Re: subjective reality
On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has not been solved. Not meet them so much in my experience. Positive Religious (like Muslim, Catholic, ...) have build-in solution. It is most of the time tabu to question them. Negative Religious (like Atheist) have build- in solution, but are generally not aware of the religiosity of their solutions. Only (serious) philosopher of mind/cognitive scientists are aware of the problem. They would probably would also agree that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body- stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you try to figure out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right? Well OK. I guess you make the difference between solipsism and idealism which can be realist or platonist. The mind stuff is just numbers and their dreams ... You do however invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of YD and than you turn the tables on it, so to speak, no? YD has nothing with classical physicalism, unless you assume physicalism at the start. YD does not assume a universe physically exist, only that I exists and that I am supported by a relatively stable (sheaf) of computations. Actually the use of the YD in the UD reasoning is accompanied by an explicit postulation of a physical universe for making the reasoning easier, but that hypothesis is explicitly eliminated toward the end of the reasoning. I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain (a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable) I really don't understand. To make YD false you must associate yourself to something non-turing emulable. Nobody has ever found a non, turing emulable process. Recall that quantum-like indeterminacy can be retrieved in the self-discourse of self-duplicating machine. Also, with some notable exception like Penrose, everybody accept YD. I teach about it since more than 30 years, and only strict dualists (with assumes explicit substancial soul) criticize it. I told you that those who get my point (of the UD Argument) and still soes not accept the conclusion prefer to abandon Arithmetical Realism. It is an empirical discovery in the sense that (I think we agree here), it is almost nonsense for me to abandon arithmetical realism. to so if you use just to demolish it later, why use it at all? This is the eleventh time you confuse p - q with q - p. Unless (here) you mean by demolish YD, the non use of YD in the translation of UDA in arithmetic. Why not proceed to that interview directly? You can. But this is like going from physics to the study of differential equation. Here it would consist to go from cognitive science to pure mathematics. Actually if you justify that probability *must* obey to the Bp - Dp rule (probability one of p entails the probability of ~p is not one), then OK, you can extract the comp- physics from math alone. But how will you explain the Bp - Dp rule in that context? Why suppress a motivation which also makes the link with theology: the fact that the comp-doctor cannot pretend that science has show that you can survive with an artificial brain (in case comp is true). Can that be done and leave your argument intact? That would make it a lot more interesting in my opinion... You are in minority here, but this is just because most people agree with YD (or at least it makes sense as an hypothesis in the cognitive science). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Kaboom
On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[BM] Of course, Everett still postulates EQM, and interpret it in a physicalist way. I have clear that I don't follow him in the sense that, once comp is assumed, my theorem shows that SWE is either redundant or false. Now I am a realist. reality is independent of me, but with comp it just cannot be "physical", unless you redefined "physical" by "observable", but then you need a theory of observation, which is what comp provides freely (with and without YD); and then the physical emerges "logically" from the number theoretical true relations. Bruno [GK] Here you lost me again! So you are convinced that QM even in the EQM format is false or redundant!? False? I don't know. But if EQM is true then it is certainly redundant, given that the whole of physics (unlike geography) is, [assuming comp (and the correctness of the derivation, but this is assumed by default: it has been verified by many people)], derivable from computer science.But yet you insist that its observable consequences can be derived from the same theory (theorem) that proves it false!!! Seems to me that by Preskill's terms you start out as a realist only to end up back in Copenhagen!! Is that it? False and redundant have not the same meaning! I insist only that its (QM) observable consequences (in case QM gives correct prediction) can be derived from the same theory (comp) that proves it redundant (not false). Or that proves it false if QM is indeed false.Given that the MANY-WORLD, in the form of many (immaterial!) computational histories, is the most easier feature of reality to derive from comp i doubt we could be lead to Copenhagen. Strictly speaking this could logically happen, and i have since 5 years a curious argument which shows that even with comp some branches selection mechanism could exist. This is well beyond my thesis and is related on Riemann Hypothesis and the primes distribution, but at this stage it is out-of topics, to say the least.All what I say, Godfrey, is that if comp is correct, physics is a secondary science. Physics is "reduced" to the study of gluable or recollable pieces of consistent machine dreams. And those terms are easy to define in computer science (assuming comp of course), and this makes the comp hyp testable, by comparing the comp-phys with the usual phys.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Brent MeekerWhy do you think YD is inconsistent with QM? Hi Brent, At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno thinks so! Just to be clear: comp gives the comp-correct physics, and from what can be qualitatively and/or quantitatively already be derived, YD is inconsistent with SWE + collapse. I guess you mean QM = Copenhagen QM. As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, meaning one scenario in which all your experience (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital computer.But YD entails much stronger form of non-locality! As, a priori, YD entails very strong form of non-locality. Proof: see the UDA in my URL. Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that is the reason I have not given myself the trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident that this can be done with a bit of patienceand the help of the many wonders of quantum states.No. If comp contradicts physics, it will be so by comp being much more non-local and much more non-deterministic (from the observers viewpoints). The mystery is that with comp physics could appears so much computational. Remember that if comp is true, whatever the physical universe appears to be it cannot be the output of a computation, nor can it be the result of a turing emulation other than a UD. Only the taking into account of incompleteness show that comp cannot be obviously false, as it could seem to be when you understand the hugeness of indeterminacy and non-locality it implies.remember also that comp (and thus YD ) is not incompatible with my brain being a quantum computer. Reason: quantum computer are classically emulable.You should read the proof, I think you have not yet grasped the enunciation of the result. It is all normal given the novelty. What seems to me to be less normal is that you don't want to read it and still want to say something.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: How did it all begin?
On 01 Sep 2005, at 00:40, Stephen Paul King wrote: Does it truly make sense to assume that Existence can have a Beginning? We are not talking here, I AFAIK, about the beginning of our observed universe as we can wind our way back in history to a Big Bang Event Horizon, but this event itself must have some form of antecedent that Exists. Remember, existence, per say, does not depend on anything, except for maybe self-consistency, and thus it follows that Existence itself can not have a "beginning". It follows that it is Eternal, without beginning or end.I would even say that it is out of time and space consideration. IMHO, Tegmark's paper, like the rest of his papers, is not worth reading if only because they misdirect thoughts more than they inform thoughts.You are hard. Tegmark paper is interesting, except that he still (like many physicists) put the mind-body problem under the rug, and so he misses the impact of incompleteness, and the fact that at the level of mathematical platonism, the physical world is not just a mathematical structure among others. With comp, although physics is secondary, the physical world is not just a mathematical structure among others, but a very special mathematical structures emerging from existing relations among a vast set of mathematical structures.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:11, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This I don't quite follow. Sorry! How are "conditions of observability" defined by CT? This is obviously technical, but in a nutshell (see more in the papers):By the UD Argument (UDA, Universal Dovetailer Argument), we know, assuming comp, that all atomic or primitive observer moment corresponds to the states accessible by the Universal Dovetailer (CT is used here). This can be shown (with CT) equivalent to the set of true *Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences* (i.e those provably equivalent, by the lobian machines, to sentences having the shape EnP(n) with P decidable. For a lobian machine, the provability with such atomic sentences is given(*) by the theory G + (p - Bp). Now, a propositional event will correspond to a proposition A true in all accessible observer-moments (accessible through consistent extensions, not through the UD!). And this in the case at least one such accessible observer-moments exists (the non cul-de-sac assumption). Modally (or arithmetically the B and D are the arithmetical provability and consistency predicates), this gives BA DA. This gives the "conditions of observability" (as illustrated by UDA), and this gives rise to one of the 3 arithmetical quantum logic. The move from Bp to Bp Dp is the second Theaetetical move. Dp is ~B~p. Read D Diamond, and B Box; or B=Provable and D=Consistent, in this setting (the interview of the universal lobian machine). Part of this has been motivated informally in the discussion between Lee and Stathis (around the "death thread"). Apology for this more "advanced post" which needs more technical knowledge in logic and computer science.Bruno(*) EnP(n) = it exists a natural number n such that P(n) is true. If p = EnP(n), explain why p - Bp is true for lobian, or any sufficiently rich theorem prover machine. This should be intuitively easy (try!). Much more difficult: show that not only p - Bp will be true, but it will also be *provable* by the lobian machine. The first exercise is very easy, the second one is very difficult (and I suggest the reading of Hilbert Bernays Grundlagen, or Boolos 1993, or Smorinsky 1985 for detailled explanations).PS: I must go now, I have students passing exams. I intent to comment Russell's post hopefully tomorrow or during the week-end. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 14:47:17 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Brent MeekerWhy do you think YD is inconsistent with QM? [GK] Hi Brent, At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno thinks so! [BM] Just to be clear: comp gives the comp-correct physics, and from what can be qualitatively and/or quantitatively already be derived, YD is inconsistent with SWE + collapse. I guess you mean QM = Copenhagen QM. [GK] As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, meaning one scenario in which all your experience (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital computer. [BM] But YD entails much stronger form of non-locality! As, a priori, YD entails very strong form of non-locality. Proof: see the UDA in my URL. [GK] What are you talking about!? Much stronger form of non-locality? By what measure? If that was the case than YD would be false by an even bigger measure!!! Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that is the reason I have not given myself the trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident that this can be done with a bit of patience and the help of the many wonders of quantum states. [BM] No. If comp contradicts physics, it will be so by comp being much more non-local and much more non-deterministic (from the observers viewpoints). The mystery is that with comp physics could appears so much computational. Remember that if comp is true, whatever the physical universe appears to be it cannot be the output of a computation, nor can it be the result of a turing emulation other than a UD. Only the taking into account of incompleteness show that comp cannot be obviously false, as it could seem to be when you understand the hugeness of indeterminacy and non-locality it implies. [GK] But isn't your UD a turing emulation? Any hugeness of indeterminancy and non-locality would only show that it is obviously false! Only the exact amount of indeterminancy and non-locality would sugget that it may not be obviously wrong. Non-locality is a non-additive property, not a big pot from which you just take what you need!!! [BM] remember also that comp (and thus YD ) is not incompatible with my brain being a quantum computer. Reason: quantum computer are classically emulable. [GK] But that does not much help you either if your brain produces correlations that are other than EPR! Than it is NOT a quantum computer either!!! [BM] You should read the proof, I think you have not yet grasped the enunciation of the result. It is all normal given the novelty. What seems to me to be less normal is that you don't want to read it and still want to say something. Bruno [GK] I guess you are right. I think I am more confused about what you are saying than when we started this exchange. Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: How did it all begin?
Hi Norman, Thanks for the kudos. I have to agree with you that Tegmark is not very convincing in his move to center his multiverse construction on inflation. Even if inflation has to be a quantum process I don't see the advantage of pinning it to a ManyWorld scenario since it is unlikely there were any observers there to split universes (;-). But he is fun to read and the pictures are always great! Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 14:19:24 -0700 Subject: Re: How did it all begin? Hi Godfrey, Thanks for the ID. Now I know that Godfrey is one of the mind-stretchers on this list. I hope that Saibal will eventually tell us the reason(s) for Dishonorable Mention. I read Tegmark's paper too, where he seems to attribute the beginning of It to Inflation. But he didn't appear to address how, or why, Inflation got started. I guess his definition of It ends with our Big Bang. Thinking of Big Bangs, or anything else, as a logical process that occurs without causality isn't something I'm able to do. But I'll keep reading! Norman ~~ - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 9:04 AM Subject: Re: How did it all begin? Hi Saibal, Norman I did not mean to intervene but so that my name is not called in vain (:-) I would like to mention that, yes, I read Tegmark's paper and enjoyed it much though I could not help but notice that, though he promises, he never gets to Level IV (my favorite) on this paper, to my regret. I don't think that was the reason for the dishonorable mention, though! I surely wasn't heard about it.. As to whom am I? Still trying to find out... Regards, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) ~~ -Original Message- From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 15:57:54 -0700 Subject: Re: How did it all begin? This is a teaser. Why did Tegmark's paper receive Dishonorable Mention? Who is Godfrey? - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 6:14 AM Subject: How did it all begin? http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429 Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it? :-) ) Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: How did it all begin?
Hi Norman, I have no idea why it received a dishonorable mention. It could be because some physicists/cosmologists don't like anthropic reasoning. - Original Message - From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 12:57 AM Subject: Re: How did it all begin? This is a teaser. Why did Tegmark's paper receive Dishonorable Mention? Who is Godfrey? - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 6:14 AM Subject: How did it all begin? http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429 Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it? :-) ) How did it all begin? Authors: Max Tegmark Comments: 6 pages, 6 figs, essay for 2005 Young Scholars Competition in honor of Charles Townes; received Dishonorable Mention How did it all begin? Although this question has undoubtedly lingered for as long as humans have walked the Earth, the answer still eludes us. Yet since my grandparents were born, scientists have been able to refine this question to a degree I find truly remarkable. In this brief essay, I describe some of my own past and ongoing work on this topic, centering on cosmological inflation. I focus on (1) observationally testing whether this picture is correct and (2) working out implications for the nature of physical reality (e.g., the global structure of spacetime, dark energy and our cosmic future, parallel universes and fundamental versus environmental physical laws). (2) clearly requires (1) to determine whether to believe the conclusions. I argue that (1) also requires (2), since it affects the probability calculations for inflation's observational predictions.
Re: subjective reality
Good argumentation, Russell, however...: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: SNIP SNIP SNIP... ...From my point of view, it appears to be necessary to get the laws of physics as we known them. If there were people around with a different sort of mind, do they see a different sort of physics? Lots of questions. ... What 'sort of mind'? instead of 'what this sort'? Our ideational development parallelled the notions we formulated into our views about the world, including the model of a physical world, with all its habitual observations (laws), using something we nonchanatly call mind. A different route would have (maybe) seen different factors for the evolution (=total history) of our universe and build a different model for the physical world. We are the 3D-Abbott people. We condone 2 poles in our physics: + and -, not more and have problems what to do with the 4th dimension (time) if we think reasonably. If one accepts my take on 'consciousness' as the acknowledgement of and response to information (not in the Shannonic sense), which is expandable to everything in the world (ideation etc.) 'we' - or whatever takes a 'thinking' role in a universe - would (maybe) recognize other factors and the 'model' for understanding the observations would be different. If such different mindset (?) would have invented colors and shade-compositions instead of numbers? Is it possible at all to free ourselves from the dungeon we incarcerated ourselves with our models? What may the 'mind' come up with, if it were free? New Nobel prizes? I doubt. The committee is enslaved. Please, take a deep breath and do not be angry at me! John Mikes
