics, does the octopus
> really have 8-freedom, or not?
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
Re: "Free Will Theorem"
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-avr.-05, à 14:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
A decision I make is "free" when I feel that I could have decided
otherwise.
OK I can take that definition of free-will, although I would bet that
free-will will always be in company of any genuine act of will.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
It is exactly the quibbling over precise definitions etc. that I was trying
to avoid. When I say my decision was "free", I mean that it *felt* free, as
opposed to a decision I might have made with a gun held to my head. I have
to use some word to describe it, so that you can understand what I'm talking
about, which is only possible if you have similar experiences. Philosophers
then take this word "free", look at various possible meanings, and decide
whether my use of the word is appropriate. For example, if "free" means
"neither random nor determined", then I am misusing the word or deluding
myself, because everything has to be some combination of random or
determined. However, I didn't intend to enter such a debate when I used that
word!
Suppose an octopus, in addition to the regular human-type free will ("will I
have dinner now or later?"), has a special 8-free will when it has to decide
which tentacle it will use. This 8-free will feels completely different to
the other sort, in that the octopus mentally spins a roulette wheel, which
feels completely random, but at the moment it moves the thus-chosen
tentacle, a strange retrospective causality event takes place, such that the
octopus knows with every fibre of its being that the chosen tentacle was the
"correct" one all along.
OK, here is the question. Given our knowledge of physics, does the octopus
really have 8-freedom, or not?
--Stathis Papaioannou
_
$60,000 prize pool to be won. Three winners. Apply now!
http://www.healthe.com.au/competition.do
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think >it is by >>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does >>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes >>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life >dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with >>"everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds >where we live >>forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink >rabbit suit >>may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in >>the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse >>where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a >pink rabbit suit. >> >>Jonathan Colvin >> >Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that >there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of >worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for >that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that >2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5) Isn't that a contradictory statement? "It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5" AND "there are lots of worlds where in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5". , but how is it >logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink >rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least >on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more >common than the ones where Hell freezes over. I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically possible. Here's a (limited) analogy. If I show you are particular mid-game chess position, with a certain arrangement of pieces on the board, it is generally not possible to tell whether the position is a logically possible chess game (ie. corresponds to a legal chess position) without knowing the entire history of the game up to that point. There are certainly particular arrangements of pieces that it is impossible to reach given the axiomatic starting positions and the rules of chess. It is equally possible, I would suggest, that there *might* be certain arrangements of matter that will not be reachable in *any* formal system; universally undecidable propositions, to use a Godelian term. My pink buny suit universe might be one such. Jonathan Colvin
Omnes?
Le 14-avr.-05, à 13:53, Brent Meeker a écrit : Before drawing drastic conclusions, like QTI, from the multiple-worlds (or better, the relative state) interpretation of QM, it would be good to remember that it is just one of several intepretations. Bohm's interpretation will leave you as dead as classical physics. So will Penrose's and other modified theories with real collapse of the wave-function. My personal favorite is decoherence (Zurek, Joos, Zeh, et al) with a lower bound on non-zero probabilities as outlined by Omnes. Omnes is just Everett + a new axiom asserting the uniqueness of the universe. Bohm is Everett + a new axiom based on a (non covariant) potential guiding some prefered observable result (particle's positions). Decoherence *is* Everett (as people can understand by reading his long text). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes: While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. "Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with "everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds where we live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. Jonathan Colvin I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5), but how is it logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Now with over 80,000 dream jobs! Click here: http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
