Re: where do copies come from?
Jesse Mazer wrote: [quoting Stathis, responding to a post by George Levy] The high standard I have described does not go nearly as far as copying the exact quantum state of every atom. It is merely aknowledging the fact that information in brains is not stored in the anatomical arrangement of neurons, any more than data on a computer is stored in the computer's circuit diagram. If you scan the anatomical arrangement of synapses *and* the concentration of all the relevant proteins at the synapses, you probably would have enough to run a simulation that would act like a continuation of the original person. The upload might find he'd lost his short-term memories of what happened immediately before he died and his brain was frozen (just as we often do when we regain consciousness after being suddenly knocked unconscious by an accident), but as I understand it long-term memories are stored in terms of the pattern of synaptic connections and the neurotransmitters at each synapse, and as long as the simulated neurons behave closely enough to how the original neurons behaved, shouldn't the upload behave like the original person in terms of personality, thought processes, emotions, preferences and so forth? I have no problem with the idea that everything about a person's personality, memories etc. is physically encoded in his brain, and that in principle, sufficiently detailed knowledge about his brain should allow an emulation on a computer which would be just like the original person. The problems are: (1) what is the level of detail of neuronal information required; (2) can this requisite information be preserved in a post-mortem specimen; (3) can the information be scanned or read in a way that can be used in a computer model; (4) can each subsystem of neuronal function relevant to cognition be modelled closely enough to allow emulation; (5) given adequate information and adequate models, is the computer power available up to the task of emulation in anything like real time? I believe the level of detail required and the complexity of the required models is grossly underestimated. Simply getting a 3D image of a brain down to electron microscopic detail, including all the synaptic connections, would be an enormous task, and it probabaly wouldn't tell us any more about the mind of the brain's owner than a picture of the books on a library shelf would tell us about the book contents. I would bet more on mediaeval monks decoding the data on a DVD sent back in time than I would bet on scientists decoding the contents of a human mind from cryopreserved brain sections. If mind uploads were to become a reality, I think the best strategy would be research into brain-computer interfacing. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Single? Start dating at Lavalife. Try our 7 day FREE trial! http://lavalife9.ninemsn.com.au/clickthru/clickthru.act?context=an99locale=en_AUa=19179
Re: The Time Deniers and the idea of time as a dimension
On Jul 6, 2005, at 10:37 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:PC:But isn't the use of time as the dimension along which things vary (or are 'processed') a somewhat arbitrary choice?[SPK] Please notice that the identification of "time" with a "dimension" involves the identification with each moment in time with some positive Real number. Thus the entire set of moments is identified with R^+. The problem with this identification is that the notion of a well ordering, an a priori aspect of the Real numbers, is not necessarily a priori for moments of time. AFAIK, the paradoxical nature of McTaggart's A and B series follows from a neglect of this issue.PC:I think Natural numbers suffice here, but I may be wrong (my background is molecular biology, not math). SPK: Time, from what I have studied so far, involves two distinct notions: a "measure of change" and an "order of succession". The idea that it is merely a dimension and related to the dimensions of "space", as considered and promulgated by Minkowski, requires the assumption of classical physics and strict local realism. We know (I would hope!) that the former assumption is flawed, but the second is still being debated.I recognize that time is different than space. But it strikes me as at least problematic that time must be assumed to have properties which space does not in order for consciousness to exist. To me, consciousness is nothing special - just one kind of pattern (one that supports robust predictions from the intentional stance) among many. I think that pattern can exist in a natural number. The intentional stance (a philosophical view of Daniel Dennett) is key to my views here, so I'll have to expound on it later. [SPK] Please notice in your example that the automata had to be implemented by some process in order to render the results. The resulting "checker board" like picture is a result of the process, it can not be said to have one pattern or some other prior to and absent the computational process. Where would a SAS "fit" into the automata? What would its Observer Moments include?You have a good point here; in the example as I gave it, a temporal process comes first, the result of which is then instantiated in a 3d-structure at a single time. But I think it would be possible to surmount this objection with the use of a lookup table. You could have a lookup table large enough to calculate the next N steps all at once, for any N - and then it's a matter of setting N large enough to calculate a block of the automaton that *would have* sufficed to produce a noticeable length of experience by the SAS, had the process been calculated for one step at a time. Of course, now you can ask where the the lookup table came from -- and it looks like it must have been generated by a temporal process...Well at any rate, I am trying to glean some conclusions from the existence of the stack after it has been created by whatever process - after all, if a simple algorithmic process is capable of generating it, it already exists in Platonia, at very high measure. This example assumes a strong Platonism for its conclusions - but I think it does go some way toward approaching the problem of how the real numbers (or in this case, I think, even the natural numbers) can give rise to observers, time, consciousness, etc. Some of those numbers can be interpreted as a Game of Life containing one or more SASs (and I'll assume the question of where the SAS fits into it answered already, by the fact that UTMs can be impemented in the Game of Life, and these UTMs must include ones that can pass the Turing Test. Many references exist for this claim which you will find if you google ["game of life" "turing machine"]).Best regardsPete
Re: where do copies come from?
On Thu, Jul 07, 2005 at 04:51:23PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I have no problem with the idea that everything about a person's personality, memories etc. is physically encoded in his brain, and that in principle, sufficiently detailed knowledge about his brain should allow an emulation on a computer which would be just like the original person. The Fair enough. You seem to suddenly deviate from this position at some point below, though. problems are: (1) what is the level of detail of neuronal information required; It doesn't matter, if that information is present in the vitrified brain. Preliminary results look good http://leitl.org/docs/cryo/ More results will be forthcoming in the next 1-2 years (this is something I know, not guess). (2) can this requisite information be preserved in a post-mortem specimen; See above. No showstoppers, under optimal conditions. (3) can the information be scanned or read in a way that can be used in a computer model; Yes, though TEM is probably not sufficient. Scaled up cryo AFM has more than enough resolution, and allows individual sampling of ablated molecules. In times where CO molecules are individually sorted by the isotopes by numerical control, and assembled into elaborate circuits, this shouldn't require much faith. (4) can each subsystem of neuronal function relevant to cognition be modelled closely enough to allow emulation; This is the most difficult point: you have to build a system which can abstract models, building at least 2-3 hierarchies, until you arrive at an isofunctional model well mapped to the hardware used. I have ideas in that direction, but nothing has been tested yet. (5) given adequate information and adequate models, is the computer power available up to the task of emulation in anything like real time? Near future will give us systems built from moles of bits (by self-assembly of individual molecular circuits). Pretty speedy systems, enough for a speedup of 10^6, if not more. The difficulty lies in obtaining a model which is isofunctional to the original. By the time you have that model, hardware will not be a bottleneck. I believe the level of detail required and the complexity of the required models is grossly underestimated. Simply getting a 3D image of a brain down No offense, but given the level of your ignorance, how do you know who has estimated what? to electron microscopic detail, including all the synaptic connections, would be an enormous task, and it probabaly wouldn't tell us any more about Yes. You need more resolution than TEM, btw. That's what automation is for. the mind of the brain's owner than a picture of the books on a library shelf would tell us about the book contents. I would bet more on mediaeval I told you we have results that there's probably enough preserved for the tissue to be retransplantable(!). Once it's in the dewar, time stops. I told you we have current methods allowing you to resolve submolecular structures in cryopreserved tissue. There's no fundamental reason why you can't image kg-sized vitrified objects at atomic resolution, at least transiently where it matters (what is this transmembrane protein, and how is it been modified, the membrane itself is rather boring). This is easily verified even with only online information. The information is preserved in the structure. Are you claiming that there is something missing? What, precisely, then? monks decoding the data on a DVD sent back in time than I would bet on scientists decoding the contents of a human mind from cryopreserved brain sections. You'll see individually accurate numerical models of simple critters + virtual models within the 20-30 year time frame. We could do this now with C. elegans, given 5-10 years, and a considerable budget. If mind uploads were to become a reality, I think the best strategy would be research into brain-computer interfacing. What is your estimated time frame for advent of technology like http://nanomedicine.com/ I, personally, am not holding my breath. YMMV. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: One more question about measure
Le 06-juil.-05, à 00:56, Russell Standish a écrit : You are right, my apologies. I read the necessitation rule backwards in your thesis. You do in fact say P = []P. I'll take your word for it that consistency destroys necessitation, but I don't have the intuitive understanding of it yet. Never mind, it is enough for my present purposes. OK. Be careful not to confuse the formula A- B, and the rule A = B. The first is just a formula (equivalent with ~A v B in classical logic). The second is a dynamical rule saying that if the machine proves A it proves B. In general A = B is written A _ B (if this survives its teleportation in the archive!) :-) Bruno PS We loose the necessitation rule for the new box Cp = Bp ~B~p, because although the tautology t is provable, Ct is not. Indeed Ct is Bt ~B~t, but ~B~t = ~Bf, and this is the self-consistency statement no consistent machine can prove. OK? http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Thought Experiment #269-G (Duplicates)
Le 06-juil.-05, à 02:44, Lee Corbin a écrit : Bruno wrote about whether or not we are all the same person. Sent: Tuesday, July 05, 2005 1:59 AM Subject: Re: What does ought mean? (was RE: Duplicates Are Selves) I have changed the subject line once again, because this is no longer about what ought ought to mean. Le 04-juil.-05, à 22:18, Lee Corbin a écrit : Yes, but I contend that while there are two organisms present, there is only one person. It's much as though some space aliens kidnapped you and tried to say that Pete at spacetime coordinates (X1,T1) could not possibly be the same person as Pete at coordinates (X1,T2) because the times weren't the same. You'd have to get them to wrap their heads around the idea that one person could be at two different times in the same place. They might find this bizarre. I'm trying to tell you a possibility that you think equally bizarre: namely that Pete(X1,T1) is the same person as Pete(X2,T1), namely that the same person may be at two different locations at the same time. That's all. I like that idea, but if they are the *same* person then we are all the same person. Or, perhaps you were just meaning that they are very close/similar; That is so: but moreover, being very very close/similar is what should be meant by the same person. in which case you can say Pete(X2,T1) is much closer to Pete(X1,T1) than Bruno(x, now) is close to Lee(y, now). But then, strictly speaking Pete(X1,T1) is not the same person as Pete(X2,T1). Well, that's up for discussion! That's what we are trying to decide. I say that it gets pretty silly to formulate our ideas so that we turn out not to be the same person from second to second. Now, yes, in order to evade the notion that one is the same person as one's duplicate across the room, people will try anything, even denying that they have any identity whatsoever. They are, apparently, more comfortable with the notion that they are not the same person from second to second that the shocking idea that they and their duplicates are the same person. In any case I am not sure that those distinctions have any bearing on the existence of first person indeterminacy and the problem to quantify that indeterminacy. (Yes, maybe it is detached from the question you are trying to answer.) Imagine you are duplicated iteratively. At the start you are in room R. You are scanned and destroyed, painlessly, given some of the discussions we have, :-) this is rather pleasant to entertain and we tell you that you will be reconstituted in room 0 and in room 1. Then Lee0 and Lee1 are invited in room R again and the experience is repeated. Rooms 0 and 1 are identical and quite separate. The only difference is that in room 0 there is a big 0 drawn on the wall and in room 1 there is a big 1 drawn on the wall. So as this is repeated, there are 2, then 4, then 8, etc., copies, and each of them remembers a different sequence of 0's and 1's. Yes. You are asked to bet on your immediate and less immediate future feeling. Precisely: we ask you to choose among the following bets: Immediate: A. I will see 0 on the wall. B. I will see 1 on the wall. C. I will see 0 on the wall and I will see 1 on the wall. D. I will see 0 on the wall or I will see 1 on the wall. Less immediate: A'. I will always see 0 on the wall. B'. I will always see 1 on the wall C'. I will see as many 0 and 1 on the wall D'. I will see an incompressible sequence of 0 and 1 on the wall And there are three versions of the experiences. In a first version you are always reconstituted in the two rooms. Okay, let's handle just that for now. Good idea. We suppose obviously that you want maximize your benefit(s). Well, since you are asking *me*, then naturally I'll want a global maximum for me, and so a maximal sum for each instance. Good idea. And quite coherent with your idea that we are our duplicates. Each Lee-i is offered 5$ each time his bet is confirmed, but loses 5$ if he makes a wrong bet. And yes, it would be possible to emphasize to each instance that he is to attempt to maximize his own instance's earnings. Quite correct. What will be your strategy in each version? Will your strategy differ? Now if the Lees know all these facts, then they'll anticipate being in both rooms upon each iteration. Therefore, they'll anticipate losing $5 in one room and gaining $5 in the other. They'll also realize that all bit sequences are being carried out. Therefore, it doesn't make any difference whatsoever. The expectation of each sequence is exactly the same number of dollars: zero. I don't get the significance of this. I don't understand your answer, and actually you did not answer. It looks like you are forgetting I give you the choice between A, B, C, D. I guess you did choose C, without saying. In that case you are correct the expectation will be zero. Are you sure there is not a better strategy among A, B, C, D? And
Re: where do copies come from?
On Thu, Jul 07, 2005 at 12:49:07PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The high standard I have described does not go nearly as far as copying the exact quantum state of every atom. It is merely aknowledging the fact Two systems in the same quantum state being indistinguishable is only relevant for equilibrium constants and gedanken experiments. that information in brains is not stored in the anatomical arrangement of neurons, any more than data on a computer is stored in the computer's circuit diagram. If you copy a car down to the scale of a fraction of a millimetrel you can expect that the copy will work the same as the original, but if you copy a computer down to the sub-micron level you might end up with a machine that will run Windows XP or whatever, but you won't copy the data in RAM or on the hard drive. While it is not known exactly Okay, your objection is simply not enough resolution. I agree. TEM is not enough resolution by far. how information is stored in a brain, it is certainly dependent on such parameters as ionic gradients across cell membranes and the type, number, No, that's wrong. Gradients collapse (you see them collapsing on the EEG in realtime) after 20-30 sec of stopped blood flow, even at normothermic ischaemia (even without hypothermia and drugs (barbiturates, etc)). distribution and conformation of receptor and ion channel proteins. At its Yes, and quite a few other things. simplest, the brain could be seen as using a binary code, each neuron having two possible states, on or off. However, a snapshot of the state of each neuron will not allow a model of the brain to be built, because all the anciliary cellular machinery as above is needed to work out how to get from one state to the next. If it were otherwise, why would all this complexity have evolved? I do not understand your objections here. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: The Time Deniers
Le 06-juil.-05, à 07:16, Russell Standish a écrit : On Tue, Jul 05, 2005 at 06:47:40PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: There have been many, many investigations of this idea. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the main theme of this list has been a pursuit of the idea. But Stephen Paul King gives a very appropriate name to all the sponsors of these ideas, from Bruno and Russell, all the way to Julian Barbour: the time- deniers. I hate it when someone introduces a new term I don't understand. What, pray, are time deniers? Is it related at all to the material jeans are made out of? Actually - I suddenly realised what you have just said, and so I left the previous passage in for a little light relief. I find it amazing that you claim I deny the existence of time. Au contraire, it is something I explicitly assume. My reading of Bruno's work is that time is implicitly assumed as part of computationalism (I know Bruno sometimes does not quite agree, but there you have it). The true time deniers on this list are those favouring the ASSA - Jacques Mallah, Saibal Mitra, etc. I never worked out your position Lee? Mmmhhh To be frank I can hardly imagine someone more ``time denier than me! Unless by time you mean consciousness, in the spirit of Brouwer. But even that *time* is not postulated, I do think I (re)obtain it trough the theaetetus' move (this is debatable, sure). Of course I am a physical-time denier (like Einstein, at least when he told his friend Besso that time is an illusion for us physicist). But I am all the same a space denier, and a whatever physical primitive-denier. I think (through comp) that the whole of physics is secondary, emergent on the atemporal-aspatial relation between numbers (even natural numbers). Comp does not need time, it needs the notion that each natural numbers has a successor. This is enough to study atemporal succession of computing states. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: where do copies come from?
Le 07-juil.-05, à 04:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : How does a quasi-zombie differ from a full zombie? Well a full zombie is not conscious at all. By a quasi-zombie I was meaning someone with some consciousness pathologies. And how could his descendants ever realise this, even after centuries - wouldn't this require a foolproof 3rd person method of determining 1st person experience? After centuries of immortality people can have better theories on correlations between some experience and some third person features of their brain. I have myself once believed that synesthesia (hearing color, seeing sound) was sort of poetical stuff until I read people have discovered specific neuronal channels corresponding to it. But here with immortal zombie I was just alluding on the fact that we can't known for sure the level of substitution. We must bet on theories, and in practice we let the doctor make the bet. Logician use model for testing the validity of an argument, and I can *conceive* (not believe!) something like 1- Hameroff is right and consciousness is produced by information processing in the microtubule in interaction with gravitation (say, this does not contradict comp) 2- Without it, the neurons can manage very high level information processing so that without the microtubule working someone can still pass a (long) Turing test 3- Yet, they could not pass a much longer Turing test. So that ultimately people discovered they are in a sort of loop, etc. OK, this could contradict Darwin, and I could search a better example, but my point was just that nobody can give garantees on that matter (actually it is the same with taking a plane, or just a cup of tea). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: where do copies come from?
Le 07-juil.-05, à 08:51, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : If mind uploads were to become a reality, I think the best strategy would be research into brain-computer interfacing. I think so. I have recently discovered impressioning progress in neuronal nets used for handicaped (completely paralyzed) people. They are able to learn fast the handling of a cursor and files on a computer. No doubt it will be used soonely to vide-games and in the middle run it could replace the keyboard for most application. Then those neuronal nets will grow into artificial sort of neocortex and I can imagine taking up the main role in our brain information processing. Then we could just abandon brain! Yet I think Cryo will progress too, most probably by genetic manipulation, copying and ameliorating some molecular technics used by frogs I think. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: where do copies come from?
Le 07-juil.-05, à 16:27, Eugen Leitl a écrit : Currently, there's only output, not input. It's invasive, and the electrodes don't age well. Actually (but I'm not a specialist) I read about systems not using electrodes. The neural nets was sensible to the waves of barin activity like in a Electro Encephalo Gram (EEG in french, sorry). Thanks for the info and links. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: The Time Deniers
Hi Lee: At 09:47 PM 7/5/2005, you wrote: snip Where I join you (in failing to understand) is what happens as the OM becomes of zero length. I did not say *the limit as it becomes zero*, I said zero. It's almost as though some people take this as license to suppose that time is not a necessary ingredient or even that time does not exist: snip The dynamic I speak of in my approach can give instantations of being to the preexisting states in many ways. For example: isolated states, all states a universe contains simultaneously, and clusters of states that would be closely coupled in a succession string of states. As being moved within the system the last example would be like a pulse of being with some non zero pulse width over the dimension of successor states for a particular universe. This might be a model for consciousness, thinking, continuity, observation, time, etc. Hal Ruhl
Re: The Time Deniers
Dear Hal, Which is primitive in your thinking: Being or Becoming? Stephen - Original Message - From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thursday, July 07, 2005 2:57 PM Subject: Re: The Time Deniers Hi Lee: At 09:47 PM 7/5/2005, you wrote: snip Where I join you (in failing to understand) is what happens as the OM becomes of zero length. I did not say *the limit as it becomes zero*, I said zero. It's almost as though some people take this as license to suppose that time is not a necessary ingredient or even that time does not exist: snip The dynamic I speak of in my approach can give instantations of being to the preexisting states in many ways. For example: isolated states, all states a universe contains simultaneously, and clusters of states that would be closely coupled in a succession string of states. As being moved within the system the last example would be like a pulse of being with some non zero pulse width over the dimension of successor states for a particular universe. This might be a model for consciousness, thinking, continuity, observation, time, etc. Hal Ruhl
Re: The Time Deniers
Hi Stephen: At 03:03 PM 7/7/2005, you wrote: Dear Hal, Which is primitive in your thinking: Being or Becoming? Stephen Let me try it this way: 1) All possible states preexist [Existence]. 2) The system has a random dynamic [the Nothing is incomplete in the All/Nothing system and must resolve the incompleteness - this repeats endlessly] that passes states from the outside to the inside of an evolving Something [There are many [infinite] simultaneously evolving Somethings - due to the repeats] [Becoming]. 3) The boundaries of the Somethings bestow instantations of reality to states as they pass through the boundary [Being]. 4) The width of the boundary determines the pulse width of Being over the dimension of closely coupled states [continuity etc.] Hal Ruhl
UDA, Am I missing something?
Bruno, After reading your Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) and I?d like to give you my reaction. It seems to me that the trick is hidden in your assumptions. I think you?ve even stated that before (using ?embedded? rather than ?hidden?), referring especially to comp. But I?d say that the trick is hidden in your assumptions about the universe or ?physical reality?. It is the assumption that ?physical reality? is limited to what we can imagine (?communicable physical laws?, with emphasis on communicable) and sense (?incommunicable physical knowledge?) it to be, i.e. in our conscious brains. This is stated in your definition of ?Fundamental Physics? as being ?the correct-by-definition discourse about observable and verifiable anticipation of possible relatively evolving quantities and/or qualities.? So if A=?physical reality? and B=?consciousness?, then the assumption is A=B. It seems that the rest is extraneous because with A=B you?ve already practically reached your conclusion, even without comp. Am I missing something? Tom Caylor
Re: The Time Deniers
Dear Hal, let me know if my (naive) worldview on Stephen's question is compatible with what you wrote (below): (to1: I don't know what to do with all possible because it is far beyond any idea we may have. Unless we restrict the 'all' to whatever we can think/know of). to2: In the inherent and incessant DYNAMISM (as you wrote random? and I still do assign random to our ignorance to find order in cases called 'random') - - to resolve the inherent incompleteness (ie. relax the stress, as I like to word it): any BEING must represent a snapshot of an inevitable and transitional BECOMING - from and into. That is in my 'wholeness' worldview. Totally interconnected, interinfluencing, interresponsive dynamism. to 3: Boundaries are constituting the 'models' of 'Somethings', restricting the observer (which I identify as ANYTHING/EVERYTHING that accepts information) from viewing the totality. I call such diversion from the wholeness a reductionism: reducing the observation into a boundary-enclosed model view. So in such case a BEING is acceptable as partial to the model. I think this agrees with your 'states' being above-model entities, as you said: passing through the boundaries. to 4: I don't 'speculate' into reductionist detail-viewings (I have trouble enough with the wholistic formulations and once I slip into the cop-pout laxness of reductionist thinking, I lose grounds). However the width of boundaries you mention comes handy in the current problem I have on my agenda: How come that in the wholistic ie. unlimitedly interconnected world certain items are more connected than others - sort of a natural basis for model-formation? George Kampis lately called such differentiation (in evolution-thinking) a depth of the connection. I tried an ideational closeness but this is too primitive a metaphor. It emerged from my Karl Jaspers F. paper (2004) of Networks of Networks where the infinitely outbranching unlimited network systems still form networks and not a boundariless free floating 'grits'. Closeness came in from a visualization of interconnected networks, through how many can one get to a distnat item, which itself of course is also a network on its own. --Ideas appreciated. -- (Forgive me to burden you with my ongoing topic of so far unsolved speculations). John Mikes - Original Message - From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thursday, July 07, 2005 3:31 PM Subject: Re: The Time Deniers Hi Stephen: At 03:03 PM 7/7/2005, you wrote: Dear Hal, Which is primitive in your thinking: Being or Becoming? Stephen Let me try it this way: 1) All possible states preexist [Existence]. 2) The system has a random dynamic [the Nothing is incomplete in the All/Nothing system and must resolve the incompleteness - this repeats endlessly] that passes states from the outside to the inside of an evolving Something [There are many [infinite] simultaneously evolving Somethings - due to the repeats] [Becoming]. 3) The boundaries of the Somethings bestow instantations of reality to states as they pass through the boundary [Being]. 4) The width of the boundary determines the pulse width of Being over the dimension of closely coupled states [continuity etc.] Hal Ruhl -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.323 / Virus Database: 267.8.10/43 - Release Date: 07/06/05
RE: Thought Experiment #269-G (Duplicates)
Bruno writes Each Lee-i is offered 5$ each time his bet is confirmed, but loses 5$ if he makes a wrong bet. And yes, it would be possible to emphasize to each instance that he is to attempt to maximize his own instance's earnings. Quite correct. What will be your strategy in each version? Will your strategy differ? Now if the Lees know all these facts, then they'll anticipate being in both rooms upon each iteration. Therefore, they'll anticipate losing $5 in one room and gaining $5 in the other. They'll also realize that all bit sequences are being carried out. Therefore, it doesn't make any difference whatsoever. The expectation of each sequence is exactly the same number of dollars: zero. I don't get the significance of this. I don't understand your answer, and actually you did not answer. It looks like you are forgetting I give you the choice between A, B, C, D. Sorry. You are asked to bet on your immediate and less immediate future feeling. Precisely: we ask you to choose among the following bets: Immediate: A. I will see 0 on the wall. B. I will see 1 on the wall. C. I will see 0 on the wall and I will see 1 on the wall. D. I will see 0 on the wall or I will see 1 on the wall. I choose C: insofar as I consider myself as a program, then the program will see 0 on the wall and the program will also see 1 on the wall. The program will experienced both. I will experience both. I guess you did choose C, without saying. Right. In that case you are correct the expectation will be zero. Are you sure there is not a better strategy among A, B, C, D? Why do you think that there is a better strategy? C. will comport with all the facts. And afterwards, when a poll is conducted among all those who can prove that they are Lee Corbin it will be found that half of them saw a 1 and half saw a zero. It is preposterous to finger *any* of them and accuse them of not being me. They will each believe that they are me (i.e., the me here in the past). That is, for each Lee', they will assert Lee' = Lee. So also will Lee'' assert that Lee'' = Lee. So IT'S FREAKING OBVIOUS THAT Lee'' = Lee'. Yet substitute someone else's name for mine in those equations, and they'll demur. Lee
